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Thesis Abstract
This is an historical ethnography about age-class formation among the people
known as the Imenti and Tigania Meru of central Kenya. By reexamining social
anthropology's long standing study of societies with age-sets and age-organisation,
this research focuses on the problem of historical perspective which such forms of
social organisation inevitably provoke. Ethnographers writing in the 1990s, like their
counterparts in the 1950s, seemed convinced that the contingent, uncertain, and often
ad hoc nature of age-class formation meant that such forms of social organisation were
fated to disappear. This thesis aims to overturn such an assumption by presenting
differing ethnographic contexts where debate about age-classes' viability in the present
led to community-wide reappraisals of traditional and modem categories of thought
and action.
By the time of fieldwork in 2001-2003, the formation of Mem age-classes fed
into intense debates about what constituted 'tradition' and an authentic construction
of local social identity. Research in two fieldsites, Imenti and Tigania, allowed for
comparison between one segment of the Mem where such organisation is seen as
defunct and another section where it is vicariously implicated in local politics. Age-
classes, it is argued in the Mem context, are both social formations and tropes within
the makings of a local political imaginary. National concerns such as the 2002 General
Elections could be locally reinterpreted as power struggles between the generations,
such that the transfer of power at the state level was likened to generational
succession, a pressing local issue which was still left unresolved when the author left
Kenya. Such debates also surfaced in the controversies of differing styles of traditional
and modem male circumcision, mirroring a similar debate about clitoridectomy which
has come and gone since at least the 1930s. The thesis also examines the uses of
Kimeru - the local language - in literacy programmes, where debates and arguments
about traditional and modem categories of thought were inscribed within a wider
constmction of culturally entangled moralities. Examinations of how Mem's
vernacular modernity required a familiar vocabulary to express itself, drawn from
tradition, was made through examining forms of popular music. In the 1990s, gospel
music sung in the vernacular drew upon the language and imagery of age-classes and
generations in applying them to typically modem problems of alienation and anomie.
Research was also focused on showing how the historical contexts of migration and
education were and continue to be implicated in the uncertain formation of age-classes,
rather than spell out their demise as predicted by modernisation theory.
The ethnographic materials presented in this thesis suggest several arguments
about contemporary social theory. By detailing the social and political situations
through which age-classes entered into debates about tradition and modernity, local
concepts of age and generation were critical to making a political imaginary 'about'
tradition from 'within' modernity. This is important because it forces anthropologists
to reconsider age-classes as a 'traditional' category of thought and arena for action and
refocus on how they are the sites of multiple historical and cultural entanglements. A
further break from structural-functionalist models of age-class formation and a
reexamination of the uncertainties and contingencies which actors face in attempting to
form them has allowed, at least, to critically reappraise the concepts of 'society' and
'culture' respectively. The focus on uncertainty allows the thesis to look at 'society'
as a community of argument and 'culture' as an arena of interpretation.
Acknowledgements
Although authored by a single person, this thesis is actually the outcome of a long,
drawn-out collaborative effort. Of course, all misinterpretations and gaffes are my
own. In Kenya, Bw. Kaaria of the Ministry of Science, Education & Technology not
only issued the necessary research permit for me to begin work, but also taught me a
great deal about who 'owns' the state. Staff at the Kenya National Archives also
assisted me to sort through the mass of papers collected there. The Institute of
Development Studies, University of Nairobi graciously accepted me as a research
affiliate and their administrator's expedient actions saved the day on a number of
occasions. Not least, however, I'd like to thank some very special people back in
Meru, for guiding me in the arts of remaining nthoni (respectful): Mutuma and
Rosemary Angaine, Paul Goldsmith and Bi Safia, Edward Mutethia, Kendi, Muriuki,
David Maingi, Kaunga, Damaris Kagwiria, Paulo Ratanya, David Mutura, Patrick
Mugambi, Mrs. Mwilaria and all the staff at Mikinduri Girls School. For the funds to
carry out this research, I acknowledge the Social Science and Humanities Research
Council of Canada (SSHRC) and the Wenner-Gren Foundation for their financial
commitments to my doctoral training and field research costs. At Edinburgh, my
supervisor, Charles Jedrej warned me off particularly clumsy arguments and kept a
sense of humour throughout the project. My thanks also go to Thomas Blom Hansen
who wasn't afraid to call me an 's-f (structural-functionalist), provoking me to
examine my theoretical persuasions more critically. Closer to home, I'd like to thank
Elizabeth Ndindi for her patience and understanding during my long absences, both in
the field and outside of it.
Thesis Chapters
INTRODUCTION 1
Meru in its regional context 1
From ThOuci to MutuatT: the geography of Meru 9
Fieldwork at the centre of the world 17
Research methodologies and fieldsites 20
In publica res: the chapters in review 28
CHAPTER ONE
Age and generation in the Kenyan political imagination 3 3
Age and generation in the Kenyan political imagination 33
Age-class and generational 'systems': state-of-play, or states of decay? 45
Beyond entelechy: historicity within the ethnographic present 62
CHAPTER TWO
Communities of Argument: uncertainties of Meru age-class formation 6 9
The great debate? Meru idioms of change and transition 69
Nthukr. historicising selves and subjectivities 73
'Batfgania': circumcision and the ceremonial context of debate 79
Forced circumcisions: authenticity and discipline in question 86
Genealogical and social generations compared 93
Comparing Imenti and Tigania age-class formation 95
Talking about cutting: explaining circumcision sets 105
Historicising age-class names: an anthropological debate 113
CHAPTER THREE
The Generations Return: Meru rhetorics of history 119
Everyone's past is different: 'Kila mtu ana zamani yake' 121
Three lifetimes: situating the problem of historical perspective 127
Key words and the rhetoric of historical knowledge 140
History and melahistory in central Kenyan communities 148
CHAPTER FOUR
Rivalries and Curses: the enigma of succession in historical perspective 155
'Who is in power?' 155
Rivalries and curses: the spectre of succession in Tigania and Igembe 160
Ntwiko: generational succession, history, and memory 167
Renovating the njuri nceke in Imenti 178
Enforcing tradition: the njuri nceke's efforts to regulate circumcision 185
Making modern men: the state, capital and the njuri nceke 191
CHAPTER FIVE
Looking for Work: labour migration and accumulation 199
Gucwa Ngugi: ballads of the unemployed and homesick 199
From 'Native Reserve' to 'labour reserve': Meru on the move 206
BurukCr. interstitial categories of person in Nyambene during the 1940s 214
i
Giithu valley: a case study 222
CHAPTER SIX
'Our gaaru is the School': education and youth 230
A brief history of schooling in Meru District (c. 1911 - 1991) 236
No more additions!: mitigating the problem of 'over-aging' in the 1970s 243
The incorporation of educational calendars into age-class formation 249
Cutting words: NGO education against female excision in the 1990s 257
CHAPTER SEVEN
You Don't Know Without Being Told: religion, moral crises and the local press 268
Identity and morality in Meru ideals of personhood 268
'You Don't Know Without Being Told' 278
Imenti modernity and life in the subjunctive 295
CHAPTER EIGHT
With Bells on Their Ears: allegories of a last generation 302
Central Kenyan prophesies of the 'last' generation 302
NthukT ncabuka, or, the 'bad' generation 315
Lip-synch gospel: recording artists as social critics 322
Exegesis and allegorical interpretation in Meru 332
Epilogue:
'When the Dust Settles': Historicity and uncertainty 335
Appendix A
KTmeru and Kiswahili Glossary 346
Appendix B
Map of Meru Central and Meru North Fieldsites (2001-2003) 351
Appendix C
Administrative Map of Meru, post-1990 352
Appendix D


























List of Maps. Figures, and Plates
The Republic of Kenya, political map of districts and provinces
The Historic 'Meru District'
The Moi Succession, East African Standard, 09-11-01
Imenti age-class formation, 1875? -1976
Tigania and Igembe age-classes in living memory
Tigania and Igembe nthuki and their nicknames, 1918 -1991
Today's Girl: FPAK pamphlet on 'Female Genital Mutilation' (1997)
The Bad Generation: nthuki ncabuka represented
in Nyaga's Customs and Traditions of the Meru (1997)
Talking with Grandparents, GTcTnini, Kangeta (2001)
Imenti boys awaiting their circumcision, 1949-1950
Still frames from Martin and Osa Johnson's filming of the
Tigania assembly of warrior lamalla ['ingala ilamal', 1928?]
Alternate generations: grandparents and grandchildren (2001)
Adjacent generation: a social 'father' in mid-life (2001)
Bakari and Nkatha: studio portrait of Miriti,'nthuki trabuta'
Njuri Nceke pose for a photograph, Muringene, Igembe (1998)
Tigania elder with markings of njuri kTamotha (1949)
M'Ncebere worked in Nairobi in the 1920s (2001)
An 'under-aged' Igembe youth and his uninitiated contemporaries
(the latter wear school uniforms) (Muringene, 2001)
Extension made to a house for an initiate, Imenti (2002)
'Traditional' circumcisor and elder (mutaam), Kangeta (2002)
Joy Adamson's representation of women's life-course from uninitiated
nkenye to elder nkirote, (Chuka, 1950)
The composure of children, Muringene, Igembe (1998)
Children dancing at Independent Church gathering, Igembe (1998)
Hi
INTRODUCTION
Meru in its regional context
This is a historical ethnography about age-class formation among the people
known as the Imenti and Tigania Meru of central Kenya. Although not one of Kenya's
most celebrated peoples - the Maasai and Gikuyu spring to mind instead - the cultural
history of the Meru has continued to fascinate and frustrate foreign scholars for a long
time. Although the first Europeans to write 'scholarly' works about the Meru were
colonial administrators and Christian missionaries, a number of historians and
anthropologists continued field research among Kimeru-speaking populations in the
four decades since Kenya's political independence in 1963. In many ways, this thesis
aims to build upon such research, noting ethnographic disagreements where relevant,
in order to contribute modestly to the theoretical literature about East African age-
class and generational 'systems.' A broader goal is to compare concepts about
generation in such a way that this thesis demonstrates their relevance to contemporary
anthropological and historical theory. With respect to Meru experiences of social
change, I approach the telling of local history as a problem which requires an
understanding of how Meru have organised themselves into categories based on age
and generation.
Much of this thesis explores the tensions between the ethnographic present of
my fieldwork from 2001-2003 and the historicity of generational time experienced by
all ages of living men and women. I do this, principally, through privileging an
historical method and perspective on why both popular and academic opinion
strongly suggest that age-class formation is an anachronistic feature of 'traditional'
society. In contrast to these predominant views, I aim to demonstrate that far from
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being an historical vestige of a life long surpassed by decades of 'modernisation', the
formation of age-classes in Meru is implicated in the longer-term construction of a
vernacular modernity. Debate among Meru about the contemporary and past meanings
of their age-classes and, by extension, the historical experiences of each generation is
an important element in redefining 'modern' and 'traditional' categories of thought and
practice. In short, this thesis aims to demonstrate that generation and age-classes are
integral components in the telling of local history and its evaluation in moral and
political terms.
Written documentation ofMeru history began scarcely a century ago. The first
mention of the Meru in European literature only dates back to 1896, with the
publication of William-Astor Chanler's travelogue Through Jungle and Desert:
Travels in East Africa. The American cartographer and 'explorer' did not know the
peoples of the Nyambene Ranges as the 'Meru', but referred to the various territorial
sections of this 'tribe', for examples, as the Embe (Igembe) and the Daitcho (Thaicu).
Coinage of the 'tribal' and ethnic name Meru came a decade later, when British
imperial ambitions, swollen by the costs of building the trans-East African railroad,
coveted political ownership over the densely populated slopes of what is now known
as Mount Kenya. In the same year of the imperial conquest, 1908, the first mention of
the Meru ('the Mweru') appeared in the anthropological journal Man, a curious
historical coincidence (Dundas 1908: 135-9).
But I leave this earlier historical prelude aside for the moment, partly because
evidence for Meru histories and history can be gleaned from other scholars' works, but
mainly due to the fact that this thesis deals with living people. Today, there are no
more elders who would have remembered the earliest imperial decades. The majority
of the oldest men and women who are still alive today came of age sometime in the
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1930s. And even these people are very few in contrast with a largely youthful
population, the majority of whom were born in the 1970s and 1980s when Kenya's
population expanded dramatically. As such, the kind of history related to me was
often a living history, told within the historical horizons of the generations alive at the
time of fieldwork.
Taken together, the population of the Meru was approximately 1 728 520
persons according to the 1999 national census. The first methodological census of
1948 enumerated the Meru population to be 312 560 (Peatrik 1999: 500). Whereas
recent talk about demographics in Kenya centres on there being too many people, at
the time when the country's oldest citizens were children this talk was about there
being too few (cf. Kuczynski 1949; Lambert 1941). To say that the Meru population
was depressed in the immediate decades following the 1908 conquest, and imposition
of the Pax Britannica, is probably both an understatement and an unknown, judging
by the flimsy archival records on such matters. Nonetheless, in 1920-1921, colonial
officials estimated that there were about 112 668 persons in the district, based upon
their tax collectors and hut counters' reports. Although it is highly circumspect, in
1911, an estimate was made which placed the Meru population at 216 736 persons
(KNA: PC MRU 1/1). Despite scanty attention to the health and welfare of African
populations in the first decades of colonial rule, later administrative reports from
Meru tell of declining standards of health and food security in the aftermath of
conquest which, according to at least one drought combined with an outbreak of
influenza and measles in 1918, 'decimated' the population (KNA: PC MRU 1/2).
Small-pox, chicken-pox, yaws, and some venereal diseases combined with the
influenza and measles infections to depopulate the region. The eldest people alive
today recall that their parent's generation suffered high mortality. Their parents were
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known as the "ones with the pockmarked faces" by a number of contemporary elders.
I heard stories about whole communities being quarantined in these early, unhealthy
days of colonialism. Other sources recalled that compounds were abandoned to the
hyenas, and houses left to decay and collapse, before the quarantines would be lifted.
It is possible that tens of thousands of people died from disease and starvation in the
decade which followed the imperial conquest, a pattern observed for most central
Kenyan populations of the late nineteenth century (cf. Dawson 1981). Yet, in
contrast, there is anecdotal evidence that precolonial populations were expanding prior
to the moment of conquest. In 1892, Chanler (1896: 156) noted that agricultural
Igembe pioneers were clearing forest in the vicinity of Laare, in the northeastern
foothills of the Nyambene Range, one of Meru's two principal geographic features.
Just months before the declaration of the Pax Britannica, another early traveller to
Meru, Colonel John Patterson (1909), noted that the population of central Tigania
was robust, a sharp contrast to the sparsely-populated parts of northeastern Kenya
where he had spent months traversing.
One possible reason why the population of Kimeru-speakers was stable, if not
growing, during this period is owed to the social geography of the region. Meru is
today very different than it was in the late nineteenth century. From a distance,
however, its physical landscape appears very much as it would have when Chanler
approached the Nyambene Range from the arid northwest savanna in 1892. Several
authors, impressed by the sight of this mountain range shimmering dull-blue above the
dry and hot savanna, have described the Nyambene Range as an island. There is more
to this metaphor than apt description, however, because this area was significant to
inter-regional trade and provided a temporary haven for hungry trading parties,
depleted of their pack animals and porters. Nyambene is like Yves Droz's (1999)
4
description of nearby Laikipia District as a kind of 'vertical archipeligo', islands of
people living and producing in narrow, vertical bands between cold, unproductive
alpine and hot, barren savanna. But the horizontal space of the Nyambene Range may
also fit into this island metaphor (Bernard 1979: 264). Situated in a hub of a complex
network of caravan trade, Nyambene was vital to the continuation of Arab, Pashtun,
European, Ndorobo, Somali, Galla, Rendille, and Kamba exchange during the imperial
period (cf. Ambler 1988). Although Meru traders participated in the last boom of the
ivory trade (Arkwell-Hardwick 1903), their economic strength lay in food provision
and the capacity to produce enough staple crops that these populations could absorb
newcomers in times of crisis elsewhere.
In their regional context, Kimeru-speaking populations interacted extensively
with their Maasai, Samburu, Galla and Rendille neighbours to the northwest, as well as
exploiting a chain of economic and social relations to their southeast among related
peoples such as the Tharaka, Chuka, Embu and Kamba. When the Laikipiak Maasai
sections fissioned in the 1880s, the outcome of internecine struggle and resistance to
British imperialism, several hundreds escaped to parts of what is now Meru. Today,
there are significant numbers of lineages among the Tigania Meru, especially in Kianjai
and Muthaara, who quietly note their Maasai descent, although shun attempts to
exaggerate their status as 'outsider' clans (cf. Mahner 1975). In the more northern
sections of the Igembe, intermarriage and inter-ethnic clan affiliation between Igembe
Meru and Rendille was pronounced. The first colonial District Commissioner, Edward
Butler Home, noted in 1911 that large numbers of Igembe elders had physical
characteristics easily recognised among the camel-herding Rendille of the arid north,
although they were 'Bantu' speakers. In the late 1930s, the DC of Mem District
requested that Rendille elders in Marsabit revoke a curse upon the Njia wa Mwendwa
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section of the Igembe. This curse was initially pronounced in 1919 for an attack upon
a Rendille trading party by Igembe warriors bound by an inter-ethnic clan affiliation
known as giciaro (adoption). In the early precolonial accounts of travel to the
Nyambene Range, there is considerable evidence that migration, intermarriage, and
cultural hybridity were features of social life in the region (Arkwell-Hardwick 1903;
Chanler 1896; Patterson 1909). Patterson describes a Galla-speaking porter conversing
with a Tigania Meru woman who was the daughter of a Rendille couple the porter
knew. Arkwell-Hardwick describes stock partnerships between Somali merchants and
Tigania herders based on local exchange conventions. A powerful Muthaara man,
M'lminuiki ('Dominuki'), appears in all the published travelogues, and eventually
assisted the first DC to navigate the difficult challenge of setting up British
administration and rule. There is partial evidence that he, or his father, was a Laikipiak
oloibonok ('seer, diviner') who had immigrated to Tigania following the disintegration
of their status within his former Maasai community (Ambler 1995: 237). As such,
precolonial Meru populations, with their agricultural potential, tended towards the
incorporation of 'outsiders' from other communities who would, in time, become
Meruised.
One of the processes through which 'outsiders' became Meru was
incorporation into local age-classes. The formation of well-defined age-classes, opened
and closed every eight agricultural seasons or about four to five years, allowed the
children of newcomers to become Meru over a single generation. Another feature of
Meru social organisation which they shared with many of their northernly pastoral
counterparts was an institution of clan affiliations, known as giciaro in Kimeru, which
were often organised across ethnic boundaries such that social identity was
considerably fluid (cf. Schlee 1989). Age-class 'systems' such as those found amongst
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many of the pastoral, agro-pastoral, and agricultural peoples of East Africa are often
formed in a regional context as described above, such that movement between groups
and a distinctive cultural hybridity was probably more pronounced than that reported
in colonial era ethnography.
The orientation of the Meru to the north was so pronounced that it shadowed
their relations to the similarly agricultural peoples to their south and southeast.
Among the Tigania, whose plains provided adequate pasturage, great value was placed
upon raising herds of cattle, reflecting an agro-pastoral ideal more like that of their
northern neighbours than their Meru counterparts further up the southeastern
mountain slopes. It is significant to Meru's cultural history that they are the most
northern of all the so-called Thagicu Bantu of central Kenya, a linguistic category
which includes speakers of Kiembu, Kikamba, Kimbeere, and Gikuyu. Despite close
economic and social ties between the Meru and their northern neighbours, successive
colonial administrations largely considered the Meru as a sub-group of a wider
'Gikuyu' community, a colonial 'social fact' hotly disputed by politically active Meru
during the same period.
Geographically, the peoples who were to become the 'Meru' were certainly
not remote from other social formations during the precolonial period. Regional
patterns of precolonial trade and social interaction were eroded during the early period
of colonial rule (1908-1939), exacerbated particularly by the formal 'closing' of the
north and its declaration as a no man's land. Ambiguously labelled the 'Northern
Frontier Province', a buffer zone between the agricultural development of Kenya
Colony and the pastoral north was created which cut Meru off from socio-economic
ties which had been in formation for centuries. The highland-savanna interface, once
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opportune location for future 'symbiotic' relations between the agricultural Meru and
the northern pastoralists.1 For the Meru, this closure of the north produced a kind of
spatial isolation from the rest of central Kenya which subsequently impoverished the
region as well as earning its inhabitants an indelible and derogatory reputation for
backwardness. In being constantly compared to the 'more advanced tribes', in which
was meant the Gikuyu, Meru's loss of their former geographic flexibility under
colonialism translated into a struggle to maintain their political particularity, a struggle
which was achieved by accepting the tribal categories of the colonial order (cf.
Maupeu 1990).
From Thuuci to MutuatT: the geography of Meru
When asked about its size, many Meru say, "Kuuma Thuuci Mwanka
Mutuatr, 'From Thuuci to Mutuati.' Thuuci is the name of a large river in the
southeastern border with Embu District (now Runyenjes District) and Mutuati is a
market town in the very northern extent of the Nyambene hills. Today, by fast public
service vehicles, such a trip 'from Thuuci to Mutuati' would take about three hours,
provided the speed was in excess of 80 k.p.h. The 'historic' Meru District measured
8673 square kilometres; about the size of Puerto Rico (Bernard 1972: 15). About a
third of this land area was unpopulated because of harsh aridity or human and animal
disease vectors. Unlike other communities in central Kenya and the Rift Valley, where
lands were alienated from Africans by European settlers, the Meru actually saw an
increase in their territories under colonialism. Beginning with political agitation and a
1 On the relevance of the concept of 'symbiosis' in Kenya's northern region, see Paul Spencer's (1970)
Nomads in Alliance: Symbiosis and Growth among the Rendille and Samburu ofKenya. For a more
recent application of this concept to the Meru of the Nyambene Range, see Paul Goldsmith (1994).
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growing 'land consciousness', as the colonial officials put it, Meru farmers and herders
began resettling into areas which were formerly unsuitable for human habitation
because of malaria or trypanosomiasis. Much of the impetus for this territorial
expansion was incipient population pressure upon land, but there were also other
mitigating factors such as the increase of agricultural production which accompanied a
slow commercialisation of farming in the 1940s and 1950s.
Map 2: The Historic 'Meru District'
This historical Meru District was massive and often inimical to effective
government administration. A single District Officer, often walking from one
administrative location to another, might have been responsible for an area of some
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several thousand square kilometres. Although the borders of this district remained
much the same as they had during colonialism, clashes over land in the late 1980s and
early 1990s prompted the Government of Kenya to redraw the district boundaries and
cut Meru District into manageable and policeable administrative units. It has since
been divided into the four smaller administrative districts of Meru South, Meru
Central, Meru North, and Tharaka-Nithi. The Kimeru-speaking groups living in these
districts are distinguished by further territorial and linguistic sub-groupings from the
southern portions of the region to the north: Chuka, Mwimbi, Igoji, Miutine, Imenti,
Tigania, and Igembe. The related Tharaka and Thaicu peoples were considered Meru
by the colonial administration despite strong debates among the more northern
communities that "they are not Meru", an attitude of exclusion also extended, in some
cases, to the Chuka. The fieldwork for this thesis was carried out in Meru Central and
Meru North, the most populated areas of the former larger district peopled by the
three largest sub-groups ofMeru: the Imenti, Tigania, and Igembe.
As these are the northern and eastern Meru, my concern here is to describe in
rough form the geographical setting of the fieldwork undertaken from 2001-2003. This
area is dominated by the imposing, craggy peaks ofMount Kenya to the south and the
rising massif of the Nyambene Range which runs northeast from Mount Kenya. On a
clear morning, Mount Kenya may be seen from any southernly faced vantage point.
Mount Kenya, a volcanic plug from the Tertiary period, is some 5194 metres high.
This is the second highest peak on the African continent. In Kimeru, the mountain is
known as Kirimara, which literally means the 'shining mountain' and is synonymous
with the Kikuyu name Kirinyaga. Mount Kenya's glacial caps and particularly sharp
contours are often rendered into symbols of Kenyan nationalism: from the planting of
the new flag of the Republic on its peak in 1963 to celebrate political independence
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from Britain; to the label of 'White Cap', a popular brand of lager beer celebrating
nothing in particular. Nyambene's most striking feature is the crest ofmontane forest
at its peak, Itiene, shrouded in cool mist and cloud at 2499 metres above sea level.
Between the two features lies a lowland plain of semi-arid foothills which are invisible
from a northwesterly approach. This is northwestern Tigania, traditionally an agro-
pastoral and militant stronghold of the Meru in the nineteenth century. Almost every
single precolonial approach to the Nyambene Range was cut from the northwest
through these rolling plains. As one goes further north and northwest, this plain
becomes particularly inhospitable, an unchanging texture of lava boulders covered by a
thin canopy of spindly, thorned acacia. In the rise and fall of this plain, where cattle
were seasonally grazed, lie a chain of numerous volcanic craters, the largest of them,
Ngombe, the best source of saline soils in this part of Kenya. The only Meru group to
domesticate donkeys, the northern Igembe exploited these salt deposits as a resource
within the extensive networks of precolonial trade. Although hundreds of small craters
dot this ancient volcanic landscape, it is the mountains which define the region.
These mountains are central to the cosmography or ethnogeography of the
Meru peoples themselves. The Nyambene Range and the plains to its northwest are
the 'traditional' territories of the Igembe (in the northern Nyambene hills) and the
Tigania (in the plains and eastern flanks of the Nyambene massif). The forested
eastern slopes of Mount Kenya have been cleared by generations of Imenti
agriculturalists and today cultivation extends high up into the plateaux separating
montane and alpine zones. At this altitude, tea does particularly well, where one can
find vivid green tea plantations and factories cut into former forests of deciduous trees.
Although there is economic exploitation of the upper reaches of both mountains, to
each of these groups of people, their respective mountains are of spiritual and
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symbolic significance. These impressive landscapes enter into specific religious
practices which continue within the formal Christianity and Islam of today's
population. The Igembe and Tigania often bury their dead with their heads facing
Nyambene and the Imenti do a similar thing with respect to Kirimara (Mount Kenya).
This is significant because burial is a practice of fairly recent innovation, the first of
such mortuary rites taking place in the late 1930s. Each of these mountains are the site
of several sacred lakes where rain-making rituals are periodically undertaken. Despite
being shrouded in secrecy, partially out of fear of being labelled superstitious or
backwards, such rain-making rituals say much about the cosmography of the Meru as
an agricultural people acutely aware of the climato-spiritual link between mountains,
forests, lakes, rivers, winds, and rain.
Sufficient rainfall is central to the relative successes of all central Kenyan
peoples practicing agriculture, agro-pastoralism and - of course - industry, commerce
and wage labour. Neither crops nor light bulbs will flourish in a drought. For a people
specialising in agricultural production, Meru is fortunate for being generally well-
watered, although there are severe annual discrepancies in the amount and duration of
rainfall throughout the region. The climate of Meru shifts seasonally with the presence
of rain-bearing winds associated with the interior forest climates of Uganda and the
maritime winds of the Indian Ocean and its littoral. Of a strictly geographic nature,
the mountainous terrain contributes to the differences in annual rainfall measurements.
While the south and southeastern mountain slopes may receive an annual mean rainfall
of some 1270-2286 millimetres, the east and northern lowlands of the region may only
receive as little as 381-1016 millimetres on average (Bernard 1972: 19). The presence
of a defined rainshadow in the eastern and northern parts of the region mean that
agriculture is severely restricted in the lowlands, despite increased migration into less
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hospitable, arid land by poorer highlanders since the 1980s (cf. Goldsmith 1994).
This sharp dichotomy between high-rainfall and fertile highland and arid and barren
lowland does not mean, however, that there is no variability in the length and quality
of rains in even the most desirable farmland. Like most of East Africa, central Kenya is
susceptible to extreme variability of rainfall from year to year and the spectre of
drought and famine is palpable every fourth to fifth agricultural year. An elaborate oral
record of former famines is a principal element of any person's biography.
In years with adequate rainfall, however, several ecological zones within Meru
may be described as yielding a twelve month growing season. Although there are many
Kimeru concepts for the coming and going of seasons, these being implicated in the
ceremonial and social calendar of the Meru, there are essentially two rainy seasons.
These periods of rain are of differing length and intensity, usually interspersed by
months of dry, hot weather. Both cycles of the annual season can be pleasant, heavy
rain and hot sun, but too much of one and too little of another is always considered to
be bad news. For example, rain is a blessing, but too much rainfall, such that it
smashes new crops before they are mature, is a defmate bane. Each season is
associated with a realm of meanings and practices which are rarely replicated year to
year, due to the unpredictability of rainfall. The word for a season, kiingo, is a basic
unit of time in which to organise the agricultural and social calendars. The rains known
as uthima, approximately from mid-April to the end of June, are associated with the
production of several varieties of staple cereals such as beans, and tubers such as
sweet potatoes. After the intense agricultural activity of these rains, also called the
'short rains' in English, a brief but very cool, even cold, season in July (mpio) gives
way to drier and warmer weather until the end of September. This dry period is called
thaano and was, until very recently, a critical period in the annual cycle for initiation
ceremonies and other attendant rites associated with age-class formation. Typically,
food resources are in decline by the middle of the next growing season, called urugura,
with rains falling in mid-October and lasting until December. This is the main season
for growing the most important food crop, maize, and failed harvests of this planting
are a serious threat to remaining food stocks. These rains are usually intense, although
longer in duration, hence, their English name as the 'long rains.' Transportation in this
season is severely hampered by mud and the collapse of critical infrastructure around
rivers and tributaries such as bridges and culverts. By early January, however,
temperatures swell for approximately two months in a dry, hot, and dusty season
known locally as thaano nceke, the 'thin dry season.' During this period of time, there
are significant bottlenecks in the availability of labour, often presenting challenges to
farmers wishing to harvest their maize, millet, and sorghum before their crops are eaten
'on the cob' by feeding birds.
Besides this description of agrarian patterns in Meru, several crops grown by
local farmers are perennial. Cassava, for example, is a drought resistant crop and is
considered by some highlanders as a 'famine food', even though it is readily consumed
on a daily or weekly basis by many lowland farmers. Preserved maize, ground into
meal and cooked as ugali (Swa., corn porridge) is the preferred food staple of highland
farmers and urban workers. Where there is sufficient water and natural drainage, catha
edulis, or miraa, a tree whose young, succulent shoots are chewed for their natural
amphetimines, is harvested twice a month, twelve months of the year. Some of the
oldest miraa trees, called mbaine, may be some two hundred and fifty years old,
testifying to the historical place of this important crop in Meru social life (cf. Carrier
2003; Goldsmith 1994). Marriage proposals, personal covenants, and bond
partnerships are often negotiated by gifts of miraa. This tree crop contributes
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considerably to farm incomes in the Nyambenes, Igembe and Tigania, despite the
generalised inequalities in how these incomes are distributed (Peatrik 1999: 23). The
globalisation ofmiraa marketing, following the Somali and Ethiopian diasporas in the
early 1990s, has put the local miraa industry under increased production. Miraa from
Nyambene reaches illicit and legal markets in London, Amsterdam, Toronto and New
York on flights which leave daily from Wilson Airport in Nairobi. Tea is also a
perennial which is restricted to higher elevations abutting onto forest clearances.
Unlike other cash crops grown by Meru farmers, tea production has generally been
well remunerated and protected by sound marketing policies. Coffee, once a mainstay
of the Meru economy, has recently been devalued owing to global overproduction,
recent economic liberalisation, and the disorganisation of Kenya's internal cooperative
marketing regime. Once considered synonymous with the social identity of 'modem'
Imenti Mem, coffee is now largely despised and thousands of farmers have cut back or
uprooted their trees (cf. Lamont 1999). Miraa has now replaced coffee as Meru's
'wonder' crop, although significant challenges to its sustainability as a base for
agricultural development have been present since at least the early 1990s. The tragedy
of agricultural production lies in the uncertainty of profit and the whims, tastes, and
buying power of remote outside consumers. Perennial food crops, despite their low
market values, offer some buffer against this commonly perceived injustice. "You
can't eat coffee", say many Mem farmers embittered by their pitiable incomes from
the crop, but cassava, yams, tea, and miraa come are "something in the hand" which
can earn a shilling or shore up hunger.
This brief geographic preface to the Mem, however, does little to introduce
how local people interact with their landscape as a site imbued with meanings. In the
following section, I shift from the problem of situating the Mem field sites by
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reference to geography, and turn to how these landscapes are lived in, as situations and
moments spatially constituting the lifeworld of the Meru.
Fieldwork at the centre of the world
The landscape of central Tigania can be surveyed from a number of hilltops.
Once during a walking tour, my hosts and guides took me to a steep ridge not far from
Mikinduri market. This was Rwerea, towering above the Thanantu river as it meanders
through the Tigania landscape. On two flanks of the ridge lay conspicuous groves of
indigenous trees. Known as kithiiri, these sheltered groves house local elders' councils,
where older men occasionally gather as njuri nceke, a 'select' council which is
respectfully feared for their secretive palaver. On this occasion we had been following
the trail of ritual processions associated with a defunct ceremonial office, that of the
mukiama, and this had led us up to Rwerea's promontory so that the path of the
procession could be traced out onto the landscape before us. In other parts of Meru,
such as central Imenti, the mukiama was known as the mugwe (literally, the 'one') and
a controversial ethnography was written on this office in the 1950s just before its
ceremonial importance waned (Bemardi 1959). One of my Tigania companions hotly
contested that any mortal man could be called the mugwe, stating for my clarification,
"There is only one mugwe and that's God" ('an mugwe umwe, niMurungu'). As we
stood on the back of Rwerea debating the correct title for the rainmakers, I was
suddenly aware of the power of the landscape before us in evoking conversation about
the deep history of the Meru.
Behind us to the north rose the forest-green shadow of Nyambene. On its
flank, evidence of recent cultivation into the forest, the sun's reflection on tin roofs
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and cleared ground, could be seen many kilometres away. In front of us, to the east,
lay the heavily deforested Thuur'i, a mountainside marked by its prominant inselbergs
and precipices. In the hazy distance, silhouettes rose up from lowland Tharaka, sharp
mountain peaks standing like sentinels upon the expansive horizon. The more erudite
storytellers I met had an explanation for the heterogeneity of Meru's landscapes.
Meru mythology held that a rainbow-dragon, the nkunga, had crashed into the earth,
churning up the hills and valleys which Kimeru speaking peoples called home. Its eye
lay as a lake in upper Imenti, its massive body the Nyambene hills, and its tail the
montane-flatland contrast of lower Tharaka.
Pointing towards a heavily wooded bend in the river below, M'Kaunga - one of
the elders leading our small entourage - described how the rainmaker would disappear
into the water and re-emerge at another spot of the river several kilometres away. He
spoke of a tunnel which connected the sites and described how the mukiama vanished
into a cloud of smoke. These were early days for me in central Tigania and I found
such stories incredulous. After living among the Imenti of Meru Town during 1991,
1998, and 2001, who conceive of themselves as 'modem' Kenyans, the vicarious
difference of the Tigania imagination forced me to accept that I had to adjust to new
ways of thinking and acting once again. In that moment on Rwerea I thought about
Latin American novels I had read years earlier, in which magic realism temporarily
suspends disbelief when angels fall from the sky and it rains rose petals.
A younger member of our ad hoc procession, some six persons in total,
casually told me how Rwerea had been scientifically proven to be the centre of the
world. The equator, he gestured, ran beneath us. To bolster his claim, he said that
satellite images had been mapped out to discern that this spot was indeed the
geometric centering of our common world. When I winced in protest, he continued his
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argument, "Ah, but is it not written in the Bible that Canaan had seven hills and many
valleys?" There were, in his estimation, seven hills in central Tigania and we were
made to count out seven larger hills on the vista. This statement reflected back upon
localised Christian themes that Meru was a land of 'milk and honey', which
predominantly followed from the Methodist translation of the Bible in the early 1930s
("nthii iji ikuunukara iria na naincu"). In the early 1990s, when the anthropologist
Paul Goldsmith conducted his fieldwork in Nyambene, he wrote of doing fieldwork in
the New Canaan, as some Christians refer to the area (Goldsmith 1994). Latterly,
while carrying out a similar walking tour along ritual paths, this time to the sacred lake
deep inside the Nyambene forest, my guide proudly showed me where the prophet
Abraham had slept while "on his trek to Egypt." Such imaginary connections to the
Biblical traditions appropriated a sense of importance, even claiming the ultimate
importance of being the centre of the world.
As I overcame the seeming impossibility of people's claim that Tigania and
Rwerea, in particular, were the center of the world, a new possibility filled its place.
What was being argued was a rather more relative and intersubjective claim. The
outside world, that of strangers and far away peoples, lay beyond a horizon which, far
from being seamless, was actually porous and volatile, rendering it dangerous and
threatening to ideas about subjectivity and self-sufficiency.2
Throughout fieldwork, I gradually accepted the reasons why quite large
numbers of local people frequently made ethnocentric claims about the originality and
universality of their social life and its values. Although it is difficult, today, to find
persons who have not had experience of the world beyond, as an outcome of travel or
2 Michael Jackson makes a similarly existential observation about Kuranko ideas about ritual items
which come from outside. See Minima Ethnographica: Intersubjectivity and the Anthropological
Project (Jackson 1998).
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communications, it is understandable that people construct their identity and sense of
belonging as if they were, indeed, living at the center of the world. The outside world,
often no more than the urban world of the nearest town, is that unknown and
uncertain periphery from where disease, enemies, and misfortunes originate. The
archaic Kimeru word for a foreigner is the same word for an enemy (maitha); the word
for a guest is the same for someone strange (mugeni). My extreme interest in Kimeru
as a foreigner, at the onset, was frequently taken as a kind of proof that Meru had
much to offer the outside world. Such opinions also did much to gainsay the
dominating view of outsiders that the Meru were some kind of backwards people who
refused to fully accept development. Perhaps this kind of ethnocentrism was a
response to the actual decentering of the Meru lifeworld, a defence against the
vicissitudes of their twentieth century history, where the 'mere centre could not hold'
and like Chinua Achebe's parallel world 'things fall apart.' A considerable element of
discussion in this thesis stems from a local argument that Meru 'culture' is inherently
purer than the forced hybridity and confusion of colonial and postcolonial
entanglements. By imagining Rwerea as the centrifugal point of their world, some of
my Meru hosts sought to challenge the cultural privilege which I undoubtedly
represented to them. Over the fourteen months I spent in the Nyambene Range, in the
company ofmy hosts, I had to partially conform to this ethnocentrism and learn to re-
centre my world.
Research methodologies and fieldsites
This thesis is based on fieldwork in Meru Central and Meru North from
January 2001 to April 2003. I spent approximately half of this time in each fieldsite.
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In central Imenti (Meru Central), I concerned myself with the lives of the people of
two locations just north of Meru Town, Chugu and Munithu, although I felt free to
establish contacts wherever I met them. In Meru North, I rented a Land Rover and
roamed throughout the Nyambenes, although most of my research was done in central
and eastern Tigania, especially Mikinduri, Giithu, Muciimukuru, and Kunatf. While in
Meru North, I was placed voluntarily by the local authority in a girls' secondary
school, as a part-time teacher of social sciences. This position had the advantage of
managing my 'outsider' status. The job provided me with an alibi and an easily
recognisable identity that I believe assisted me to settle into a community reputed for
being parochial and suspicious of foreigners. Although I had envisioned spending more
time in Igembe, further north than Tigania, I was compelled to make only brief visits
and was not able to establish myself there in 2001-2003.
Plate 1: Talking with Grandparents. GTcTnini, Kanqeta (2001)
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Prior to this period of research, I had spent time in central Meru in 1991
teaching at a local school and carried out nine months of fieldwork in 1998 on the local
coffee industry which culminated in a MA thesis (Lamont 1999). The familiarity with
social life among the Imenti allowed me to begin my research activities almost
immediately upon arriving in Meru Town in early 2001. With the assistance of several
young friends I originally met in 1998, Mutethia, Muriuki and Kendi, we set about
organising semi-structured interviews and biographies among people selected because
they belonged to a specific age-class. The intention behind these initial contacts was to
compile a representative social biography of different age cohorts. This was largely
effective, but these collective biographies were by no means free of contradictions nor
debate, an observation which is articulated by some of the chapters in this thesis.
Although I liked my friends' help, I found my secondary position in the
research process to be socially claustrophobic and constraining. Fieldwork of the kind
which I undertook is often limited by working through paid 'research assistants' and I
strove for some semblance of independence wherever possible. I often learned more
when alone and in casual settings with local people where my awkward language use
was graciously tolerated. Despite the initial necessity of setting down a specific
methodology, my fieldwork was most effective when I cut loose from my established
research agenda and experimented with the use of my time. Above all, however, it was
the degree of participation in both fieldsites which taught me the most about social life
in Meru and provided me with the basic ethnographic information required to narrow
my research problems further. Besides working on compiling the social biography of
all present and past age-classes or generations, I busied myself with learning about
genealogies and kinship terms; attended numerous ceremonies implicated in the life-
course such as children's naming parties, circumcisions, weddings, and funerals;
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learned about farming, species typology, weather, the seasons, and livestock; as well
as familiarising myself with the daily use of time and space. Where these kinds of
information do not explicitly appear in this thesis, they are nonetheless part of the
general background to much ofwhat is written here.
Local patterns of age and gender based avoidance also contributed to the kinds
of information, views, and understandings presented in this thesis. The intimacy
between alternate generations, that of grandparents and their grandchildren, meant that
many of my most revealing fxeldwork encounters were with people who were my
classificatory grandparents. As such, out of 127 interviews conducted on age-class
formation, some 64 of these were with men and women over the age of sixty. Because
there is a generalised pattern of social avoidance between adjacent generations, that is
between parents and children, only 25 sessions from this age-group were achieved.
Whereas with older persons, the views of both men and women were roughly equally
represented, noticeably, I had less than 10 completed biographic or interview sessions
with women who would be classified as my social 'mothers.' These were also only
possible through the assistance of Kendi and Kagweria, two young women who I
relied upon when researching women's lives and subjectivities. This is a
methodological fact which accounts for some of the biases in this thesis towards the
views and experiences of men. The remaining interviews, some 38, were done with
youths and, in some cases, children. Again, here, the majority of those I spoke with
were male, although I had a number of close female age-mates who volunteered their
perspectives when asked. Not all of these interviews were recorded, transcribed, and
translated for detailed textual analysis and comparison, but I have written records for
those where I either did not have the appropriate equipment or where they occurred
spontaneously in the course of another activity.
These interviews also differed significantly in their attention to biographical
details. I was particularly interested in gathering specific information on peoples'
experiences with childhood, initiation, marriage, employment, migration, schooling,
health, parenthood, land use, property relations, succession and legal disputes. In a
broader vein, I also asked about social changes which had occurred in people's lives.
This often related to demographic, political, and economic transformations which were
documented in the archival records, but in just as many cases, individual histories
revealed the silences and gaps in such records. I consider my own fieldnotes to be a
valuable archive in their own right, largely because they contain references to
experiences which appear nowhere else. Although this thesis, in part, aims to
adequately represent the subaltern status of many Meru under differing political
regimes, it has proven a grave challenge to retain the phenomenological quality of
fieldwork encounters, where views and experiences were always rendered as part of an
intersubjective dialogue. Where biography was concerned, the colonial legacy of race
and racism was always an element in the discussions between a 'white' European and
a 'black' African, no matter our personal experiences or non-experiences with
colonialism. Where persons consulted were too aged or too young to recall 'critical
events' in their lives, these sessions tended towards anecdote and the formal direction
of the interview encounter was dropped to accomodate for a much looser situation. In
some other cases, however, I returned to particular individuals and compiled enough
biographical data to create detailed and comprehensive life histories. Some people
found my interest in biography to be somewhat therapeutic, while others were more
guarded about their personal histories and spoke instead about other people such as
their neighbours, spouses, parents, children, or age-mates. In contrast to my 1998
research, nobody refused to see me, although on several occasions scheduling meetings
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proved impossible, a situation I acceptingly put down as a polite refusal. I tried to
select individuals after I had already met them once or twice, but in some cases more
gregarious people offered their time and tutelage spontaneously and freely.
In my spare time, I focused on advancing my command of Swahili, a language
spoken widely throughout East Africa. Although Swahili is less than ideal for carrying
out research among the Meru because it is associated with the government (therikali)
and 'outsiders', it is much easier to leam and speak than the morphophonemically
complex language of Kimeru. After almost thirty months of fieldwork in northern and
central Meru, dialectical differences aside, I managed to speak Kimeru arduously and
understand most dialogue. At times, however, because I relied on the Kimeru
translation of the Bible, as my source for grammatical structure, I would provoke
riotous laughter at some of the ridiculous statements I would make. I could not
convince some people that I was not a missionary. People also used to joke that I had
a Gikuyu accent because my tongue was too heavy and breathy. With these linguistic
difficulties, I communicated in whatever language was appropriate, whether English,
Swahili, or Kimeru, and took a pragmatic approach to each situation, preferring to
listen on some occasions and speak at others. With time, transcription of recorded
interviews and biographies, as well as songs and other forms of oral artistry became
easier to do alone, although I frequently relied on proofreading and translation help
from a variety of persons. All errors in translation, of course, are my own.
The reason for carrying out research in two fieldsites was comparative.
Although the Tigania and Imenti share broad similarities in their age-class and
generational 'systems', there are also significant differences in their organisation. In a
broader sense, the Imenti and Tigania also have had distinctive histories before and
after the colonial conquest. I was intrigued by the question of why age-classes
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appeared defunct among the Imenti, while they were vicariously maintained among the
Tigania and Igembe to the north. Admittedly, in the field, I had a rather positivist
sense of purpose about this question, collecting broadly 'demographic' data about
fertility, morbidity, mortality, and birth spacing to account for where I thought the
answer would be found. I was heavily influenced by the theoretical application of
demographics to the analysis of age-class and generational 'systems' laid out by
anthropologists such as Anne-Marie Peatrik (1995, 1999), Paul Spencer (1980) and, to
some theoretical extent, Frank Stewart (1977). This approach soon proved to be
unpalatable in terms of local etiquette and my research acquired a sharper historical
bent, especially in the later stages of fieldwork among the Tigania where questions
about 'population' were regarded with suspicion.
In both areas, however, the existence of age-classes was implicated in local
patterns of political debate. The ethnographic treatment of key political debates in
Meru is critical to the overall argument of the thesis. By the time I moved to
Mikinduri in January 2002, a small marketing and administrative centre for central and
eastern Tigania, I was hoping to observe and perhaps participate in a 'planned'
inauguration of a new age-class, that of the young cohort of adolescents touted to be
called the Gicungi. More exciting, however, was the chance to witness the ritual
contexts of an anticipated generational succession between two senior adjacent age-
classes in the Nyambene hills. I had expected the advancement of the 'junior elders' of
the Lubeeta and the retirement of the 'fathers of the country' of the Ratanya. By the
end of fourteen months living in the Nyambene Range, I came to the conclusion that
such an 'event' had either occurred and I missed it, or that it was not an 'event' as
such, but a process, occurring over a much longer time frame than thirty months of
fieldwork would allow. The Tigania fieldwork features more prominantly in this thesis
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than that of the period where I researched the Imenti, although I have made every
effort possible to compare the two fieldsites where it has been relevant to my overall
argument.
My research methodologies would best be described as multi-pronged. As I
was principally interested in understanding the shifting historical subjectivities of
different generations, I stressed collecting biographies from representatives of each of
the successive age-classes and their spouses. Biographies and life histories present the
researcher with considerable interpretive difficulties about the nature of chronology in
historical research. To give just a single example, when asking when an elder woman
married, she replied "tirio ncacadamo cienjire" ('wasn't it [when we were] pricked by
needles'). Here, she was implying that her cohort began marrying about the time when
vaccinations were administered by syringe. I knew of no medical facilities in operation
in the Nyambene Ranges, besides the Methodist Hospital in Maua, during the period
of time this woman would have been of marriageable age. Although her birth-date of
Kiaramuu - the famine and influenza epidemic of 1918-1919 which decimated her
community - is understood because it is traceable in the colonial archives, a programme
of vaccination trials in Imenti probably during the late 1930s is not even entered into
the annals, leaving doubt and speculation about the precise date. Archives were
frequently called upon to determine when a particular event or process was said to
have occurred. Unfortunately, this historical approach was often unsatisfactory.
Often, when an event was remembered by an elder, it was not reported in the
governmental or personal archives available. Inversely, an event the archives stressed
at length was often not found to be remembered by those old enough to have
experienced it. The most frequent problem, however, was that my respondents did not
use a system of calendrical years, but referred to incidents such as an auspicious
27
initiation, a famine, or a personal event which were contemporaneous with a given
year. The example given above, the coincidence of birth with a renowned famine,
Kiaramuu, is a typical response of this kind. Indeed, in their population census of
1999, local enumerators drew up a chronology based on the succession of age-class
recruitment and memorable events such as famines or political crises to assist them to
estimate the age of those born before the advent of birth registers and identification
cards. Age-classes featured as a template for such a chronology, not only for Meru,
but for dozens of communities across the Republic. Most people under the age of
about fifty, however, use calendrical years with varying degrees of accuracy. I spent
an inordinate amount of time attempting to cross-reference approximate years given
for an event. Ironically, once I had established a detailed chronology of the kind given
by elders, I found that this was a more accurate method to follow than when given
specific years or historical references. I have chosen not to suggest that the 'Western'
calendar introduces distortion in the telling of Meru history, particularly because few
Meru themselves object to this.3
In publics res: the chapters in review
The first chapter addresses the wider context of fieldwork through discussing
age and generation as tropes in the Kenyan political imagination. Through investigating
the uses of political motifs related to age and generational categories during high-profile
political contests in 2001-2003, the chapter argues that rhetoric about 'youth' and
'elders' has far reaching implications in East Africa. As ethnographic illustrations of
5 For a discussion about the ethnographic distortions introduced by reliance on this form of calendar
and historical reckoning, see Renato Rosaldo's (1980: 48) Ilongot Headhunting: A Study ofSociety
and History, 1883-1974.
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how age and generation are implicated in local and national thinking about politics, I
draw upon discussions about the Mungiki sect, a Gikuyu 'youth' social movement, as
well as how the General Election campaigns in Meru North were framed within the
vocabulary and rhetoric of local debates about generational succession. To accurately
portray the interpretive scheme used in this thesis, these examples are followed by a
lengthy discussion about the state-of-the-art in theory on age and generational
'systems', long held to be a regional speciality of ethnographers working in East
African societies. This discussion helps position this thesis within concern for the
historical dimensions of such forms of social organisation and representation.
A second, more ethnographic chapter examines current and past debates within
Meru about 'tradition' and 'modernity', shorthand codes for generalised anxieties and
expectations surrounding the interplay of planned change and contingent transitions.
At the heart of these debates lies the Meru age-class and generational 'system', itself
thought of as undergoing constant renovation from generation to generation. A main
concern of this chapter is the problem of historical perspective in writing
ethnography. This is especially acute when writing about forms of social life which are
implicated in managing and making sense of the changes in the life course. When it
comes to historicising selves and subjectivities, the chapter argues, the actual
historicity of the fieldwork encounter must be taken into consideration. One must
understand that the position of 'informants' shift over time and, hence, historical
reconstructions of any 'system' based on an ethnographic present require further
reconstructions of the once was within the situatedness of the now. To contextualise
this theoretical point, debates encountered during fieldwork over the authenticity of
boys' circumcisions are presented as an ethnographic example of this methodological
problem of historical perspective. The chapter also includes an extended sociological
description of age-class formation among the Imenti and Tigania as a guide to further
chapters in the thesis.
Chapter three discusses the ambiguities introduced when anachronistic terms
enter into the debates mentioned in the previous chapter. By focusing on a
problematic concept, that of gitiba, this chapter aims to underscore that 'everyone's
past is different', a reference to the historicity implicit in the construction of
generational or cohort-based identities, subjectivities, and 'consciousness.' This view
is introduced to further contextualise the problem of historical perspective. Through
an exploration of key words used at different times in different ways, the chapter then
discusses the rhetorics employed in historical knowledge.
An extensive ethnographic exploration of the enigmatic character of
generational succession and the rites associated with it is presented in chapter four. By
initially arguing that one of the first questions ethnographers have asked about age and
generational 'systems' is the ubiquitous 'who is in power?', this chapter aims to
demonstrate that this question is not only a problem for anthropologists, but also for
those positioned within and without age-class and generational 'systems' themselves.
By describing on-going debates and arguments about generational succession among
the Tigania and Imenti Meru, this chapter shows how historical memories of past
rivalries between adjacent and competing age-classes are invoked to make sense of
contemporary standoffs or impasses in the succession of power between the
generations. This is followed by a longer discussion about the renovation of key
'traditional' councils through thoroughly 'modern' networks and their implications
with the general context of the Meru as a community of argument. This is towards an
ethnographic argument that many elements of Meru 'tradition' have been the outcome
of historical entanglements with the political culture of colonialism and Indirect Rule,
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hence, arguing that what earns the label of 'tradition' is perhaps best thought of as the
manifestation of a vernacular modernity. The focal example of this process is the njuri
nceke, a council of elder men who make executive decisions about community-wide
debate and arbitrate on the meanings of 'tradition' and the definitions of 'customary'
practices.
The fifth chapter examines the sociological implications of labour migration
since the 1940s in modifying the formation of age-classes and the categories of
personhood which such movement engenders. A central component of the chapter
relates to the creation of new, interstitial categories of personhood which fall outside
the formally constituted age-classes, but which were nonetheless incorporated into the
sociological 'system' being discussed. The chapter then presents the case study of a
remote Nyambene community which has been defined by generations of labour
migrants.
Following from the theme of social change in chapter five, the next discussion
focuses on the place of schooling and formal education in introducing novel changes to
the formation of age-classes. One focus of this chapter is how the introduction of
ritual calendars based on school holidays effectively eliminated the problem of'over-'
and 'under-' aging by emphasising age criteria for initiation over that based on
generation. As a counterpoint to the discussion of changing boys' initiations, the
chapter then introduces how community-wide bans on girls' clitoridectomies have
been negotiated. Using a language of universal human rights, NGOs have made the
argument for girls' initiations being carried out through non-excising rites, a kind of
revival of female initiatory lore, although highly modified from past practices.
The last two chapters, seven and eight, deal with the contemporary debates
over morality and the implications for historical memory upon future constructions of
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community. Focusing on the shifting contexts of initiation and the construction of
moral personhood, many of the examples explored in these chapters pertain to youth
subjectivities since the 1970s. Exploring the idiom of the 'mannerless generation',
nthuki ncabuka, through the production of regional music, especially gospel music
which draws upon allegories about the end of community drawn from the nineteenth
century traditions of prophesy, this chapter argues that understanding the
contingencies of present youths' lives requires an analysis of how traditional
categories of thought and practice come to be reconfigured through critical events.
These critical events, including major initiatory rites, provide the forum and the
rhetoric through which to argue and debate Meru 'culture' and 'society.' The
conclusion reflects on notions of culture as an 'arena of interpretation' (cf. Rapport
2003) and society as the formation of a 'community of argument' (cf. Waller 2000).
Because both 'culture' and 'society' are notions often contested in the social context
where they are voiced, this thesis questions their analytic validity outside of the
historical specificity to which they speak of.
32
CHAPTER ONE
Age and generation in the Kenyan political imagination
Age and generation in the Kenyan political imagination
During fieldwork in Kenya, a central methodological problem I faced was how
to sift through the fragmentary and often contradictory historical sources to reach a
representation of Meru 'history' without effacing competing versions 'from below.'
Common to all colonised peoples, many critical details of Meru pasts are silenced by
colonial-era documents and literary sources. Yet, oral sources from local peoples are
just as frequently characterised by lacunae, forgetting, and revision as the 'official' and
written historical record. For example, living generations of Meru themselves
distinguish 'good' and 'bad' histories, sometimes voicing the former and silencing the
latter. Given that historians must view silences and ellipses as critical to the political
dimensions of local history, how can a fieldworker overcome this challenge to the
historical method? In the field, I dealt with this challenge by listening to the public
debates that took place between people of different ages, generations, and genders on
the contested meanings of history.
This is not a straight forward procedure, however. One must, firstly, learn the
language of such debate and, in Meru at least, this meant that I had to become
intimately familiar with the terminology of age-class formation. Questions about who
got left out of these forms of social organisation were as critical as knowing and
identifying those who were included. The array of narratives which tie the pasts of
elders to the present, and futures, of all subsequent generations borrow extensively
from a language that is derived from models and ideals about how to organise
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themselves socially. Meru history is often voiced in a language where age and
generation are more than tokens to their political imagination, they are its parts of
speech. Like hundreds of other East African social formations, the Meru are highly
conscious about the telling of their histories and the place of generation in narrating
them, for their histories are made sociologically through what the ethnographic
literature has defined as age and generational 'systems.'
Before going on to describe the relation between how one is positioned socially
and how they narrate their history - in effect my contribution to theory on age and
generation 'systems' - I will pause briefly to tell an anecdote and then present an
account. This relates specifically to an encounter I had in April 2002 with the eldest
living couple in a small valley community called Giithu, 'Little Forest', nestled into
the eastern Tigania flanks of the Nyambene Range. Our meeting had been arranged
through a local university graduate, Kaunga, who was assisting me to get around, meet
people, and interview them in Kimeru.
M'Limbua and his wife Ciomuciaria were perhaps unique because their house
was constructed in the architectural style of the 'ancients' (antubantene). It was a
'traditional' cluster of huts built in wattle and daub and enclosed within a stockade for
security and for corralling livestock. I picked up the Kimeru words for specific
features of domesticity and household space with an ethnusiasm which Kaunga put up
with patiently. Alone for several minutes in the thick of M'Limbua's entangled,
impenetrable compound wall, I thought about how difficult it would be to get through
the obstacle late at night as an unwelcome suitor. The internal fence, itself, was as
thick as a bull. Prickly caned undergrowth, mottled by the dying sun, thwarted my
mock intrusions with every turn. Although I had seen photographs of such
homesteads, they are no longer built, having given way to rectangular, painted plank
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houses with corrugated tin roofing. These newer tin and plank constructions are not
nearly as comfortable as the wattle, daub, and thatch houses in respect to escape from
the day's heat and the night's wind. Neither are they as well protected. Their outside
fences are nothing more than a porous hedge of 'sodom' apples and a few parallel
strands of barbed-wire. Traditional houses are, however, dark, smoky and humid in
comparison with today's spacious, ventilated, and relatively well-lit buildings.
Compared to my curious fascination for the old and traditional, many Meru ofmy age
grouping view such houses as quaint and old fashioned. Originally built sometime in
the late 1950s after the people of Giithu came back from 'villagization', the
government policy of collectively relocating rural people during the Mau Mau
Emergency, this kind of building ceased in the 1970s and many examples of its kind
fell into ruin. Generally, such houses were never reconstructed after their inhabitants
were deceased, but left to collapse before they were finally cleared away. This made
M'Limbua's compound the last of its kind in the area where I was doing my
fieldwork.
As a couple, they were also unique because they were the last of their age-
class; the husband being an Ithalii and the wife being a Ncencenga. These people began
to marry by about 1930 to about 1935. I stress the qualifier 'about' because I was
always matching my annual and calendrical chronology to the oral testimony ofmany
Meru elders whose historical reckoning was articulated by 'good' and 'bad' episodes
in the past, such as a successful initiation or bountiful harvest, as opposed to a famine,
disease or war. Each Meru age-class is given its proper name and its membership
crosses over clan affiliations in the Nyambenes. Thus, during their adult lives,
M'Limbua and Ciomuciaria would have had thousands of Ithalii-Ncencenga
counterparts throughout the Tigania and Igembe sections of the Meru. The Imenti
observed a different way of organising themselves into age cohorts, but we will turn to
this later in the thesis. Although there are a number of Ncencenga who have survived
their husbands (or in some cases their co-wives where the household was
polygynous), the elderly Ithalii have almost completed disappeared as an extant age-
class. As very old, superannuated persons, they are recognised as ntindiri, 'those who
wait', this category of personhood being the esteemed end of the life-course in Meru
ontology.
Nevertheless, both of these elderly people were active into their nineties',
fetching fodder from the exterior compound fencing and cutting up banana stocks to
feed their milch cow. This was a bony old animal, loosely tethered under a mango tree,
but it was also the focus of our initial conversation with M'Limbua. He sang
beautifully voiced, but quiet refrains from songs about herding livestock. Because I
was interested in composing a social biography of each of Meru's age-classes, the
opportunity to speak with an Ithalii-Ncencenga couple was quite a rarity and, in the
excitement, I came prepared with an array of questions which, in the end, I didn't ask.
Instead I sat and listened as both husband, then wife, told Kaunga and me stories
which were versions of similar stories 1 had heard from other Tigania elders. From
them I gathered notes on a superbly detailed version of the Mboa narrative, which tells
of the coming of the proto-Meru clans, the Ngaa, who fissioned at a hill called Kagairo
and then peopled the Nyambene hills (cf. Fadiman 1993; Peatrik 1999). As our
dialogue built up for about an hour, there was a sudden lull in the conversation, leaving
me to reflect on some of my notes and allowing me time to ask Kaunga for
clarifications. M'Limbua went back to chopping up pieces of banana stock with a
machete to feed his cow, and Ciomuciaria came to stand a few paces in front of me, as
if scrutinising my writing.
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It was then that she prompted Kaunga to ask me a question. As this was in
Kimeru and I did not have any recording equipment, I will paraphrase what she posed
to Kaunga in English:
"What does the white-man think about these Mau Mau?"
"Which Mau Mau?" ('Mau Mau baria bariku?')
"Those ones in Nairobi and Kiambu who are cutting girls again..."
"Cutting women..?" (Bagutaanithua..?)
"And taking this snuff and worshipping the Devil"
"Oh, you mean to say the Mungiki?" (Of, ntikwaaria atiri tiMungiki?)
"Yes, those Mungiki Mau Mau from Kiambu"
In a pained explanation, Kaunga conveyed to me that the old woman was asking for
my opinion on the politics of the Mungiki, a youth-centered movement which
appeared on the Kenyan scene in 1992. Comprised of a mostly young, Gikuyu
population of Nairobi's urban and peripheral poor, Mungiki has been described as a
'Kikuyu-based religio-political movement' and heir to a 'long tradition of religio-
political revivalism' with ideological roots which date back to the anti-colonial
movement of the 1940s and 1950s (Kagwanja 2003: 29-31; Maupeu 2002: 122-3).
Criticised by the media for advocating 'female circumcision' and demonised by many
for being atavistic and tribalist, they were nonetheless patronised by a number of
Kenya's political elites in 2002 whose shadowy relations with the group were
believed to be dangerous.
Ciomuciaria clearly perceived news about the Mungiki as a threat. This old
Meru woman was worried that the Mungiki would come to her rural location, Giithu,
in the hills and valleys of central Tigania and bring back the chaos, violence and
uncertainty which had rocked central Kenya for nearly a decade from 1953-1963.4
4 My periodisation for Mau Mau may raise concern among historians more comfortable with the
declaration of the Emergency which ran from 1952-1956, but 1 recognise the existence of a prolonged
military resistance in Meru until 1963 by remnants of the Land and Freedom Army (LFA) led by
General Mwariama. Units of this guerrilla organisation were still active in the Nyambene Forest until
after political independence (Njagi 1993).
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Although these events were nearly a half-century ago, they were fresh enough in the
woman's memory that she feared the Mungiki with the same trepidation that she felt
towards the Mau Mau in the early 1950s. It is almost certain that she had heard of
Mungiki only through conversation or perhaps over the radio. Although during my
2001-2003 field work in Meru there were rumours of local youth involvement in the
movement, usually referred to as a 'sect' by the national media, as far as I know, no
Mungiki activity had actually taken place in Nyambene or in other Meru areas. It was
almost exclusively a 'Gikuyu affair.' Although I do not know why Ciomuciaria asked
me for my opinion on the movement (perhaps it was because I was a white and thus
implicitly connected with colonialism), I tacitly accepted the basis of her fear as my
research appreciated the vicissitudes of the civil war among Meru communities who
had been heavily involved in it. She was still living this part of her past as a kind of
experience with its own historicity.
Ciomucfaria's query about 'these Mau Mau' presents an opportunity to
clarify the topic of this thesis. This can be achieved through turning this ethnographic
vignette into an account, that is, an explanation of Ciomuciaria's thinking on the
subject of the Mungiki. This woman's anxiety about Mungiki was not only the play
of her imagination. Her analogy was based in a critical reading of the contemporary
currents of political anger in Kenya. Mungiki had drawn upon the legacy of the Mau
Mau to seek some kind of historical legitimacy to their political project. Analysts have
come to the conclusion that there are 'striking parallels between the two movements'
(Kagwanja 2003: 27). More than this, the link between Mau Mau and Mungiki is
attributed to Ibrahim Ndura Waruinge, one of the founders of the movement, who
publicly admitted consulting former Mau Mau generals in setting up their political
manifesto to 'complete' the Mau Mau mission (ibid.). Just like the early Mau Mau
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recruits, the Mungiki were poor, mostly Gikuyu youth, dispossessed of land and
angry about their life prospects on the margins of a society which condemned them to
poverty. Their vision of an 'ethnically pure' Gikuyu state, the 'Kirinyaga Kingdom',
is perhaps as strikingly primordialist as their claim to 'capture state power' is
modernist (ibid.). Like Mau Mau, they administer oaths of loyalty and collect dues,
however minimal, from their members to finance political activities. Yet, the analogy
between the two movements, one in the 1950s, and the other in the 1990s may hint at
a deeper, but implicit feature of the Kenyan political imagination.
I argue that Mungiki's specific appropriation of Gikuyu and Mau Mau
imagery is powerful because it taps into the symbolism of 'youth', 'elders', 'age', and
'generation' in Kenya's political imagination. Mungiki stole center stage in Kenya's
'culture of politics' because it was seen to grasp at a millenarian vision which was
simultaneously traditional and modern. Mungiki founding members gave voice to their
political project through a series of seemingly anachronistic Gikuyu concepts which
were derived from the vocabulary of their age-class and generational system, long seen
as defunct, possibly even since the nineteenth-century in some parts, but probably
since the 1930s throughout the central Gikuyu plateaux (Kershaw 1997: 277-80). At
the heart of this appropriated language was the itwika, a ritualized process of
generational succession, or the 'handing over' of political office from one age-class to
another. Mungiki spoke of the itwika not as a pacific exchange of power between the
younger and older, but rather as a revolutionary upheaval. In tracing their legitimacy in
long-since forgotten oral histories from the Kiambu (Kabete) area, not far from
Nairobi, Mungiki founders decided to call themselves Iregi. By naming themselves the
Iregi, the young men at the heart of Mungiki's organisation were forging a parallel
between the mid-nineteenth century riikaya Iregi, literally the 'age-class of Severers',
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but more colloquially the 'angry young men', who initiated themselves at Kabete to
sever their ritual ties and, hence, their political insubordination to wealthier, centrist
elders in Murang'a. Yet, Mungiki were also mirroring the Mau Mau's ideological use
of the symbolism of the Iregi. In the analysis of the crises of the 1950s, some scholars
have suggested that generational antagonism was a factor in Mau Mau recruitment
(Githige 1978; Lonsdale 1992), with a struggle breaking out within Gikuyu society
between the two generational classes, Maina and Mwangi, although this may have
been a more ideological than a structural or sociological interpretation of youth
involvement in Mau Mau (Kershaw 1997). As Lonsdale points out, however, the
itwika was perhaps not something 'real' which anybody had ever witnessed, neither
Mau Mau nor Mungiki, but it was an idea and 'a strikingly apt one at that' (Lonsdale
1992: 450). Besides the reactivation of the Mau Mau memory, Mungiki sought its
most poignant symbolism in a language that was, ironically, considered anachronistic,
but also evocative of the failed expectations about modernity which many Kenyans
could readily identify with (cf. Ferguson 1999).
Mungiki have made extensive ideological use of the anthropological writings of
Jomo Kenyatta (1938) and Louis Leakey (1977), as well as subaltern activists like
Marcus Garvey and Martin Luther King (Kagwanja 2003). While Greet Kershaw's
study of Kiambu during the Emergency itself offers an empirically detailed critique of
Kenyatta's and Leakey's ideological uses of anthropology (Kershaw 1997), it is
probable that Mungiki's appropriation of terms like itwika and Iregi owe much to the
ethnographic imagination of these authors.5 It is, also, improbable that the reinvention
of such terms may be traced to their use in everyday Gikuyu life. Most analysts of
5 The group that were known as the Iregi were, according to Greet Kershaw's original field work
undertaken during the Mau Mau insurgency, a Kabete initiation group who were called this, sometime
around 1835-1840, because as recent pioneers in the nineteenth century forest economy of Kabete they
broke away from the more central Murang'a, to whom they were politico-ritual subjects and clients.
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this large Kenyan population insist that age-class and generational organisation has
decayed over the past three generations (cf. Davison 1996; Droz 1999). As John
Lonsdale (1992: 345) remarked, the itwika has 'stirred more ethnographic anxiety,
historiographical scepticism and political imagination that any other feature of Kikuyu
life.' In a recent paper on the Mungiki, Herve Maupeu (2002) stretches the boundaries
between the ethnographic and political imagination by assuming that many Gikuyu
tacitly accept the terms itwika and Iregi as promoted by the Mungiki and conserved in
the written work of Kenyatta and Leakey. In contrast, most people would never have
even heard of these terms without their recent revival as tropes within the political
language of the Mungiki. Mungiki's creative recycling of these terms lent them a
sudden authenticity that they likely never had before. In a critical paragraph Maupeu
makes the leap from a rather obscure and, probably, parochial Gikuyu oral tradition
into statements about national politics, arguing that 'in Kikuyu mythology it was the
generation of the Iregi who put an end to the tyranny of the monarchy and instituted
itwika'' (Maupeu 2002: 130, translation mine). It is only a short step to take before
this 'charter myth' becomes interpreted, in the context ofMungiki, as symbolic of the
politically precarious climate of Kenya in 2002. Going even further, the Iregi become
the Mungiki, the tyranny of the elders becomes KANU's state terror, and the itwika
becomes the revolution of the angry young, disenfranchised Kenyan! Such escalations
in the ethnographic and political imaginations demand that scholars revisit the enduring
problems of age and generation in Africa rather more critically and responsibly.
Modern Kenya offers a curious insight into the continued significance of age
and generation as tropes for thought and action in periods of political conflict and
instability. Yet, clearly here, we are not necessarily talking about age-classes and
generational 'systems' as specific institutional forms of social organisation. Instead,
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we find it implicated discursively in contested expressions of subalternity and
domination. The ideological contexts in which these borrowed terms are meaningful is
particularly relevant to analyses of the political imagination in East Africa.
Even in the build-up towards Daniel arap Moi's political succession, age and
generation were playing cards which politicians, local voters, and the media used to
simplify the terms of their struggle. As such, during the political campaigning which
preceded the 2003 general election, much ado was made of the 'Young Turks' and the
'Old Guard' in the build-up to the Moi succession. Both the then-ruling party KANU
and the victorious contenders of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) employed
age and generationally based motifs which promised a break from the recycling of
political elites and promised a more redistributive allocation of resources by
combatting corruption, a move that was seen to be especially appealing among
Kenya's remarkably young population. This discursive politiking around generation
became the subject matter of a number of political cartoons, ofwhich the following is
one example.
Figure 1: The Moi Succession. East African Standard. 09-11-01
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During the 2002-2003 election campaigns, when I was living in the rural market
town ofMikinduri, Central Tigania, I noted how Meru age-classes, or at least their
political lexicon, were extended to political arenas outside this locality. Moi had
chosen the son of Jomo Kenyatta, Uhuru, to be his successor in the leadership of
KANU. Not only was this choice canny because of Uhuru's age and membership in
one of Kenya's dynastic families, the Kenyattas, but it clarified the lines of dissent
within KANU itself as a political party. The decision to promote 'Uhuru for
President' was hotly debated within Kenya around the idea that Uhuru was a young
man and that many more senior KANU figures had been overlooked by Mzee (Moi,
but a Swahili term of respect for an elder man). Those who pointed to Uhuru's youth
as undesirable for such a powerful position were quickly drawn to the example of
Joseph Kabila, president of the DRC, who was in his early thirties' when his father,
Laurent, was assassinated.
The idea of the 'Young Turks' and the 'Old Guard' was further localised in
Mikinduri, with people drawing parallels between the national political events to an
anticipated, but rather slow or dormant generational succession in Tigania: what
appears in the ethnographic literature as ntwiko. Although this generational succession
is called kunenkanira thiiru (make the way) in Tigania, expectations that it would be
effected quickly were rather low. Instead, the high politics of the 2003 General
Election was localised and drawn into the inter- and intra- generational drama of the
Meru age-class 'system', with analogies being drawn that Moi was a Ratanya, an age-
class of 'ruling' elders, and Uhuru was a Miriti, the category and age-class of
Ratanya's 'sons.' It is important to note that this identification of KANU's
leadership with Meru age-classes and their struggle against NARC appeared to be in
parallel with attempts by the Ratanya to 'hand over' power to their sons of the
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Miriti. This was a highly contentious affair, seen by some as a conspiracy to alienate
an alternate class, that of the Lubeeta, who are more senior than the Miriti and, in
theory, next in line for the seizure of elder status and power over the 'moral
economy.' In a sense, on the local level, the macro politics of the nation were writ
small in the micro politics of the Meru generational system. As such, the Ratanya and
Miriti were equated with Moi and Uhuru (and hence KANU), while the Lubeeta came
to be discursively positioned in the oppositional camp of NARC, not that this talk
actually reflected voting practices. An even younger politician, a Gwantai, eventually
won the election.
Returning to Ciomuciaria's query, it is possible to see that her reading of the
political imagination was not a spurious analogy between different 'Mau Maus.'
Instead, it is important that the place of age and generation in contemporary Kenyan
politics be traced, in the sense of a template, back into the recent histories of political
contest and struggle. Age and generation may be raised to an ideological level in East
Africa, perhaps reflecting its institutional and sociological legacy, but there is a much
more general problem at stake. This can be put in two ways. The first recognises that
age and generation are implicit to many arenas of social life, from kinship to political
movements, and that different social formations will emphasise their importance in
different registers. Secondly, and more critically for anthropological study, it is
important to listen to the contested manner through which people voice the
importance of age and generation in their particular circumstances. Along with these
basic observations, as Gavin Smith (1997) notes, anthropologists must shift from the
orthodoxy of studying the institutions of other peoples, 'whose distinctive feature was
that they were not like 'us' towards a focus on the expression of peoples 'whose
distinctive feature is their subalternity' (Smith 1997: 92-3).
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To bring a critical focus to the history of age and generation theory and, in
particular, the study of institutions described as age-class and generational 'systems',
the following section looks at the state-of-play among selected ethnographers of East
African peoples said to have some form of 'age organisation', while posing an acute
question about these scholars' sensitivity to the vexing problem of stability and
change over historical time.
Age-class and generational 'systems': state-of-play, or states of
decay?
I would like to start off a theoretical discussion about East African age-class
and generational 'systems' by drawing upon analogy and metaphor. In the first
analogy, the reader might imagine a machine, built from the bits and pieces we
anthropologists call structural functionalism. Let's call this particular mechanism a
time machine which, when in the service of 'society', performs the function of
socialising time and segregating the reproduction and the competing aspirations of
different generations. People get fed into this machine as infants and they come out as
grandparents. In the second analogy, let's imagine a subterrean river which, silently
flowing underground through unseen fissures and tunnels, at disjoined intervals noisily
appears at surface springs as if it had no particular source. In this metaphor, we might
suggest that the long lengths of the underground river are the periods when society
forgets the importance of generation, while when it comes the surface, bubbling over,
the generations are invested with far reaching meanings and implications. While not
pressing these metaphors too much for metonymic significance, I argue that these
analogies could represent two divergent theoretical views on how to study and explain
East African age-class and generational 'systems.' It is the subject of this section to
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clarify what is meant by metaphors such as these.6
I am aware of some seventy-three ethnic groups in the ethnographic literature
on East Africa which are said to have either 'age organisation', 'age systems' or 'age-
class and generational systems.' In isolating Kenya alone, where the 1999 census
identified forty-three ethnic groups, the majority of whom had some form of age or
generationally based social organisation, the distribution of such social 'systems'
throughout East Africa is evidently very widespread. Primarily because of this broad
feature of the ethnographic map, East Africa has become something of a regional
workshop in which anthropologists may journey to and experiment with the latest
theoretical idea about what makes such 'systems' tick (Fardon 1990). Not
surprisingly, since this kind of venture has been underway since the 1930s, this
particular literature is probably as divergent in its claims and theories as are the
peoples studied as diverse in their ways and histories. This literature has a protean
quality (Waller 2000). As a result of such diversity, hardly any other speciality of
ethnographic focus appears to be as arcane or, even, confusing as the literature on age-
class and generational 'systems.'
Given the broad scope of such research, what can be made of its multiple
theoretical orientations? No attempt will be made in this chapter to cover all the
nuances of the controversies which have engaged ethnographers on these topics. The
danger is either to admit the irreducible eclecticism of major approaches, or to uncover
the 'elementary structures of age-class and generational systems' (cf. Peatrik 1995).
Instead, having reviewed the more recent theoretical and empirical contributions to the
topic, I identify three major approaches which, when taken together, hint at certain
'family resemblences' woven into the literature as a whole.
6
Margaret Ogola's (1994) novel, The River and the Source, closely parallels this analogy here while
following a Kenyan family's experiences over generational time.
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The theoretical state-of-play has benefited from renewed interest in age and
generational 'systems', firstly in the 1970s, and, more recently, in the 1990s.
Accounting for the cyclical pattern of debate among anthropologists is not only about
discipline-wide shifts and debates about the meanings of our main concepts, but also
about the practical issues of professional meetings, funding opportunities, and the
publication of major ethnographies or edited volumes. There is also a more reflexive
dimension to these cycles of debate, since anthropologists themselves speak of
'generations of fieldworkers' and authors of reputation often inspire their students to
revisit old problems in a new key. Some of the major authorities on age-class and
generational 'systems', such as Anne-Marie Peatrik, have closely scrutinised the
findings and assumptions of their own teachers and mentors. Nonetheless, the edited
volumes, in particular, evoke transformations in the state-of-play more than single
monographs on group x or group y, mainly because they draw together dozens of
perspectives on the problem and offer alternative ways of analysing it.
From the major volumes on East African 'age systems' published in the last
three decades, it is possible to discern at least three interpretive schemes, all ofwhich
relate to each other in terms of the questions they pose, but not the solutions they
propose. For brevity's sake, I identify these approaches as follows: order versus
disorder (e.g. Abeles and Collard 1985; Baxter and Almagor 1978; Kurimoto and
Simonse 1998); stability and change (e.g Miiller-Dempf 1991; Peatrik 1995; Stewart
1977); and time and historicity (e.g Baxter and Almagor 1978; Rigby 1983; Waller
2000). We might summarise these approaches further by suggesting that each
prioritises and concentrates analysis of 'power', 'demographies', and 'history'
respectively. Although these approaches offer subtle critiques of each other, it is
likely that any attempt to construct a meta-theory of age and generational 'systems' is
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thwarted by the contingencies of actual, living societies. In the end, detailed
ethnography continues to sit awkwardly with comparative theory.
The first recent approach I shall review deals with themes about order and
disorder. Here, authors draw upon political anthropology, providing insights into
internal and external societal conflicts and struggles for power within and between
polities. Exploring this theme, Eisei Kurimoto and Simon Simonse's (1998) edited
volume on North East African 'age systems', Conflict, Age & Power, sought to
highlight how age and generation are central to understanding modem political
transitions in relatively remote polities in southwest Sudan, southern Ethiopia and
northern Kenya. In deference to a comparative approach which looked beyond the
boundedness of 'ethnic' groups, these authors argued that polities that articulate
power struggles through age and generational categories should be studied in terms of
their relatedness within inter- and intra-group political arenas. Their typology was
derived from the ethnographic record, identifying such arenas as the monyomiji
(Simonse 1992; Kurimoto 1995), the asapan (Dyson-Hudson 1963; Gulliver 1958;
Lamphear 1992; Peristiany 1939; Tomay 1999), or the gada (Baxter 1978; Legesse
1973; Schlee 1989). If the Meru were to be included in this kind of arena analysis,
considerations of Gikuyu, Embu, Kamba, Mbeere 'systems' would have to be
compared to those in formation among the Maasai, Okiek, and Samburu as well. The
concept of the contested arena, at once a regional as well as a historical construct,
allows this theoretical approach to study political process alongside cultural history.
The idea of the arena for political drama allowed researchers to ask why age
'systems' act as military and political organisations (Kurimoto and Simonse 1998: 3).
This gives Age, Power and Conflict a functionalist bent, despite some leaning towards
a historical perspective. Yet, this theoretical emphasis clashes with previously edited
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volumes on age and generation which stressed the essentially ideological basis for age-
grading, recruitment into age-classes and the antagonism between the generations (cf.
Abeles and Collard 1985; Baxter and Almagor 1978). In brief, the arena approach put
weight behind the argument that organisation into age-classes and formally constituted
generations was effective in creating community structures against the disordering
tendency of political contest, since conflict within specific social formations, through a
form of complementary opposition between the generations, actually reinforced their
military and political strengths against other groups. In a sense, this view was a
challenge to the position held in Baxter and Almagor's (1978) volume, Age, Generation
and Time, where age-classes and generations represented ideological constructs
through which demographic and social changes were stabilised by cognitive and
structural order (Baxter and Almagor 1978: 5).
The arena approach is relevant to the study of Meru age-class formation,
because many of the significant historical challenges to this form of social organisation
among the Meru came, simultaneously, from within as well as from without. A
perspective which recognises a broad political arena may also deal with the effects of
imperialism and subordination to the 'nation' state. It can accomodate some of the
problems ethnographers face when dealing with societal shifts or transitions, which
highlight disorder over order when placed in a historical context. Few examples of the
arena approach are derived from polities which may claim some form of 'sovereignity'
from the state. Serge Tornay's (1999) ethnography of the Nyangatom of southeastern
Ethiopia is perhaps unique in this regard, since they were still beyond the
administration of the Ethiopian state when Tornay originally carried out his field work
in the 1970s. Nonetheless, even Tornay's later Nyangatom ethnography of the 1990s
acknowledges the political intervention of the state, albeit through the agency of
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Nyangatom actors themselves (Tornay 1998: 110-8). In consideration of its merits,
the arena approach assists to suspend the idea of a 'tribal' unity and opens analysis
up to the contingency of power struggles happening in regional, frontier, or state
contexts.
If disorder and conflict is the anchor of Kurimoto and Simonse's (1998)
volume, the problem of order and rules is the focus of Baxter and Almagor's (1978)
earlier collection. In their comparative work on East African 'age organisations', Age,
Generation and Time, these authors warn against the excesses of approaches
committed to the discovery of hard and fast rules governing age-class formation. Rules
exist, these authors argue, but the sheer unpredictability of human lives often demand
that such rules (as ideals or principles) be afforded flexibility in the form of secondary
alternatives. In practice, much of what pass for primary principles and secondary
rules are, in some instances, overtaken by ad hoc guidelines of recent invention. A
faint echo voicing the transitional character of age and generational systems can be
heard in Baxter and Almagor's edited volume. Transitional elements within
generational systems are resistant to easy explanation, despite the long asserted claim
that crisis and disorder within such social systems are the motor which gives them
their dynamic (Peatrik 1995b). Just as kinship does not exist in the abstract flatness of
a genealogical grid (Yanagisako and Collier 1987), neither do generational systems
'make sense' as a calendrical list of successive generations. Put another way, no social
'system' may stand outside of its own historicity, as long as we understand
'historicity' to mean that social life must be approached as a moment, or a context,
within a very long-term process of social formation (cf. Bayart 1993). Sociological
blueprints of age-class and generational systems would, I presume, appear to be rather
unreal to those persons positioned within them and acting upon them. Contingency is
as much a feature of social organisation by age and generation as the construction of
cognitive and structural guidelines for action. While avoiding rule-bound analyses of
age-class and generational 'systems', it may be more interesting to interpret some of
the tangental social phenomena at the margins of age-class formation. Peatrik's (1995)
insistence on focusing on the disordering, hard to analyse features of age-class
formation over time is particularly relevant. Indeed, in this thesis, one of the main
goals is to highlight the impact of forces like state-rule, migration, wage labour,
commercialisation, education, and religiosity not as extraneous to the operation of the
system, but as part of its modernity.
Theoretical perspectives on the problem of stability and change within age and
generational 'systems' represent the current state-of-play (Miiller-Dempf 1991;
Peatrik 1995b; 1999). Following the earlier, more positivist work of Frank Stewart's
(1977) Fundamentals of Age Group Systems, and its application to Paul Spencer's
(1980) analyses of demography, contemporary ethnography in this vein has become
more, not less, structuralist in its descriptive language. This is not to deny the broad
relevance of such literature to a comparative study of age and generationally based
social organisation, but such language does tend towards reifying social structure and
promoting functionalist interpretations at the expense of detailing where and when
things in practice do not mirror things in theory. As such, much of the literature
dealing with stability and change highlights demographic analysis, a theoretical move
which is matched methodologically by the introduction of computer generated
simulations of long-term demographic processes (Miiller-Dempf 1991). In a sense,
this approach returns to classic sociological problems about the relationship between
social change and population processes. The differential regulation of marriage and
procreation between the generations becomes, in this approach's view, the sociological
basis for political contest and cooperation between the ages (cf. Hazel 2001). Anne-
Marie Peatrik (1995) promoted the idea that age and generational polities are
'demologiques' insofar as they are capable of regulating population processes
sociologically, thereby making the demographic regime of a particular social formation
the subject of political contest. In this view, age-classes are sociological 'systems'
which structure power relations between the generations through constraining the key
questions 'who may I marry?' and 'who may I not?' An echo of this approach is in
the description of these social formations as marriage 'systems' (Mahner 1975). While
this approach is attractive because of its insights into the linkages between social and
demographic transition, its relation to ethnographic method is fraught with difficulties,
especially those which arise from questions about data and their interpretation.
So far, our discussion of theoretical approaches to the study of age-class and
generations in East Africa has dealt with 'power' and 'demographies', but not
'history.' Although elements of all three will feature in this thesis, it is the historical
approach which articulates the ethnography presented here. Taking a cue from Richard
Waller's (2000) argument that the literature on East African 'age organisation' lacks
historical specificity and depth, a new approach to the problem may be undertaken
which reveals the ways in which these forms of organisation foster ongoing debate
about the meanings of history.
Two perspectives emerging from 'cultural history' are insightful here. The first
concerns the view that age-class formation was an element of 'traditional' society
which could not withstand the vicissitudes of capitalism and its developmental
schemes. The second view, somewhat more methodological in scope, has to do with
the problem of perspective and historicity. Historical considerations arc vital to
understanding the wider contexts of fieldwork on age and generation, as Waller readily
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admits, 'Age cycles take many decades to unfold, and there must always be an
underlying historical dimension to studies of how age systems 'work' (Waller 2000:
138). Because time dimensions are critical to both method and theory in the study of
age-class formation and the social and political differentiation of generations, it is
surprising that discussions of 'power' and 'demography' could have placed such
scanty emphasis on 'history.' For the purpose of this thesis, however, it is the
interpretation of age-classes and generations as historical constructions, as much as
part of the expression of a political imagination as the relations within social
organisation, which provides the way forward.
There have been attempts at forging historical explanations for the current
organisational features of age-class and generational 'systems' (e.g. Lamphear 1989;
1992; 1994), but these tend to assume that such organisations will inevitably
disappear. From very early on in the twentieth century, but especially in the 1950s
when much of the pioneering field work in East Africa was being undertaken, there
was a predominant assumption that 'modernisation' posed a grave threat to forms of
social and political organisation premised on age and generational differentiation.
This was a view shared by many colonial administrators, such as the District
Commissioner of Meru, Hugh Lambert, who in 1938, felt that the future of Indirect
Rule was challenged by the disruptions he was witnessing in the form of migrant
labour, religious conversion, and vocational schooling. With feigned nostalgia, he
asserted, 'It is no answer to the problem to say that uneven development is inevitable
and that age-grades and tribal control and discipline will disappear in time' (DC MRU
1/2: 1938). The 'de-tribalised' African was a threat to the political imagination of
British colonialism in the 1930s and there is historical evidence that during this period,
in Meru, those individuals who were incapable of inclusion, or were unwilling to be
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included, into locally formed age-classes were increasing in number. For the first time,
indigenous social organisations, such as age-classes, earned a reputation for being if not
anti-modern, then backward looking.
Historians working in later decades, such as the 1960s, frequently asserted
slightly different shades of the argument that the dissolution of 'age-organisation' was
teleologically inevitable. Reconstructing defunct generational systems and, by
extension, questioning the long term stability of these forms of social organisation
remains a problematic area of inquiry. One of the most contentious historical
reconstructions made its focus the defunct system of the Iteso (Nagashima 1992).
Nobuhiro Nagashima, a historian of western Kenyan and eastern Ugandan societies,
noted that during the 1960s, when he was carrying out his field research, there had
been a highly idiosyncratic attempt of a single individual, a self-proclaimed neo-
traditionalist, to revive the local Iteso 'system.' Nagashima took the view that
'modernisation' is incompatible with age and generationally based 'systems', arguing
that they were abandoned by the generation following imperial conquest and the
building of the railway. However, as Richard Waller (2000) insightfully observes,
Nagashima does not analyse the abandonment of the Iteso 'system' within a regional
context, where the Iteso were realigning themselves away from the Karimojong to their
north, in a bid to exploit the opening up of new markets and economic orientations
along the railway to the south. Likewise, in his fieldwork among the Mbeere, also in
the 1960s, Jack Glazier was compelled to state: 'Age-sets have not been formed since
the early 1950's and generation-sets since the 1930's; an entire generation of Mbeere
people thus has not participated in the age organization and, with their seniors, regard
it as one more aspect of the tribal past' (Glazier 1976: 313). Barely a hundred
kilometres away from where my own fieldwork was carried out - and thirty years
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earlier - Glazier was forced to concede that the 'age-organisation' of the Mbeere 'no
longer mobilises people for significant action' {ibid). How is it, then, that much of the
ethnography in this thesis deals specifically with the 'significant action' of Meru
actors, both young and old, in debating age and generation at the crossroads of social
organisation and political imagination? Neither Nagashima nor Glazier stress that such
systems may be revived, adopted or abandoned within relatively short periods of
time, nor do they make the important argument that 'age-systems operate both in the
short and the very long term' (Waller 2000: 138). Going a little further, no approach
has provided evidence that such 'systems' may even appear to disappear, before re¬
inventing themselves in a new mould. Nagashima's and Glazier's comments on the
question raise even more interesting historical questions. For examples, what does the
abandonment of such social systems in some communities suggest about their
maintenance in others? Or, perhaps more relevant to the problems of fieldwork, how
does the ethnographer's own historicity and perspective influence how they interpret
the viability of an age-class 'system'? How do anthropologists reconcile the
ethnographic present with the problem of generational time?
These latter questions may be stated more methodologically. Historians of the
kind of social formations we have been discussing, Waller points out, often assume a
chronological regularity in the recruitment and succession of different age-classes under
differing historical circumstances (Waller 2000: 138). An example would be Godfrey
Muriuki's (1974) A History of the Kikuyu, 1500-1900, whose entire chronology is
methodologically balanced between the oral histories of age-classes, on the one hand,
and clan fission and migration, on the other:
In discussing their past, the Kikuyu very often indicate the time factor
by phrases as, 'at the time of Iregi', 'when the Manguca were
warriors', or 'the Mungai did it.' This is an indication that not only are
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they very historically minded but also that their mariika, or age sets,
act as milestones of chronology (Muriuki 1974: 15)
The confidence with which Muriuki employs age-class succession as chronology says
little, if anything, about the contingency, disjuncture, debate, and uncertainty which
meet with attempts to form age-classes. Similarly naive chronologies involving age-
class formation have appeared in a number of early East African historiographies, such
as Fosbrooke's (1956) construction of Maasai 'tribal chronology' based on 'age-
setting' (cf. Rigby 1983). The assumption of regular, calendrical patterns in the
historical succession of age-classes and generations harkens back to the metaphor of
the structural-functionalist 'time machine', alluded to above. Against such
historiography, alternative and often contradictory evidence for internal conflict,
changes, and debate is frequently overlooked, despite the significance of such 'history'
in understanding these particular social formations (Waller 2000: 138). This emphatic
use of specific age-classes in historiography echoes that in the political arena where
generation is frequently appropriated as an easily digested or distilled gloss upon
nation-wide or localised political contests.
The methodological problem of when and how and by whom an age-class
'system' is being interpreted has not, so far, been given the priority it deserves. The
reconciliation of the ethnographic present with generational time is a problem with
deep methodological roots. An anthropologist, or an historian, has but only a few
scant years in which to observe the unfolding of social processes which are, almost by
definition, historically mediated. One of the first ethnographers to recognise this
methodological problem was Paul Spencer, who claimed that the memory of past
Chamus age-classes was to be interpreted as an account between 'true history and an
expression of the way in which they structured their traditions at the time of my
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fieldwork in 1977' (Spencer 1997: 134). This is often an insight which stems from
longitudinal fieldwork. Serge Tornay's (1998) Nyangatom ethnography recognises this
in an explicit way, when he describes a long-standing impasse in the asapan, or
handing-over of power rituals, between the Elephants and Ostriches, the two most
senior and rival generation-classes: 'When I returned to the field in November 1991 the
situation had not changed and I learned something which had been carefully hidden
from me' (Tornay 1998: 110). That 'something' was that the Nyangatom blockage on
asapan Tornay had witnessed in the early 1970s was only a brief manifestation of a
longer-term problem of succession. Whereas Tornay's earlier ethnographic
interpretations were that such a stand-off would have been resolved, based on his
reconstructions of the system's temporal models, the later fieldwork demonstrated
that this was not the case. What is being described, hidden from the anthropologist for
more than twenty years, is a long-standing and, probably, predictable standoff
between competing age-classes, a situation that is far from unique. Far from being
machine-like, reducible to computer simulations, Tornay describes the Nyangatom age
'system' in terms of local human agency, which was as significant a factor for
Nyangatom social change as population growth, Christian evangelicism, and
subordination to the Mengistu state. So much for any assumptions about regular,
uncontested calendrical precision in the transmission of power between the
generations!
But the problem of historical perspective does not only rest within the
observations of the ethnographer over differing periods of research. Moreover, there is
an additional question about the shifting perspectives of informants themselves who,
perhaps, would say one thing to the ethnographer as youngsters and quite a different
thing once becoming elders. As Waller's research on Maasai history carefully shows,
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'Observation at a single point in time is thus likely to be misleading. What appears to
be incipient breakdown or dsyfunction in one time frame may be the prelude to
transition in the longer time' (Waller 2000: 140). Not only is there a sociological
problem of succession, but there is also a succession of internal perspectives which
informants, depending on their social position, may hide from the ethnographer who
does not have the comparative advantage of longitudinal field research. In other words,
studying age-class formation and the transmission of power between them is
methodologically problematic from the perspective of the ethnographic present. In
order to begin to capture the sense of contingency, uncertainty, and conflict occurring
over generational time, the ethnographer is compelled to make a historical turn; a move
which makes listening to and interpreting inter- and intra- generational debate even
more salient. It is in this sense, then, that age-class 'systems' may also be viewed as
'communities of argument' (Waller 2000: 141).
But this problem of competing perspectives is long standing. The first study
of an East African age and generational polity to confront this ethnographic problem
was Jean-George Peristiany's (1939) study of the Kipsigis. Peristiany's ethnography
is worth re-reading in light of the ethnography written in the last decade, since this
early work shares many of the same pitfalls and problems as more contemporary
work. In his attempt to reconstruct a social institution perceived to be waning under
the influence of colonial rule, Peristiany asked his elder informants to revive a defunct
ceremonial event, the saget ap eito (or 'killing the bull'), and had this rite performed
for his benefit:
The last generation to have gone through the saget ap eito were the
Kablelach. This ceremony has not been performed since, as the
Government officials were afraid that the presence of a great number of
armed warriors might prove dangerous to the interests of the European
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community. The Nandi laibon Parsirian arap Samoi, who belonged to
the Nyonge ipinda, tried to revive the custom, but it all ended very
unfortunately for him. An accusation was brought against him that he
was trying to disturb the peace, and arap Samoi was imprisoned. My
information on the cutting of the ipinda was collected from old men
who had already gone through it. It was quite a unique chance, as there
are very few of them alive now, and the rising generation knows very
little about this ceremony. The old men called a meeting, which was
attended by a hundred Kipsigisiek of different ages, and between them
they gave me a very good imitation of this ceremony... With the
passing of the saget ap eito, very serious changes were introduced into
the system of the ipinwek (emphasis mine, Persistiany 1939: 37)
This ethnographic example demonstrates the problems of time and historicity which
come into play when studying age-classes and their attendant ceremonies. As an
example illustrating an encounter between elder Kipsigis and an ethnographer during
colonialism, Perisistiany's work raises significant concerns which continue to be
relevant in the present. Firstly, there is a pronounced anxiety on the part of some
social actors, and the foreign ethnographer, that ceremonies leading to the formation of
age and generationally based cohorts may be on their way out. Secondly, there are the
evident contests of power between (colonial) state and ethnic polity (with European
laws outlawing certain ceremonial elements associated with the formation of
successive age-classes) and a heroic attempt among local actors to subvert or resist
such proclamations. This was alluded to above as the anti-modem status of these
organisations, but we do not hear from Peristiany whether the 'rising generation'
thought of the saget ap eito ceremony as decidedly 'anti-modem' as well. Such debate
remains unknown because ethnographers like Persistiany frequently spoke to older
men about such affairs, openly ignoring the views ofwomen and youth. Thirdly, there
is the striking emphasis on the part of the ethnographer to seek authenticity in his
subject matter. This is achieved through encouraging the continued performance of
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ceremony as evidence of its persistent relevance to the social formation in question. It
is not without irony that a 'defunct' ceremony can be quite readily recreated and
revived given the incentive to do so!
What is revealing in this earlier study of an East African 'age organisation' is
that each subsequent cohort of ethnographers who come to study such 'systems'
replicate the same concerns with historical consciousness and reproduce doubts that
the object of their study will remain operational in the years to come. Curiously, the
literature on age and generational 'systems' seems to undergo similar crises. Yet,
according to my reading of the relevant literature, no ethnographer has integrated the
historical underpinnings of such 'systems' in a thick description of how age and
generation find their expression in the political imagination of particular communities.
There are few examples where people are described to be currently organising their
internal tensions, doubts, and uncertainties through sociologically active age-class
formation. Both ethnographers and their informants are subject to shifting
perspectives on age-class formation and, alongside the debates within their separate
'traditions', the relevance and authenticity of studying age and generation in African
contexts is subject to historically volatile waves of interest which, sometimes, may go
underground or become dormant.
Recalling the initial metaphors I drew upon at the beginning of this section, of
the machine and the river, ethnographic approaches to the study of age-class and
generational 'systems' could benefit from analysing the 'history' within more
orthodox analyses of 'power' and 'demographics.' But merely historicising the
problem may not dissolve the more fundamental problem of how age-classes and
generations have been the object of reductionist thinking. Anthropologists have put
considerable intellectual stress on understanding age-classes and generations by narrow
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sociological or demographic analyses. According to some of the authors cited above,
age-class formation and the construction of generationally based identities are the
living reflections of sociological structures. But the analytic recovery of tacit 'rules'
and 'principles', however significant for subsequent social theory, becomes the raison
d'etre of their ethnography, severely distorting how these forms of sociality are
'structures of feelings.' We do not have any example of ethnographies written about
age-class formation which place analytic priority on working out the problems
associated with the shifting perspectives of historical subjectivity. In other words,
there are no examples within this literature which deal with how age-class formation is
experienced by particular kinds of persons at specific historical conjunctures. Writing
ethnography often entails a high degree of abstraction which may efface the personal
and intersubjective encounters during fieldwork (Warren 2001: 64). The challenge to
expose the gulf between theory and lived experience requires some kind of detour in
the ways in which scholars, Africanists in particular, have sought to represent colonial
and postcolonial subjectivities.
Ethnographies on East African age-class formation, informed by a historical
perspective, should attempt to take apart some of the dichotomies, such as 'tradition'
and modernity, which stall critical assessment of theories which assume the
disappearance of 'traditional' forms of organisation (and imagination) and their
replacement by modern ones. Time is indeed 'on the move', as Achille Mbembe
(2001) suggests, but contemporary social theory seems to have stalled on this
question. Following critical searches for an African subjectivity, ethnography must
patiently exploit any possibility for understanding the contemporaneousness of age
and generation in the political imagination of East Africans. To do so, as Mbembe
argues, is to grasp what it means to choose between a 'total identification with
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"traditional" African life (in philosophies of authenticity)' and the 'merging with, and
subsequent loss in, modernity (in the discourse of alienation)' (Mbembe 2001: 12).
Ironically, the first European ethnographers to write about age-class and generational
'systems', such as Peristiany, had the empirical basis to make this argument about
'authenticity' and 'alienation', but not the epistemology.
Beyond entelechy: historicity within the ethnographic present
Anthropology has never really responded to the 'historical problem of
generations' debate (cf. Spitzer 1973). Opting instead to investigate the alterity of'age
and generational' organisation as found, particularly, in the 'great' ethnographic
regions ofAfrica, ethnographers may have overlooked the considerable methodological
problems facing sociological analyses of age-class and generational 'systems.' What
makes this anthropological object intriguing, even befuddling, has been the reluctance
to negotiate the basic problem that generational time presents to historical inquiry.
Perhaps, as a historian researching an indigenous 'historical problem of generation'
among the Maasai, Richard Waller (2000) is able to go beyond others working on the
historicity of age-classes and generations by describing them, aptly I would argue, as
'communities of argument.' Waller introduces, for the first time, the methodological
strain on studying these social and cultural forms of life from the ethnographic
present. The problem of historical perspective suggests that anthropological studies of
age and generation recognise the limitations and horizons cast by their own history of
expanding and contracting theory construction. The anxiety, incidently shared by
Waller, that such modes of organisation, action, and thought are declining,
disappearing, or even collapsing in East Africa suggests less about the object of the
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anthropological gaze and more about the anthropological lens. Obviously, a visit to the
Meru in 1940, just when my story begins, would have produced a vastly different
ethnography, but it would not have resolved an ubiqitious problem: the problem of
historical perspective.
As Alan Spitzer (1973) put it in his critical essay, 'The Historical Problem of
Generations', the problem of historicity - of an attempt to tell stories about what 'we'
or 'they' went through as a claim about authentic, long term historical experience - is
that 'each generation writes its own history of generations' (Spitzer 1973: 1353). As
Spitzer demonstrates for us, this is not an argument about entelechy, a blow-by-blow
account of what 'really' happened, but of shifting perceptions, relationships, and
modalities of action within a familiar, recursive old concept:
[Pjerhaps, when contemporary generational differences force themselves
on the consciousness of historians they rediscover significant age-specific
relationships in the past. Given our recent past, the current preoccupation
with past generations was predictable, but as is appropriate for historians
we shall probably run somewhat behind events, flooding the market with
histories of generations just when our present generational crisis has
evaporated. There is nothing wrong with this - our responsibility does not
lie in being up-to-date but in the effective application of what has been a
vague, ambiguous, and stretchable concept to the explanation of past
events (Spitzer 1973: 1353).
This is precisely how Meru 'apply' the concept of generation in the telling of their
history. Importantly, most Meru remain quiet about the tacitly accepted problems
associated with their age-class formation when they are in the mode of narrating their
history. Specific 'facts' relating the historicity of a particular group of people,
whether a dynastic story about a clan or a tale about the exploits of a group of
initiates, are relatively less important than the identification of where the mentioned
group may be located in a long-term framework for history which is both progressive
and recursive in its theoretical underpinnings (cf. Peel 1987: 282). Here, the historicity
of generation is a trope in the explanation of more general entanglements of 'good' and
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'bad' events, relationships, happenings, and processes. The nthuki, as the age-class
and the generation are called, contains such flexibility in meaning and 'application', not
to mention organisation, that it becomes a powerful metaphor among the Meru as a
community of argument.
These dynamics are most visible in the aftermath of what Veena Das (1995)
calls 'critical events', happenings which relocate and reappraise the problems
associated with categories of tradition. To follow Das a little closer, the problem for
contemporary anthropological writing about 'East African age-class and generational
systems' is not that they are dealing with something which has 'collapsed' - a granary
collapses, a generation simply dies off - but that 'old concepts, being asked to inhabit
unfamiliar spaces, acquire a new kind of life' (Das 1995: 1). The methods used to
understand how 'critical events' transfigure the anthropological 'object', in this case
age-class formation and the historicity of generation, must recognise the residual traces
of 'traditional' modes of action, not as the ruins of modernisation, but as manifestly
new modes of action and forms of life. In other words, I aim to argue that age-class
formation in Meru, Kenya, continues to be of significance because it is, as Spitzer
argues about 'generations', indeterminate and flexible. The relevance of the Kimeru
concept of nthuki to new and old 'generations' is that new modes of action and
thought may be reorganised around a residual, old concept.
Social theory remains challenged in reconciling material social change with the
multiple perspectives through which it is recognised and voiced. This is especially the
case when 'age organisation' is the focus, provoking the idea that when certain 'rules'
or 'principles' are abandoned the entire 'system' becomes defunct. There is less
committment to historicising the changes which may occur within social relations and
identities spread across and between generational times. Even less attention is paid to
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the successive transformation of the many 'rules' and 'principles' through which
people meaningfully organise themselves. Claims such as, 'once placed within an age-
class, one does not, in effect, defect from it' (Stewart 1977) may be questioned by the
particulars of persons' biographies, some of whom may have never been effectively
positioned in such a categorical manner, but may claim a more interstitial position vis-
a-vis others. Perhaps one generation comes into being through a set of 'rules' and
'principles' which turn out, historically, to be quite unique to a specific cohort
experiencing particularly formative political and economic conditions. As such, social
action is often closely associated with the consciousness a particular age-class has of
its position relative to other classes. Its participants become acutely aware - even
reflexive, one might say - of their collective actions upon the wider social arena.
Ironically, these same social actors may, or perhaps may not, be aware of the rules and
principles which constrain other possible courses of action or behaviour.
Reflexivity within generations, such that they form distinct social identities, is
by no means a Zeitgeist expressing the 'spirit of the times.' Such fuzzy, romanticist
notions are perhaps more effective when employed as ideology, rather than as theory
for grounded ethnography. In post-colonial Kenya, for example, the term 'Uhuru
Generation' {uhuru, Swa. for freedom, emancipation) was originally coined by
journalists to celebrate those citizens who were born during the presidency of Jomo
Kenyatta, Kenya's independence leader who died in 1978. Latterly, however, the term
came to symbolise the crisis of collective memory assumed for youth who had no
historical consciousness of having been colonised subjects and, hence, little in the way
of radical, subaltern nationalism (cf. Mbembe 1985; Werbner 1998). Nobody
encountered during fieldwork who fit into this age category claimed identification with
the Uhuru Generation, although I frequently heard it being employed critically as
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either a kind of cynical slur about the 'younger generation' (1964-1978); or as a term
used to describe people now in mid-life who shared some of the post-independence
optimism. Because the term is never used for younger persons who were born
sometime around the presidency of Daniel arap Moi (1978-2003) identification with
the Uhuru Generation is not synonymous with a Zeitgeist of the postcolony. Any
search for such a 'spirit' of Kenya's postcolonial history would have to first
distinguish between overlapping and frequently contradictory expressions of
postcolonial subjectivity, before concluding that no such 'spirit' exists, apart from a
struggle for subjectivity.
The kind of reflexivity which gives rise to the self-identification of specific
cohorts is dealt with in this thesis as the historicity of generation. When talking about
the historicity of generation, there emerges the possibility to approach the study of
age and generation as categories which are entangled historically in the lives of different
individuals, to the point that interpretation of the meanings of these categories are in
flux with the changing situations and moments that define subjectivity. Following
Bayart's (1993) grasp of historicity as the idea that 'politics must always be
understood as a moment in a complex and very-long term story' (Leys 1996: 40), this
thesis argues that the 'discursive genre' through which Meru tell their story has been
that of the different age-classes or nthuki. Nthuki - as both a flexible concept and a
specific organisation of individuals into age and generationally based groups - is the
operative concept to be explored in this thesis. Locally significant debate and
contestations are framed and organised, at differing historical conjunctures, through the
respective age-class formation of people separated by age, gender and generation.
Vignettes drawn from fieldwork encounters, contested exegeses of social life,
transcribed narrative and songs, documents and other publications, biography and
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autobiographies all come together to argue that people are not the same. This approach
grounds fuzzier concepts such as entelechy or Zeitgeist in the social practice of specific
individuals, and groupings of persons, when they come to speak about or enunciate
that their subjectivity and identity is emmeshed within a particular time or historical
crossroad. The ethnographer can only get glimpses of this relation to history. It is
limited by the lives of informants. Historicity is not necessarily interpretable over
periods of time stretching beyond the biographic horizons of its protagonists.
This kind of reflexivity is the site of ongoing contests and conflicts. It is
specific and particular to the construction of the historical present, despite remaining
with its protagonists in the acts of memory and forgetting; affirming and gainsaying;
predicting and divining. Such reflection on a generation's place in the order of things
does not occlude fantasies of the future. The particularity of each generation, including
its own debates and lack of cohesive subjectivity, emphasises the need to reflect on
the position from which a social identity or action has been fashioned. Because of the
possibility of estrangement from their parental and filial counterparts, East African
age-classes offer a unique and experimental study of shifting historical and social
identities. Age-classes, however, do not always reflect all of the transitions occuring
over generational time, nor do they embody their historicity in isolation of other
socially constituted positions. An age-class comes into being through the social
compulsion to slap boundaries around self-knowledge. Just as the historicity of a
given individual is expressed in an intersubjective context, the entelechy identifying the
experiences of a generation comes about through a constant negotiation of the
conditions of the present. From a historical and ethnographic perspective, this is what
makes the study of separate, successive age-classes so crucial to understanding
transition within societies articulated upon what the literature has called a generational
67
'system.'
During the Meru fieldwork, the historicity of all living generations was only
available through intersubjectivity and dialogue. From encounter to encounter, the
narration of historical experiences (in the context of research on age-classes) brimmed
over with potential comparisons between the present and the past. For example, an
aged couple recalled being instructed by the authorities to hide in the forest after word
spread, in 1941, that a market town some twenty kilometres from Meru, Isiolo, had
been bombed by an enemy Italian airplane. These elders described how the word
spread so rapidly that there was panic. The chiefs, or kaborio7, told people to stay in
hiding. Certainly news of the attack's failure, much touted by the District
Commissioner of the time, reached their remote valley neighbourhood much later than
areas like Mutindwa, Maua, and Mikinduri. Remembered sixty-three years later as a
terrifying event, I found myself reflecting on the impact of news upon my own
historicity. Could I forget the images and mixed emotions associated with '9/11'?
Likewise, news about the violence of urban vigilante groups, especially the Mungiki
sect, brought about comparisons with the Mau Mau by many of those who had
experienced the violence of the Emergency from 1952-1958. The creation of a
historical analogue, like the use of allegory, is often a means through which to
comment and act upon the construction of the present through the idioms of the past.
The imagined stability of a generation, slow to come into social being before its gradual
decline, has a kind ofmotility which allows for flexibility in the telling of history.




Communities of Argument: uncertainties of Meru age-
class formation
The great debate? Meru idioms of change and transition
The bulk of this thesis turns around Kimeru concepts and practices related to
age-class formation in differing historical contexts. For readers unfamiliar with the
extensive ethnographic and historical literature on age and generational 'systems', the
task of analysing and representing how Meru conceive of their particular 'system' is
daunting. An entire thesis dedicated to this kind of description would be warranted
instead of this brief chapter.
Indeed, the extensive ethnographic treatment of Meru's generational polity
carried out by Anne-Marie Peatrik, based on her research in the late 1980s, is one of
the most detailed studies of any East African age-class 'system' (Peatrik 1999). While
Peatrik's research goes into further detail about local categories of thought and practice
than any other studies of the Meru, its ambition towards representing the Meru as an
ethnographic entity, a community, is simultaneously its limitation because it does not
represent Meru 'culture' as an arena of interpretation. When seen as an arena where
debate and differentiated points of view are as dynamic to its interpretation as the
rhetoric about its coherence and continuity, expounded by its powerful, such
ethnographic ambitions to represent the 'Meru' as a collectivity become impossible to
substantiate (cf. Rapport 2003: 381). The problem of historical perspective which I
encountered during fieldwork assumes a greater significance in this work than that of
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previous ethnographers writing about the Meru. As far as Peatrik's research has
stimulated my own, her work stands as a kind of sociological humus from which many
of my own fieldwork questions grew. It is important, at this stage in my research, to
state that where Peatrik's concern was with the sociology of how Igembe and Tigania
Meru time and segregate the reproduction of successive generations, my ambition has
been to represent the historicity of internal debates among the Meru about the
viability of their age and generational 'system' in the vicissitudes of late colonial and
postcolonial history. In this important difference lies the potential to take
anthropological thinking about both age and generation a few modest steps towards a
new horizon of understanding.
The aim of this chapter is to introduce Kimeru concepts which have entered
into local debates in Meru Central and Meru North about the 'breakdown of tradition'
and the compelling ideological forces of 'modernisation.' This debate is probably
ubiquitous within African societies and is deeply implicated in the arguments ofmany
Africanists about Africa. These debates cannot really be understood in an abstract
manner. While people hold an array of differing opinions on what constitutes the
'traditional' and the 'modern' as categories of thought and action, it is clearer to the
lived expression of these debates to argue that they are actually about loss and
redemption, on the one hand, and alienation and emancipation, on the other (cf.
Mbembe 2001). Whether the forms of argument are storytelling, rumour, gossip, or
versions of oral history, listening to such debates allow a researcher to approach
contemporary subjectivities through the idioms in which they are articulated. An
outcome of this chapter is to demonstrate that colonial, but especially postcolonial
themes of loss and redemption or alienation and emancipation have problematised
'Western' interpretations of tradition and modernity. As far as these concepts are seen
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refracted in Western social theory as theories about continuity and change, they are
bound to be hotly contested by those who would wish to make these terms their own.
This problem has to do with the ways in which social theory - and by extension
Western epistemologies and sensibilities - has owned the terminology surrounding
debates on tradition and modernity.
This debate is also at the heart of Lynn Thomas' (2003) study of historical
changes in women's position in Meru society during the twentieth century. Thomas
has examined the role of local elites, missionaries, and state administrators in struggling
to redefine and change women's initiatory practices, and through doing so changed
women's political position under colonialism. In the process of telling this story, she
has outlined the emergence of critical arguments about gender and the morality of
reproduction. Using an array of legal case studies and oral testimony for periods in the
1920s and 1930s, particularly the early attempts to outlaw infanticide and abortion, as
well as the lowering of the age of female initiation, Thomas' research goes further than
any other historical writing on Meru in demonstrating how local actors have reworked
their subjectivities through transforming their social organisation. In her discussions of
postcolonial debates about premarital pregnancies and the rash of paternity suits in
the law courts, mostly occurring in the 1960s with the introduction of new Affiliation
Acts, Thomas clearly contextualises the debate over the 'breakdown of tradition'
within local understandings of age and generation as entwined in the 'politics of the
womb.'8
Thomas effectively demonstrates how gender has been part of the debate about
tradition and modernity in Meru because, like age or generation, it is one of the
8 Thomas' (2003) concept of the 'politics of the womb' brings gender analysis to a critique of Jean-
Franijois Bayart's (1993) 'politics of the belly', arguing that reproduction has historically been
politicised in African societies and that Bayart's theoretical argument has insufficiently grasped the
relations between men and women as an arena of reproductive politics.
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primary axes through which subjectivities are differentiated in the political
imagination. Key to Thomas' interpretation of changes in how Meru thought about
'proper' ways of conceiving and birthing children is the recognition that women were
incorporated into the age-class and generational 'system' through their relation with
men, particularly their fathers, husbands, and sons. As this 'system' was frequently
subjected to interventions on behalf of the state or local elites, women's roles as elders
and midwives, 'traditionally' powerful figures in the guise of an organised women's
council (known as nkirote or nkatha among the Imenti, kaaria among the Tigania and
Igembe), were gradually eroded and the politics of reproduction subordinated to the
politics of succession. The resulting argument is that women's position in Meru
society was undermined by their exclusion from being participants in the formation of
spousal-classes which mirrored the age-class formation of men. Both spousal-classes
and age-classes have the same gloss in Kimeru. The strength of Thomas' interpretation
lies less in her empirical proof and more in her idea that subjectivity is constantly in
flux and that when it comes to the analyses of social differentiation and the debate it
engenders in any community or culture, as an arena of interpretation, all the interstices
(age, generation, gender - perhaps - class) must be taken into consideration.
Taken together, Thomas' interpretation of historically shifting personhood is
supported by Peatrick's sociological treatment of the question. By highlighting the
'politics of the womb' in colonial and postcolonial states' natalist policies, Thomas
has shown how Meru subjectivities have been historically transient, shifting, and
uncertain in the context of Kenya's tumultuous political-economy. As the debates
over 'custom' and the meanings of tradition have found voice in growing ambivalences
about modernisation and development, this thesis recognises that the formation of age-
classes has played a critical part in recreating the Meru as a community of argument
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through the contested ideas of tradition and modernity.
Nthuki: historicising selves and subjectivities
Central to this debate are local questions about social identity and civic virtue
as articulated by people's differential placement within age-classes, which are called
nthuki in Kimeru. Age-classes, or nthuki, are at the centre stage of local drama around
the question of the 'breakdown of tradition' and modernisation theory, although I tend
to think a more recent interpretation of this debate among the Meru has been to argue
about the 'failure of modernity.' Nthuki are as much vocabulary and trope in everyday
conversation as they are relations and organisations among concrete groups of people
differentiated by age, generation, and gender. The question whether nthuki - the word
- comes to mean 'age-class', 'generation', or 'spousal class' depends upon the context
in which it is evoked. As will be argued in greater detail below, the organisation of
nthuki - the groups - affect such diverse facets of social life such as initiation,
reproductive entitlement, marriage, ritual knowledge, and political association. This
thesis goes a little further in arguing that nthuki, as a trope in the public imagination of
the Meru, have also been elemental in expressing people's experiences of migration,
education and Christianity over the past sixty or seventy years. In this thesis,
speaking of age-classes (nthuki) as word and concept should be distinguished from
situations where the term means a specific group of persons. My impression is that
Meru themselves make such a distinction.
As such, the vocabulary of nthuki express a swathe of issues related to the
'breakdown of tradition' and 'failure of modernity' debate; but at periods of
intensification in the organisation of ritual activities, such as initiation, or as we will
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see in a later chapter, generational succession, the concept of nthuki may be
understood as a concrete reference to people brought together by their similar age,
generation, or gender. It is the flexibility and centrality of nthuki, as both sociological
and ideological referents, which has put age-classes beyond sociology and into the
realm of symbol, metaphor, and trope.
Among the different Kimeru-speaking communities where I carried out my
research, Imenti and Tigania (and to a more limited degree Igembe), one sure method of
engaging with informants and their ideas about the world was to begin talking about
nthuki. In doing so, a complex story about origins, loss, and redemption could be
traced. As such, debate about the making of a community through the historical
formation of age-classes may be a portal onto Meru political thought, articulated by
vernacular theories of history and society. Yet, importantly, following Caroline
Hamilton's (1998) notion of historical entanglements, what this debate most strongly
demonstrates is that the vernacular must be understood politically as a process, or
becoming, in which crude assertions of'African' or 'European' concepts remain duds,
mere abstractions upon the specific historicity of Meru as a community of argument.
Another way of putting this critical idea is that while age-classes were not a colonial
'invention', neither are they the residual evidence of a timeless indigenous past. Nthuki
are formed in time and woven into the telling of Meru history, not as a seamless
narrative of all time, but of specific times and critical events.
Understanding this kind of historical difference requires some methodological
reflection. Luise White (2000) is one of the few historians who has actively admitted
that there is a problem associated with historicising African selves in attempts to
uncover, hint at, or discuss the problem of the African subject. In her reading of East
and Central African vampire stories, as a study of rumour and gossip as sources for
74
colonial history, White confronts the problem that Africanists often speak of
'historical subjectivities' without any prior reflection on how past and present
subjectivities may significantly differ :
When people talk about what they did in the past, are they talking about
their present-day personas or about ones from an earlier era? How can we
know what someone was like - what they felt and thought - in their
twenties without rewriting their lives for them? In some parts of Africa, we
have enough information to hint at some changing notion of self, but for
most places, we relied on vast oversimplification of personalities in order
to use oral sources. What someone says in 1990 about himself or herself in
1935 is taken to be true because the same person is doing the talking.
Historians rarely ask if the experience is described with the insights of
1990 or 1935, however. Similarly, what we know about African selves in
the 1980s and 1990s is applied to recorded testimonies from 1913 or 1947
(White 2000: 67).
White urges historians (and ethnographers) to think about the problems associated
with historicising selves from different periods of time and from differing
perspectives. This is a point echoed by Richard Waller - cited earlier - that youth,
women, and elders will always speak of themselves differentially, at different
historical periods, according to their position in the social scheme of things. For this
discussion, the important point is that historicity - the shaping of self and subjectivity
at specific times and critical events - is built up and imagined over a lifetime. As this is
challenging enough when dealing with individuals, how can the problem be resolved
when coping with groups such as age-class and generation?
Meru age-classes enter into arguments and debates about the meanings of
tradition and modernity because they give local actors the rhetorical tools necessary to
historicise their selves. Both the vocabulary of nthuki as a kind of Foucauldian
'technology of speaking', and the way in which age-classes specify sociological and
existential differentiation amongst people of separate ages, allow Meru to express their
historical positionality within the ongoing, recursive story of change/modernisation
and continuity/tradition. In other words, by belonging to an age-class either by
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initiation, or marriage as in the case of married women, an individual acquires the
power to make themselves as subjects within a history that is longer term than the
specific times and critical events they have encountered in their lifetimes. Another
factor which differentiates nthuki into separate sociological entities is the contingency
of historical processes and events. One grouping may experience famine during their
initiations, thus postponing the complete formation of the group, while other
successive groupings do not experience this difficulty, but are confronted by an
increased threat of a different nature at a later point in their formation, such as a series
of virulent diseases which affect their children's health. But when these groups come
to speak, to insiders and outsiders, about their different historical experiences, they
employ similar rhetorical schemes in the use of the nthuki as idioms of authenticity, of
having-been-there.
Based on my fieldwork experience, I will argue that debates about the
breakdown of tradition and the failures ofmodernity are critical in Meru constructions
and reconstructions of their community. I have not written about the long history of
sociological transition among Kimeru-speaking communities here, because the
intention is to put the ethnographic present into a historical perspective of fairly
recent origin. I assume Luise White's observation that the past is inflected in stories
told about the present and that the present is always 'present' in stories about the
past. There is a problem of interpretation within all attempts to historicise selves or
subjectivities, limited by a variety of factors, including short periods of fieldwork
experience.
I am convinced that there is a need for historically sensitive studies of
postcolonial Kenya, as part of a rupture from the scholarly attentions that the colonial
period has warranted. Although I will occasionally trace the foundations of these key
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debates about tradition and modernity to the entanglements of indigenous and colonial
ideas, my primary concern throughout fieldwork and analysis has been to examine the
differences in the historicity of living generations. This positions this thesis within
certain historical horizons which, I argue, are derived from the fact that very few of
my informants experienced early colonialism and most were born after the 1940s. The
1940s are highlighted as a kind of historical watershed because most elder informants
reminded me that this period 'stood apart' from earlier periods. One of the
consequences of the decades following the 1940s is the elaboration of the 'breakdown
of tradition' and 'modernisation' debate which has dominated many strands of local
political throught in the postcolonial period. Indeed, shortly after this story begins in
the 1940s, the elders of central Kenya, if not all aged Kenyans, perhaps witnessed the
single most 'critical event' in the history of the country in the form of Mau Mau and
the declaration of the State of Emergency from 1952 to 1956. Mau Mau continues to
attract a flow of new research and debates among Africanist historiographers despite
the fact that this conflict occured half a century ago. I argue that Kenyan
historiography must take into account postcolonial subjectivities. Following this
committment, my arguments also spill over into vernacular constructions of the future,
prophesy, morality, and the meanings of history without trying to exoticise the
research matter. In this guise, the thesis attempts to translate thought about continuity
and change which is often not in agreement with the dominant - shall I say
'Eurocentric'? - ideas about what constitutes tradition and modernity.
In paying close attention to the ways in which age-class formation intersects
with these entangled concepts, a broad representation of the historicity of generation
and the problems with historical perspective illuminates the difficulties with
hegemonic concepts of social change and historical process. Yet, the age-classes which
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I seek to describe and represent have a sociological presence in the lives of Meru, a
recognition that I do not ignore, but suspend as a kind of 'folk model' which has the
potential to reveal more than the historically shifting field of social relations. The age-
classes, or nthuki as they will continue to be called in this thesis, continually change
their organisation and structure alongside the transformations of what they mean to
the persons positioned within (and without) them, an observation that has been
downplayed in the more significant literature on the question of age and generational
'organisation' or 'systems.' In more blunt terms, the nthuki are apt motifs about the
social consequences of change, even potent metaphors through which this debate
about community can be expressed and understood within a particularly rich local
idiom. As a common trope organising debate in this community of argument, nthuki
represents actions, thoughts, situations, and moments for which the
tradition/modernity dichotomy is inappropiate. That dichotomy is derived from the
experiences of being colonised and struggling against or through this experience. Hence,
in appropriations of the notion of 'tradition', the Meru meaning steers towards
authenticity, and in accepting modernisation theory, Meru may justifiably be evoking
a project of redemption.
In the following sections of this chapter, I illustrate some ethnographic cases
involving age-classes in the debates over the 'breakdown of tradition' and
'modernisation' through the different perspectives of parents and children over the
socially necessary rite of initiation. The transformation of child into adult through
circumcision or clitoridectomy is wide spread in Africa and elsewhere, but here my
concern is about initiation as a precursor to the wider social formation of separate age-
classes. Because the terminology of Mem age-class formation is extensive, I do not
aim for a comprehensive treatment of the subject in this chapter. It is preferable to
introduce some of the more general concepts and practices involved in forming distinct
age-classes, while also demonstrating the historicity of specific groupings through
exploring the significance of their names in tracing the critical events which occurred
sometime in their formation. These names permit a partial understanding of the
significant debates which have contributed in making the Meru a community of
argument.
'Batfganiacircumcision and the ceremonial context of debate
In both Imenti and Tigania communities, the periods of the year set aside for
organising the circumcision of boys (and to a more politicised, but hidden extent, those
of girls) witness no blind reproduction of the social order, but perhaps its opposite: a
public debate about the disorder in which social actors perceive themselves to be
engulfed. In the tensions of circumcision and, hence, age-class formation, parents,
sponsors, and initiates may find the means to actually break with the ideals,
principles, and rules which are abstracted from the idea of a polity organised around
age, generation, and gender. Negotiations over the meanings of age-class formation, at
any given time, imply a sustained and active sense of historical reflection, and
ambition, towards the goal of doing things a better way. Perhaps sensing their own
engagement in argument and debate, some of my Tigania informants cultivated a self-
deprecatory humour. Playing upon the verb, gutigania, 'to disagree', the joke was that
"We argue, yes, we are the Batigania" ('those who disagree'), a double play on the
meaning ofTigania.
A few brief ethnographic instances must suffice to illustrate how ceremonial
contexts may lead to debate and rebuttal about tradition and modernity. Late into the
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driest season (thaano) during the circumcision period of August and September 2002,
parents in several central Tigania locations were busy organising their sons' 'coming-
out' ceremonies (guturanyumba). The initiates had, by this time, spent approximately
three weeks to a month in the seclusion of a separate dwelling and were anticipating
being reabsorbed back into social life as young adults. The 'coming out' ceremony is
normally the single most important event in any youth's life. This entailed the
purchase or acquisition of large amounts of food stuffs and other commodities such as
new clothing. Parents are not only responsible for feeding their sons or other boys
they were circumcised with, such as cousins, but they are also burdened to feed an
array of invited and uninvited guests. The prospect of overspending on such
ceremonies, or even falling into debt, is a source of worry among the poorer of
households. Such auspicious events are often the source of considerable stress.
Even the gifts of new clothing, given to the intiates to symbolise their new
adult status, are subject to muted controversy. Sisters of initiates I interviewed
commented on their brothers' transformed identities, expressed through expensive new
clothing, with mild envy. For the most part, girls no longer endure an initiatory
experience, although older women who underwent excision (gutaanithua) related to me
that they were given an assortment of special items for adornment, usually beads or
printed cloth, which symbolised their new station in life. Although stripped of any
clothing while in seclusion, the initiate and his peers are given new trousers, shoes and
shirt as gifts, symbolising their return to social life and, in particular, their emergence
as a young adult. The new clothes, often replacing tattered school uniforms, symbolise
becoming a young adult. More general observations may be made from the donning of
new clothing upon the re-insertion of initiates into social life. In past performances of
circumcision rites and 'coming out' ceremonies, the changing of one's way of dressing
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symbolised their newly acquired status and advancement in the life course. On that
day of 'coming out', the initiate dresses like an adult, proudly displaying his new
status through his clean, smart, and new clothing while - above other considerations -
cultivating a serious countenance befitting the importance of the event. The envy of
girls, in particular, suggested that their own passage into adult life, now completed
through marriage and bearing children, is perceived in less momentous terms. Such
comments added to debate about circumcision in the context of gender disparity and
the relative absence of clearly demarcated life-course transitions in female lives.
To make these occasions memorable and significant to all participants, an
extraordinary pulse of activities is usually required. Most of the day-time work
involved in food and gift provision is undertaken by parents (aciart) and other
'daylight fathers' (beethe ba muthenya) or sponsors (agwati, sing, mugwati). The
special role of the 'daylight fathers' was explained to me as the "cultural fathers of the
ntaani\ meaning that these men were charged with visiting the initiates while they are
in seclusion and instructing them on certain moral and practical issues involved in their
transformation from child to young adult. In the space of a month, these youth are
changed from an uncircumcised lad (mwiji) to an initiate (ntaanf) to a 'warrior'
(muthaka). The sponsor, or mugwati, fulfills the role of a minder, making sure that the
initiates have enough food to eat and carefully monitoring the healing of their wounds.
Despite the considerable effort that parents, the 'daylight fathers' and the sponsors
make, their work is generally overshadowed by the extravert and nocturnal activities of
'warriors' (nthaka). The nthaka (sing, muthaka) are those circumcised, unmarried
youth who involve themselves intently and intimately with the activities of the
circumcision seasons. Slightly older, the sponsors are charged with keeping the
secluded intiates safe from rough treatment by a steady flow of visiting 'warriors', as
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well as being responsible for cleaning the initiate's wounds and instructing them in the
ethics of initiatory lore, which is generally social and sexual in content. In the dark of
night, for weeks on end, nthaka were to be heard singing and dancing along the
footpaths en route to the 'closed' houses of the newly initiated where, purportively,
they would engage in their 'secret' activities9: visiting, feasting, and hazing.
In my discussions with a variety of older persons, concerns were voiced over
the quantities of food consumed by the young men and their commitment to hazing
which was, in the opinion of many of those I spoke with, an unacceptable form of
bullying. Amongst the nthaka themselves, hazing was thinly disguised as a kind of
'education.' Several parents complained that, in comparison to past performances, the
burden of material and social responsibilities for the circumcision of boys had fallen
away from community and landed hard upon parents. According to this line of
argument, circumcision was a collective responsibility in the past, where mothers'
brothers (muntuetu) and not fathers (beethe) were called upon to provide for the
initiate's needs. This was one of the first debates I encountered about Meru
'tradition.' Arguments about circumcision tended to outline the rising costs of living,
alongside a growing confusion about how to balance the conflict of 'traditional' and
'modern' moralities. For a wide spread example, should a parent insist that their sons
undergo a group circumcision, despite doubts about hygiene and infectious diseases?
In recent decades, parents have grown wary of the health risks associated with
circumcision, especially with concern to the hygiene of implements used on their sons
and the ever-present threat of hepititus-c and HIV infections. Although group
circumcision is still practiced in parts of Tigania and Igembe, it has almost completely
9 It is not my intention here to elaborate on activities which I observed, mostly in 1998, while acting
as a mugwatt (or sponsor), by default, for two badly infected ntaani. I was called upon, by an
overwhelmed friend, to assist to nurse them back to health. In 2001-2003, being slightly older, I was
differentially positioned as a 'married man' and as an observer saw events from a different perspective.
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Plate 2: Imenti boys awaiting their circumcision. 1949-1950'°
'11 This photograph was taken by Joy Adamson under contract for the Government of the Colony of
Kenya in 1949 and 1950.
83
ceased among the Imenti, who advocate the operation being done in a clinic. The
public health worker has largely replaced the mutaani or local circumcisor among the
Imenti. Some parents have gone even further and eliminated the pain factor of
circumcision by paying for local anaesthesia. The following, from an interview with an
Imenti elder about why 'traditional' initiations and the naming of separate
circumcision groups were increasingly difficult to organise, was a typical remark made
by 'modern' parents on the initiations of their youngest sons:
"Mariitwa ja kiria giatuniire twbadilisha, utikuona, kethira ni igiita ria
itaana, eekuru ibakiaga marwa na biatho bakarigwa bia ntuku iria
bagataanwa... yaani...bataanwa uu nkuruki ya bwiji mirongo itano biria
amwe na mutaani ari iimwe na mutaani teeka ari daktari... ni mutaani tu
binfasfi, nandi muntu gakomiria gutemwa waigua murimo ni shauri yako,
indi nacio nthaka cigukaritie ukiija gukira nuu mwanka urwe. Nandi
turona ngugi iria mbuthu igwiita gutaana aana tutikubaa thiina"
"What made us change those names was, you see, like in the circumcision
period women were constantly making marwa (millet beer) and feasting
on those days they were being cut... I mean... More than fifty lads all
together and one circumcisor and that one isn't even a doctor, he was just
a self-styled circumcisor, but one had to persevere anyway. If you got sick
it was your own affair, but the nthaka are watching you to see any fear: if
so, you were to be beaten. Now we see that this work is simpler if we
circumcise our children without making them suffer"
While not against the entirety of initiatory experiences, concern about feeding large
numbers of nthaka at the expense of their sons' physical safety bled into larger
critiques about the generalised poverty of the community, the disruptive activities of
'idle' youth, new perceptions of risk, and the stalled nature of social development.
On one occasion during the circumcision period of August 2002, in Ankamia of
central Tigania, I encountered these entangled critiques about contemporary initiation
rather haphazardly. While chatting on a narrow footpath with a locational Chief, three
nthaka ran single-file down a slope towards us at a brisk pace. The jingle-jangle of
their anklet bells and their whoops and hollers made it imperative that we -
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government chief and visiting anthropologist - climb into the prickly hedging to avoid
their path. Armed with short swords and adorned with plastic flowers, they looked
the part of 'warriors'; belied little by their grubby nguu da githaka (bush clothing),
stained calico from weeks of accumulated dust and sweat. Returning to conversation,
the chief surprised me by launching into a critique of contemporary initiations,
suggesting that they (the Tigania) had to "let go of this culture", which he clearly
perceived as 'backwards.' In his view, the current nthaka were caught up in something
they could not possibly understand. Their grandparents and even their fathers, he
explained, had something to gain from 'tradition', while present youth had only to lose
"by clinging on to the ways of the past." Contrasting these contemporary nthaka to
their grandparent's generation, the chief maintained that while their motive was the
plates of food served at each house they visited day and night, their predecessors were
motivated by more martial and moral ideals. He stressed a responsible aspiration
towards marriage and having children as a primary ideal of the past nthaka. He
questioned the legitimacy of indulging young men their ceremonial life, while the rest
of the community dug deep into their pockets to satisfy them. In his own location, he
asserted, he pushed a policy that made circumcision a private matter between a boy
and his parents, as well as insisting that the circumcision was done in a hospital or
clinic. Regardless of his 'good' policy, he was having little impact on transforming
circumcision towards the ideals he upheld. While conceding that poverty was the 'root
cause' of all the damaging aspects of contemporary social life, he felt confident to
interdict today's youth for misunderstanding all that they had been taught at schools
and in the churches.
What this 'misunderstanding' entailed was not clear, but further conversations
with parents of initiates hinted at a widely-spread view that the subjectivities of
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ntaani and nthaka had changed dramatically over the past generation. Although
circumcision is taken very seriously in contemporary Meru, parents are divided over
how circumcisions should be performed. I attended three circumcisions in 1998 and
2001 while staying in Imenti, and witnessed several 'coming out' ceremonies during
my 2002-2003 fieldwork in Tigania. More and more ntaant are being sent to clinics for
their operations in Imenti, an innovation that was until recently reflective of economic
class differences, but in Tigania this practice is seen by a large number of people as
lacking authenticity.
Forced circumcisions: authenticity and discipline in question
Although there is disageement about what constitutes a 'traditional'
circumcision event, the idea of authenticity is so strong as to influence an individual's
status among peers, as well as define different kinds of moral personhood. Take, for
example, the case of two Tigania youth who were 'cut' in the government hospital at
Miathene, an administrative centre some ten kilometres from Mikinduri. A week into
the August 2002 circumcision period, they discussed with me why they could not
participate in the nightly dances and visitations, nor approach the kiene (circumcision
field), a location where the circumcisor met with rows of boys to be initiated. One of
them confided that he would be beaten or "even cut again" if he witnessed the event,
adding that "those ones who are cut the Kimeru way look down on us who went
Kiswahili." The reference to languages, the vernacular and the national language of
Kenya, is frequently heard to describe the differences between boys circumcised
together by a mutaani (circumcisor) and those operated on in a clinic by a nurse or
doctor. The other youth described the humiliation he faced in secondary school when
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his peers taunted him to show them his ndigi, the aesthetic practice of making an
incision in the foreskin and pulling it over the glans penis, leaving the foreskin dangling
when it heals. At least twice, I heard young men challenge one another by saying,
"Show me your ndigil", a shorthand way of questioning one's authenticity as having
been circumcised 'Kimeru.' Such taunts are direct affronts upon an individual's
masculinity.
Typically, there are a number of differences between the 'Kiswahili' and
'Kimeru' forms of circumcision. With circumcision in a clinic, the boy is usually
operated on alone. Some people argue that this solitary operation defeats the purpose
of initiation, arguing "removing a piece of skin does not make one a man", while there
are others who maintain that the risks of infectious disease associated with group
initiations makes this form of operation legitimate. 'Kimeru' initiations, however,
entail far more than the construction of group solidarity among those circumcised
together and who call one another wacia (brother) or, in times past, muramu (bond
partner). As will be described in further detail below, the 'traditional' circumcisions
are organised according to local territorial hierarchies between the clans (miriiga, sing.
mwiriiga). The extent to which this persists in Tigania and Igembe is questionable,
however, because even in the most remote areas, such as Kunati in eastern Tigania,
such involvement of the clans has been problematic, owing to a number of factors,
including schooling and migration. In Imenti, informants told me that clan involvement
during the circumcision periods elapsed during the 1950s, especially during the Mau
Mau Emergency. It is in the perception of moral personhood, however, that the
greater difference between these two forms of circumcision is expressed. Apart from
elders who speak about the lack of restraint among the 'younger generations', those
who have been initiated as a group consider those circumcised in clinics as able to
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flaunt certain codes of discipline outlined during 'Kimeru' circumcision events. The
argument is that the 'Kiswahili' have not undergone certain oathing procedures and,
hence, are capable of breaking the disciplinary code of a specific age-class without
punishment. It is with this distinction that the 'Kiswahili' are viewed as outsiders. As
an outsider myself, however, I sensed a kind of rivalry between those circumcised as
'Kimeru' and their 'Kiswahili' counterparts, an antagonism which often went beyond
mockery and deprecatory remarks. It sometimes spilled out into a specific kind of
violence which is known locally as the 'forced circumcision.'"
It was in 2002 when I first observed a 'forced circumcision' and attempted to
detail the circumstances behind it. This term had no equivalence in Kimeru, as far as I
could tell, and was mainly attributed to the local newspapers, which focused on the
illegality of forcing youths to undergoe circumcision against their will. Their
circumcisions were viewed by the reporters as being an infringement on their civil
rights. Yet, the number and frequency of 'forced circumcisions' seemed to swell over a
three week period at the end of the long dry season. These circumcisions took place
much earlier than those planned by fathers, uncles, and sons for the following months.
In those weeks, I learned that the lamalla, a small number of men charged with being
responsible for the behaviour of initiates, had named individuals who had not been
initiated but who were, in one way or the other, considered to be in need of discipline.
Here, circumcision was made to shore up the political authority of the lamalla, a
council comprised of men who have not achieved the status of elders, but who intend
to join the elders' councils, such as kiama, when their own sons reach the age of
initiation. Quite clearly, then, there exists a tension between the voice of reporters,
who condemn such acts as violations against the person, and the agency of the lamalla
" It is the English language term which is used. In Kimeru there is no specific differentiation and the
English term entered usage through the media and governmental circulars.
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Plates 3 & 4: Still frames from Martin and Osa Johnson's filming of the
Tigania assembly of warrior lamalla f'ingala ilamaP, 1928?]
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who consider adult individuals who have not been circumcised as deviants.
One hot, bright and dusty day in July, I sat with the granddaughters and
grandsons of Mikinduri's ageing imam, engaged in casual conversation, propped up
against the wall of the small mosque. They were, incidently, the descendants of a
Pashtun trader from Afghanistan who had set up a small business in the aftermath of
the 1918 famine, kiaramuu, which killed - by colonial estimates - some tens of
thousands. This muindi, as the Meru called him, eventually married a Tigania woman,
starting a large family whose sons were initiated alongside their Tiganian age-mates and
whose daughters, likewise, married locally. This family's prosperity declined in the
past few decades when they faced increased economic competition from additional
Meru and Gikuyu entrepreneurs who moved to Mikinduri as migrants in the 1970s.
Although differentiated from most Meru by religion and identity, this family had
extensive links within the local community, their youngest being considered "one of
us." We were discussing their family histories, when a teacher from Ankamia, joined
us in a glass of sweet, black tea. He announced that he had witnessed a kind of
commotion at the other end of the market. He explained that a certain youth had been
misbehaving so badly, stealing, smoking cannabis, drinking chang 'aa (moonshine) and
abusing his elders, that he had drawn the ire of other young men. As it transpired,
these other youth discovered that this wastrel had never been circumcised at all,
despite having fathered three children. Despite many changes in Meru personhood and
ethics over the twentieth century, an uncircumcised father is considered a threat to the
community's well being, just as in former times, an unexcised mother was a travesty
according to the moral entitlements of reproduction (cf. Thomas 2003). A plan of
action was quickly hatched to apprehend him and drag him to the house of a
circumcisor where he would be 'cut.' But first, they declared, they needed to collect
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money, the makethi ja mutaani (literally, the circumcisor's harvest), to pay for the
circumcisor's beer and food. Although many circumcisors are paid in kind with millet
beer, mead, and meat, some insist on cash payments as well. And so, on this hot and
dusty day, they were parading the youth up and down the market's shops and kiosks
calling out for donations and urging on-lookers to support them. The crowd had pulled
off the young man's shorts, slung a sisal bag around his neck for the donations and
sang mariri, a form of circumcision song. For the most part, shopkeepers and
passersby gave what small change they could afford to the crowd of young men and
curiosity seekers. Satisfied with their small collection, the throng then marched the
young man towards the house of a known circumcisor. Although there is some moral
ambivalence about the legality of 'forced circumcision', quite a number of people I
spoke with afterwards defended the practice by arguing that it was one of the only
means through which the community could maintain its own codes of disciplining
miscreants and offenders. A common apology made for this kind of action was the
complaint that the state security forces could not protect the community from
antisocial behaviour such as theft, nor enforce the local provision that only
circumcised individuals could father children.
The security detail in Mikinduri was, however, involved in cracking down on
'forced circumcisions' which are illegal under Kenyan law. For the initial period, when
nothing went wrong, no action was taken against the nthaka and lamalla encouraging
the circumcision of specified and delinquent individuals. One late July night, however,
I encountered the District Officer of Mikinduri who was in a kind of panic and seemed
enraged. He explained his horror upon finding a youth bleeding profusely and close to
unconsciousness in his compound. The victim of a 'forced circumcision', this
particular young man was hemophiliac and was slowly bleeding to death. While I
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offered to transport the youth to the Miathene hospital, the DO insisted in making the
necessary arrests and denied me permission to drive the boy to receive medical
attention. The DO came from Nyanza and was a Luo, one of the few Kenyan ethnic
blocs which do not practice circumcision. Although the victim was eventually placed
in medical custody, the encounter was alarming and exposed the tensions which
accompany the circumcision periods within Tigania.
In summary of this discussion, people approach the circumcision periods,
usually in the dry seasons of eekanga (January and February) and thaano (August and
September), with a certain degree of ambivalence. Because the boys' initiations mark
auspicious events in their life-course, the actual preparations for circumcision are
subject to debate about the 'proper' course of action to take. Here, morality intersects
with concerns about health, social discipline, wealth, and the historically shifting
constructions of personhood. It is during these periods of the year that people make a
forum for argument and debate about the reproduction of the social order. Yet, the
debate is as much about disorder as it is about order. It is necessary to discuss this
before moving on the describe the sociological impact of circumcision upon the
formation of age-classes.
In the next section, Meru concepts and practices related to the historical
formation of age-classes are sketched out against the backdrop of community anxieties
about their viability in the future. Because the particular names of such age-classes
(nthuki) are critical to understanding the narration of Meru history, the following brief
sociological description of the Meru age and generational 'system' is complemented
by a discussion of the subjectivities of specific age-classes at particular historical
junctures. As mentioned above, the following description of age-class formation among
the Imenti and Tigania Meru is provisional and partial, the focus of this thesis being
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narrowed to the historicity of generation.
Genealogical and social generations compared
The age-class proper is known as nthuki throughout the Imenti, Tigania and
Igembe sections. Sometimes riika, or liika, is heard as an alternate term (pi. mariika,
maliika). Some variation of the terms, riika or nthuki, are common among other Bantu-
speaking populations with some form of age and generational social organisation in
East Africa. I came across no evidence that nthuki or riika are other than synonymous,
despite claims to the contrary by scholars of comparable Bantu-speaking societies of
central Kenya (cf. Glazier 1976). Jack Glazier's research among the lowland Mbeere,
close neighbours of the Kimeru-speaking Chuka and Tharaka, suggests that the
Kimbeere term nthuke refers specifically to a generation class, while riika refers to an
age-class. In the Mbeere context, nthuke is employed when referring to an adjacent
generation, usually signifying the presence of an age-class {riika) formed between the
position of fathers and sons. In other words, there usually is one age-class formed
between that of fathers and sons. In Kimeru, however, other terminology and concepts
are used to identify generational classes and their dual organisation (see Chapter Three
on the concept of gitiba), hinting at the exception which the Meru present for
comparative sociological analysis.
During fieldwork the etymology of nthuki could not be discerned, although its
meaning as a social generation - or age-class - contrasts with the term ruciara, used for
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describing a genealogical generation.12 The Kimeru concepts of nthuki (or riika) and
ruciara have significant temporal distinctions as pertains to their usage. One may
speak of a historical relationship between nthuki, as is expressed in the expression
"nthuki-o-nthukf' ('from generation to generation'). Thus, nthuki, implies an idea
about tradition and history. By extension, nthuki and riika are often applied to the
transmission of practices and ideas particular to the historicity of a specific group of
men and their spouses. In practice, whether one is speaking about an age-class, a social
generation, or a spousal cohort, the term used is nthuki. To some extent, despite the
above stress that the terms are equivalent, speaking of a particular riika usually means
a group of men, exclusive of their wives. Nthuki, therefore, is associated with
historically contingent generations; or, to be precise, those who have knowledge of
one another. In their biographies, elder Meru informants would frequently situate their
age with reference to "how many nthuki" they had seen, alongside any critical events
such as famines, wars, and diseases which had occurred in their lifetimes.
In contrast, ruciara refers to 'begetting' and may be understood to mean
filiation. The word itself is derived from the root stem -cia- from which the verb
guciara (to beget, to give birth) is constructed. A number of further words can be
constructed from this root, such as muciari (a parent, pi. aciari) and giciaro
(adoption, as well as cross-clan affiliation, or 'blood brotherhood'). The idea of a
genealogical generation is closely linked to the limits of the life-course enclosed by
birth and death. Consider the oft-quoted Biblical passage, "Ruciara rumwe rwathira-
rt, ni rungi rwijaga" ('Each generation is finished by the coming of another').
12 The Bantu term nthuke turns up in Mbeere as an age-cohort (Glazier 1976: 114) while irua, rika and
riika are references to age and generational classes among the Giriama and Gikuyu respectively
(Brantley 1978; Kershaw 1997; Droz 1999). Ruciara - genealogical generation - is a derivative of the
transitive verb guciara to give birth, engender. See Jan Vansina's (1990) Paths in the Rainforests for
Western Bantu lexical data, where the derivation 'to name' is given as the root -dok- and the word for
'friend' and 'namesake' is given as -doki (Vansina 1990: 277). The comparison is suggestive of a
possible etymology.
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According to my understanding, Meru thinking about generations and the life-course
do not include the non-living, and the spiritual or relational importance of ancestors is
downplayed.13 There have, however, been significant transformations in this regard.
Quite a few of my elder informants, for example, argued that prior to the
Christianisation of large numbers of Meru in the 1940s the Kimeru term for a 'spirit'
was irundu, which means today a 'shadow', but which used to mean a 'shade', or, a
spectral being linked to the material landscape and found in such natural features as
rivers, trees, and pools. Jeffrey Fadiman (1993), undertaking his oral history of the
Meru in the late 1960s, suggested that the Meru had a clear concept of their ancestors
in the form of nkoma (spirits). According to my interlocuters, all of them, Christian or
Muslim, the word nkoma came with the Swahilisation of Kimeru and was more atoned
to the Christian cosmology of an afterlife. As such, knowledge of ancestral afterlife or
the presence of ancestors may be historically traced to be of relatively recent
adoption. Ruciara has a much more shallow temporal resonance. Here, genealogical
generations are more determinate, often no more than the primary linkage of the
parental and filial relation. The distinction is worth being upheld at the level of
interpretation; because while ruciara relates to the biological necessity of reproduction
and population renewal; nthuki stresses the equal need for the regulation of fertility
and procreation, and, reflects upon both procesess of reproduction in all of their social
and political ramifications.
Comparing Imenti and Tigania age-class formation
Although the Imenti and Tigania employ a similar vocabulary to describe and
131 am aware of some disagreement on this issue, particularly among some Meru authors writing about
their own society (cf. M'Imanyara 1992).
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order the formation of their age-classes, there are significant differences in their
sociology and history. At this point, it is necessary to outline these differences. In
theory, among the Imenti, the successive formation of age-classes follows what may
be called a 'linear' organisation. In contrast, the Tigania share with the Igembe what
might be considered a 'cyclic' organisation. Recognising that this is a simplistic
interpretation, based on metaphors of 'linear' and 'cyclic' organisation, it is also the
way in which Meru themselves describe their age and generational 'systems' to
outsiders and, often, to themselves. I will first outline the Imenti representation of
their age-classes, before moving on to that of the Tigania and Igembe. Because I have
described Meru age-classes as inclusive of their spouses, it is also necessary to include
the names of the wives of a particular nthu/d.
Among Imenti youth, there is difficulty in recalling their parents' and
grandparents' age-classes. My interpretation of this lapse in memory about nthuki has
to do with the problem of historical perspective. As an old woman suggested to me,
"The younger people don't know about age-classes because they have not yet had
their children circumcised." Here, this old woman was not arguing that young people
have grown refractory about 'traditional' forms of knowledge, but was plainly
suggesting that they lacked the necessary historical perspective to understand the
formation of successive age-classes in generational time. In other words, the social
formation of a particular age-class is only considered complete when all their children
(today, meaning boys) have begun to agitate for their own initiation and have been
circumcised. In terms of years, an age-class is in formation for approximately a decade,
although it is only considered completed when the sons of this nthuki begin to demand
their own circumcisions, a period of time ranging from 25 to 27 years. This longer
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period corresponds to the length of a generation in Meru thinking.14 This calculation
was based on the available biographical materials I was able to garner as well as tracing
the historical chronology of successive age-classes back to the turn of the century.
The circumcision of the children of a particular cohort signifies transitions in
the life-course not only of individuals, but all of the age grades which are
contemporaneous and articulated with one another. When a specific age-class is
initiated, concomitant changes in the life-course of others is effected, such that
'warriors' and young women marry and become couples; young parents become junior
elders with circumcised children; and male elders participating in local councils
effectively retire from their active role in political decision making. Older women,
especially those belonging to women's councils would also allow for, and prepare
themselves for, the succession of slightly younger women into this position. The grade
of nkirote and nkatha in Imenti and kaaria among the Tigania and Igembe were the
equivalents of the title of the 'Fathers of the Country', or, the beethe-ba-nthii, but
from Lynn Thomas' and Anne-Marie Peatrik's evidence, these organisations of
women declined in the late 1930s under pressure from the colonial government and its
Chiefs. While ideals about the life-course and their historical transitions are important
research subjects, particularly because their interpretation is necessary for
reconstructing and historicising past subjectivities, discussion is restricted here to the
more sociological and 'structural' features of age-class formation.
In Kimeru, the terms 'open' (kuingua nthuki) and 'close' (kuinga nthuki) are
used to determine when an age-class began to form and when it is considered to have
been completed. These metaphors of 'opening' and 'closing' appear with regularity in
14 Interpretatively, I would argue that Meru observations about the length of a generation are shorter and
more strictly defined than those imagined for Europeans. It is common in European popular culture to
argue that a 'century' allows for the formation of three generations, but in the Meru imaginary, the
equivalent unit of time, a gitiba (see Chapter Three), allows for four generations.
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the ethnographic literature on East African age-classes (cf. Spencer 1988, 1997). Once
an age-class is said to have 'closed', there is a general anticipation about the
subsequent opening of another. Closely linked to this anticipation are concerns about
succession between age-classes and, by extension, social generations. In theory, the
formation of a given age-class should advance all other positions through their
respectively senior grading. This would also imply the necessity of some form of
succession. In practice, the predictability of succession outlined by the 'opening' and
'closing' of age-classes forms a basis from which autobiographies may be linked to
collective identities consisting of similarly aged people. With older people, in
particular, the listing of successive age-classes is a matter of self-presentation, with
elders frequently stating which nthuki had an impact on their lives. Among all the
Meru sections, nthuki are given formally announced names, but they are sometimes
remembered by alternative names. These alternative names, or nicknames, are
sometimes only known within a particular locality.
To understand how people locate their own lives within a chronological
narrative about successive age-classes, it is best to take an example from dialogues
gathered in the field. The following testimony of Nkatha, an ageing Imenti woman, is
typical of the biographical use of nthuki:
"I saw one nthuki, long ago in the past when I was a child called Samburu...
Samburu, that is a long time ago, another one was called Kubai and another
called Mung'atia and Memeu, those I have seen since childhood. We grew.
Now, becoming an adult, I saw Riungu, those who bore me, then Miriti,
then KTruja, then Mbaya, Kibaabu, now it's Gicunge, now that is where I
have reached. As I am, I have seen twelve nthuki from childhood. I don't
know the name of this young nthuki. Women aged as a generation with a
certain name for both women and men until it is over. The women have
names, but I don't know them very well, they are like those you hear of
Samburu... then men were called Memeu and the women called Munyange,
others were called Riungu and their wives were called Tirindi, those women
called Mucece belonged to Miriti. We are called Nkoroi and our husbands
are Kaburu or Kiruja. Women were named after we all had married"
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As with younger people, even the aged are subjected to the problem of historical
perspective, witnessed by Nkatha's admission that she does not know "the name of
this young nthuk?\ because it is removed from her own experiences. She also reveals
the implicit gender bias in telling history through the succession of age-classes and
relating these to historical events or processes when she claims that her knowledge of
women's age-classes is incomplete. Other examples of this kind of narrative, which I
heard regularly as preludes to biographies, suggest that the problem of historical
perspective has deep implications for the reconstruction of historical subjectivities.
Gender and age, in particular, sharply differentiate the points of view from which
histories are told. Furthermore, the task of placing this narrative of which "nthuki I
have seen" into an accurate historical chronology is problematic. Often, such
narrations need to be read as idiosyncratic accounts of larger historical events,
happenings, or situations.
Nkatha was married to a man initiated as a Kaburu (Kiruja) and the wives were
called Nkoroi ('colobus monkey'), a cohort whose funerals are becoming ever more
frequent in the late 1990s and whose survivors are now becoming great-grandparents
(,kwjuuju, pi. bwjuuju). This woman's biography and age suggests, however, that the
'Samburu' she spoke of referred to people who came to Meru in the late nineteenth
century as refugees from the internecine wars of the Laikipiak Maasai (cf. Fadiman
1993; KNA: PC 1/1). There may well have been Samburu women who became the
wives of Imenti and Tigania men in the 1890s. In Igembe and Tigania it is commonly
heard that "such and such a clan were originally from Rendille or Samburu country", a
distinction of Meru clan hierarchies which led Jiirg Mahner to speak of clans of
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'insiders' and 'outsiders' in the Nyambenes (cf. Mahner 1975: 405).15 The so-called
Samburu age-class which this old woman spoke of would have been elders when she
was a young woman in the late 1920s. Her parent's nthuki were the Riungu and the
Tirindi. The Riungu would have been lobbying to form their age-class sometime before
the turn of the century, because the Memeu or Kiramana were of 'warrior' age when
the conquest ofMeru was effected in 1908.
Interestingly, this particular old woman omitted the name of a decisive age-
class in the early colonial period, the Murungi, who were of the 'warrior' grade during
the outbreak of the FirstWorld War. Because her father was a younger member of this
nthuki, she recalled the name of the age-class as Riungu. Based on principles of
seniority within the formation of age-classes, each Imenti nthuki was further divided
into a senior and a junior grouping. In this case, the Murungi were the senior and the
Riungu the junior. As we will see with the Tigania and Igembe, there are further
divisions within a nthuki based on the opening and closing of internal circumcision sets
called mataana (sing, itaana). The Tigania and Igembe had three such divisions within
their age-class formation, but in Imenti there was a maximum of two, although some
individuals would be added to these groups retrospectively. In Imenti, there was much
less emphasis on these mataana, an aspect of their 'system' which I discuss in greater
detail below. According to government ethnography conducted in the mid-1930s, such
senior and junior circumcision groups among the Imenti were known as chankanabiri
and ntimirigwe (Lambert 1956: 35), although these terms are highly anachronistic
today. This distinction based on mataana is not recalled by age-classes younger than
'5 Early on during the colonial administration ofMeru, Edward Butler Home, the first DC ofMem,
noted the presence ofMaa speakers in Uringu and Kianjai, two locations within northern Tigania, as
well as in Katheri in northern Imenti. Over a hundred years ago, Rendille were said to have
intermarried extensively with the Igembe, among whom they had clan-based affiliations, known in
Kimeru as giciaro. In 1916, Home wrote of the 'infusion of new blood' in the making of the various
Kimeru-speaking polities, adding that 'In Tigania and Igembe the straight hair and semetic features are
very marked in most of the old men' [KNA 1910-1916: PC 1/1]
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the eldest remnants of the mostly-deceased Miriti and their wives, the Mucece.16
Throughout all the Meru sections, the Miriti and their counterparts elsewhere, such as
the Kiramunya of Tigania and Igembe, were conscripted into the Carrier Corps
(kariokor) during the campaigns of the First WorldWar in East Africa. Thousands of
young men worked as porters on the Tanganyika front lines, earning them the
alternative name Kaaria (after the English, 'carrier'). Kaaria is now a popular name
among the grandsons of these veterans of the First World War.
Hugh Lambert's (1945) mention of a numerically large circumcision class called
chankanabiri was largely contested by Imenti informants, most claiming they had
never heard of such a thing.17 Even the eldest Imenti men and women I spoke with
knew of no division of nthuki into smaller circumcision groups, although they did use
the word mataana to describe groups of initiates circumcised together. These
groupings, mataana (sing, itaana), are the subject of the following section below, but it
should be noted here that their significance to the Imenti appears negligible. In the
declension of Imenti age-classes, however, some elders spoke of further categories of
nangitia and kimonye. These were described as mataana, but descriptions of how one
was positioned within such groups implied a 'lag' rather than a statistical placement.
An Imenti acquaintance of mine went on to suggest, "nangitia ni itaana-ri riringaga
ringf' ('Nangitia were a group circumcised and attached to another later group'); while
another stated, "Tuuge nangitia ni kinyiritha kia nthuki ii yathira" ('We can say that
Nangitia are the laggards of the age-class which has passed'). For a long stretch of
fieldwork this puzzled me, until Tigania acquaintances told me of exceptional
categories of initiates who could be added, retrospectively as it were, to the last
16 Without exception, the surviving Mucece are superannuated widows of the Miriti and often the
younger second or third wives of this deceased cohort ofmen.
171 have also heard the Ratanya ndinguri (nkuru) of Muciimukuru, Tigania, call themselves
chengenabiri.
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circumcision set. These were known as mwongela, literally meaning 'an addition."8
This was done to avoid them being conflated with a group too out of step with the
minimal structural distance from their 'fathers' age-class, as compared to that of their
'grandfathers' who represent an alternate generation (cf. Ruel 2002: 73). Likewise, the
category of kimonye was shrouded in ambiguity. Several informants pointed out that
these young men were most likely labour migrants who had been circumcised, but who
were absent for the ceremonies surrounding the formation of a proper age-class.
Conscripts in the KAR regiments which fought in the Second World War were
renowned as recruits from a kimonye category. Again, the Tigania fieldwork assisted to
draw out comparisons, as will be seen for the category of the buruku (see Chapter
Five). Current field materials, however, suggest that the Imenti placed much less
emphasis on circumcision groups in the overall formation of nthuki.
Below is a table listing the Imenti age-classes which I have compiled from a
number of different sources. Oral history, biography and archival research created a
great deal of ambivalence about the Imenti nthuki and their chronology. While I have
been able to cross-reference my sources and check for contradictions, I am still
unconvinced about the accuracy of my Imenti materials. There remains the possibility
that the fragmentation of knowledge about their age-class formation in the past several
decades has contributed to greater uncertainties among the Imenti regarding this
increasingly 'anachronistic' aspect of social life. Important facts in the reconstruction
of Imenti nthuki in this century were the names of the successive age-classes and the
determination of the approximate period of time in which they were initiated and
18 In a fascinating discussion of how Turkana maintained a 'slip mechanism' to time and segregate
generational classes, John Lamphear remarks that at some point in a sustained crisis of'overaging', the
Turkana had 'given up and shifted their emphasis from generation to age, so that all men are initiated
at the 'proper age' (at about twenty)' (1989: 237). This statement has comparable, theoretical
implications for the analysis of the Imenti-Meru system's seeming irrelevance for the establishment of
mataana despite the inclination of their system towards demographic drift.
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married.19
Husbands Years in formation Wives
Kubai (i. 1875?, m. 1885?) Samburu [?]
Memeu / Kiramana (i. 1888?, m. 1900?) Ncurubi
Murungi / Riungu (i. 1902?, m. 1912?) Tirindi
Miriti (i. 1913?, m. 1925?) Mucece
Kaburu / Kiruja (i. 1924, m. 1939) Nkoroi
Mbaya / Gwantai (i. 1949, m. 1956) Mukami
Kibaabu (i. 1952, m. 1965) Munyange
Gicunge (i. 1964, m. 1975) Ncurubi
Mung'atia jwa kilo (i. 1976, m. 1990) [unnamed]
Figure 2: Imenti age-class formation. 1875? -1976
Although various authors have argued that a Meru age-class is in formation for about a
decade (cf. Bernardi 1959; Lambert 1956), this is a crude approximation about the
length of a particular generation. The formation of age-classes depends as much upon
human agency as it does upon structural constraints and principles of organisation. In
the brief narrative cited far above, the elderly woman glossed over many of the
contingencies which postponed or frustrated the ideal timing of 'opening' and 'closing'
particular age-classes. Besides the perennial threats of droughts, wars, famines, and
diseases, other historical processes of a more political and economic character like
forced labour, military conscription, taxation, and schooling also had their unique
impact upon the formation of age-classes and the temporal dimensions in which it
occurred. Some of these problems will be discussed in further detail in later chapters,
19 This chronology for Imenti nthuki stems from interview materials, biography, and assorted archives
and published materials [KNA: PC 1/1/9 Kenia Province, KNA: DC/MRU/1/2; KNA: DC/MRU 1/3,
Lambert 1956). In comparison to the chronology established for Tigania nthuki, some discrepencies
occur in the Imenti data, owing partially to my own methodology in 1998 and 2001.
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but it needs to be stressed that age-class formation is an outcome of lobbying,
agitation, and even struggle between those wishing to be initiated and those resisting
the change of their age grade and status.
There are some theoretical considerations which clarify these particular
problems and uncertainties of age-class formation. One of the main problems
associated with age-class formation is the question of time. The use of calendars to
calibrate age, generation and time is bound to be invested with problems. Baxter and
Almagor (1978) noted the dilemma posed to age-class formation by the inevitable
creep of demographic drift, claiming that:
The biological facts of birth and death must slide out of allignment with
the social order with which they should conform. Age-systems which are
based on measured units of time are unsuccessful attempts to tame time by
chopping it up into manageable slices. So it should be useful, when
examining a particular system, to examine this gap between cognitive
order and the social reality (Baxter and Almagor 1978: 5-6)
Such an approach ought to be useful, but only in circumstances where the rules
regulating the system are historically maintained. As this thesis aims to show, this is a
stiff challenge in the face of a changing political and economic landscape. Despite
Baxter and Almagor's predictions, a swathe of ethnographic literature suggests that the
'attempts to tame time' in quite a number of societies with generational 'systems'
have been, more or less, frustrated by the contingencies of critical historical events and
social processes (cf. Droz 1999; Hodgson 2001; Peatrik 1999; Shetler 2003: 385-412).
In answer to this difficulty of ordering time, people organising themselves into age-
classes have restructured, recreated, and reordered the principles and rules which
underlie the succession of the 'system.' They achieve a balance with the inevitability
of such difficulties, like demographic drift, because they continually resort to changing
the rules. It is through the periodic ad hoc historical re-appraisals they are compelled
to make that people with 'age organisation' are capable ofmaintaining successive age-
104
class formation.
As will become clearer throughout the thesis, many contemporary Imenti
conceive of their age and generational 'system' as stalled or defunct. Their Tigania and
Igembe neighbours of the Nyambene Ranges, however, treat the viability of nthuki as a
primary means of maintaining their social identity. The Tigania have experienced
problems with the timing of opening and closing specific nthuki since the 1940s, but
much effort is put into creating provisionary rules to maintain the recruitment of
initiates and continue to form age-classes. In what follows, our discussion must
include an examination of what limits the contemporary organisation of circumcision
sets, called mataana (sing, itaana) in Kimeru, as well as how the ideas about how to
'properly' carry out circumcision as a necessary 'step' in the life-course (eetalia) have
also changed since the 1940s.20
Talking about cutting: explaining circumcision sets
Meru age-classes are formed over time through the opening and closing of
separate circumcision sets, the mataana, which never overlap and are given ordinal
names according to their seniority and juniority. I argued above that the mataana were
described to me in ways that suggested they are 'statistically' placed, in the sense that
some premise based on birth order is implicated in the recruitment of initiates into
different circumcision sets. Each of these sets will be circumcised during differing
periods, sometimes by four to five year intervals. Those initiates who are not placed
within this 'statistical' order are subject to ad hoc arrangements which make them later
20 Anne-Marie Peatrik's (1999) research argued that the concept of eetalia, meaning 'step in life' or
even 'age grade', was of importance to the Igembe and Tigania Meru in the 1980s when she carried out
her fieldwork. During my own fieldwork, however, the term seemed to have been forgotten, especially
among the 'middle-aged' and young people interviewed in 2001 to 2003.
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additions to the larger grouping of the nthuki. These were described earlier as the
mwongela, the 'additions', or, among the Imenti as the nangitia, the 'laggards.'
Nevertheless, when local people speak about the mataana, they have in mind the three
groups of youth whose initiations and circumcisions were separated in time and by
approximate birth order.
For the Tigania and Igembe, for example, there are three separate opening and
closing periods within the early formation of an age-class and these are known as
ndinguri, kobia, and kabeeria. When an individual claims their identity as "Miriti
ndinguri", what they mean is that they were among the first, large group of Miriti to
be circumcised.21 This grouping is large mainly because a number of individuals may
have waited for their circumcision, postponed for a number of possible reasons, which
inflate the size of the ndinguri grouping. These individuals may be described as older
than the average age of other 'timely' initiates and, to reflect this, the ethnographic
literature has called these individuals 'over-aged.' Likewise, if someone was to say that
they were a "Lubeeta kobia" they mean to suggest that their circumcision occurred
between the Lubeeta ndinguri - the first and senior grouping - and the last and smallest
grouping of the Lubeeta kabeeria. Some clans refuse to initiate their sons into kabeeria
groupings, based on a conviction that this last group is often prone to calamities such
as famine or disease. Such distinctions are not frivolous and people take them quite
seriously as they are implicated in local readings of seniority and the power which
seniority signifies. Moreover, there may have been sociological disadvantages to being
'cut' as a kabeeria, such as the postponement at the age of marriage, or confusion in
the choice of an appropriate spouse due to the inavailability of young women of one's
sister's age. A woman in Kunati, eastern Tigania, told me that her son had married a
21 It is likely that the term ndinguri came into Kimeru through the Maa term endungore (cf. Spencer
1988: 66).
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young woman who was subject to a marriage prohibition. Because the young man and
woman's clan were giciaro clans to one another, meaning that they neither raided nor
married from one another, but assisted in times of distress or political conflict, the
kinsmen of the man were outraged at their matrimony. The man defended his choice of
bride in front of his kinsmen by arguing that because he had been circumcised as a
kabeeria he had experienced difficulties marrying an 'appropriate spouse' and chose
to marry his categorical 'sister.' Although their marriage was a kind of incest, between
'adoptee siblings', the appropriate cleansing rites (kuthinjanua) were performed. Such
an admission is rare, even suspect, but this man's mother was attempting to
demonstrate why it was considered dangerous to initiate sons as kabeeria. Outside of
this strict sociological understanding, however, one's relative position within the
mataana - the ndinguri, kobia, kabeeria - may also express one's subjectivity, hinting
that such categories are grasped existentially. A man initiated into the most senior
circumcision set, the ndinguri, has many age-mates and perhaps feels secure in a sense
of social maturity, whereas someone initiated into the more junior and uncertain set of
the kabeeria may not experience a sense of security. One's bad luck, after all, may be
attributed to one's circumcision as a kabeeria.
Previous efforts to explain Meru age-classes have emphasised the sociological
and structural features of this 'system' (Mahner 1975; Peatrik 1995a, 1995b, 1999).
In these readings, the mataana (circumcision sets) are seen as the articulated,
constituent parts of the nthuki (age-classes). In following this sociological
understanding, the mataana have been described as fractions of the larger, more
inclusive organisation formally constituted as nthuki, with Anne-Marie Peatrik (1999)
calling them des fractions de classes d'ages' in her sociological terminology. In this













































Figure 3: Tigania and Igembe age-classes in living memory22
22 The grey-scales demonstrate the population of nthuki still living, their years of circumcision, the
time of their formation, and the significant historical events which occurred within this chronology:
Kiaramuu (1918 famine and influenza epidemic); Kiaranduara (1921 'famine of eating leather skins');
Ngigi (1926 'Locust famine'); Gwita Kiora (1933 'Compulsory Labour Ordinance'); Bara Ijilie (1939
Second World War); Kaunanku (1944 'Firewood famine'); Gatandugu (1948 'Don't Have Kin'
famine); Mau Mau (1952 Emergency); Igiita ya Thama (1954 villagization); Kimutu (1969 'Flour
Famine'); Ndakua Gwete (1984 'I die, You go' famine).
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contribute to age-class formation in the longer term. In addition, strictly sociological
understandings may obscure how local people interpret these social formations and
the meanings which imbue them at different historical moments.
A clue to understanding the mataana as constituent and preliminary elements
in the formation of age-classes lies in the etymology of the Kimeru language itself.
Indeed, the term itaana derives from the root verb gutaana, meaning to make an
initiatory cut or excision. This is different from other verbs denoting a 'cut', such as
gutema, 'to gouge out, carve', as it is specific to initiatory changes to the body and its
genitalia. Semantically, however, this verb's root is deployed in a creative manner to
construct much of the vocabulary used to describe Meru initiations and the people
involved in them. For example, the root -taana may also be extended to include a
sense of differentiating or dividing people according to defined categories of
personhood. A boy initiate is known as ntaam (pi. ntaani), just as the circumcisor -
usually an elder man of an age-class immediately senior to the initiate's father - is
called mutaani (pi. ataani). The distinction between the 'cut' and the 'cutter' is
perhaps important. While girl initiates were known as nkenye, in general the practice
of clitoridectomy is understood as gutaanithua, thereby setting it apart from the male
initiations and their ceremonies.23
In each neighbourhood, which is called ntuura in Kimeru, a number of
circumcisors will have earned reputations for their expertise in operating on initiates
and their knowledge of initiatory lore. Shrouded in some mystery, the ideal way to
perform initiations becomes the subject of intense speculation and negotiation in the
months leading up to the dry seasons when such ceremonies are anticipated and
planned. A circumcisor I met with on several occasions in Kangeta, Igembe, was
23 In Kimeru verbal morphology, the male circumcision, gutaana, is stative, while female
clitoridectomy, gutaanithua, is causative.
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reluctant to speak much about his craft, but outlined the contemporary clash of
opinions over how circumcisions should proceed. According to this senior man, many
of the contemporary social problems among the Igembe could be attributed to the
emergence of the 'Swahili' category of circumcision.
Conversations like those I held with the mutaani from Kangeta, on the dry
leeward slopes of the Nyambene hills, built up my suspicion that the classic
anthropological subject of 'initiations', 'circumcisions', and 'rites de passage' had
perhaps missed something crucial in their enthusiasm for ethnographic details and
sociological interpretation. In my own fieldwork, the observation of actual ceremonial
events paled in comparison to the opportunities I had for entering into the debate
which such events inevitably provoked. There simply was more talk about cutting
than there was actual cutting. In Meru, one could not shake the feeling that strict
interpretations of how to organise the mataana had become, or always was, socially
and existentially uncertain. Certainly, in recent decades, there was a popular
perception that the strict, rule-bound formation of circumcision groups had waned, but
I still held out questions that perhaps what had actually 'waned' were the ideals which
had formerly provided a kind of model for their performance. For the sake of
argument, however, talking about ideals revealed the undeniable historical fact that the
organisation ofmataana and nthuki had undergone deep transformations.
The circumcision period has a kind of 'charter myth' which is often told to
outsiders and the uninitiated wishing to know more about how the Meru initiate their
young sons. It is principally a story about hierarchy. The version which I have
summarised below came from the son of a well-known circumcisor in Giithu, central
Tigania.
"You know, it was during the time of Miriti ndinguri, or even, Lubeeta
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kabeeria, when the traditional circumcisions broke down. Like me now, I
am a Miriti ndinguri, although I was very, very small [under-aged], but
even with us, we did not perform the circumcisions like our fathers. No...
even my fathers were not really cut the Kimeru traditional way either...
those were Ratanya and they got confused. But, like our grandfathers, they
did the traditional circumcisions. Even so, with us Miriti we were
hundreds of youths gathered from many different clans at that
circumcision field over there [pointing away in the distance]. The mutaani
had so much work because there were so many young boys waiting to be
circumcised, but they were not all young boys because there were even
some, no many, with beards like men waiting to be cut. So, there were so
many boys that one circumcisor could not cope, so the Kimeru way is to
initiate the first nine initiates from senior clans by a very special
circumcisor and a very special knife. The rest of us are cut any old how.
These nine boys are called the kenda ya mutaani, the circumcisor's nine,
and they are from specific clans like Antumburi and Akiuna. The boys'
fathers pay the circumcisor with meat and mead, but it is the knife (ruciu
rwa mutaani) which is very special. This knife begins the cutting of all the
first nine initiates and it remains with them as a symbol of the new
generation. It is broken after and hidden away. But, with us the Miriti, we
did not really follow this way and this is why some people say we became
so misguided. I remember being there on the field with hundreds of other
boys, but then some boys from other clans, such as those from Ikana and
Thathi, in lower areas of Kunati, did not come as they had before and there
began to be talk about how things had become ruined"
This witness to the 1973 circumcisions of the Miriti ndinguri reflects on the
significance of clan hierarchies in ordering which initiates are circumcised before others.
Although there is a clue about local constructions of hierarchy between the clans, in
choosing the kenda ya mutaam before all other initiates, this hierarchy is rendered into
an ideology of seniority and juniority based on birth order. At the point of
circumcision, the 'insider' status of specific clans is transformed into the 'first borns'
of the age-class as it is inaugurated.
To understand the formation of an itaana it is necessary to discern what limits
it. In principle, each itaana (pi. mataana) is time limited. The temporal ideal suggests
that each of these circumcision classes should be opened for a period lasting about a
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year: followed by an intermission which may last up to four or five years.
Organisationally, there are 'open' and 'closed' periods. One might hear someone
describing the closure of a particular period of circumcision as "itaana Ma
irakwingirwa" ('that group have been closed'). As such, within any nthuki period -
approximately fifteen years - most of this period is ceremonially inactive as regards
the initiations of boys.24 Consequently, some youths miss being included into an
opening period of circumcisions. In such a situation, they would be compelled to wait
it out, sometimes for years, until they get their opportunity to be initiated. Unlike
today's examples, until about the mid-1980s, the formation of the mataana was a
lengthy process, often spanning about eight harvests (kiingo yanaana). In both
European and Kimeru calendars this is calculated at four years. Since this is an ideal
representation, the actual timing ofmataana depends upon local ecological conditions.
Despite the statistical possibility of temporal disorder when analysed over
generational time, the reconstruction of age-class formation for the entire twentieth
century demonstrates a remarkable continuity in the timing of successive mataana.
For the intervals between nthuki for which a reliable, cross-referenced chronology
could be established during field work, the average period of time between the closure
of a senior kabeeria class and the opening of a junior ndinguri class was about four
years (ranging from 3.5 to 6 years). This includes past delays for reasons of famine,
disease, war, or other social crises. Particular cases of postponed initiations are
revealing of the precarious basis of age-class formation in general. A drought, for
instance, would threaten to lengthen the period during which boys await their
initiation and probably inflate their numbers. Without the necessary food provision
24 As shall be shown in Chapter Six, the temporal limits within age-class formation have undergone
significant modifications in the past three decades as educational calendars have been introduced to the
logic of class formation.
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which accompanies all ceremonial activities, environmental constraints are a serious
limit upon age-class formation. Drought and famine, in this respect, pose the most
extreme limits to the temporality of the generational system and the polity which was
constructed around it. Consequently, in the event of ecological crises, the advancement
of all other social actors would be postponed, although in practice there were always
exceptional persons willing to take the risk of stepping on with their life, out of tune
and tempo with the political orthodoxies which constrained the larger population's
behaviour. Such individuals were frequently dismissed as deviants.
The formation of separate mataana is also politically limited. Sociologically,
there are relationships which have to be redefined when a broad cohort of boys and
girls undergo a transformation in their life-course. They do so as a demographic cohort.
Whatever begins to signify this imposed societal change, such as the biological
maturation of individuals set within a cohort, a calendar is used to organise the
anticipated ceremonies. As the anticipated time of a new itaana approaches, usually
associated with lobbying, celebrating and agitating on behalf of the younger and elder
nthaka, discussion would turn to the public recognition of a newly identified grouping
of initiates as a political body. The opening of a circumcision period was organised
along inter-clan lines, giving these events a regional importance, as people from distinct
territorial communities were called upon to participate.
Historicising age-class names: an anthropological debate
An itaana is only recognised when it has been closed, given a proper name and
it has a reputable nickname. These names contain embedded meanings about the social
identity of the grouping. But names also ascribe a sociological, structural position to
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the group which is contingent on their place in the entire generational system. Thus,
for the following examples, the Ratanya ndinguri, initiated throughout 1946-47,
eventually became known in central Tigania as bibii, or 'chewing gum' which was sold
by the Pashtun traders in Mikinduri market at about the same time. Certainly ofmore
global relevance than the parochial curiosity with chewing gum to the Tigania-Meru,
the Lubeeta kabeeria, who formed a circumcision class in 1969 were immediately
christened Apollo after the lunar landing of that year. In both examples, reappraisals of
modernity are married to the cyclical naming and classification of nthuki-mataana. The
individual nicknames given to different cohorts have been advantageous to historians,
especially those studying historical processes amongst societies with complex, cyclical
systems for identifying the order of age and generational class formation (Lamphear
1989: 239).
In contrast to the view presented here, other anthropologists have stressed the
ephemeral character of names given to circumcision classes (Glazier 1976: 317; Peatrik
1999: 79). These authors point out that these nicknames are subjugated to structural
time, especially where genealogical memory is shallow (cf. Fosbrooke 1956). In the
Meru context, Peatrik (1999: 92-3) argues that the cyclic practice of naming nthuki and
itaana, girded up by a preestablished principle of repetitive names, ensures that each
class's nickname is to be forgotten over time. Yet, among the generations still living
such names offer glimpses of each group's historcity that survive as long as its
protagonists are alive and sometimes even after they are gone (see Table 2). More
importantly, however, these authors omit that it is not only the people who form age-
classes which are subjected to historical transformations, but also the structures and
principles which constrain them. Of course, it is reasonable to assume that proper
names and nicknames may change over time (cf. Rigby 1983: 443). This is often the
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case when a group advances in the life-course as a cohort and changes their social
grade, as from warriors (nthaka) to married men or junior elders (akuru).
The expressive dynamics of this process are revealed in the practice of naming
mataana and nthuki with either structurally-defined proper names - as in Lubeeta,
Miriti, Gwantai and so on - or through historically contingent nicknames, such as
Kimwe, Apollo, or Trabuta which refer idiomatically to historical events.
Gwantai
kabeeria 1991
kobia 1988 Nthuki Ncabuka
ndinguri 1983
Miriti
kabeeria 1981 Nthuki Nkabuta
kobia 1977 Trabuta















kobia — Mwonjati and Gicunoko
ndinguri 1918-1919 Muriera
Figure 4: Tiaania and Igembe nthukf and their nicknames. 1918 -1991
The formation of separate age-classes (nthuki or riika) and their accomplished status
as generations (ruciara) provokes, through their actions, specific historical
reappraisals which are framed within a discourse on morality. These nicknames are
playful to a degree, but often recall the community's appraisal of historical episodes
which occurred during the period of time when a nthuki or itaana was in formation.
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Often, these are contingent events over which the age-class had no ostensible control,
such as famines or economic crisis.
In the above table, the alternative names for Tigania nthuki are given in reverse
chronological order. Each of these names evokes a structure of feeling about the
particular identity of the nthuki represented. They also tell a story and hint at the
historicity of each successive generation. The Miriti who were in formation from 1973
to 1981, for example, gained their initial nickname of Kimutu or Kimwe because of a
drought which occurred in 1973 when the eldest and largest of the first circumcision
groups, the ndinguri, were being initiated. Kimutu and kimwe are types of milled flour
that the postcolonial government issued as emergency staples during the drought. Just
as maize meal warded off famine in central Kenya in 1973, a more hopeful nickname
was given in 1977 to the middle group of the Miriti, the kobia, when the events of the
early seventies had resonance with a new drought and the advent of disco halls in
Meru Town. This new group were nicknamed Trabuta in a clever word play on the
idiom, nthuki nkabuta ('the exhausted generation') and a Meruisation of the name of
the American actor, John Travolta, who starred in the film 'Saturday Night Fever.'
Gukabuta is the verb to be completely exhausted and trabuta became a slang word for
platform disco shoes. In the Meru imaginary, the sight of young people climbing the
hills and valleys of the Nyambene landscape in platform shoes, after dancing all night
in the discotheque, in the middle of a drought, was a glimpse at some of the absurdities
of the modernity appropriated by the youth of the 1970s. Likewise, their
predecessors of the Lubeeta kabeeria were similarly called toyo, 'bar soap', because
they laundered their clothing with scented detergents at their boarding schools. They
were said to "stink." The use of this soap was an innovation in Meru. Other examples
fit into this pattern of naming successively younger age-classes by imaginative cliches
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which capture the irony of what Turgenev called 'the new improved generation' in his
novel, Fathers and Sons. As mentioned above, the Ratanya ndinguri were called Bibii,
'sweet chewing gum', after sweets and other confectionary entered local diets.
Likewise, the emergence of the Micubu kabeeria from their initiations in 1940,
wrapped up in blankets instead of nude and painted, led them to be named Murikinyi,
'something new has arrived.' In each of these creative names, the Meru imagination
plays upon the materiality of each successive age-class' experiences with new things.
Among the Imenti this semantic play is less emphasised than amongst the
Nyambene communities, although nicknames have been employed to historicise a
particular age-class in formation. The last Imenti nthuki was the Mung'atia jwa-kilo
('surprise of the kilogramme'), which was initially 'opened' for recruitment in 1977
and has not been formally and publically 'closed.' This is an enormous group of young
people ranging in age from adolescence to men and women in their late forties'.
Compared to former Imenti age-classes, the Mung'atia have been 'open' for twenty-
four years, about twice the period of time calibrated for the formation of nthuki.
Where there was anticipation that a new age-class would be opened as late as 1990,
this did not occur as a separate event, instigating a series of debates about the future
viability of the nthuki in contemporary Imenti society. Many people interpret this
long duration to be a sign that age-classes are no longer relevant to the Imenti.
Thus, there is a central ambivalence in naming nthuki as active reappraisals of
their historicity. Through an array of constructed identities, the subjectivity of the
nthuki is never clearly viewed and perceived as passive or active: it lies, relationally, in
the betwixt and between. This ambivalence stems from the historicity of such names;
they are negotiated in the presence of the now, but contested by the imaginations of
what once was and might be. Although there is a passive dimension to naming specific
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cohorts, particularly since the responsibility for approving such names often fell upon
ageing and 'retiring' elders, it is the actions of the age-class concerned which provoke
assessments of their moral character. The now of any present generation is compared
to the once was of past cohorts, alongside the might be which the future holds up as a
vague, generative possibility.
The identity of each successive age-class is contingent upon their recognition
and exploitation of their own historicity. But this is not to construct each age cohort
as encapsulated, bounded and autonomous subjects whose agency is without internal
constraint or contradiction. As will be argued in the next chapter, the recognition of a
generation's place in history is often no more mysterious than the stories it tells about
itself, or, the autobiographies of its individual 'members', whose imaginative a
posteriori reconstructions of history form the basis for a contested, but collective
arena for interpreting their social identity.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Generations Return: Meru rhetorics of history
The time is out ofjoint. The world is going badly. It is worn
but its wear no longer counts. Old age or youth - one no
longer counts in that way. The world has more than one
age. We lack the measure of the measure. We no longer
realise the wear, we no longer take account of it as of a
single age in the progress of history. Neither maturation,
nor crisis, nor even agony. Something else. What is
happening is happening to age itself, it strikes a blow at
the teleological order of history. What is coming, in which
the untimely appears, is happening to time but it does not
happening in time. Contretemps. The time is out of
joint...[T]he age is off its hinges. Everything, beginning
with time, seems out of kilter, unjust, dis-adjusted.
-Jacques Derrida
The aim of this chapter is to clarify a difficult Kimeru term, gitiba, which is an
anachronism to many and a key word to a few. But gitiba contains a double difficulty.
Although I frequently encountered it in explanations of how age-classes were
organised in the past, it was also heard to substitute for a number of other concepts
such as a 'century', a 'cycle of generations', or a form of what anthropologists call
'dual organisation.' Almost unknown among young people, this particular term found
a strong resonance when mentioned amongst elders, particularly those who had lived
in the 1930s and 1940s. Its variation of usage seemed to be ambivalent rather than
polyvalent, not only to me, but also to the Meru as well, such that a growing list of
possible definitions and meanings were ascribed to the term. In short, an archaic
terminology for a way of living now thought to have passed was briefly given new life
as an imaginative result of the fieldwork encounter.
Gitiba was, however, not a passive or a neutral term. Despite the existence of
alternative concepts like the 'century' which encompassed the entirety of the
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chronology since the Meru were conquered in 1908, evocation of the term gitiba had
the effect, among some Meru, of making this chronology their own. Local exegeses
about the meanings of gitiba led me to see the rhetorical play upon key concepts
within attempts to put local histories into perspective. There were alternative ways of
grasping time as biographical, historical, and allegorical. Coming to the conclusion that
many of the stories and biographies which entered into my fieldnotes required reading
alongside Meru theories of time and historical consciousness, it became clear that
Eurocentric understandings about the same would be insufficient and distorting.
I found this concept, gitiba, a mystifying problem and eventually summed up
my confusion as an outcome of ignorance. My faltering Kimeru confounded this
mystery. Gitiba was an abstraction, what the anthropological literature might gloss as
a 'dual classification' or 'dual organisation', but I found local explanations of its
meanings wildly divergent. This presented a problem because I was aware that
exegesis may contradict what people do and think they do in their social lives. Since
ethnographic study is processual and carried out through social relationships and
interactions, this concept presented a challenge to meld symbolic constructions with
observations of everyday life. It was surprising to speak with a self-styled 'modern'
man, a 'Revolutionary Meru Man' as one man called himself, who would describe
historical process as the return of generations, a recursive concept of history which
clashes with that formulated in European historicism. In talking about gitiba, I found
myself in the situation of asking people such an obtuse and heavy question as 'What
is History?' Unsurprisingly, this resulted in an array of possible answers, few of
which could be related directly to my overall ambition to represent a history of Meru
age-class formation. It did not really matter, however, for no such total history is
possible in the arena of interpretation which is called ethnography. The important task
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is to demonstrate that everyone's past is different.
Everyone's past is different: 'Kila mtu ana zamani yake'
Sitting on a neatly woven carpet of grass, cooled in the shade cast by an
enormous, rustling stand of bamboo, I strained to follow a conversation in Kimeru
which altered the course ofmy fieldwork in Nyambene and, arguably, forged the main
tension of this thesis. Since the eureka moment is a rarity in anthropological fieldwork,
the dialogue emerging from this particularly engaging discussion lead me to consider a
Meru concept of history, or more precisely, an expression of different people's
historicity.
We had been discussing the Kimeru concept, gitiba, at my request. By 'we', I
mean to specify that I struggled to make sense of a lively banter between Kailanyi,
Amos, and Kiboore, men who belonged to different nthuki, or age-classes, but who
were all, in one way or another, passionate and competitive about their respective
cultural knowledge. These were, in the jargon of ethnography, key informants in the
sense that they indulged me by taking my obtuse questions somewhat seriously. In
Kimeru, however, they had a specific word, mugwatt, which described their relation to
me. Anyone seen to be moving about with me, speaking with me, or introducing me to
others was my mugwatv. those 'holding' me (from the verb, kugwata, to hold, get,
sponsor). This rang truer, in my mind, than words like 'informant' or 'research
assistant' because it stressed my dependence on my Meru interlocuters and friends.
Literally, my 'catchers' - the same term for the sponsor of a neophyte during their
circumcisions - these men made it a persona! responsibility to guide, mould, and
initiate me into their world of contested local knowledge.
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Amos sat squat with his thighs hard up against his chest. His comportment
seemed explosive, as if he were preparing to jump up in protest. He was, however,
listening intently to Kailanyi explain the notion of gitiba, the older man emphasising
one point after another by casting down tiny blades of grass he had plucked. Naming








kwi nthuki ijili cionthe ti gitiba'25
Kailanyi used the verb to beget, guciara, in both its genealogical and social meanings
when outlining the successive relations between all the age-classes, or in other words,
between social 'fathers' and 'sons.' Kailanyi did not have to strain to convey the basic
principles which gave rise to the concept of gitiba. The Ithalii are the 'fathers' of the
Ratanya, who are in turn the 'fathers' of the Miriti, who are in their time, the 'fathers'
of the Gicunge. All of these men belong to one gitiba. This group of 'fathers' and
'sons' are distinguished from their opposite gitiba by classifying these men as Ntangi.
The opposite gitiba, the 'fathers' and 'sons' of Kiramunya, Micubu, Lubeeta, and
Gwantai, are called Mbaine. Taking the relationship between the Kiramunya and the
Micubu as fathers and sons as a starting point, an intermediate nthuki is formed
between these two, in this case the Ithalii, but this adjacent age-class belongs to
another generational 'moiety' or gitiba. In the Nyambene Range, there are only eight
possible proper names for their age-classes. Once each of these eight age-classes has
been named it is 'time' to recycle their names once more. The names are said to be
2S (Kiramunya begot Micubu...Micubu begot Lubeeta...Lubeeta begot Gwantai, but Ithalii begot
Ratanya...Ratanya begot Miriti... Miriti begot Gicunge, from all these two generation-classes is
[gitiba]).
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recycled every hundred years or so. For example, the recent initiates of 2003 were not
yet officially named as a nthuki, but they are widely referred to as the Gicunge, the
'return' of the grouping initiated at the beginning of the twentieth century. This earlier
Gicunge are still within living memory, but once the new initiates come into formation
and acquire their own reputation, the defunct Gicunge ("Gicunge ba ntene") will be
said to have been 'reborn' ("nthuki ciawe jwacoka") in the subjectivities of the young
Gicunge circumcised in the early 2000s. In terms of their genealogical relation, most of
the former Gicunge would be the deceased great-grandfathers (kiojuuju) of todays'
Gicunge youths. The names of the nthuki are recycled every fourth genealogical
generation, which is also constitutive of eight social generations. Although Kiramunya
is the name of an age-class in formation from around 1899 to about 1915, the last
survivors of this grouping dying in the mid-1970s, it is a name which is expected to
'return' in the next decade, providing that such a practice remains viable among the
Meru. While this is the sociological understanding of gitiba, people actually use this
word in a variety of contexts. Listening to Kailanyi's explanations, he suggested that
gitiba refers to both the two generational 'moieties' of fathers and sons, as well as the
period of time in which the recycling of names occurs.
Between Kailanyi and Amos erupted a long dialogue. In faint comprehension, I
noted the anglicised Swahili word historia repeatedly, alongside a repertoire of
famines, diseases, wars and rituals which were said to have occurred in the time of
such and such an age-class. I wrote down fragments of conversation: "ti Micubu
bariitire bara ijilf'; 'it was certainly Micubu who went to the Second War.' Using
particular references to exceptional, sometimes traumatic past and present events or
episodes, the age-classes named above became protagonists in hours of story telling.
Age-classes and not individuals became the actors in the rhetorical construction of
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history. Kailanyi tried to explain that the old people, those who had been children
during the early years of imperial rule (1908 - 1926), often invoked events which bore
no recall in the experiences of those who were younger than they.
"My father's father saw Kang'ang'i build this road over Nyambene, but he
was not the first white man to be seen. There was this one people from
Kamatune called Limanyangu. He passed through Mikinduri with a white
woman. But Kang'ang'i is the one the old people remember. He brought
money. When he came he was the same age as the Gicunge and they were
his sponsors. M'lminuiki of Kianjai was his spokesman. M'lminuiki sent
Gicunge warriors throughout Tigania and Igembe to tell the old and young
not to shout at and fear this white man. It was common to pass news that
Kang'ang'i was coming by crying 'uu-uu-iW and the people hid from him
and his entourage, not liking the looks of them. Among these Gicunge, the
ones in his employ, Kang'ang'i made them wear the white man's clothing.
Later, he ordered the young warriors and maidens to visit him in Mutindwa
and dance for him. He gave them cloth, hoes, machetes, and salt as
payment. The girls that he liked were given glass beads. My father was an
Ithalii and he went to Nyeri once to dance for the whites. He was the first
Meru to see an airplane. They were ordered to wear loin cloths. Imagine,
for eight days of dancing in Nyeri, these Ithalii were exempted from
paying taxes for eight years! Neither Ithalii, nor Kiramunya went out to
work. It was Micubu who were called to work. In the old days, the Meru
were upright people."
For these elders, they could speak of a time "Indira teneya acunku atiruj?\ or before
the white man came. Stories often began with this phrase, and ended with the moral
punctuation that life had been more authentic, more enriching, and more ordered before
the white man's coming. His own father, Kailanyi explained, had been a real man, not
like the imitations of men that had been bom after his own generation. To emphasise
this moralising version of history, Kailanyi suggested that the Mem had left one gitiba
and were entering another. Things had ran their course. The initiation of the Gicunge in
the early 2000s had already led to gossip about their inauthenticity. "They know
nothing of our culture", is one frequently heard complaint; while others ask in
exasperation, "What is the world coming to?" Spoken of as mere shadows of their
former namesakes by many elders, the contemporary Gicunge represent a kind of
historical comparison between a world which now only exists in the imagination of
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elder men and women. Such comments suggest not only the coming of a new age, a
new gitiba, and the return of past nthuki, but an indirect comparison of the weight of
today's events, its changes and uncertainties, to those which occurred on the volatile
threshold of the precolonial and imperial periods.
Picking up from Kailanyi's claims about the authenticity of their ancestors,
Amos gestured to both Kiboore and myself, telling us that we were ' faki" (fakes)
because we had been bom after "Lancaster House", a clear reference to the 1963
negotiations of Kenya's political independence in a London office block. Elsewhere in
Kenya, especially in urban Nairobi, young people bom immediately after 1964,
during President Kenyatta's reign, are referred to as the 'Uhuru Generation.' Because
the 'younger generations' could not remember the struggle for freedom, Amos
concurred, they couldn't possibly understand the depravity of the white man's rule.
Then came the insightful comment. In Swahili, Amos imposed a remarkably referential
idea, suggesting that "kila mtu ana zamani yake": Everybody has their own past.
If it had not been for the striking way in which Mem conceptions of history
differed from my own, this conversation may have remained no more significant than a
hasty jotting in a grimy notebook. As I recall it, however, this conversation left me
with a newly expanded horizon about the problem of historical perspective in Mem
social life. I was suddenly reminded of an undefinable gap of historical experience
which separates parents from their children. At the same time, however, I wondered
whether this observation had more poignancy among people organising themselves
through age-classes and generation. Thinking about the notion of gitiba, I wrote a
footnote in my diary that night:
[T]he past is a ever-shifting point of reference... there is need for more refined
descriptions of how the historical and mythic are intertwined with successive
generations... what is gitiba if not ahistorical? Why does this bug me so much?
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{author's field diary, May 21 st, 2002)
Why did my Meru informants emphasise the relational aspects of historical experience
over blow-by-blow accounts of History? Multiple and often contradictory, many
conversations about the past seemed to weigh upon the present, as in Kailanyi's
critique of how today's youth lacked the stoicism which defined the Meru in the past;
or Amos' comparison to fiaki young people as cheap radios which broke within a few
weeks' use. Amos clearly perceived a cheapening effect of modernisation as
experienced in Meru.
There was a tension at the edges of age and generational categories which
highlighted the status of local history as some kind of reflection upon social
organisation. What emerged from my encounter with Kailanyi and Amos was the
linkage between historicity and the problem of generational time in the Meru context,
at least, as it was sociologically situated during fieldwork from 2001-2003. In other
words, this brief fieldwork encounter pointed to the ways in which historical
consciousness was implicated in differing forms of social relations. In Meru, the
specific forms of social organisation that took on historical meaning were based on
local constructions of difference through age, gender and generation. Because the
formation of age-classes is a prominant feature of Meru social life, their historical
consciousness is subsequently expressed in the rhetorics of what may be called a
generational consciousness. Although in this thesis I focus on age-class formation, as a
means through which to engage ethnographically with historical narratives as they are
told by Meru, the real tension which ties all the materials together is the problem of
historical perspective. More specifically, the tension which occurs to the Meru is the
historicity of generation.
In order to give a rough appreciation of what is meant by the historicity of
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generation, the subject of this chapter, I might preface it by examining this particular
fieldwork encounter in more depth. Through describing the relations between Kailanyi,
Amos, Kiboore in terms of their respective age-class positions, I aim to contextualise
how generation is frequently called upon in everyday encounters in Meru to express
difference and otherness. It is the alterity within Meru concepts of generation which
give particular cohorts the language to bring themselves together. I will, also, reflect
briefly on my position as a foreign interloper. I do this, primarily, to counter the
ethnographic language often used in the past to describe East African 'age-
organisations' as monolithic and ahistorical structures. Instead, I would wish to offer,
at least, a different rationale for writing about age-class formation and generationally
based social organisation as enduring anthropological problems. That rationale has
much to do with the politics of knowledge in which anthropologists are willing
participants.
Three lifetimes: situating the problem of historical perspective
My relation to Kailanyi was the most tenuous, partially because the basis of
our intersubjectivity was rooted in Kimeru, a language which challenged me and often
overwhelmed me in its idiomatic richness. I spoke Swahili with Amos, mostly, and
English with Kiboore. Although I could not deny the obvious divisions rooted in race
and class categories, there were other, locally significant differences which separated
Kailanyi from me. At about seventy years of age, Kailanyi was a member of the
Ratanya age-class, a peer group of ageing men whose nthuki (age-class) was in
formation throughout the period, 1946-1956. Because I was, at this point in the
fieldwork process, assigned to belong with the Gwantai, those youth currently in their
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late twenties' to early thirties' and who were initiated during the years 1983-1991,
this man represented a person for whom I would be expected to pay deference
towards, as a member of the 'Fathers of the Country' (beethe ba nthu). They are also
known as the 'Owners of the Country' (eene ba nthu), since most of these elder men
are household heads (mwene). As a generalisation, these Ratanya monopolised certain
economic rights and priviledges, such as land ownership, lines of credit, and co¬
operative marketing society membership which gave them some control over the
aspirations ofmany younger men, as well as over their wives and daughters.
Indeed, I found the most difficulty positioning myself and getting my
fieldwork done among this category of ageing men. Firstly, there was a principle of
avoidance between men of my age and elder men of the age of the Ratanya. Or, at
least, there was such a principle in the time of these elders' youth. This avoidance
may be seen as showing deference and respect, but it also reflects the fear which age
based hierarchies can instill in both the old and the young. Rooted in the respective
position of differentially aged men, the careful, deferential approaches of the young
towards the older reinforce an oft cited ideal espousing the worth of avoidance
between parental and filial generations. Often the capriciousness of elders towards a
man ofmy age and social category takes on a theatrical element, because this behaviour
seems to play between real ire and some form of performative stance. In a similar vein,
the back-biting and gossip mongering of younger men towards their elders was a
common practice, although many of these complaints were impossible to substantiate
or prove. Because open conflict between the ages is carefully avoided, many elements
of inter-generational conflict were sublimated to stereotypic complaints; such that
youth could complain that "These elders and their njuri just want to eat" in echo with
the elders saying, "The problem with youth today is that they want to starve us."
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There were, certainly, sociologically complicated questions to ask about these
particular and volatile relationships between the young and the old. Was this,
putatively, an outward expression of their gerontocratic power? Or, did it arise
because the Gwantai would be permitted to marry the social 'daughters' of the
Ratanya? Was feigned irascibility a means of initiating some kind of respectful
relationship?
In retrospect, my attempts to form relationships with these elder men was
frequently the locus of a peculiar misunderstanding. In Kimeru, the methodological
term, rapport, might have been more accurately glossed as rugambia, which is
reserved for discussions with fathers about the courtship and marriage of their
daughters. For some men, marriage was a way through which I could 'become' Meru, a
desire they took as self-evident from my interest in their way of living, their language,
and their history. The potentiality of being an in-law to these elder men, meant the
cultivation of 'shyness', nthoni, a composure much valued as a quality of personhood
among Meru. When a Meru tells another, "karaga nthoni/" ('be humble!'), it is a kind
of gentle chastisement to stay in one's place and accept the hierarchial scheme of
things. Any extraverted efforts to form relationships with these men ran the risk of
being viewed as aggressive and pushy. The only soft way towards knowing this age-
class ofmen was to wait for them to initiate a dialogue.
Ideals for behaviour in Meru are very age sensitive, such that adopting a
passive stance towards one's elders is appropriately seen as accepting one's
subjunctive status to them. One is never allowed to be seen to bristle with anger
amongst one's elders. To verbally abuse an older person is an offence with no known
excuses. One's own age-mates are responsible for such a breach of civility and are
charged with meting out the punishment. Until fairly recently, young men could be
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Plate 6: Adjacent generation: a social 'father' in mid-life (2001)
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beaten with poisonous thorns by their cohort, or, forced to run through a gauntlet of
blows as punishment for abusing an elder, especially a social 'mother.' On an
experiential level, such ideals revealed forms of ageism in both my thinking and that of
my Meru interlocuters. Whereas in European and North American thinking, ageism
pertains to images of and ideas about 'growing old' and entering physical and mental
decline, among other things, in some parts of Africa, such as Kenya, a more pervasive
ageism also characterises youth as a time of intemperence, immaturity, and laziness.
Once, for example, a Ratanya rebuked me for asking him questions about the past,
arguing that if I was truly interested in 'reading' Meru cultural history, that is to study
it, "you should stop being lazy and read the books already written in the library,
instead of bothering us old men!" With time, I gave in to the Meru age and generational
hierarchy, even though I never felt wholly at home with it. As such, I learned to work
with the expectations of 'shyness' and quietly put to work my biographical
understandings of this cohort.
Yet, Kailanyi was an exception because far from avoiding younger men, he felt
it was his moral duty to teach them. He sat with Amos - a categorical 'son' to the
Ratanya - on many occasions because they agreed together that their community was
in turmoil. Sometimes their dialogue assumed the language of conspiracy. Our
intersubjectivity, although impaired by my faltering and arduously spoken Kimeru,
was bridged by long sessions of conversation, interspersed by singing and silences,
where I sat patiently and listened intently. In groups of three or four, these meetings
often lasted into the darkness of early evening, inspired by the convivial chewing of
miraa (catha edulis), with dialogue switching back and forth in Kimeru, Swahili and
English.
It was Amos, over many long months, who cultivated a particular zeal for
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argument, polemics and a generosity of opinion in his relation with me. It is this
specific kind of generosity with local knowledge which anthropologists have always
relied upon in their field studies. Sometimes this can be a form of competition, but
with Amos I judged that his debates and arguments were born of disquiet with the
inequalities he had suffered in life, rather than an attempt to impose his will and views
upon another.
A former convict who converted to Islam in the late 1980s, Amos was a
member of the nthuki Miriti, men who are in their late thirties' to early fifties' and
who were initiated between 1973-1981. Locally, he had to live down constant rumours
about his criminality, but I found him to be secretly admired, even feared, for his
reputation as a rehabilitated gangster. Some people thought I was foolhardy or brave,
probably both, to have Amos as one of my mugwati. Amos greatly admired the
warrior-hero figure in Meru folktales and allegories, the ncamba, but insisted that such
persons no longer exist. On one occasion, he told me, "In the past, Meru had three
kinds of great men, the braves (ncamba), the orator (mugambi) and the benefactor
(gitonga). Today, there are only the rich." Amos strove, somehow, to embody each of
these figures in his relation to others, as if carried by some moral imperative. To all
who spoke about him - behind his back - lay a tacit respect for this angry figure who
had been jailed for six years, but not crushed by the penal system. He was, to me,
something of a rebel. His imaginative political visions embraced a kind of millenarian
neo-traditionalism. He told elaborate yarns about the exploits and defeats of the Mau
Mau, even though he was an infant in the 1950s. His father had fought the British and
Loyalists in the Mount Kenya and Nyambene forests during the Emergency (1952-
1955), before returning to Tigania, unscathed, to plant the massive bamboo grove
towering above us. His biographical link to struggle in Kenya was a prominant feature
132
of his politics, convinced that uhuru (independence) had died at Lancaster House in
London and that the Meru had perished when the government created its own version
of the njuri nceke (select council of elders).26 Although he had left primary school
before his leaving certificate, Amos was - to borrow Gramsci's famous phrase - an
'organic intellectual', who was acutely critical of his country's political leadership and
the vicissitudes of postcolonial Kenya.
Amos was not only framed as my 'catcher', but was also of the age of men
who were considered the 'daylight fathers' (beethe ba muthenya) of all Gwantai. Each
age-class forms itself through relationships with older youth, usually of the nthuki
adjacent to their own, who are known as their 'daylight fathers.' With me somewhat
under his tutelage, I found my relations to men like him growing increasingly
subjunctive: that is, I became much more passive than was personally comfortable, but
this was, in itself, one of the ways through which my research could be conducted.
Deference became a question of social access. Whereas Kailanyi was of the generation
generally thought of today to be the 'Fathers of the Country' (beethe ba nthii), that of
Amos' nthuki related to more junior positions, but both were constructed through the
idiom of fatherhood, exemplified by the 'daylight fathers' or the 'Fathers of the
Country.' The beethe ba muthenya were those persons of an immediately senior age-
class which act as a model for those younger than them. As Kiboore came to explain it,
"these daylight fathers are your cultural fathers, where you leam how to speak and
how to dress... but they are not the ones holding you when you face the knife, these
are your catchers and they are like older brothers." The idioms of kinship were
implicit in the explanations given for the relationships between people based on age,
generation, and spousal classification.
26 See Chapter Four on the policies of indirect rule and the cooption of the njuri nceke in colonial
governmentality.
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This expanded definition of fatherhood is pivotal to understanding the
'dualism' at play in the concept of gitiba. It was Kiboore who explained to me that
it's a preference to be initiated into the nthuki alligned with that of one's parental
generation; "that of your own father." This meant, in the language of anthropology,
that some form of principle called 'dual organisation' could be discerned from people's
concern for initiating their sons into their own gitiba category. This is what Kailanyi
had been calling gitiba, when he began to chant the names of nthuki filiated as fathers
and sons. Kiboore's father was a Ratanya, but Kiboore's mother was a younger
second wife (mwiru) and he had been initiated into Miriti at a precocious age in 1981,
on his father's insistence. It was important to Kiboore's father that his son 'belong' to
his gitiba. To the extent that fathers feel great pride in their own gitiba, or speak about
the potential danger of initiating one's own sons into their opposite gitiba, stories
about past rivalries between these groupings of men continue to be told despite the
growing sentiment among a minority of fathers that such prescriptions are old
fashioned. For these other men, what matters is that their sons are circumcised,
without particular stress on which 'generation class' they are initiated into. Anne-
Marie Peatrik described this social division among the Meru as generation 'fractions'
(Peatrik 1999: 80-4) while other ethnographers have described these as 'alternation
generations' (Almagor 1983; Simonse 1992). Whatever terminology anthropologists
superimpose upon such forms of organisation, which do seem to 'alternate' between
categories of fathers and sons, it would do better to understand these as models or
ideals for organising, rather than hard-and-fast rules about social life.
In Meru, the emphasis on maintaining these social divisions is now a matter of
negotiation and personal choice. Kiboore represented a unique case, because his father
was adamant about initiating his son into Ntangi and their gitiba at such a young age.
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In providing a reason for insisting that Kiboore be initiated as an 'under aged' youth,
Kiboore's father declared that he believed his sons would perish if they were not
initiated into the Miriti. Latterly, Kiboore suggested that initiating him into the Miriti
was his father's priority because the ageing man did not want to appear to have
fathered many sons late into life who would be initiated as Gwantai. Kiboore could
only have been included in his father's generation class by being initiated at the age of
eleven, a precocious age to be circumcised by any comparison, the normal age
currently about fourteen to sixteen years of age. His younger male siblings, he
explained, were initiated mwongela, that is to say that they were circumcised at
convenience as nominal Miriti, but after this age-class had ceased to recruit new
initiates. Because of this, Kiboore's mwongela siblings did not have the status that he
enjoyed within his father's younger children. Like Kiboore, they would be the
contemporaries of the Gwantai, people who were just beginning to marry in the mid-
1990s. Their Ratanya father, Kiboore explained, would have been embarrassed to have
sons of differing ages and spread out between two adjacent age-classes. Amongst the
elder man's peers, the Ratanya, it was common for their sons to be spread out or
'mixed' between two gitiba, even though it was undesirable. It was better for him to
appear to be a man who was particularly blessed with a large number of children born
closely together than to appear as a man whose reproductive period exceeded those of
his age-mates and their spouses.
The lifetimes of these three 'key informants' only partially overlapped.
Despite their fundamental zeal for discussing their cultural history, these men all had
significantly different points of view about life and interpreted the topics raised in
conversation from their own perspective. Not only did these men belong to different
generations, but their position in the life-course and their personhood were also
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differentiated. As such, the topics they thought important enough to remember, and
share with me, spoke of the subtle problems of perspective a historian faces in any
kind of reconstruction of past subjectivities.
Kailanyi, for example, remembers debating with his cohort around 1947
whether they should revive the practice of living in their gaaru cia nthaka, a kind of
warrior's barracks, during their bachelorhood. This house was abandoned by the
previous nthuki, the Micubu kabeeria, because of the effects of the SecondWorldWar
upon their older members who went abroad and came back with new ideas about how
to live. Ratanya not only decided not to persist with the gaaru cia nthaka, except
during initiations, but in an unprecedented change they also began to live in the same
houses with their wives. Whatever their individual views, this decision to cohabitate
with their spouses contributed to a lasting perception that the Ratanya were spoilers
of tradition. More than this, however, the Ratanya brought new practices into their
married lives which earned them reputations for being both fecund, in the positive
sense, and promiscuous, in the negative. Cohabitation was ultimately one answer to
the colonial system of hut taxation, where separate houses for husbands, wives, and
initiated children were enumerated for higher tax payments. With a repressive system
of migrant labour already in place, Ratanya and their spouses, the Nculubi, began to
build larger conjugal houses to live in, despite the fact that many men were away from
home more or less permanently. The multigenerational and conjugal house set the
pattern for today's couples' homes. However, the Ratanya also stressed an ambition
towards having more children and abandoning many of the strict rules and practices
surrounding reproduction, such as birth spacing, child control (infanticide and
abortion), and ending the birth of subsequent children at the time a couple's oldest
children were circumcised. In the 1950s, a kind of 'sexual revolution' of sorts took
place in the Nyambene's, although it probably occurred in Imenti at an earlier time (cf.
Chege 1993; Thomas 2003). Kailanyi's age-class, the Ratanya, were of such ill repute
in the opinion of their elders that they were given the nickname Nyaga na Mpua,
which means to be inconsiderate of the proper way of doing things, a "don't care"
generation, not without resonance with the reputation of today's youths. Today, of
course, these men are elders and their opinions are considered to be conservative by
those of younger age-classes.
Amos' age-class, the Miriti, formed in the postcolonial period and particularly
during a period of time when the Nyambene communities were beginning to feel the
first effects of economic downturn and dramatic swings in agricultural profits. The
major internal debates among the Miriti were about how to satisfy the constraints of
'tradition' while surviving in an increasingly precarious 'modem' economy. The
alternations this age-class made to bridewealth payments (ruracio) and other social
exchanges between affines, in particular, led to greater personal 'freedoms' but more
conflicts between parental and filial generations. Platform shoes, denim jackets,
sunglasses, earrings, and flaired trousers earned them vitriol from their elders. Closely
associated with their new subjectivity was a kind of social anger which produced new
forms of criminality. Not for the first time in Meru history, small gangs of armed
youth conducted raids upon members of their own communities. Whereas in the past,
young Meru warriors would seek out cattle in their raids to build up animals for
bridewealth payment, the new raiders had no clearly defined intent which left the
public baffled about stories of senseless murders. But the Miriti, later in life, also
became the main thrust behind a kind of millenarian movement in the Nyambenes,
fuelled by the small profits and hope which the booming trade in miraa encouraged.
These men are no longer feared as criminals, or dismissed for their 'modem' fashion
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Plate 7: Bakari and Nkatha: studio portrait of Miriti. 'nthuki trabuta'
138
sense, but are respectable junior elders who are now initiating their sons and lobbying
to join the ranks of councils such as the biama and njuri (see Chapter Four).
Kiboore, a Miriti, but much younger than Amos, was a high school teacher
posted by the national teacher's union to teach in Tigania. Kiboore's sense of
modernity and of self-imposed alienation from tradition rested upon a primary
contradiction: he was also passionate about Meru's cultural history. Like his older
counterparts in Kailanyi and Amos, however, he had no unequivocal definition of
what constituted 'tradition' or 'modernity', these being the most problematic key
words in public debates. Kiboore was a contemporary with the Gwantai and shared
much of the same dressing, speech, and aspirations as members of this age-class. Most
of the Gwantai are in their early thirties or late twenties. They have appropriated
many of the elements of the globalisation of the 1990s, including fashion, music, and
the desire for travel and experiences outside of Africa. Amongst this group, there is a
profound taste for the otherness of Afro-American styles of dress and speech. Many
had active imaginations and fantasies about "flying away" where they see themselves
affording the consumption patterns of the "rich countries" of Europe and North
America, particularly the United States where quite a number of young Meru have
immigrant relatives. For a small minority of this age-class, especially those circumcised
in clinics and members of a declining "middle-class", a sense of pessimism about
"African culture" prevails. A major 'critical event' in their lifetime, the rapes and
murders of schoolgirls at St. Kizito's High School, contributed to this group's
polarisation around the question of the merits of tradition as authenticity and the traps
of modernity as alienation. Their historicity is very much still in the making, but the
events of 1991, when Gwantai youth participated in a shocking and traumatic
destruction of the notion of community, remain with this cohort as the defining
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moment in their young lifetimes.
Key words and the rhetoric of historical knowledge
I spoke to many people about gitiba and while it was not a surprise to find
that it was a contentious notion, I was sometimes disheartened by the very looseness I
encountered with every attempt to explain the concept. I felt frustration that, unlike
Anne-Marie Peatrik, I could not carry out a sociology of 'dual organisation' or
'generation classes', because gitiba did not refer to any particular thing in the
ethnographic present, but a cluster of ideas which clearly meant something different in
the past. A novice ethnographer brings certain expectations with them to the field.
One of these expectations is that the people one 'studies' will speak about their lives
in such a way that their meanings and intentions will be clear to all. Our 'informants'
will not lie, we presume, nor will they confuse the imaginary with the real. These may
very well be unreasonable expectations, but the idea that every 'culture' has its own
'truth' is a pervasive myth for beginner fieldworkers. We search for 'key words' to
unlock the secrets and mysteries of all the tacit things which escape our ken. One
gropes about in the field seeking clarity on topics dreamt up in the ethnographic
imagination, but often the objects of this research are less tangible in reality than in the
pages of an ethnographic monograph with its figures, charts, and empirical prose.
Gitiba was one such topic which emphasised the idea that culture is an arena of
interpretation and an historically shifting one at that. Retrospectively, I am convinced
that 'dual organisation' only influences Meru social life when crisis within the
community provoke the need to have a language in which to discuss matters
historically. Nevertheless, asking informants about the term had the result of eliciting
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many diverging understandings of its place in social life. I was left with the possibility
that the many explanations of gitiba provided glimpses of an indigenous rhetorics of
history. But placing one interpretation above the array of others posed a fundamental
question. How does one interrelate differing definitions of concepts such that they
clarify rather than confuse?
In the following passages, this question is explored through descriptions of a
number of situations in which the term, gitiba, was given widely contrasting meanings.
This is not to argue that exegesis was random. There were limits to what people could
suggest and these limits pertained to interpretations of social organisation, on the one
hand, and measurements of time on the other. The ambivalence at the heart of this
concept was what lent it its particular flexibility and breadth as part of the rhetorics of
historical knowledge. When followed closely, gitiba stood as a kind of explanation that
there are cycles or patterns to be observed in Meru history. The primary rhetoric was
that generations 'return' after a predetermined period of time. Although this may
appear exotic, on closer analysis, there is a familiar overlap with some European ways
of historical thinking. Hayden White (1973) spoke of such rhetorics as the basis of
what he called 'metahistory.' An example comes from Marxist economists, such as
Samir Amin (1998), who argued that capitalist production and accumulation went
through seven year cycles of 'boom' and 'bust.' Inscribed in everyday understandings
of history, many persons employ the cliche 'history is doomed to repeat itself when
they perceive analogies between past and present events. Likewise, the oscillation
between categories of Meru fathers and sons, the gitiba of Mbaine and Ntangi, are
ascribed with values not too distant from the ideas of 'boom' and 'bust', although
these are intepreted within local idioms of 'peace' and 'war', 'rain' and 'sun',
'flourish' and 'drought', as well as a 'time for animals' and a 'time for people.' Some
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of these are described in greater details below.
In Kaelo market, Laare Division, when I was looking for a suitable fieldsite, it
was recommended that I seek out a well-known, erudite elder - a Ratanya ndinguri -
who would, it was promised, tell me everything I needed to know about nthuki in the
Nyambenes. When he was finally encountered and the purpose ofmy visit explained,
he produced a thin ethnographic volume on the Kalenjin, an ethnic cluster on the
western Rift valley, and demonstrated that the Nyambene age-class system was
identical to that of the Kipsigis or Pokot.27 The poignant proofwas a single diagram
depicting a cyclical system of generational alternations, four in number with a total of
eight separate and recurrent age-classes. I stared at two circles said to represent an 'age
organisation.' Taken together, he claimed, this was gitiba. As we sat back to digest this
analysis, I thought about how ethnographic abstractions could reduce the vagarities
and ambivalences of cultural knowledge to the simplicity of a diagram or a flow-chart.
More than this, however, the presentation of a book as the measure of authority
appeared absurd to me. Coached by the myth of the 'key informant' in fieldwork, the
idea that an ageing man might resort to 'book knowledge' to answer the questions of
the visiting ethnographer was a contradictory possibility.28 Certainly anthropologists
have commented on such situations before and is now part of the stock jokes an
anthropologist might tell their friends or students. The image of the stumped
'informant' consulting a book by famous ethnographer x or y to answer another
ethnographer's questions about such-and-such a 'custom' is now a familar trope.
27 The ethnic term 'Kalenjin' was coined after a vernacular Kipsigis radio programme which began with
the salutation 'I hear you!', a common greeting among Kipsigis speakers. Today, the Kalenjin refer to
Nandi, Kipsigis (or Kipsikis), Tugen, Marakwet, Pokot, and Keiyo peoples who live in the Rift Valley
and speak closely intelligible languages.
28 The mythic quality of the elder as 'key informant' is particularly acute with those carrying out
fieldwork in African societies. Perhaps this can be traced historically to the figure of the elder as an
archetype of Marcel Griaule's relationship to Ogatemmeli. Likewise, Jan Vansina's quip 'A dying elder
is like a library on fire' has contributed to this archetype.
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What mattered in my encounter with this kind of game was that the small 'Peoples of
Kenya' book provided a template for discussion between a Meru and a 'white.'
Perhaps this description of gitiba as a social structure mirrored colonial
preoccupations with 'institutions' and 'organisations.' Whatever the case, this
particular man managed to quell the interpretive difficulties of explaining gitiba by
showing me a diagram which had been produced by a European imagination.
The extent to which overlapping conceptions of time and history have
modified current definitions of gitiba demonstrate its actual resilience within historical
processes, rather than its obscurity. Among younger people, where knowledge of
gitiba was fragmented, the diversity of explanations given revealed how the term could
be used to explain the chronology of environmental or ecological events. When asked
about gitiba, many younger, school educated informants responded as if I had quizzed
them on the meteorological properties of drought, discussing topics as variable as
over-population and de-forestation. The gitiba known as Mbaine, inclusive of the age-
classes Ithalii, Rantanya, Miriti, and Gicunge, was associated with droughts (mipara)
and pestilence (mirumo jau). A number of older informants insisted that droughts
occurred more often when intiates of this 'moiety' were in seclusion, using as evidence
the famines of the period 1918-1927 when the three successive mataana of Ithalii
were in formation. These famines were referred to as Kiaramuu in 1918-1919
('blistering sun' drought), Kirianduara in 1921 (the famine of 'eating leather'), and the
locust invasions of 1926, known as the 'locust hunger' (mpara ya ngigi). The 'sons'
of Ithalii, the Ratanya, became associated with two additional famines, Kaunanku (the
'selling firewood' famine) in 1946 and Gatandugu ( the 'Got no kin' famine) in the
following year. The 'sons' of Ratanya, the Miriti, in turn experienced the famine of
1973 known as the 'flour famine' (Kimutu or Kimwe) and another smaller drought in
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1977 which gave rise to the imaginative nickname of the Miriti kobia as nthuki
nkabuta (the 'exhausted generation'). Although droughts and famines occurred when
members of the opposing Ntangi gitiba were initiates, Meru observations that more
famines occurred during the initiation times of Mbaine age-classes are essentially
correct. I offer no explanation for this observation. Periods of war, however, effected
the Ntangi more than the Mbaine, because both the First and Second World Wars
recruited more men of warrior age from the Ntangi than the Mbaine in both 1914 and
1939. It was to this oscillation which led Peatrik (1999) to speak of these gitiba as
signifying shifts in environmental and social patterns:
Une mesure supplementaire du temps apparait ici ou les cycles de cinq
generations sont associes a des manifestations atmospheriques recurrentes et
antagonistes: un cycle est associe avec le soleil et 1'autre, avec la pluie. Le
retour au pouvoir du premier cycle s'accompagne, croit-on, d'une episode de
secheresse, au sens ou les saisons seches seront plus marquees que les saisons
humides; a l'inverse, l'arrivee au pouvoir de l'autre cycle coincidera avec des
saisons humides prononcees. A ce balancement pluriannuel qui procede de
l'observation empirique de la succession d'episodes plutot sees ou plutot
humides que la meteorologie commence a comprendre, sont associees des
idees de prosperity differentielle. Le gitiba du soleil est favorable a la
multiplication des troupeaux, des humains et des abeilles mais il est aussi
synonume de guerre, alors que le cycle de la pluie apporte des recoltes
abondantes et signifie le retour de la paix (Peatrik 1999: 80-1).
Peatrik's idea of differential prosperities between adjacent age-classes was mirrored by
a number of explanations I received in the field, but in practice this interpretation was
far from equivocal. There were competing interpretations.
Others, immediately linking my questions about gitiba with their background
knowledge ofmy fieldwork exercises and interest in history, attempted to reach some
kind of inter-subjective compromise by answering that gitiba was perhaps best
throught of as a 'century.' A cursory analysis would demonstrate that the names of
the Nyambene age-classes repeat themselves every hundred years or so. Closer
examination shows that there are four generations to a gitiba, such that the names are
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repeated on the coming of the fifth genealogical generation (ruciara rwathano).
Another possibility is that, like in the 'West', the memory of descent begins to
fragment after several generations. In terms of a chronological limit, it is possible that
the length of the gitiba reflects some kind of limit upon social memory. Indeed,
today's eldest men and women in Meru speak about their parents' nthuki but rarely
mention those which preceeded their parent's generation. The idea that gitiba is the
Kimeru equivalent of the 'century', however, possibly reflects a problem in the
historical perspectives of differing respondents. A closely related idea is that this 'key
word' simply means something different than it did in the past.
When I asked a teacher what he thought gitiba meant, he told me to give him a
few days to find out: he would ask his grandfather and a few other old men. He even
wrote the word down on a piece of paper. Figuratively, I began to sense that I was
chasing a phantom, perhaps a figment of my own 'ethnological' imagination. But still
there was a nagging doubt about dismissing gitiba outright. Afterall, hadn't Kailanyi
linked gitiba into that other preeminent Kimeru 'key word' of nthukff Why would one
term fall away from the problems of social life, while the other seemed to invite
consistent and, sometimes, passionate debate? What did the anachronism of gitiba
begin to suggest about Meru social life? Why did the term not have the power of
explanation that it must have had before? Essentially, what had changed? I didn't ask
these questions to carry out a historical semantics of Kimeru, indeed, my limited grasp
of the language would have nipped this in the bud. Instead, like Richard Waller (2000),
I had come to accept that people who organise and talk about themselves through
categories of age and generation - perhaps above class - come to create a political
imaginary which is acutely responsive to historical change and continuity. In other
words, I came to think that gitiba, when thought about in the context of age-class
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formation, was a rhetorical tool, or as Foucault would have it, a 'technology of
speaking' which made the subaltern version ofMeru history possible.
Here, I think the arguments made by Raymond Williams (1976) about 'key
words' are apt and applicable to the historically shifting fields of meaning in Kimeru
concepts. Returning from the Second World War, Williams and another colleague who
had been absent from Cambridge University for the duration of the war were curious
to discover that many of the words they had been familiar with before the war had
changed their meanings in the time they had been away. Adjusting to their new world,
they conceded in conversation, 'the fact is, they just don't speak the same language'
(Williams 1976: 9). Because concepts and the words used to express them are
contested and, thus, change, the 'key words' which are most grounded in social life,
materially and symbolically, are frequently the site of critical debate. This can be
applied to the way in which Meru debate concepts which are connected to broader
political idioms of age and generation. Across and between generations, these concepts
are made and remade through shifting points of reference, usually biographical in
scope. Insisting that variations in meaning embody different experiences and differing
interpretations of experience, Williams argues:
It is an exploration of the vocabulary of a crucial area of social and
cultural discussion, which has been inherited within precise historical and
social conditions and which has to be made at once conscious and critical -
subject to change as well as to continuity - if the millions of people in
whom it is active are to see it as active: not as a tradition to be learned,
nor a consensus to be accepted, nor a set of meanings which, because it is
'our language', has a natural authority; but as a shaping and a reshaping, in
real circumstances and from profoundly different and important points of
view: a vocabulary to use, to find our ways in, to change as we find it
necessary to change it, as we go on making our own language and history
(Williams 1976: 22)
The constant traffic in 'key words' occurs because they lack precise definitions,
exactly the kind of slippery terms needed to keep up with the contingency of social
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life. Likewise, the connections Meru make with age-class formation are polyvalent.
But at the same time, it is through differentiated, sometimes contradictory,
understandings of concepts like nthuki and gitiba that Meru open up discussion about
their social life.
While some sociological meanings of gitiba have shifted, somehow, from the
specific social relationships it addressed, this is not the case for nthuki which
dominates and even excites the political discourse in Meru. Consider the ambivalence
of the concept ofgitiba in comparison to the words for age-class or generation (nthuki
or ruciara). Once, when asking an elderly woman in Imenti about the 'importance of
nthuki these days', through her grandson as an interpreter, she demanded we clarify
what we meant. We were discussing an idiom, that of 'leaking' (icabuka), which
designated a 'sloppy', 'uncaring', or even 'rebellious' generation:
"Which is this age-class said to be leaking?"
"Which? All age-classes are leaky"
"Why, then, are they said to be leaking?"
"Because of their disturbing behaviour... isn't your age-class behaving badly?"
"So, we Mung'atia [a current Imenti nthuki] are behaving badly?"
"You're the worst leakers"
"Are age-classes still important?"
"What?!? How can they not be important?"
"Even nowadays?"
"Yes... they are important... they have importance"
"Tell us how they are important"
"Start by asking me which age-classes I have seen"
The problem with our usage of the term nthuki lay in its intended meanings. We were
not using it in its strictly sociological sense of a relationship between parents and
children, on the one hand, nor that between adjacent age-classes related to one another
through senior and junior positions on the other. Instead, we were evoking the term
nthuki "whether it was still important", a usage which presupposed that the term was
no longer a key word. Unlike the concept of gitiba, which is clearly anachronistic in
some usages, the concept of the nthuki maintains its place as a key word, albeit in
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different schemes ofmeaning specific to today's historicity.
This section has aimed at showing how words like gitiba become recycled into
an ongoing rhetoric of historical knowledge. The wide field ofmeanings which the term
inspires in conversation and debate is an outcome of the shifting semantics of
everyday life as well as concrete historical change. In the next section of this chapter,
however, it will be useful to look at the possible ideological arguments that are made
through invocation of the terms, gitiba and nthuki, as the parts of speech in localised
historical knowledge. In other words, there remains the question of how such key
words emplot historical narratives and charge them with meanings which reproduce
ageist and generationalist hierarchies.
History and metahistory in central Kenyan communities
The question of indigenous theories of history among East African
communities has not been taken as seriously as it ought to among historians and
ethnographers. This is not to argue that it hasn't been written about, for there are now
a number of loosely related articles which discuss the issue for some Kenyan and
Tanzanian communities (cf. Ambler 1995, 1989; Kershaw 1997; Lonsdale 1992, 1995;
Muriuki 1974; Shetler 2003). The problem here, however, is not necessarily that these
interpretations and representations of East African theories of history are
overwrought from scanty evidence, whether from the oral, archival, or ethnographic
records, but that they tend to presume an unproblematic starting point over the more
fundamental question 'What is history?' Indeed, there is another related problem at
stake. In making the assumption that social and cultural difference in time and space
bridges the distance between History (with a capital H) and histories, it is far too easy
148
(and ethnocentric) to reduce the histories of the subaltern other in terms of 'cyclic' or
recursive concepts of time. This assumption is, of course, highly misguided in its
simplicity and use of metaphors about time. The result is that the Kenyan theories of
history are 'understood' through the culturally priviledged idea that History, and its
concepts of 'linear' and redemptive time, are the only legitimate version of historical
consciousness. Such versions of History have already been deconstructed as
metahistory by scholars such as Hayden White (1973), leading analysis of historical
narrative towards a path which negotiates the uneasy fallacy of 'cyclical' versus
'linear' models of time and historical consciousness.
In his discussion of time and historical consciousness among the Ilparakuyo
Maasai of northeastern Tanzania, Peter Rigby (1983) questions the abstract
separation of concepts of time from the specific historical formations of the societies
being studied by anthropologists. As a deft criticism of this tendency to subvert
African notions of time to cosmological abstractions, such as the notion of cyclical
time, Rigby argues:
There is seldom any attempt to place all these elements or levels of time
reckoning, even where their existence is noted, in a total and specific historicity
arising from the nature of the specific social formation under consideration,
which in turn is itself a product of that specific historical development
[emphasis mine] (Rigby 1983: 437)
Rigby's call for more specificity in ethnographic interpretations of time is
simultaneously a refusal to essentialise 'Africa' as timeless and ahistorical. But, more
importantly, Rigby suggests that there are competing and controversial concepts of
history, leaving room for ethnographic comparison. The notion of gitiba being
interpreted here is vested with a 'total and specific historicity' which is analytically
inseparable from the ecological, demographic, and sociological change experienced by
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the last three Meru generations.
It is frequently stressed that there are historical connections among the so-
called Thagicu Bantu, from whom a number of contemporary Kenyan peoples are
believed to have been formed. These are the clusters of peoples living in Central and
Eastern Provinces of Kenya who have been known for more than a hundred years as
the Gikuyu, Embu, Kamba, Mbeere, and the Meru. Although it may be possible to
assume, as C.W. Hobley did in 1910, that these peoples share many metaphysical
understandings of the world and the cosmos, such as the decision making powers of
God, spirits, and ancestors, few ethnographers have studied the weight of
anthropocentrism in informants' explanations of the scheme of things. In other words,
early European attempts to discern 'how natives think' overlooked the extent to
which these people thought of good and bad events in the world and the cosmos as
intrinsically related to human agency. An extension of this oversight were statements
that such peoples lacked history.
Greet Kershaw's ethnographic writings about the central Gikuyu were the first
to question this 'people without history' fallacy (Kershaw 1997). Her insights are
pertinent to how different ideas of history can be from one social formation to the
next. Kershaw's point of departure was the tumult of villagisation during the Mau
Mau Emergency, when the central motif for historical narrative was the alienation of
land from Kiambu Gikuyu and their struggle to regain it. She correctly asserted that it
is the specificity of the historical and social context in which field research takes place
that enables any history, at all, to be told. As such, in her dealings with the recall of
elders about former struggles, the disastrous outcomes of social disorder and of things
coming apart were silenced and reordered in an attempt to form memory around the
good, the ordered, and the blessed. In Gikuyu thought, evil events stemmed from evil,
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good events stemmed from good, in which God, spirits, ancestors, and living men and
women all played critical decision making roles. Blessings from all of the above
brought a man land, fertile wives, a long life, wealth and authority (Kershaw 1997: 15).
Existential suffering in disease and misfortune, as well as raw inequalities, were
punishments linked to transgressions made in the past. A man's virtue and fortune
could be 'lost' in an instant, his cattle herds numerous one day, only to be taken the
next. And all this, Kershaw tell us, was understood to have precedent in the way in
which people spoke about the past, such that 'events which brought evil and their
possible causes should be deleted from general memory' (Kershaw 1997: 16). As such,
Kershaw argues that the Gikuyu sense for history, at least as it was formed in the
early 1950s, stressed the human role between memory and 'good' and 'bad' histories,
such that her informants would recall blessings from the past, but refuse to
acknowledge that so-and-so had been cursed. History was, to the Gikuyu, selective
because it was imbued with moral consequences for the present. Her Gikuyu
informants would also withhold historical knowledge from younger people until they
had reached the 'proper age' to be told, from whence they would possess the social
gumption to put such knowledge to 'good' or 'evil' ends. She writes that the decisions
not to expose 'evil' histories, such as the plight of families caught in the desperation of
killer famines or diseases, was a moral response to the 'ancestors' in making such
'evil' come back into the existence of the living. In conclusion, Kershaw suggests that
the telling of history is differentiated:
Given this perspective on history, it is not surprising that different people
had different histories; it also explained the gap between elders and
younger members in knowledge about land. As it was, though elders'
knowledge about the distant past and its hardships had become limited and
vague, younger males knew even less of the hardships of the past or the
past itself. Each generation would lose part of its history (Kershaw 1997:
17)
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The ideological stress on a differentiated history may have contributed to earlier
European assumptions that the Africans they encountered lived in some kind of
timeless, otherworldy twilight of past and present. Such a counter-ideology about the
nature of history certainly legitimated the possession of African land since, as
Kershaw aptly points out, a lack of history demonstrated the recent migration of the
African peoples they colonized. After all, the adage might go, peoples without history
are also peoples without a future. As many earlier ethnographers also sought to
resolve this problem of perception with elaborate models of 'cyclic' versus 'linear'
time, none sought out the ideological possibilities for ordering the relationships
between the past and the present in ways which were at odds with these abstractions.
Greet Kershaw's contribution to the problem of historical perspective is to underline
the possibility that 'history', ignored by many European thinkers, might find its roots
in the differentiations of social life, where recall or forgetting are often pragmatic
claims against competing views of the past, present, or even, future.
It is my understanding that Meru feelings about history do not conform to that
presented by Kershaw for the Gikuyu, but I do not have evidence to demonstrate
whether this is a recent change, or else, the outcome of different rhetorical styles in the
way and the reasons why histories are told. I suspect that any ideological brackets put
around the telling of history are also subject to biographical and historical changes. I
noted that several of my elder informants displayed an unease in discussing
contentious issues of the past in the company of younger persons, usually myself and
my minders. Others, however, as if driven by some purpose, would tell us, "I don't
believe in secrets, so I will tell you what happened", before embarking on telling
stories which, in the past, had been treated with great sensitivity. Consider the
following fragment from an interview where we learned about the fear associated with
152
having a child before initiation and out ofwedlock:
"How long was the courtship to last before marriage?"
"As long as they liked, but there was one thing that was greatly feared... you told
me to tell you everything..?"
"Yes, tell me..."
"The girl feared getting a baby before marriage... young man feared if this girl gets
a baby. We would all lose our reputations... who has no fear among them?"
Other elder women were less open about discussing this period of time, which I could
not date accurately since the prohibition against uninitiated girls' pregnancies lasted
many decades and still lingers on today in some quarters. Not only were the colonial
officials punishing girls who became pregnant and abandoned their infants, or who
sought abortions, but such young girls (nkenye) also had to keep such incidents
strictly to themselves, lest they be seen to bring great shame and pollution (mugiro) to
their fathers' compounds. Others, ran away to other parts ofMeru as refugees, often
with their warrior lovers, but just as often alone. Because such experiences were
traumatic, that is 'bad', they were considered unmentionables, more than what we in
the West might term, a 'skeleton in the closet' or 'dirty linen.' Yet, undeniably, such
incidents have, in the European understanding of history, a significant place in
explaining the intertwined threads of biographical and historical time, as exemplified
by Lynn Thomas' (1996; 1998; 2003) extensive historical research on this topic in
Meru.
Despite the ambivalence which traffics through the concept of gitiba it is
relatively clear that it cannot be disassociated from the history of the Meru as a
people. The problem may be put simply. It is not a question of seeking an English
translation of the term. An obvious example of this kind of translation work would be
to suggest that gitiba be compared to our familiar concept of the 'century.' While the
'century' can be used outside of European historiography, the application of gitiba to
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any situation outside of Meru history, and its rhetorics, would be nonsensical. A
century is a unit of chronological time with its own history, to be sure, but it is
privileged to be commensurate with other times. It forms the basis of European
historicism, and it is through this unit that the histories of other peoples are compared
with that of Europe. Gitiba, however, cannot be thought of merely as a measurement
of time, or a chronological marker, because it is an idiomatic and highly specific
concept of historical time incommensurate with any other social formation other than
the Meru.
To bring this chapter into perspective and closure, gitiba marks the period of
historical time during which the Meru have organised themselves into age-classes and
social generations. According to Meru narratives about their originary exodus from
Mboa, their subsequent wanderings in the wilderness, and their eventual peopling of
the Nyambene Range and the eastern flanks of Mount Kenya, a revolutionary period
occurred in their history which required the 'adoption' of age-class organisation to
counter inherent trends towards social chaos and crises. The hero of this story, Kaura
wa Bechau, is discussed in the following chapter, but it is to this obscure, even
legendary figure that many Meru attribute the origins of their social organisation and
its concomitant ideas about history. Since then, the question of where the Meru have
come from and where they are going was continually raised and answered through the




the enigma of succession in historical perspective
'Who is in power?'
The most general assumption about age-class and generational 'systems' is that
they are political. Not surprisingly, one of the most basic questions an ethnographer
can ask during fieldwork in such a context is 'Who is in power?' In the anthropological
literature on the topic, the 'who' has always been older men of a specified age-class,
where there is general agreement that they are the generation in power. This is the
gerontocratic model of power frequently alluded to in the ethnographic literature
(Aguilar 1998). But notions of gerontocratic power have their theoretical problems,
not the least of which stems from the ethnographic authority to answer the question,
in the first place, coupled by the additional problem that these same ethnographers
have been, overwhelmingly, young European males.29 Very likely, the problem is that
there will not be any general consensus or agreement on this question among the
people being studied; and that the basic question 'who is in power' is precisely what
has yet to be settled. Very little in the way of ethnographic writing has looked at the
problem of gerontocracy from other perspectives, the most noteable being that of
women (see Kawai 1998: 147-167). Other agents situated outside the formation of
local age-classes, such as women, government administrators, merchants, and perhaps
ethnographers, must also be included in this question about power. This is because
29 There are, of course, exceptions among European women and African or Japanese men ethnographers
of societies with generational 'systems' (cf. Legesse 1973; Kurimoto 1998; Peatrik 1999)
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such agents often have the authority not so much to wield power, but to represent it.
But, here, it must also be recognised that power is differentiated and the capacity to
use it in such an organisational context is often beyond the scope of 'outsiders'
knowledge. Most evidently, the power of a District Officer (DO), an employee of the
Provincial Administration, resonates with local people in a completely different
register than that, say, of an elder member of the 'Fathers of the Country.' Likewise,
the ethnographer's portrait of 'gerontocracy' may be appropriated or rejected
depending on its instrumental political value to local and state actors (cf. Mamdani
1996; Amselle 1990). And, importantly, neither the elders', nor the DO's, nor the
anthropologist's power goes uncontested. Nevertheless, these problems of power -
and perspectives on it - provide the focus for the present chapter.
In Meru, one of the main ways through which power comes to be critiqued and
contested is the expectation of generational succession. By 'generational succession', I
mean to argue that the formation of age-classes, effected through the initiation of
youngsters, puts pressure on the very oldest in a chain of successive age-classes to
withdraw from their role as decision makers. The main argument in this chapter is that
the moment of succession is actually a temporal trompe d 'ceil which spans so many
years that no panoramic perspective can prevail. The effect of this upon the politics
of generational succession is that it succeeds in creating communities of argument,
based on the imagined hierarchies of age, gender, and generation. Ethnographic
interpretations of this problem of perspective reveal that events perceived to be 'new'
and unprecedented, on further analysis, often turn out to be historically recurrent
formula with quite deep cultural pasts. In creating a political imagination where 'age'
and 'generation' are viewed as fluid, moving categories, are younger and older people
perhaps continually seeking to divert the consequences of assymetrical power
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relations? By examining accounts drawn from fieldwork on Tigania and Imenti views
about the 'inevitability' of generational succession, the following sections aim to
resolve this question.
Some detail on the debates between elder and younger Meru about 'who is in
power' within the context of Imenti age-classes might help shape the problem of
historical perspective alluded to in this chapter. In addition, youth and middle-aged
mens' agitation for a long-overdue generational succession, which the Imenti njuri
nceke have mentioned as a pressing 'priority', may be creating more confusion among
the Imenti than it does among the Tigania and Igembe, for example. With the current
disorganisation of the Imenti nthuki - which some of my younger informants called
'mixing' - the question of which specific age-classes of men have access to power
remains a topic of current debate.
The lines which divide Imenti age-classes are blurred to some degree. Men and
women who were young adults during the 'Mau Mau' Emergency presently control
access to land and title deeds, cooperative marketing societies, credit facilities and bank
accounts. It is for this reason that they generally consider themselves to be the most
powerful of all Imenti age-classes. I am convinced, however, that their accumulation of
material wealth does not exhaust the issue of how Meru elders maintain and exercise
their power. In conversations with the young other dimensions were given importance.
I sensed deeply felt, existential turmoil among numerous young men and women over
the ambiguity of their status as mature social actors. Their problems were not
reducible to questions about insufficient access to land or the legal security of a title
deed. These economic ways of seeing seemed, to me, to miss out on equally important
conundrums and ethical ambiguities which weighed heavily upon the expectations of
the young. A title deed in the name of a young man who is no more than a 'boy' in the
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opinion of his elders is about as useful as a vast tract of land which nobody is
prepared to work. The power of the elders stems from a moral discourse about
personhood and development which was centred around Meru ideas about maturity.
"Young people these days are not strong enough" is a commonly heard observation by
the old. Depending on the context, a man of forty years of age, with a wife and
children, can be symbolically reduced in status by his elders calling him 'raw',
'unripe', hence, immature, as in the phrase, "muntu una mbithr ('that man is unripe');
that is to say, unprepared for his station in life. Age, in itself, carries little significance
if the person does not possess the symbolic capital of mature personhood. An
immature person, for example, must seek blessings from his or her elders before
pursuing a personal undertaking. In each new development, say, building a house,
preparing one's bridewealth, a young person must be seen publically to kuromba
njira, that is, to ask permission from one's elders. And, symbolically, elder men and
women possess the power to bless or curse others as they see fit. Denying a younger
person approval to do something is only a different shade of what Meru conceive of
as a curse, the tacit refusal to offer blessings in the form of consent, encouragement, or
support.
The question of a generational succession looms large in the consciousness of
youth and middle-aged farmers who, collectively, still have no access to title deeds and
the sureties of inheritance within the domestic group. Responsibility for some kind of
token ceremony indicating the abdication from ownership and stewardship of small
holdings, on the part of men and women elders now aged in their seventies' and
eighties', is felt to rest upon the moral decisions made by these elderly actors. It is
largely felt that their status as elders justifies the respect, deference, and dependance
that younger persons are expected to show towards them. On the other hand,
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however, younger people argue that these elders have also been unfairly withholding
their control over the inheritance of property and other social rights, thereby excluding
the younger generations from achieving the means of achieving full social maturity: a
title deed and access to sufficient land and credit to make a living. This alone, however,
does not explain why such elders are viewed as powerful. In conversation with two
Imenti youths, I recorded them debate this question ofwho was in power:
"As in terms of nthuki, which are in power now? Like, it is Mbaya or
perhaps Kibaabu?"
"Like it's the Mbaya now who are the people giving their children
[properties]... they are kind of now trying to disperse their [power]... and
even, let's say, that we have Gichunge and Kibaabu there now... in
between... they are the people in power in most things. They are the
elders who are making the decisions. In fact, they are the people who have
the knowledge now to [effect some kind of transfer of property and
power] in so many fields. So, these Mbaya and Gichunge are the people
who can talk and be heard, because everywhere they are now in charge of
these parastatals. They are the people who, like the Mbaya, are chairmen
of very many bodies... then the Gichunge are in control of some other
things here, such as schools... they are the school principals, the area
chiefs... they tend to fall under that group now. So, they are very
influential, those two age-groups. I think those are the most powerful
now..."
"Your father is Mbaya? Or is he Kibaabu?"
"Kibaabu"
"So, actually most of your fathers... most fathers of Mung'atia would be
Kibaabu?"
"I think Kibaabu are supposed to be..?"
"Your old man is Kibaabu"
"Aah... those people like Nahashon and Samson haven't really been given
things... know that they are now coming into things and those Mbaya are
aging a lot... know that it is now their children who are coming into
things. Where are the Mung'atia at? Our own fathers haven't really
started to be given things... they haven't really been called to any power
on their own, but Kibaabu on their part have begun to kind of
struggle...those like Nahashon and Samson... they've begun to struggle
because they want to be getting something now. Like, I'm saying that our
fathers are those Kibaabu... Kibaabu or Gichunge really? Like, Muriuki is a
Gichunge..."
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"Muriuki... this chairman of Kenyan National Union of Teachers and
those kinds of people are Gichunge"
"He isn't the same age as your father?"
"I guess so..."
"So, what we trying to say is that those people who are now giving away
their properties, who are aging, those are Mbaya"
"Giving to Gichunge..?"
"Yeah, but you see, even Kibaabu and Gichunge... and some of the
Mbaya... they all have children who are falling under our age-group of
Mung'atia, because this is a very big group. The Mbaya have elder sons
who have been put in our big group of Mung'atia, so, to us, we have not
started asking for things from our fathers that strictly. But the children of
Mbaya are now asking for things because these people are aging fast. They
are the people who are in control. So, where I was saying that maybe it's
Kibaabu and Gichunge who are actually so influential and not Mbaya.
Mbaya is a bit older."
In this short passage, it is revealed that these youth have difficulty identifying which
Imenti age-classes have access to power. With respect to their relative position in the
hierachies of age and generation, quite a number of Imenti youths cannot identify their
father's nthuki. Until they marry, a greater number have difficulty knowing their clan
(,mwiriga). One would expect, as many older informants stressed, that this confusion
comes about because of the fragmentation of Meru social life experienced in recent
decades. Such a point of view is consistent with most versions of modernisation
theory and such theories have been internalised by many Meru themselves. Again,
however, this is but one version on the problem of historical perspective.
Rivalries and curses: the spectre of succession in Tigania and Igembe
In late November, 2002, with only a month left before the General Elections
which would usher in Kenya's new NARC government, central Tigania was a hotbed
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of political intrigue, rumour, and heated discussions. The clamour and activity
witnessed during this month connected the struggle of aspiring MPs for seats in
Nairobi's Parliament House to the ongoing local politics of age and generation. The
electoral campaigns mirrored the locally organised and 'traditional' politics of age-class
formation and generational rivalries in ways that were still not clear to me by the time
I left the field in March 2003. Nonetheless, while the elections were over by January
2003, the political pressure exerted uponTigania politicians, from both 'modern' and
'traditional' arenas, continued to be felt in the circumcision festivities of youths and at
the by-invitation-only meetings of the njuri nceke and the lamalla. Most of the
following accounts pertain to the period six months before the elections. If on one
given night, I was to participate in a rally whose organisers sang circumcision songs to
shame a particular aspiring MP; then on the next, I would find myself listening to the
voices of nthaka as they sang no less ribald versions of the same, but for different
reasons. In Meru, politics do not conform to neat boundaries which separate the local
from the national, nor the personal and the public.
But it is the meetings of the njuri nceke which concern us here, although I was
not in a position to participate directly in these 'selective' affairs. Over the months
leading up to the new circumcision period, there had been a series of large meetings of
elders at one of the special groves of trees below Rwerea hillock. There are some
nineteen such sites within Tigania, the most significant being at Mikinduri, Kianjai and
Mbaranga. Such meetings are known as kithiiri and are opposed to the more specified
juridicial meetings of the various njuri councils, or biama, which aim to solve disputes.
A kithiiri is a matter of wider importance to the community, often bringing in elders
from both Tigania and Igembe. According to local gossip in Mikinduri, some claimed
the kithiiri had been organised because of conflicts over land between 'fathers' and
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'sons', while others hinted at the formal announcement of the latest youth to be
named as a nthukr, the 'sons' of the Miriti, who were expected to be called Gicunge (or
Icunge). Other more garrulous individuals spoke of the impending General Elections
and the role of the njuri nceke in its outcome, whilst others even suggested that the
meetings were about darker, occult happenings which contradicted the teachings of
Jesus Christ. Since at least August, however, I had been made aware of an ongoing
debate among the njuri nceke about the effects of an old curse upon the handing over
of power between the age-classes of the 'Fathers of the Country.' In 2002, the
'Fathers of the Country' were represented by the Ratanya who were initiated from
about 1946 to 1955, a period which roughly corresponded to the 'Mau Mau'
insurgency.
On witnessing from afar the first of three kithiiri, which scores of elders
attended, rumour soon circulated that the Ratanya had proposed to carry out a ritual
called kunekanira thiiru ('to hand over the way'). Through discussing this ritual with
people who had never formerly witnessed it being performed, I interpreted it as a kind
of 'cleansing ceremony' linked to plans for a generational succession. Speaking with a
member of the Nyambene Mau Mau Veterans Association, who called himself
Nguruwe, I learned that many Ratanya were convinced that the oaths administered
during the Emergency by participants in Mau Mau had been 'unclean' because they
had used human flesh, blood, or excrement. Another Ratanya from Giithu, M'Ncebere,
stated that the oathing had brought about a curse, or a kiruume, because it had been
'filthy' ("mma ma iriitire migiro", lit. 'that oath brought pollution'). Whether these
oaths were similar to those administered by the Kenya African Union (KAU) during
the height of the struggle is unknown, but there is anecdotal evidence that insurgents
had ignored many 'spiritual' prohibitions and abused elders, which may also be
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viewed as grounds for the proclamation of a curse (Njagi 1993: 45-55). Very few
Ratanya would speak to me about either oathing or the rumour of a curse, such
matters being considered inappropriate for conversations with a younger person (let
alone a white), especially outside of kxthiiri whose participants were sworn to silence.
Here and there, however, trickles of rumour led to broader discussions about the
underlying local conflicts instigating larger kithiiri meetings throughout the year.
Plate 8: Njuri Nceke pose for a photograph, Muringene, Igembe (1998)
By September, during the long dry season of thaano, it was known that the
chairman of the njuri nceke, M'Kailimbi, challenged the elders to take responsibility
for the negative effects of former oaths upon the 'sons' of the Ratanya. Many recent
social crises were imaginatively linked to the oathing of the 1950s. While a strict
interpretation of Meru ideals about age-class formation and the dual organisation of
generations into gitiba would categorise the 'sons' of the Ratanya as the Miriti,
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initiated from about 1973 to 1981, many Ratanya were said to have initiated their
younger sons as Gwantai, from 1983 to 1991, even though this age-class are thought
of as being the 'sons' of Lubeeta. The effects of the kiruume were said to have been
inflicted upon the Miriti and the Gwantai. When asked for evidence of the curse's
malignance, a few elders pointed out the perception that large numbers of these
younger men were afflicted by 'bad' and immoral behaviour, antisocial traits, and
diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Through claiming responsibility for the 'cleansing' of the
kiruume, the Ratanya represented themselves as the beethe-ba-nthu, or 'Fathers of the
Country', even though this status was disputed by the slightly younger Lubeeta, who
were in formation during the decade 1959 to 1969.
This initiative alarmed some Lubeeta who viewed Ratanya's proclamation of a
kunekanira thiiru as a ploy to hand over the status of beethe-ba-nthu to their 'sons' of
the Miriti. The matter conjured up conspiratorial distrust of the Ratanya by the
Lubeeta, some of whom claimed that the move was consistent with an even older
political incident which occurred between these gitiba, Mbaine and Ntangi, sometime
in the late 1930s, or even before. While I will describe how this earlier rivalry between
these gitiba was invoked in some detail further below, it is worth noting that quite a
number of prominent Lubeeta have enjoyed political success as MPs or councillors,
while very few Ratanya have ventured into parliamentary politics, despite having a
vested interest in piloting the affairs of the njuri nceke.
This difference of allignment in political activities owes much to the earlier
histories of these adjacent nthuki, especially when considering Ratanya's youthful
participation in Mau Mau and Lubeeta's coming-of-age during the first optimistic
years of independence. The formal education of the Ratanya, it is widely assumed,
was disrupted by the events of the 1950s and their political ambitions radicalised
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towards local affairs by an aversion to participation in the state. In contrast, the
Lubeeta represent the first nthuki to have had almost universal access to schooling,
literacy and technical training, with quite a number of them graduating from
universities. A small and elite cohort of local Tigania businessmen and politicians
known as the 'Big Five' are all Lubeeta, among whom are included such popular
figures as Karauri and Ndubai, both well known former politicians. For their part,
quite a number of informants told me that these 'Big Five' had been subject to a
separate curse, originating in Muthaara some hundreds of years ago, which has given
them political and financial success, but early and tragic deaths. Here is an abbreviated
narrative about the curse upon the 'Big Five' as told to me in 2001 following the death
of a Lubeeta army colonel hailing from Muthaara:
In Muthaara, long ago, there was a brave war leader (laing'o) by the name
of Lukuciuku, who returned from a raid upon Baringo with many, many
cattle. As was expected, Lukuciuku brought these animals to a place called
Nguthiru, at the central meeting place of Tigania, where representatives
of each of the major sections claimed their share of the livestock. So
successful was Lukuciuku as a war leader that his fame could not be
rivalled. Other warriors grew intensely jealous and began to talk amongst
themselves. One day, a group from Muthaara and a group from Karama
came across the mother of Lukuciuku. Having just been shaved, she asked
if they could dignify her by applying oil to her skin, but she was badly
abused. "Your son is a laing'o. Go and apply blood to your skin, for he
has been killing people and has given away all his cows!", they cried out
enviously. Mother of Lukuciuku was incensed by their behaviour and went
to him with her complaint. Lukuciuku was angered by this insult and called
together the nthaka cia mucii of his clan and its njuri elders to resolve the
injury inflicted upon his name. Each of his kinsmen herded their animals
together and redistributed them amongst themselves evenly, taking care
to give mother of Lukuciuku many head of cattle. Lukuciuku then
approached the councils of Muthaara and Karama for reconciliation.
They refused this gesture, before openly cursing the laing 'o and mocking
his status, saying "Is the war leader only one? We will organise our own
councils from now on!" They intended to exclude Lukuciuku from
participating in their councils. Some time later, the people of Lukuciuku's
clan began dying, one after another, until they became known as the
mwito mucii (bringing death to the clan). The great war leader himself
grew decrepit, but did not die immediately. He thought up a cunning and
vengeful plan. Calling upon the Muthaara and Karama, he offered to bless
the young warrior of these areas before he could succumb to his ailments.
He told the warriors to bring their walking sticks (mituro) to his
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homestead where he would bestow his blessings upon them by spitting
benedictions. But, this was a trick, for Lukuciuku lay down on the pile of
sticks, breaking them all in half. It was thus that the great war leader
cursed the Muthaara and Karama, "You will never have another laing'o.
You shall break like sticks!" Since this time, long ago, the best leaders of
the Muthaara and Karama are broken by this curse.
Although allegorical, this kind of narrative was commonly voiced during the politically
charged months before the 2003 General Elections. The death of the Lubeeta
politician, Ndubai, was linked to this curse, which is called kiruume gia ncamba ciuku
(the hero Ciuku's curse) in Mikinduri. Another prominant political activist from
Muthaara, Ntai wa Nkuraru, although a Miriti, also died under mysterious
circumstances while studying law in England. As it concerns the Lubeeta, the 'Big
Five' are now only two and, in the discussions of local Tigania, their apparent
disregard for, or aloofness from, the activities of the Ratanya dominated kithiiri is
circumstantial evidence for their "political confusion", as one Miriti put it, as well as
their weak position within the general debates and intrigue on generational succession.
The main response to my inquiries about the large scale kithiiri was that, with
many of the aging Micubu 'fathers' of Lubeeta still living, quite a number of the
younger men throughout Tigania had not been given any formal inheritance from their
fathers. This included Lubeeta as well as Miriti, men who are for the most part
becoming grandfathers themselves, but also Gwantai who are, for the most part, now
parents of young children. The political contenders in the 2002 election campaigns
were one Lubeeta (Karauri); two Miriti (Mpuru and Kirianki); and a Gwantai (Gatirau
Munya) who, surprisingly, won the elections. Their age-class membership appeared
on their campaign posters quite conspicuously. While these politicians are wealthy
men and presumably have not had to wait for their fathers' decisions to give them
land, many poorer men of these nthuki expect some form of succession from their
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Micubu and Ratanya fathers in the coming years. There is also an additional pressure
for some kind of succession coming from very young initiates, the 'sons' of the Miriti,
who have not yet been formally named as the Gicunge, many of them having already
left school. While the younger age-classes are intent in accessing political resources
from the state, perhaps to lobby for land redistribution or the reorganisation of the
cooperative marketing societies, their elder counterparts mirror their participation in
election campaigns by holding large gatherings under the name of kithiiri and njuri
nceke. In such a situation, the pressure to participate in any future generational
succession is intense, a fact that the Ratanya seem to have tactfully exploited.
Ntwiko: generational succession, history, and memory
A few notes on the organisation of the generational succession among Meru
age-classes may be added to this description of events in Tigania during 2002, before
further analysis about their broader significance for the problem of historical
perspective can be introduced. The Imenti Meru frequently speak of a process,
usually prolonged over the course of several years, called ntwiko, which evocatively
means a 'collapsing' or a 'land slide.' The last Imenti ntwiko was completed in 1952,
although more must be said about this further into this chapter. The colonial
administration periodically described the build up towards ntwiko as a period of
tension, while other observers, such as the Methodist missionary, Mary Holding,
described the ntwiko as a theatrical display of 'mock' hostilities (Holding 1942). An
alternative way of viewing generational succession among the Meru is to stress the
actual conflict, debate and contingencies that it engenders. As Peatrik (1999) noted in
her ethnography on the Igembe-Tigania, age-classes are formed through the political
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pressures applied by younger cohorts upon older ones to initiate and recognise them
as a separate nthuki. In 1988, when she conducted her fieldwork, she noted the
hightened sense of insecurity in Igembe during the formation of Gwantai, although
armed and motorised 'gangs' of Miriti were thought to be more menacing to public
safety than rowdy Gwantai initiates. I certainly subscribe to this interpretation,
particularly with reference to the debates and arguments I witnessed in Tigania during
2002-2003. During the initiations of September, 2002, a group of some twenty ntaani,
or recent initiates, blocked a road into Mikinduri I was travelling on. Painted in white
clay (iira) and armed with machetes and swords, the initiates cleared their throats
menacingly (kwara nkoro) and refused to let us pass in our vehicle, until we had come
to a full stop and had given them some loose change (muketha ya mutaani). Not all
Tigania I subsequently spoke with thought the actions of these ntaam were
acceptable.
In fact, the Tigania do not mention ntwiko, but employ the term guturuka
gaaru, which has a double meaning of 'to destroy the warrior's barracks' and to
'approach the husband's house', glosses which accurately describe the movement of
one age-class from their status as 'warriors' and their entry into married life at the
point of succession. The kithiiri meetings did not formally announce the guturuka
gaaru in the immediacy ofmy field work. It was, alternatively, a public gesture which
possibly gave some context in which to discuss the problems associated with the
expectations of a generational succession. This talk of 'handing over the way'
exemplified the problem of historical perspective. The debate it excited over the
proposal of a 'cleansing' was taken locally to be a long overdue, albeit highly
contentious sign of a succession in the near future. At the time of fieldwork, however,
it was in a kind of deadlock. A colonial administrator during the 1930s and 1940s,
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Hugh Lambert, briefly mentioned that hints of an upcoming succession ceremony
could be discerned by announcing a 'cleaning up of the country' before the actual
ntwiko was to be achieved:
Proclamations are often made during the ntuiko. Formerly there was an
attempt at "cleaning up" the country just before the replacement of one
set or generation by the next; outstanding claims [...] were quickly
settled... It is said that in Meru warnings were broadcast that unless such
claims were brought for settlement before the ntuiko ceremonies, they
would not be entertained. There was thus in theory a sort of limitation; a
suit was barred by time if an ntuiko had intervened. But the limitation was
largely disregarded and was possibly merely symptomatic of the usual
feeling between nthuki (sets). However that may be, the country was
theoretically "cleaned up", and in all the tribes the new rulers started their
period of power with a clean bill of political health and usually set out to
emphasize their power by proclamations, frequently no more than
reiterations or slight amendments of earlier statutes (Lambert 1956: 137)
Rumours circulating after the largest of the kithiiri held in late 2002, at which hundreds
of elders attended, suggested that the njuri nceke had carried out a 'cleansing' rite in
the form of a divination called kuoria kiruume. This involved the sacrifice of a special
ram (nturume). Although I was not permitted at any of these kithiiri events, I was able
to participate in several informal group discussions about the possible consequences
of the divination. Because participating elders must not speak of njuri proceedings to
the uninitiated - which mostly excludes youth and women as broad categories -
information on this large meeting proved to be haphazard, speculative, and touched by
the unsayable. Checking over my notes, I had expected the rite to be that of kuoria
mburi, a divination read through goat entrails which foretold of the most propitious
time to open an additional nthuki, but some older men found this quite funny, pointing
out to me that this had not been carried out since at least the time of Micubu's
initiations. Instead, they pointed out, the kuoria kiruume was a sound alternative to
any other kind of divination, especially since knowledge of many others had been
forgotten and, they added, the morality of the Meru was at an all-time low. If it even
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existed, one of them stressed, this divination may be just the trick to put them back on
track. "Too many things go awry nowadays", he mused, "for it to be completely
useless."
Several significant points must be made about these events. The ntwiko or
guturuka gaaru do figure, periodically, in the historical memory of individual, ageing
Meru, but no one today has any clear idea about how to effect or bring closure to
them. Perhaps this is illustrative of the creative tension which 'tradition' engenders in
problems of historical experience and perspective. 'Tradition' in Meru has the
meaning of something 'lawful' and this is why Meru often speak ofmwingo (binding
persons by law), rather than mtiuurire (manner of living together) when discussing
their 'traditions.' In other words, mwingo is about creating closure from the
heterodoxy and debate that defines living together (mtiuurire). The meetings of elders
in Mikinduri was more about debating the historicity of past juridicial precedents and
binding this to the taken-for-granted way people presently live their lives, than it was
about actually carrying out an uniform declaration of an upcoming, scheduled
succession between the age-classes. Such a definitive proclamation was never issued.
Regardless of the actual conflicts or competitions which are being played out between
and amongst the generations, calling upon 'tradition' temporarily sublimates the stakes
of political contest. The njuri nceke, in the form of meeting as kithiiri, seize the
responsibility for the community through symbolic actions such as 'cleansing',
proclamations, and divinations, but these depend upon the additional political
intrigues of rumour, debates and disagreements for there to be any effective impact on
the political imagination of the community. It is in this latter sense that the meetings
of elders become a focus for age-class rivalry and, hence, provides the contested
framework for the construction of community through the argument such anatagonism
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provokes. Yet, as mentioned before, since no single individual has a panoramic
understanding of what is going on, the problem of historical perspective becomes one
of the ways through which the elders appropriate the power to make decisions which
will affect the community at large.
But what about earlier attempts to carry out a generational succession? Were
previous guturuka gaaru or ntwiko also beset by argument, intrigue and conflicts,
albeit strung out over quite lengthy, subterranean periods of time? Or, are current
uncertainties about 'handing over' power a recent problem? I will note, at the onset,
that I was struck by the historical parallels between what I had experienced and
witnessed during fieldwork - about the 'handing over of power' between senior age-
classes - and what I read and cited from the colonial records at the National Archives
in Nairobi.
Early in the year it was evident that the district was not in an altogether
normal state. Disobedience to Tribal and Government authority was rife
among the younger men and the old system of tribal administration
through the "Agambi" or heads of sub-clans had completely ceased. Moran
in defiance of their customs [were] endulging freely in drinking bouts
instead of working and the elders and the headmen were doing nothing to
stop this. Stock thieving from both the Meru themselves and settlers
along the border was causing grave unrest. Old men were doing very little
to assist their women to cultivate and the young men nothing at all. It was
eventually found that the cause of much of this trouble could be traced to
the fact that the "Ntuiko" or ceremony of taking over the country by
new ages of elders and moran had started in 1927, continued through 1928
and was still going on in 1929 [KNA/DC/MRU/1/2: 1929 Annual Report]
Here, the problem of historical perspective is explicit. The colonial officer who wrote
this report had to wait three years, possibly longer, before he was capable of reaching
an understanding of 'what was going on.' But later on in the colonial period, the
British colonial officers of the early 1940s were not insensitive to the creativity which
could be applied to 'tradition' when critical political contests were being fought out
between the age-classes and their gitiba. Reporting on the ntwiko taking place among
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the Imenti Meru of Miiriga Mieru in 1941, one official noted with some bemusement
the degree to which 'traditionally' differentiated institutions, such as clan colours,
could be appropriated for broadening the debate and contests which accompanied the
periodic generational successions:
The Meru tribe is divided into the Red and White Clans and every clan
belongs to one or other of these divisions. The distinction is of no great
importance in the tribal organisation and is usually of no importance at all
in administration. There are songs extolling the bravery of the warriors of
one or the other colour, and occassionally a quip such as "That's the sort
of opinion one would expect from a man of your shade" is used with
facetious intent. But the final ceremonies of the ntuiko in Miiriga Mieru
appear to have stirred up a stronger feeling and to have created something
approaching a colour bar. It seems probable that the Murungi age-grade,
going out of power, got the Kiruja to help them use the division as a
political one in the hope that it would disrupt their rival Miriti (as each
age-grade has members of both colours, of course) and substitute a political
division based on clan for the one based on age-grade which was naturally
not very popular with Murungi [sic?] for the time being. Thus, the
argument appeared to be, if the substitution could take place Murungi, who
had a membership of both colours, would stand a better chance of losing
some of theirs. Any real attempt to graft political meaning on to the
colour-division will have to be discouraged. The ntuiko clashes are bad
enough and we certainly don't want Wars of the Roses too. [KNA 1942:
DC/MRU/1/2]
Although this officer's understanding seems to be confused about the intrigue between
the gitiba Ntiba (Murungi and Kiruja) and Kiruka (Miriti), the stakes of the ntwiko
were such that the political imagination could be creatively expanded during the build¬
up towards the succession of senior age-classes and their replacement by younger
ones.
Is it possible that competing Meru age-classes express their political intrigue
through a kind of formula? Returning to the rivalry in Tigania between present-day
Ratanya and Lubeeta, 'tradition' seems to have been altered to correspond to the
subjectivities of postcolonial Kenya, but several narratives I collected suggested that
these current rivalries were contingent upon previous ones. These elder and middle-
aged men were, in 2002, engaged in a series of running quarrels which had, at one time,
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embroiled their fathers and grandfathers in a similar standoff. At an earlier moment
during fieldwork - I happened to be researching a period in the late 1940s when
initiations in Muthaara and Kianjai had been carried out in an unorthodox manner - I
gleaned a number of narratives about the 'jealousy of Kiramunya', an age-class in
formation from about 1905 to 1915. Known as the ngoaya Kiramunya, in Kimeru,
this memory of 'jealousy' between two age-classes and their respective gitiba,
provided an exemplary form of historical knowledge through which the rivalry of
Ratanya and Lubeeta could be understood. Here is an example of how the 'jealousy of
Kiramunya' was relayed to me, although because such stories were partial and often
incomplete, I had to rely upon several versions to reach a composite form:
The jealousy of Kiramunya started when they refused to give Ithalii the
bulls of the age-class feasts. Ithalii were the sponsors of Kiramunya's sons,
the Micubu, when they were being initiated. These bulls were given to
avoid bad feelings between these men. But, Kiramunya were really jealous
of Ithalii because of their standing and reputation, so they quarrelled with
them, saying 'We won't give you anything and we, ourselves, will sponsor
the initiations of our sons.' This mostly happened in Muthaara and
Kianjai. The Kiramunya did this to spite Ithalii, but Ithalii were not
jealous when the time came to initiate the Ratanya. Micubu were their
sponsors. But since this time, the bulls of the age-class feasts have never
been given. This stopped with Kiramunya's jealousy.
There are two major concepts for 'jealousy' in Kimeru. The first, ruriitho,
literally the 'envious eye', is used in a broad range of everyday contexts, but its
meaning is usually limited to personal or domestic examples of jealousy. The second,
ngoa or ngoga, connotes an intensification of jealousy, such that it is rarely used
except outside of specific instances where large groups of people are moved to spite
one another when competing. The ngoa ya Kiramunya was evoked during my
fieldwork as an infamous example of a breakdown in the relations between adjacent
age-classes over a period of time which spanned decades. It was likened to the relation
between the Ratanya and Lubeeta, although as a formula and not as a direct historical
comparison.
As partially explained in a later chapter, the jealousy of Kiramunya led to the
creation of interstitial categories of initiates who could not claim membership in either
nthuki nor mataana. As it was initially explained to me, however, the incident started
at the outbreak ofWorld War One when thousands ofKiramunya were recruited into
the ill-fated Carrier Corps as transporters. Their numbers diminished by death on the
fronts of Tanganyika, as well as by the devastating famine of kiaramuu and the
influenza epidemic of 1918-1919, Kiramunya felt threatened by the robust strength of
the 'sons' of Gicunge: their adjacent nthuki of the Ithalii. In the versions which I
collected, Kiramunya created enmity with Ithalii because when the latter acted as the
sponsors for the Micubu ndinguri and kobia, during their respective initiations in
1933 and 1936, Kiramunya failed to present the food 'bulls' (ndegwa cia nthuki) to
the Ithalii. The giving of these 'bulls' would have symbolised the Kiramunya's
reconciliation of any rivalry with the Ithalii when they had been younger, but this
important ceremony was ignored. By withholding the feast bulls and eating them by
themselves, however, Kiramunya sent a clear message of overt rivalry with their
younger counterparts of the Ithalii. Not long after this incident, however, the Second
World War broke out and many of the Micubu ndinguri and kobia were conscripted
into the King's African Rifles (KAR) to serve in Italian Somalialand, Ethiopia, the
Sudan and, latterly, the campaigns in Burma. Casualties in this war were also high,
thereby reducing the population of the gitiba Mbaine (those of Kiramunya and
Micubu), a process which some people stressed as increasing Kiramunya's jealousy.
In some parts of Tigania, especially Muthaara and Kianjai, the Kiramunya decided to
sponsor their own 'sons' initiations, a decision which was historically unprecedented.
This led to the creation of a new category of initiate, the buruku, who effectively
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became outsiders from the institutions of the Meru polity.
While I shall explore the creation of the buruku with more detail in Chapter
Five, further archival research suggested that Kiramunya's jealousy was also
implicated in struggles for appointments in the colonial government's Tribal
Administration as well. Read by colonial officers as a rivalry between the gitiba,
Mbaine and Ntangi (or Kiruka and Ntiba as it as known among the Imenti Meru), the
concept of ngoa surfaced in documents related to the 1941 ntwiko, which saw the
Imenti age-class of Murungi 'take over' from that Kiramana as the 'Fathers of the
Country.' In Igembe, the rivalry between the Kiramunya and the Ithalii had reached a
kind of climax by this date, although it took colonial officials several years to interpret
the reasoning behind their political intrigue. Colonial administrators noted the fitina, or
quarrels, between the age-classes of the Kiramunya and the Ithalii in the mid-1930s,
just around the time when the Micubu had not been fully formed and the first of the
buruku were being initiated. Because the following passage is insightful to
understanding the ethnographic present in Tigania, I have quoted it in its entirety from
the annual report of 1941:
The "ntuiko" upset a number of Chiefs of the Murungi (Kiramunya) age-
grade who were evidently afraid that the agitation by the Miriti (Itharie)
grade would result in replacements of Government posts. There was even a
degree of mistrust of the head interpreter (M'Muraa) by the Murungi,
including Cheif M'Angaine. The most troublesome effect of the ntuiko,
however, occurred in Igembe and it was some time before its connection
with the ntuiko was recognised. The trouble took the form of a concerted
fitina against Chief M'lmathiu Ithiame of Maua, and developed into a
passive resistance to all his attempts to carry on the administration of his
location. Several months of careful investigation were necessary before
the real trouble could be elucidated, the reason being that all the people
concerned had sworn a secret oath to disclose none of the real facts.
When the true story come to light it was found to affect the whole of
Igembe and to date back to many years ago. Very early in the history of
the British administration the Gwantai (Kaburia) age-grade decided to take
concerted action to prevent any appointment, particularly of Chiefs,
from among people of the Kiruka age-division, their own age-division
being Ntiba. This, they thought, would be a very effective and, of course,
new way of increasing the power of their age-division at the expense of
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their rivals. If their decision had been followed in fact it would have meant
that there could be no appointment from the Gichungi (Kirimana) or the
Itharie (Miriti) age-grades. It seems that when appointments were actually
made from Gichungi, the Kiramunya endeavoured by various means to put
Gwantai's decision into effect and were successful by underhand means in
getting some of the Gichungi appointments cancelled. But they were not
successful in every case and some of the leading Kiramunya were badly
treated. The appointment of Chief M'lmathiu in 1939 was contrary to
Gwantai's decision and was consequently not much to the liking of
Kiramunya, who were on the point of handing over to Itharie, the age-
grade to which Chief M'lmathiu belonged. At the meeting to determine to
whom the appointment should be given, the then District Commissioner
made some enquiries as to the possibility of amalgamating the very small
Maua location with one of its neighbours, this being in accordance with
the general policy. But two of the Chiefs of neighbouring locations
belonged to Kiramunya and the most influential Mugambi, who had
previously suffered at the hands of Gichungi, of the third location was of
Kiramunya too. These men, knowing that M'lmathiu was a man of great
personality and influence, being a leading Mugambi of Itharie, feared that
(as they put it, when they eventually "came clean") M'lmathiu and
consequently Itharie would "swallow" the whole of Igembe, and this would
be contrary to their own interests and to the decision of Gwantai to
exclude the Kiruka age-division from Government appointments. They
therefore got together secretly and thought out ways of stirring up feeling
against M'lmathiu so that he might be deposed. It is probable that the
Chiefs themselves kept aloof from any such fitina but they certainly took
part in lighting the fuse which, they hoped, would eventually blow
M'lmathiu and Itharie sky-high while they themselves sat back in safety.
They dropped hints, in fact, to other leading Agambi of Kiramunya which
suggested that the Ntiba age-division was in danger of beign ousted
altogether by Kiruka and that M'lmathiu was the ringleader in a concerted
move to this end. The leading unofficial men of Kiramunya set to work
very cleverly and stirred up feeling against M'lmathiu among the people
of his own age-grade, using particularly very kind of reasonable or
unreasonable disgruntlement that could be worked up into a complaint. In
this they were helped by the presence in the Maua location of two
pretenders to the Chiefship who based their claims on the fact that their
families had provided Chiefs or Headmen in the past. The first effect of
all this underground agitation was a deputation of men, mostly young, who
called themselves the Njuri Ncheke of Maua and Antubochio - which they
had no right to do - and demanded the dismissal of Chief M'lmathiu on
the grounds, among others, of extortion and the use of witchcraft. They
could substantiate none of the charges and returned to Igembe with the
knowledge that Chief M'lmathiu would retain his appointment. This
failure of the first attack did not satisfy the Kiramunya in the background
and they accordingly continued to pull strings and managed to start a
campaign of passive resistance. The leading Agambi of the whole of
Igembe were then called in and invited to settle the trouble. But when,
after a sufficient period, it became clear that they themselves were
involved and that they had probably sworn a secret oath of silence and
non-cooperation. They were then called in again and made to understand
that unless they were prepared for the exclusion of Agambi and the
indigenous bodies from all part in the administration of Igembe they must
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get the oath "unsworn" and must then tell the true story of the origin of
the trouble. They went back to Igembe feeling rather ashamed of
themselves and asked that M'Murithi, President of the Imenti Tribunal,
and Interpreter M'Muraa should accompany them and be present at the
"unswearing" as representatives of the District Commissioner. This was
done and at the "unswearing" the true story as given above came out. It
was also agreed that the charges levelled against Chief M'lmathiu were
entirely without foundation and that he had done nothing that a good
Chief should not do. Chief M'lmathiu's attitude throughout was entirely
correct and in his share in the oath of reconciliation following the
"unswearing" of the secret oath he made it clear that though he sought no
aggrandisement either for himself or his age-grade if he were required by
Government to assume the administration of a larger location ("even if it
be from Mbirigata to the Thuchi") he would not hesitate to take it and
would administer it to the best of his ability [KNA 1941: DC/MRU/1/2]
This document reveals the degree to which Meru age-classes formed a community of
argument. There is a clear difference of perspective between this lengthy archive and
the brief version recollected during fieldwork. The political competition between Ithalii
and Kiramunya for government posts in the late 1930s and early 1940s generally has
not been remembered in the stories of Kiramunya's jealousy. It should be noted,
however, that the political competition witnessed during the 2002 electoral campaigns
does resonate with these earlier precedents, especially with regards to how age-classes
become embroiled in the makings of political culture in Meru. The rather hidden
aspects of this political culture - including oaths, secret palavers, invocations of age-
class solidarity, and the threat of cursing one's political opponents - are convincingly
recurrent formula that suggest more than a fortuitous historical parallel. It is possible
to argue that the very uncertainties which age-class rivalry provokes, especially critical
during periods when succession is highlighted, emphasises the need to have a common
political language through which the formation of age-classes and the succession
between generations may be negotiated and argued about. The problem of age-classes,
in Meru at least, is also a problem of historical perspective and political interpretation.
Belonging to an age-class and, hence, being a member of the political community is not
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so much seen here as a sociological or structural continuity, so much as it represents a
continuity in the language and practices of argument through which the community is
symbolically constructed.
In the next case study, this idea is explored further with respect to the
situation in Imenti during my fieldwork there in 2001-2002. This relates almost
exclusively to attempts to reform the Imenti njuri nceke. Again, the idea is to pay
attention to the problem of historical perspective, witnessed in a comparison of
archival to ethnographic materials, such that a pattern in the use of political language
may be discerned. I shall narrow the focus to events taking place in the wake of the
Mau Mau 'Emergency' in 1955 and relate this, comparatively, to the efforts made in
2001 to recruit hundreds of Imenti 'elders' into a renovated njuri nceke which, like its
predecessor, has been the subject of local controversy and disagreement between the
Imenti, on the one hand, and the Tigania and Igembe on the other.
Renovating the njuri nceke in Imenti
At a political rally held in March 2001 at the Kinoru Stadium, Meru Town,
hundreds of spectators gathered to listen to speeches by opposition party politicians
who had come from Nairobi. By the time I arrived, the stadium was full and I
eventually ended up sitting far from the events under a tarpaulin with some charcoal
vendors, straining to hear the addresses blaring out of a distorted PA system. It wasn't
the best fieldwork situation. At that time I was residing in Miiriga Mieru, within
walking distance ofMeru Town, and I had been attending as many public gatherings as
possible. Most of these were political in outcome, even if this was not the original
intention. At Kinoru, on this occasion, each of the delegates praised Meru's
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association with the opposition of the 1990s, while several made reference to the
defunct Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association (GEMA). GEMA was a 'tribal'
political organisation that many Meru supported when Jackson Harvester Angaine
(1898 - 1999), a reknowned Meru MP, had joined up with the 'Change the
Constitution' movement of 1976. Labelled as an 'ethnic business venture' by some of
its critics, GEMA underwent something of a revival through the opposition politics of
the 1990s. Just before the March 2001 rally, I had spoken with individuals who felt
that Meru's long association with the political opposition was inevitably a 'tribalist'
strategy that, they argued, partially stemmed from their own lack of nationalist-
looking politicians and political organisations. Most of the people I spoke to,
however, felt great resentment that Meru was, in their opinion, neglected since the late
1970s by Daniel arap Moi's KANU government, because of the 'tribal' shifts which
had attended the 'Kenyatta succession' in 1978. In this argument, the GEMA bloc had
been sidelined in political appointments and development funds, while other
ethnicities alligning themselves with the Kalenjin - Moi is a Tugen - had benefited from
the ethnoregional biases of the government (see Haugerud 1993: 38-43). Although this
is an unavoidable perception about the 'tribalist' character of Kenyan politics, it is not
clear whether to locate it in the rhetoric of disappointment with governance, or the
rhetoric of trust in ethnicity. At the Kinoru Stadium, I was reminded of these
different perceptions about 'tribalism' in Kenyan politics, because of a particular
moment in the speech of a local councillor who was introducing one of the invited
speakers travelling from Nairobi.
Making the point that a group of people must know who they are before they
can act in a politically conscious way, this councillor argued that the Meru were 'for
change' and that their identification with the political opposition over many years
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demonstrated this trait. The councillor, whose name I will not mention, invoked the
legendary figure ofKaura wa Bechau, a cultural hero of the Meru who in the distant,
allegorical past was said to have founded the first njuri nceke. By speaking of Kaura
wa Bechau, this particular man stressed that the Meru "not lose their way" politically
and unify themselves with the opposition. The politician broke out into a well-known
song:
Oo-ociu! Kaura-o-Bechau...
Kaura-o-Bechau narumanire njuri ikaura!
Oh-hear! Kaura-o-Bechau...
Kaura-o-Bechau left a curse that Njuri should never die!30
In most narratives, Kaura wa Bechau is represented as a moral reformer among the
Meru, who instituted many of the practices and organisations that define Meru social
life. In some versions of the story, he instituted circumcision and clitoridectomy, while
in others, he even borrowed the age and generational organisation from the Maasai,
with whom the Meru were enemies.31 Kaura wa Bechau was seen as a hero because
his njuri was a means though which social chaos and indiscipline could be controlled
and balanced. Other narratives share this theme of the threat of immorality and
disorder.32 The story of how Kaura wa Bechau came to insist that the (proto) Meru
organise themselves into councils based on age and gender divisions is known by many
persons. The song quoted above is, at least, as common as any nursery rhyme in
English would be to myself. It is said that on his death-bed, the great moralist Kaura
wa Bechau declared an oath that, as long as the njuri continue to flourish and rule, the
Meru would remain one and prosper. If the Meru let the njuri diminish or be
overtaken, then his death wish was that the Meru, as a whole, would cease to be a
30 See David Maitai Rimiti's (1988) The Njuri Ncheke ofMeru for the words to this song 'Kaura
Bechau.'
31 The Maasai and the Samburu were known in earlier times by the Meru as the Uru.
32 Here, I am chiefly referring to the stories of the 'Turkana', young men and women who fled
circumcision; as well as allegories about the 'coming of a last generation' which will be reviewed in
Chapter Eight.
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community. He is reputed to have said, 'Kiruume giakwa ni ati njuri ikoraura' or
'My death wish is that njuri should never be allowed to die' (Rimita 1988: 79). This
oath is called the kiruume gia Kaura-o-Bechau (Kaura wa Bechau's curse). Keeping in
mind the limits of my own historical perspective, this curse is presumably only
mentioned when public morality and the future of the community are being debated.
This describes the discursive context of my Meru fieldwork in both 1998 and the
period 2001-2003. Although I heard this curse openly invoked in public, it was also
mentioned in my discussions with local elders about rumours of an impending effort to
recruit younger men into the Imenti njuri nceke.
This hearsay was intriguing because, as far as I was able to discern, the Imenti
njuri nceke had not recruited any new members into its ranks since the 1980s and it
had not taken in a large cohort since the 1960s. Calling for new initiations into the
njuri nceke were its ageing members, some of them Kiruja, who 'took over'
responsibities as elders in the 1952 ntwiko, and who, today are ageing into their
nineties'. Meru Central's 'Paramount Chief, a colonial honorific of sorts maintained
by the present Kenyan government, Naaman M'Mwirichia, was the primary moving
force behind the call to initiate younger members of the njuri nceke. One member of
the njuri nceke, Baikiao, who has a vibrant interest in Meru cultural history and wrote
a theology PhD thesis in 1977", led part of the initiative to expand the council's
membership through the already existing Meru Leaders Forum. This is an organisation
of politically active local men with close links to the Methodist Synod and,
particularly, the Kenya Methodist University, which is based at Kaaga, Meru Central.
Although Baikiao was a Catholic priest, he has since maintained his own Independent
33 Ndegwa Ng'unyura, B.J. (1977) Towards Africanisation of Christianity. An approach to the
evangelication of the Meru ofKenya in light of their tribal anthropology and post-Vatican council 11
Magisterium, doctorial thesis, Turin, Rome, Faculty of Theology.
181
Church, which must be described as neo-traditional and syncretic. Catching up with
him one day, I asked what the circumstances behind the new 'recruitment drive' were
and why the njuri nceke were looking to younger men. Although the encounter was
brief, I will paraphrase what he said below, since he is known locally to have acquired
the title, mugwe34, which in his own words claims to be the "spiritual leader of all the
Meru."
"There are a number of reasons why we are initiating younger elders into
njuri nceke. Chiefly, it was decided that many things have gone wrong
with the Meru for some time now because the njuri nceke was not kept as
active in the life of the tribe as it should have been. The word of the elders
on morality is considered final. But, many of the njuri elders are now
ageing, so it is time for the younger generation to leam about its ways.
Not only are we initiating more njuri nceke, but the ntwiko is a priority.
We have four unnamed age-sets of youngsters to sort out. The ntwiko is a
kind of cutting, cutting off one generation in power, so it can be given to
the next. These days, of course, we have Christian rites and so we look to
the good Christians for leadership in these matters."
Baikiao's emphasis on the succession issues was echoed by another elder, Francis
Kiruja, who, although not a njuri nceke member, had been a local councillor of long
standing. Kiruja told me, "Ah, this recruitment into njuri nceke has not occurred for a
very long time now, maybe even since the 1960s, so these old men are worried that it
will end. They need a succession, so that new can proceed the old." Mutuma Angaine,
one of the new initiates into the 'new style' njuri is a prominent Gicunge and a
formerly highly positioned civil servant with whom I lived with for more than a year
while in Imenti. In discussing how the njuri nceke approached him and asked if he was
interested in becoming an elder (but not telling me anything about the initiatory
process, which is secretive), he called upon the story ofKaura wa Bechau.
"Long ago, there lived an elder called Kaura wa Bechau, whom many Mem
believe started the njuri nceke. These elders had the final word over the
34
see Bernardi, Bernardo (1959) The Mugwe, A Failing Prophet: A study ofa religious and public
dignitary of the Meru ofKenya for a broad discussion of the office of the mugwe and the mukiama.
Note that several Mem have since disagreed with Bernardi's earlier claim that the mugwe was a 'failing'
prophet and the author more recently republished the book under the title, The Mugwe, A Blessing
Prophet.
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Meru people, but also had the responsibility to make sure that the Meru
remained moral people. Now, people are looking at our society nowadays,
with all its problems, and thinking about what Kaura wa Bechau had
predicted. And he said that "Njuri must never end, but if it does, then so
to do the Meru." If you look around at how people are behaving, as many
people do, you'd also see that this crisis is self-imposed. Well, that's at
least how some people think of it. Naturally, I am happy to be initiated
into njuri nceke, but I can't tell you what actually will pass on the day it
happens."
Not only was this successful former bureaucrat initiated into the njuri nceke, but
hundreds of similarly self-consciously 'modern' businessmen, educators, professionals
and politicians were initiated into the njuri nceke during November of 2001. Even the
national newspapers reported on this locally auspicious occasion, as witnessed in the
EastAfrican Standard:
Meru lawyers and doctors were among 300 elders who were inducted into
the new-look Njuri Ncheke council of elders. Others who were admitted to
the council were teachers, clergymen, councillors and business people. The
powerful council is the custodian of the Ameru customary laws and
practices and has been in existence since the 18th Century. Its word is
final. The fresh graduates were drawn from the four Meru districts of
North, South, Central and Tharaka. The colourful ceremony held at the
Meru County Council hall was presided over by the council chairman,
paramount chief Naaman M'Mwirichia, aged 90. The elders are mandated
to solve boundary disputes and draw new ones in the larger Meru region.
{East African Standard, Novermber 28, 2001)
The allusion to the 'fresh graduates' in this report points to an association with
schooling and education as one of the new criteria of membership in this selective
juridicial council. And, importantly, not all elder men enter the njuri nceke, this term
meaning the 'select' council, or more literally, the 'thin' council {-ceke, thin). Men
whose reputations are sullied by drunkenness, irascibility, or adultery are barred from
becoming candidates. Even poverty is considered a disqualifying characteristic. A
Kibaabu I knew quite well confided in me, "Men like me cannot enter kiama", by
which he meant njuri, "because they call us nkurumbuE While I could not directly
translate nkurumbu, semantically it is the same as the Tigania term nturiika, which
comes to mean a wastrel or ne'er-do-well. This individual used to spend much of his
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Plate 9: Tiqania elder with markings of njuri kTamotha (1949)35
3S Photograph taken by Joy Adamson under contract by the colonial government (1967)
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time in drinking dens, earning a reputation his wife, by her own actions, managed to
redeem. Nonetheless, he thought that the decision to recruit a new membership into
the njuri nceke was an amelioration to the immorality widely perceived be to be
subverting the 'good life' sought by many Meru.
Despite its aspiration to carry out moral reform, however, this 'new style'
njuri nceke - as it is being called - is not without its critics. A young man thought the
move to recruit "Meru's movers and shakers" into the council was an overt and
cynical ploy to promote the richest ofMeru Central's 'tycoons.' Echoes of this view
could be heard among other actors. Another youth laughed at me during a conversation
where I mentioned the njuri nceke initiations, adding, "Yeah! And the entrance fee is a
Pajero!", a clear reference to the prefered vehicle among many wealthy East Africans
in the mid-1990s, but also an attack at the increasingly prohibitive initiation fees
charged by the njuri nceke. Among some of the rural youth I knew well enough, there
were complaints that the same elites who had run the cooperative marketing societies,
the banks, and the schools "into the ground" would now seek political 'immunity' in
the 'kangaroo courts', as some of the local tribunals were derogatively called. With the
presence of a provincial administration, government chiefs and 'headmen', and a police
force to regulate and enforce the law of the Republic, quite a number of young people
felt that the renovation of the njuri nceke was a repressive movement and a step
'backwards' in winning democratic and human rights. Nowhere were these sentiments
more pronounced than in the local debates about the njuri nceke's attempt to regulate
circumcision.
Enforcing tradition: the njuri nceke's efforts to regulate circumcision
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I did not elicit so many responses to the renovation of the njuri nceke from
Imenti women. This is not because these women are politically inactive - indeed I was
lucky enough to learn a lot about Meru politics from elder women who had lived under
colonialism - but, probably, because they are excluded from entering the njuri nceke.
Their participation in other voluntary associations, such as self-help groups, or
employment in nationally organised NGOs, such as FPAK (Family Planning
Association of Kenya), has mirrored the renovation of neo-traditional bodies
representing men, especially since the njuri nceke has made public their committment
of working in tandem with these other organisations. As Holding (1942), Peatrik
(1999), and Thomas (2003) have demonstrated elsewhere, women have been
historically marginalised from 'traditional' political arenas because their own separate,
but quite powerful councils of elders were undermined by the colonial policies of
Indirect Rule. Yet, one of the most contested interventions made by the njuri nceke
has to do with the controversial 'cultural rulings' about the circumcisions of boys, on
the one hand, and the banning of clitoridectomies on girls, on the other. Controversies
over clitoridectomy and womens' initiations in general have long been themes of
Kenyan historiography (Ambler 1988; Murray 1976; Thomas 1998, 2003) and
elements of how they have been implicated in religious affiliations, education, and
public conceptions of morality are dealt with in other chapters of this thesis.36
Nonetheless, the point should be made that women's involvement in organisations like
FPAK to curb what has become known as FGM (Female Genital Mutilation) has a
parallel with the decision by male elders to renovate the njuri nceke and begin
appointing and initiating younger men into its ranks.
36 See Chapters Seven and Eight specifically, which deal with the coinage FGM (Female Genital
Mutilation) as well as local perceptions about sexual immorality and the place of initiation in ordering
youth.
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An article published in the East African Standard, in October 2001, briefly
narrates the most recent recycling of public controversy over the political issue of
girls' initiations. The article was accompanied by a picture of an elderly woman
'circumcisor' from Tharaka brandishing two scalpels, bearing the caption, 'Dying
Generation: Some Circumcisors Are Giving Up.' The rhetorical linkage between
'modern' NGOs, like FPAK, and the 'traditional' councils of elders, like that of the
njuri nceke, is accomplished by the title, 'Courting Meru Elders' Support.'
The Meru community has made significant progress in eradicating
traditional practices that harm girls such as female genital mutilation and
early marriage. The female circumcision prevalence rate declined by 15
per cent between 1994 and 2000 in Nyambene District. The success is
attributed to the support by the Njuri Nceke, the Meru Council of Elders.
They are participating in the anti-FGM project. One of the projects is the
Options Project initiated by the Family Planning Association of Kenya. It
is supported by International Planned Parenthood and Plan International.
The Njuri Nceke support for the anti-FGM initiative has taken many
forms over the years. First, it banned FGM in 1957 in Meru. This was due
to pressure by the colonial government and the influence of Christianity.
This initial action by Njuri Nceke had effect on present day Meru and
Tharaka-Nithi districts. Unfortunately, the ban did not affect semi-arid
Nyambene. This is puzzling because the Njuri Nceke headquarters is
located in Nchiru, Nyambene. However, due to the influence of the
FPAK's Options Project, the Njuri Nceke once again banned FGM in
Nyambene, last year. The Njuri Nceke have also shown their support for
the anti-FGM campaign by attending anti-female cut rallies. Mzee
Yohanna, 80, a member of the Njuri Nceke, took oath to support a ban
on female circumcision. The strategy to use the Njuri Nceke succeeded
because of the council's influence. It is the top decision making organ of
the Ameru. The Njuri Nceke has legislative and judicial powers on culture.
The council makes laws, settles disputes and enforces its directives - by
force if necessary. Gaining the confidence of the Njuri Nceke to support
the campaign was not easy. "Initially, the response was poor because we
were asking them to go against their calling," says Paul Mbirithi, the
chairman of FPAK's project advisory committee. The Njuri Nceke is the
custodian of Meru culture and way of life. "FGM, which we were asking
them to stop, is part and parcel of the Ameru culture. It was like telling
them to reject what they were sworn to protect. For instance, they put
laws demanding that the Ameru be circumcised. This was meant to ensure
equality." (East African Standard, October 17, 2001)
The initiation of girls and the regulation of their sexuality have been recurrent themes
of communal argument and contestation at varying points in the 1920s, 1930s, 1950s,
and, more recently, in the 1990s. Lynn Thomas' (2003) insightful book, The Politics of
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the Womb, discusses girls' initiation, abortion, childbirth and premarital sexuality in
terms of the gender of Meru subalternity within colonial and postcolonial power
relations. Focusing on the complex negotiations between local men and women about
the transformation of their initiatory and sexual practices and, hence, their power, this
book is an important historiography of Meru, but it tends to ignore the problem of
historical perspective which local controversy inevitably provokes. In order to
highlight this problem in respect to the recent renovation of the njuri nceke's ban on
female clitoridectomy in the 1990s, and compare the ethnographic present to the
original declaration of a ban by the njuri in 1956, it is worthwhile to explore the
current concerns and debates about boys' circumcisions.
As early as 1998, I was aware of a major controversy in Meru regarding the
'proper' way to initiate boys. Today's Imenti youth concede that they are
circumcised in the 'Swahili' style. This means that they attend clinics and are often
circumcised under local anaesthetic. Two such youth, from Kaithe, visited me in
Mikinduri, Tigania, during the November 2002 initiations in the Nyambenes. They
claimed that they could not attend the circumcisions of local boys, because they were,
in their own words, "turagutaanirwa cibitirine na kiroge", that is to say, 'we were cut
with a scalpel in a clinic.' The term, kiroge (a scalpel), is considered an insult. For the
most part, Tigania youth still idealise the masculine bravery and cameraderie of public,
group initiations. In parts of Imenti, however, youths from poorer families have
recently drawn criticism from several quarters, including schools, clinics, and churches,
for 'reverting' to group circumcisions.
This has gone against an Imenti njuri nceke provisal that boys visit clinics for
their circumcisions. The decision to change the 'traditional' circumcision of boys, like
that of girls' clitoridectomies, follows the advise from workers in the public health
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sector. Although the practice of having sons initiated in clinics goes back to, at least,
the late 1950s, when several Christian families found the 'traditional' rites in
contradiction with the gospel, its recent association with the spread of diseases like
hepatitus-c and the threat of HIV infection has prompted the njuri nceke to compel
parents to have the operations done by 'trained professionals.' The move by the 'new
style' njuri nceke was bold, but it was seen to be addressing the problem of
indiscipline and immorality which was being exhibited by some Imenti youth. In 2001,
a Catholic priest wrote a scathing article in a local newspaper, Mwembe, about having
to intervene in a 'forced circumcision' of two elder men in Ruiri, who had somehow
not been circumcised when they were youth. Another editorial letter, again written to
the East African Standard in January 2002, asked the controversial question, 'What Is
This Farce About Circumcision in Meru?'
Real weird tales have been bubbling out of Mem Central District in the
recent past. They are the unrelenting stories of a diabolical cartel of self-
appointed gangs of youths purporting to defend a backward culture. These
battalion of retrogrades are preaching to the locals how they should
circumcise their children in accordance with the Ameru tradition.
According to them, a real man should face the knife - not the scalpel - the
traditional way. Going to hospital for circumcision for them is misplaced.
To some Ameru youth, manhood is not merely a matter of losing a piece
of one's skin but losing it in the right way and in the right place. The real
men who have faced real traditional knives are avowed enemies of the
lesser men who go to hospital for the cut. In their wisdom, or lack of it,
they regard boys who go to hospital as cowardly young men not worth the
blood they shed. Perhaps no-one would have had problems with that had
not these barbarians not gone a step ahead and vowed to re-circumcise
those who went to hospital to make them real men. Only last week, about
300 youths ran amok at Uroko village burning down a house and generally
wrecking havok and prompting police to intervene. Eleven youths were
arrested but were later released after the owner of the burnt house
pardoned them. As you read this a man is fighting for his life after he was
mutilated by a bunch of crazed youths for trespassing where only 'real
men' are allowed to tread. The Ntuuru village youths accused the man,
who was circumcised in hospital, of trespassing into a traditionally
initiated boys' seclusion. Indeed, this list of atrocites by these wayward
youths is long. And though enforcers of law and order have variously acted
to tame these retrogrades, it is apparent that they haven't done much to
teach these brutes a lesson in the laws of the land. They should be taught
to respect human rights. They should be made to know that there is law in
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this country, they should not do things their misguided way. They should
not be left to terrorise innocent people. There is no better way of doing
this than arresting them and arraigning them before court. They way they
will serve as a lesson to other egotistic youth, [Mr. Philemon Abong'o]
(East African Standard, January 18, 2002)
While this editorial is strongly worded, refusing 'cultural' excuses for the violation of
individuals under Kenyan law, it may stand as an example of the media's stereotypic
representation of the Meru as violent, lawless, and backwards. I did not witness any
'forced circumcisions' in Imenti, although I was confronted by several in Tigania
(described in Chapter Two). None of the 'forced circumcisions' I witnessed
corresponded with the above descriptions. Nonetheless, I was aware that these were
occurring in Imenti, especially in the higher areas of Abothuguci, such as Katheri. In
confronting local youths in Miiriga Mieru about these events, most of them argued
that violent circumcisions were motivated less by abstract or atavistic notions of
'tradition' and more by the opportunity to extort money from the community as
'circumcision fees' (muketha ya mutaani). These informants pointed out that even if
Imenti youths had wanted to perform a 'Kimeru' circumcision, they probably would
not have known how it was supposed to be organised, so few of them having gone
through it themselves. They pointed out the making of 'easy' money and the eating of
'party' food as the most likely motive behind the attacks.
The underlying opportunism of such events had occured to me before in 1998.
Since not all parents can afford the have their sons initiated by a 'trained professional',
I witnessed a new, younger class of circumcisors, or ataani (sing, mutaani), reinvent
themselves as 'nurses' without any training in public health whatsoever. Charging a
reduced 'fee', such circumcisors have exploited a new market of opportunism, without
regard to the dangerous practices they employ, such as reusing scalpels on multiple
initiates and failing to provide instructions to the initiates' sponsors about medical
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follow-up should events turn sour. In 1998, I witnessed such as case, when some
initiates, infected by an unhygenic scalpel, grew progressively ill during their
seclusion. With the care of a scrupled sponsor, I saw these ntaani slowly overcome
their infections and return to relative health before their 'coming out' ceremony.
What these concerns with circumcision and clitoridectomy point to, however,
is that the njuri nceke, far from being a conservative force in Imenti, are experimenting
with their mandate as the custodians of the 'traditional.' But this begs a question
about the younger participants of the 'new style' njuri nceke of the Imenti. Through
seeking inclusion into this 'traditional' arena of politics, what possible courses of
action do the most recent members of the 'Council ofElders' aim to open up?
Most of the recent initiates own businesses, sit in local municipal councils, run
public or private organisations, retain strong church memberships, and make efforts to
accumulate power and wealth through a variety of enterprises. Although some of them
retain kin ties with the 'chiefly lineages' of colonial times, quite a number of them are
nouveaux riches, 'self-made' political entrepreneurs who have made connections at the
national (or international) level, accessing different networks of power in government,
the IFIs and banks, the churches, the judiciary, the universities, or the media. These
are men who have overcome the new inequalities of modernity and become its local
heroes. However esteemed they may be when thought of as 'successful' men,
however, their actions are limited when they encounter the more levelling discourse of
the local political imaginary of age and generation, that is to say, the 'traditional.'
Making modern men: the state, capital and the njuri nceke
On one occasion, early on during my fieldwork, I sat in the shade of my
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friend's veranda, waiting for him to return from town. A wealthy, sociable, and highly
respected local businessman, this friend of mine was a Gicunge and his age close to
fifty-years old. I was sitting with his youngest son, when a neighbourhood elder
dropped by for a visit. The little boy told the elder, "My Daddy's rich." To which the
old man answered, "Maybe rich... one, two, three children, but I'm richer, I've thirteen
grandchildren" ('Babako ndiye mtajiri, ana... moja, wawili... watoto watatu, lakini mimi
ni tajiri zaidi... ndtna ntagu babaingi ikumi bathatu'). In invoking the term, ntagu,
meaning 'namesake', this elder demonstrated the generational difference between
himself and the boy's father, and differentiated a sense of wealth in people from that
of property. Although the number of the elder's ntagu was exagerrated, the little boy
most certainly grasped the point.
Despite their four-wheel drives, foreign educations, managing directorships,
large pension schemes, positions in the trade union, and so on, these modem men are
divested of their status as elders. Here, some problems arise from the often romantic
meanings Western ethnographers have attributed to the 'elder' in African societies. In
Meru, elderhood has a much wider variety of meanings than is conveyed by the
English term. Younger men may become akuru (elders) when their own children have
been initiated, but further distinctions apply and not all older men become, in the
sense that I am drawing, elders. The examples of the nkurumbu and nturiika
demonstrate cases of older men who are not elders. Elderhood, as it is spoken in
Kimeru, has much to do with the acquisition of knowledge and experience (but not
necessarily 'wisdom' which European romanticism would be attracted to). The njuri
nceke, for example, was once described to me as divided into hierachical levels, each
successive stage equivalent to new kinds of specialised knowledge. The metaphor used
was 'primary', 'secondary', and 'university' educations, these signifying the various
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njuri of kiamotha, njuri imbingere, and the njuri imbere, each more selective and
esoteric than the former. Once, when I attended a kiama hearing at Kitharene, Tigania,
the row of young men I sat with were called 'nasarV (nursery school), indicating our
immature status in, and knowledge of, the affairs of the litigants and their specialised
way of speaking. For the newest Imenti njuri nceke, their status of elders is separated
from their recognisably modem achievements and they must, as a neophyte, begin to
learn in the localised idiom a way to act in a 'traditional' manner. In late colonialism,
such men were often labelled as the 'detribalised' African, which pejoratively came to
mean 'neither modem European, nor conservative African.' Yet, by sheer fact of their
numbers, the enthusiasm for entering into the decision making process of the Imenti
njuri nceke may be read to mean that something is to be gained. It is in this sense,
then, that opportunities to venture into the local political imaginary may allow for
new forms of accumulation which their status as 'modems' formerly denied them.
A second, related question is equally pertinent. Is this renovation really such a
new phenomenon in Imenti? The colonial archives demonstrate some interesting
parallels between different historical moments spread over generational time. Hugh
Lambert wrote extensive reports in the 1930s about the 'Disintegration and
Reintegration of the Mem Tribe.'37 Much of his writing over the twenty or so years
Lambert was a colonial administrator highlighted a seemingly unprecedented crisis in
the morality of the Mem, despite the rich allegorical narratives about 'moral' and
'immoral' times within the Mem oral tradition itself. Based on his view that British
administration had alienated itself from the 'administrative use of the indigenous
institutions', Lambert argued that new colonial policies should 'use and support the
Njuri' to instill discipline and 'progress' within the 'tribe' (Lambert 1939: 33).
37 PC Central 2/1/11, 'Disintegration / Reintegration', 'Meru Tribe', by DC Hugh E. Lambert [KNA:
1939]
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A 'modernisation' of the njuri nceke was effected in 1939 when the first
Christians took an oath on the Bible, in lieu of other 'pagan' oaths, for their entry into
the select council. As the 1940 Annual Report suggests, however, the entry of
Methodist elites into the njuri nceke, most of whom were in the employ of the
African District Council, the main wing of Indirect Rule in colonial Kenya, led to a
standoff between Christians and the so-called 'conservatives.' In retrospect, this
standoff had a regional dimension, with the Imenti drawn into conflict with the Tigania
and Igembe. Lambert wrote that "the Njuri had never agreed to initiation by a
Christian oath, but only to allow selected Christians to attend its deliberations on
certain questions from time to time, if those Christians were sworn on the Bible to
secrecy on each occassion" (KNA 1940: DC/MRU/1/4). A certain Father Whelan
forbid Catholicised Meru to join the njuri nceke on pain of ex-communication, or, in
the case of school pupils (which was unlikely), the threat was expulsion. Curiously,
when the Consolata Mission expanded in Nyambene, where the njuri nceke was
vibrant throughout the colonial period, the Catholics seem to have placed a greater
emphasis on experimenting with syncreticism, especially with regard to age-class
formation. As some of my Tigania informants liked to joke, "Ah, batiri (Padre) pulls a
blind eye to these things as long as you show up at Mass." With regard to the
historicity of the Imenti njuri nceke, however, it may be possible to argue that, unlike
the Tigania and Igembe njuri, it has always been modem.
This 'modernity' of the Imenti njuri nceke becomes clearer in the context of
the 1950s. Towards the end of the 'Emergency', the colonial government devolved the
responsibilities for governance even further to the Provincial Administration. In
Nyambene forest, there were still guerrilla units committed to Mau Mau under
General Mwariama (Njagi 1993), but the administration felt confident enough to
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embark on ambitious plans for development under the rubric of Reconstruction,
Rehabilitation, and Resettlement (RRR). It is possible to see this moment as a kind of
last chance for the proponents of Indirect Rule to redeem themselves to the Colonial
Office. An administrator working with the ADC explained how the njuri was to be
resituated in the new policies: 'The Njuri can have a greater part in the framing of the
policy to be adopted, and take the main responsibility for the modification of law and
custom' (DC/MRU/7/l:28/l/55). Falling short of announcing decolonisation, the
Colony of Kenya called for the setting up of a 'multi-racial government', even though
Africans were still prohibited to form political parties until 1960. But this
'Africanisation' of the colonial government was limited and decidely anti-nationalist.
The idea in Meru was that the 'indigenous' institutions, which in this definition also
included the ADC and the Native Tribunals, could be strengthened to the point where
Kenya could still maintain a 'Dual Policy' system of rule when the moment for
political independence came. The theme of 'new times' and 'development' inspired
the Reconstruction Committee ofMeru District to consider an alternative approach to
colonial welfare schemes which included, not for the first time, the renovation of the
njuri nceke alongside the building of cooperative marketing societies, credit groups,
land resettlement boards, and an 'indigenised' form of National Youth Service. Still
shaken by how close the colonial government came to losing control in Kenya during
Mau Mau, the administration was keen to reconcile the differences between the
'modernists' and the 'traditionalists', with an eye to galvinise the already weakened
colonial regime. There were frequent calls to 'encourage more of the enlightened
younger men to be initiated into Njuri', as wrote the feminist missionary Mary
Holding [KNA 1955: DC/MRU/2/2 #2], The following missives put great emphasis
on the 'modernisation' of the njuri nceke among the Meru.
195
It has been decided in Meru to make an effort to develop the indigenous
system which has shown itself to be capable of adjusting itself to the new
times, as experiment in Imenti has shown, and build up on the framework
of the Njuri system an institution which can take over the responsibilities
of present day administration, and to try to graft on to the roots the
necessary new element to assist in that development... The Njuri can be
reconstituted to close the gap if it can be persuaded to consider the new
deeds and to adapt itself to the new influences. The first step which it has
taken in this direction is to encourage as many enlightened members of
the tribe as are keeping aloof from it to allow themselves to be initiated
into the Njuri38 [KNA 1955: DC/MRU/7/2]
Part of the work of the Team should include the preparations of
recommendations for constitutional reform of the Njuri system, and try
to set up a constitution within the indigenous body which will retain its
character, and help it to develop into a progressive and elected governing
body, which will be able to claim a representative place in the Government
of the Colony [KNA 1955: DC/MRU/7/2]
The 'experiment in Imenti' consisted of enlisting 'enlightened members of the tribe'
into a neo-traditional njuri. This was creatively mirrored by the invention of a parallel
organisation of youth 'training camps' which were designed to instill the virtues of
Meru 'citizenship.' Many of the youth who were slated to enter these 'training
camps', which the administration anachronistically dubbed gaaru (warriors' barracks),
had either been labour migrants during the Emergency or were 'rehabilitated'
insurgents. The camps were optimistically called, 'Nthaka Gaaru for Training in
Citizenship and the Execution of Communal Work', a name which barely concealed its
ulterior motive of extracting free labour. A document related to these proposals stated:
They also considered the proposal for training Meru youths in 'Gaaru'
before they go out of this district and decided that it was a matter of great
importance. They would have learnt a great deal of Mem ways of life in
the past and present and of future developments so that when they meet
people of other tribes they would not fall prey to their bad teaching as has
been the case in the years of 1948-1954 [KNA 1955: DC/MRU/7/1]
In the colonial imagination, this gaaru was said to be modelled on the office of the
lamalla, but in Imenti, at least, this council of warrior-grade men had not been formed
since the time of the Pax Brittanica in 1908. Very few ofmy Imenti informants could
38 This document is entitled 'Reconstruction #2' [KNA 1955: DC/MRU/7/2]
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verify if they had participated in such gaaru cia therikali (government youth camps),
although some Ratanya from Mikinduri, Tigania, recalled being instructed to form
credit groups and open tea-shops in the late 1950s, which earned them a local
reputation as a drinking group (gikundi 'self-help' grubu). This group's notoriety in
recent years was extended, in the public's imagination, by the 'looting' of cooperative
marketing societies and the failure of the coffee industry. At one baraza called in
Maua, in 1955, a group of young men (probably Ratanya and Micubu) demanded a
meeting with the DO, the area Chief, and the lamalla to lobby for their inclusion in
renovations ofnjuri nceke throughout the Igembe area. Titling the report 'Effect of the
new attitude of the young men to the Njuri', the DO wrote enthusiastically about the
day's events:
The young men had met earlier in the day apparently without any
encouragement from the Chief or his elders. They eventually sent a
deputation to the Chief who called the Ramare [szc. lamalla\ elders to
hear them. The young men, who consisted of newly initiated youths, ex-
Mau Mau confessees, and men who had worked outside the District,
submitted that they wished to be taught the traditions of the tribe, and to
return to the old laws and customs, and discipline. They said they wished
all loungers to be punished, and to stop drinking beer among the lower age
groups. They were told of the intended Youth Training Scheme in Miiriga
Mieru, and advised to discuss with the elders of the Mwiriga [clan] a means
of providing some funds, and the possibility of instituting a similar
scheme... Both elders and young men agreed to do this [KNA 1955:
DC/MRU/7/1/2]
What is striking about this document are the arguments for a 're-traditionalisation' in
the wake of the tumultuous 1950s. The 'forced circumcisions' occurring in Imenti
which were introduced above may be a contemporary manifestation of a recurrent
formula for youth dissent, only just hinted at in the above colonial report. Although
the idea ofMeru institutions being 'dormant in the recent past' recurs with remarkable
frequency in the colonial archival records, it is a curious that this discourse, consisting
of 'key words' such as njuri nceke, nthaka, even gaaru, should be occurring in the
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ethnnographic present of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Anne-Marie Peatrik drew a
historical parallel between the late 1980s Meru she knew with the archives depicting a
crisis ridden and precarious Meru of the 1930s (Peatrik 1999). More than the specific
reconstruction of historical experiences, however, what such documents strongly
suggest is that where outsiders have consistently interpreted political crises in Meru
to be the unprecedented heralding of a new age and the passing of the old order, other
evidence shows that these oscillations between the new and the old are the outcome of
problems with outsiders' historical perspectives.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Looking for Work: labour migration and accumulation
Gucwa Ngugi: ballads of the unemployed and homesick
A once popular Kimeru musician, Gitonga Kathuma, sang what was to become
an anthem for young men coming of age during the late 1960s. It was called, simply,
'Looking for Work.' Kathuma was most popular among the Imenti, alongside an
equally reknowned follksinger, George King'ua, who was his contemporary.
Kathuma's song Gucwa Ngugi, or, 'Looking for Work', was born of his experiences as
a young man who tried his luck in different jobs outside of Meru. Travelling in the
newly independent Kenya, Kathuma's expectations of the matunda ya uhuru, the
'fruits of freedom', must have been dashed, for he latterly wrote and performed
popular songs which reached a broad Kimeru-speaking audience with similarly
bittersweet feelings about being young in the 1960s. In this Kenya, where the world
was optimistically 'on the move' and where many believed in something called
'development', lay more painful recognitions of the crises which decolonisation had
exposed but which people were ill-prepared to resolve. The compulsion to migrate in
search of work, leaving behind the familiarity and the security of one's home, was one
of many crises which could be experienced by large numbers of people. Evoking the
homesickness of living as a farm worker in Naro Moro township and of eking out a
living in Nairobi, Kathuma's lyrics still resonate with the experiences of those looking
for work today. Another crisis in the late 1960s was the anxiety about the cultural
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gaps in the experiences of the young and the old. Whether this is an ubiquitous
historical, or existential, problem is probably moot to those Meru coming of age during
the 1960s, who expressed their historicity as a kind of 'rupture' which, ironically,
echoed loudly with the tumult of the Mau Mau insurgency of the previous decade.
When put into their historical context, all of Kathuma's lyrics engage in a locally
salient debate in Meru about the 'breakdown of tradition' and 'modernisation' during
the first decade ofKenya's political independence.
Reconstructing the historicity of Kenyans born before the 'uhuru generation',
those who never experienced colonial rule, proved to be a labyrinth-like task of
collecting biographies representing the youth of the 1960s which, to some degree,
could be interpreted alongside the music and lyrics of recording artists such as Gitonga
Kathuma and George King'ua. My interest in such musicians was provoked by
questioning whether the historicity of any given past might well be grasped through
looking at its art. For their contemporaries of the Kibaabu and Gicunge age-classes, as
well as for those born after them, this music described a kind of cultural threshold
between the ways of their parents and the new horizons then being encountered.
Listening to such songs was like someone of my generation listening to Bob Dylan's
Tangled Up In Blue. Not surprisingly, when young people listened to Kathuma's
songs many of the idioms he sang through were not immediately grasped, as they were
specific to Meru social life of the sixties', or else played upon more anachronistic
'traditional' categories of thought which were no longer salient. Gucwa Ngugi,
however, linked me to the lore ofmigration which seemed to be part ofmany persons'
biographies who were youth during this time:
Ndaumire Meru, ndeeta Nairobi
[I moved from Meru to go to Nairobi]
200
Gucwa ngugi, ntamionere.
[Looking for work, I didn't get]
Ndathitithie uu ntuku ithatu,
[Spending three whole nights]
Ntina gintu giakuruma.
[With nothing to bite]
Ndabwerenca ii nthaka cietu cia Kibaabu na Gicunge
[I implore you all, nthaka Kibaabu and Gicunge]
Jukia giau nojukia gicembe, bugwatane buri harambee.
[Take up a panga, grab a jembe, Let's unite in harambee]
Jaja imantu jaria ndoneere riria ndetire itu bwa Nairobi
[All these things I'd see there when I went to Nairobi]
Ndathuganagia ndeeta Nairobi, nkathithia mantu jakurigaria,
[I thought if I got there, I'd do surprising things]
Ndoona baagi ban na ngari ndathuganagia ni nkamigura,
[Seeing all those people with cars, I thought I'd buy mine]
Ndamamaga itu magarine jaria jateegi ni mucubari
[I slept in a husk of a car, thrown away by the Council]39
This song, abbreviated here, captures the uncertainty of migration to Nairobi. High
expectations of success could fade to poverty and privation in the harshness of urban
conditions. The symbols of postcolonial modernity, such as waged employment,
material possessions, and the dream of improvement are all juxtaposed with the
symbols of the developing, rural homeland which musicians like Kathuma draped in
nostalgia. The postcolonial rural community was no longer a fringe, but a network
around which the Republic was to be built. Commercial agriculture organised around
the integration of smallholders into cooperative marketing societies came to define
'agricultural development' planning around the expansion of high-value export crops
such as coffee and tea (Heyer, Maitha, and Senga 1976). The large estates in the
former 'white highlands' continued to be of economic significance and provided
employment to migrant labourers as they had for decades. In the late 1960s, ambitious
road building projects were underway, accelerating the movement of people between
39 From the album Gitonga Kathuma: Original (1979?). Assistance in transcribing and translating the
works of a number of Kimeru popular musicians was given by Godfrey Muriuki, ofKaaga, Miriiga
Mieru (2001).
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rural and urban places of work and residence. Colonial laws demanding permits for
travel and employment had been abandoned and replaced by a constitutional right to
live and work anywhere (which in practice is sometimes transgressed). Kenya had
won its political independence and its agrarian heartlands were undergoing fundamental
transformations. Land resettlement was a major priority for the postcolonial
government. Despite the current opinion about this decade as a period of optimism,
there are historical sources which suggest that it was also a period of emerging
contradictions, especially in differing visions ofmodernity and the emergence of new
inequalities which reflected the new moment in Kenya's capitalist political-economic
development (cf. Swainson 1980).
One of these contradictory views was whether or not there was value in
retaining the institutional vestiges of either 'African traditional values' or the political
residues of Indirect Rule.40 Categories of personhood had to be reworked into
recognisably 'modern' forms, consistent with the renovation of the postcolonial legal
system. Against the rhetoric of nation building, local categories of personhood and the
ritual processes through which they were fashioned were reduced to caricatures of the
quaint rural hillbilly or 'backward' peasant. In such a context, the seemingly 'archaic'
forms of social organisation, in which age-classes could be counted, required their own
'modernisation.' Yet, such forms of organisation had already undergone tremendous
change, generation to generation, and looked as if they would anxiously fail to remain
significant in the reconstruction of the Meru as a 'modem' community (of argument).
The increasing demands placed upon young people to migrate outside the Meru
District in search of schooling, training, or employment provoked serious anxieties
40 See Thomas 2003 for an insightful discussion about Meru debates on the redefinition of the
'customary' in postcolonial Kenya, especially focusing of the interculturality in reworking moral
definitions of personhood against the residual 'legal' categories embedded in Indirect Rule (Thomas
2003: 103-34).
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about the continuation of age-class formation and the institutions which it indirectly
effected. Alongside other local intellectuals and artists, musicians of the period placed
nthuki at the heart of debates about the 'breakdown of tradition' and the anxieties of
'modernisation' (see Chapters Two, Seven and Eight).
Yet, is it not possible that movement, of migration into Meru and migration
out of Meru, has somehow been an integral challenge to age-class formation
throughout the twentieth century and possibly before? In introducing the problem of
migration for age-class formation and the construction of a Meru community of
argument, I have found folksongs produced in the late 1960s to be invaluable historical
sources. The value of Kathuma's musical appraisal of this period is that he found a
way to express the everyday ways in which people could simultaneously be
frustrated by their expectations of 'progress' and self-improvement while constructing
for themselves something of a past 'golden era' into which they knitted hope and
nostalgia together. Perhaps more than any other person, the migrant was a subject to
which Kathuma's musical rhetoric about cultural loss and melancholy spoke most
convincingly.
In another of Kathuma's memorable songs, Gwetu Ikuraja (Far from Home),
the listener is invited to share in the migrant's longing for his or her home, a world
bereft of kin and age-mates while living in the settlements of the Laikipia plains, an
area of large commerical farms which employed many Meru and Gikuyu labourers
from colonial times to the present.
Kabarigarire acoore bakwa bonthe
[All my friends were surprised]
baigua nandi gwiita -
[hearing I was now gone]
itu turitieni nkatho ntuura-e-Naro-Moro
[please we thank Naro Moro village]
nliumba gukaara naja
[I'm unable to live here]
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Gwetu ni kuraja ntuurene ya Meru
[Far from Home, in Meru village]
mutanocia inao akaraaga -
[my brother lives there]
ndiuga ambite nao gacionere mama-o-kwa
[I say, I will go there to see my old mother]
ntiumba gukaara ninka
[I'm unable to live alone]
In this song, the imaginary space of the migrant is one of loneliness and homesickness,
even of anomie and depression. In being separated from a sense of belonging,
Kathuma's ballad expresses a kind of refusal on behalf of the migrant, "I'm unable to
live alone" ('ntiumba gukaara nlnka'). In both of these ballads, the countryside is
metonymically linked to a proper sense of morality, whereas the city is reflected upon
as a place where one can get separated from one's self. Living alone in an abandoned
husk of a car, with nothing to eat, the city becomes the opposite of countryside living,
where there are houses to live in and commensality is taken seriously. To give a recent
illustration of this construction of the countryside as a moral space, peoples'
etiologies of the spread of HIV/AIDS (mutheera, mukingo) often pivoted upon
descriptions of sexually predatory urban men who sought 'virginal' sex in the
countryside, hence, infecting 'healthy' rural dwellers with the disease. To rural
thought, AIDS is an immoral force which comes from the urban exterior. Likewise, the
first cases of gonorrhea (gatego) in Tigania during the early 1940s were associated
with the urban prostitutes which Micubu labour migrants purportedly slept with in
Nairobi and Mombasa.41 The city and the town, likewise, are places of anomie and of
'getting lost', whereas the countryside is a place of'home' and of moral order. Songs
about migration play upon this moral (dis)ordering of social space.
To the Kimeru listener, however, Kathuma's two songs about migration also
41 Luise White's (1990) well-researched study of prostitution in urban Kenya during the same period
provides some context for historicising the construction ofmen's moral constructions of urban and
rural space.
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contain references to age-classes as a kind of metaphor which, for our purposes here,
require some further explication. In 'Looking for Work', the motif of the age-class is
evoked to invert the desperate situation of urban migrant returnees, who spurned by
their failure to find a job, may return to their homeland and vindicate their sense of
loss through pulling together, amongst age-mates, in working the land and the soil.
This Kimeru song is perhaps a modem parable on the individualist fallacy; perhaps
echoing John Donne in stressing the essential intersubjectivity of human life, 'No man
is an Island, entire of its Self; Every Man is a Piece of the Continent, a Part of the
Maine' (Donne 1624; quoted in Jackson 1998). But amongst the Kibaabu and
Gicunge, the two Imenti nthuki with whom Kathuma identified himself with, the
ideological pull of self-help (harambee) in the late 1960s would have had to contend
with sharpening social differentiation and the emergence of new inequalities. Age-
classes were, in lyrical terms, a focal point for discussing the material and moral
consequences of these changes taking place in the early postcolony. The changing
sense of selfhood and personhood which accompanies movement, especially labour
migration, while hardly new, could be drawn back into the local political imagination
through critical reworkings of what it meant to be a member of a particular age-class at
a time of rapid social and cultural transformation. From Kathuma's portrait of the
migrant subjectivity, especially of the historicity of his Kibaabu and Gicunge age-
mates, come significant questions about the social construction of age-classes in the
context ofmigration.
This chapter argues that migration was a sociologically disruptive force in the
process of forming successive age-classes. As the songs demonstrate, however, the
effects of migration were implicated in the ongoing construction of different
generations' historicity, as moments in a long-term story about the Meru as a
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community of debate. In focusing on migration in the context of age-class formation,
my intention is to draw attention to how Meru have continued to debate their
community in terms of the 'breakdown of tradition' and 'modernisation' paradigm.
Hints of rural economic class formation are also traced into this analysis. Two
distinctions must be made in respect to my interpretive schemes in this chapter. On
the one hand, I priviledge the sociology of age-class formation when discussing how
migration contributed to the emergence of interstitial categories of personhood in the
late 1940s among the Tigania. On the other, however, I also lace my arguments with
examples where the disruptive cycles of labour migration have also contributed to the
construction of community in the more remote of Nyambene's rural valleys, places
which have only managed to enter the wider political-economy through the
experiences and material accumulation of their migrating residents. In order to
contextualise what migration meant to my Meru informants, I introduce the issues to
be explored through a very brief sketch of movement as a significant theme in Meru
historiography.
From 'Native Reserve' to 'labour reserve': Meru on the move
The first massive trend towards labour migration was triggered by the Great
War (1914-1918). Although colonial troops from several British territories fought in
the East African campaigns, most Kenyans were recruited into ancilliary roles, such as
portage and food provisioning. Like many 'Tribal Reserves' in the British East African
Protectorate, Meru provided the colonial war effort with non-combatant manpower.
In the space of a few years, thousands of young nthaka were recruited into the East
African Carrier Corps. Indeed, among the Imenti, those who experienced the military
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campaigns in Tanganyika became known back home in Meru as the Kaaria (carrier),
derived from their wartime role as conscripts in the Kariorkor (Carrier Corps)
(Fadiman 1993). The effects of this novel form of migration upon Kimeru-speaking
communities were complex. Epidemiologically, Meru communities were to suffer high
mortality in the post-war influenza pandemic, brought by the return of infected troops
to their home areas. Socially, the opening up of African districts like Meru to labour
recruitment instituted migration as a long-term solution to the transformations in the
life-course overtly created under the imperial Pax Brittanica. Notwithstanding the
periods covering the East African campaigns ending in 1918, the colonial
administration had outlawed all forms of warriorhood, thus depriving young men, in
particular, of their socially constituted vocation as warriors. The reports of
administrators during this early colonial period detailed the social problems associated
with young men, including drunkenness, sexual licentiousness and acts of banditry.
The latter had been created by the outlawing of raiding, a ruling which was resisted by
some elements of the warrior classes throughout the protectorate. The collapse of
discipline among the warrior ranks resulting in the use of alcohol and the emergence of
a new form of sexuality was attributed to the weakening of the indigenous polity and
its demographic regime, which restricted the sexuality of its youth. Labour recruitment
and the migration of youth was viewed as an amelioration of the conditions of
inactivity, boredom and poverty which gripped youth during early colonial rule. As
such, labour recruitment was seen as part of Britain's pledge to bring order to East
Africa through the transfer of civilisation and commerce. Locally, with no socially
acceptable role to play, migration outside of Meru became an alternative form of
livelihood for nthaka. This was a preferable alternative to the colonial policy of
compelling young men of the warrior grade towards agricultural labour, which was
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widely felt to be an indignant form ofwork among this category of personhood. Since
this early colonial period, movement in search of work and a wage has since been part
of the lore through which each successive Meru generation has constructed their
separate identities.
Among Imenti residents, many of the most aged men experienced successive
periods of migration which reflected government intervention and the labour needs of
Kenya Colony's nascent agricultural commercialisation. Although there were partial
collapses of the labour market in the late 1920s and during the Depression of the
1930s, most elder informants' biographies contained episodes where they remained
outside ofMeru for most of their youth, only returning at the age of being eligible for
marriage and raising children. Initiated in the mid-1930s, the nickname of some Kaburu
was kirugi, a mildly derogative term meaning a 'little cook.' The example of this
grouping, the Kaburu or Kiruja, demonstrated their positionality within an emergent
system of short-term, poorly paid jobs available to male residents of the 'Tribal
Reserves.' The imposition of an efficient tax collection system, based on the number
of huts within the compounds of domestic groups, provoked greater numbers of
migrants to lessen the burden on their families through movement to the farms and
workplaces of Nairobi, Thika, Nanyuki, Timau and even Mombasa. The kirugi were
an unprecedented group of young men, recognisable for their ill-placed domesticity, a
role which conflicted with local allocations of labour through gender. They were the
first historical grouping of men to turn to agricultural production upon their return to
Meru and eat foods traditionally reserved for women. Indeed, one of my older
interlocuters, a Kiruja who had cooked for an Asian household in Nairobi as a
youngster specifically conformed to this social and economic career. Although a recent
initiate when he was employed as a domestic worker, the kind of nthaka-hood he
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Plate 10: M'Ncebere worked in Nairobi in the 1920s (2001)
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experienced was unprecedented and remarkable in local terms. Their livelihoods
brought them into close contact with the culture of colonialism, which although deeply
racialised, advocated personal improvement through capital accumulation, albeit petty.
The result for many of this Imenti age-class was cycles of labour migration compelled
largely by the poverty and privation of agricultural work on the estates of the settler
economy. Summary dismissals from employment mirrored the crises and
contradictions which waged workers and their employers were both subject to.
Alternative forms of migration entailed taking up trade, usually in agricultural goods
such as tobacco or smallstock for whom buyers could be found en route to one job or
another. Some of my Imenti informants who were youth during the 1930s also
experienced a dislocation with respect to their incorporation into an age-class, with
several of them being positioned within a category called kimonye, falling somewhere
in between their elders of Kaburu or Kiruja and their juniors initiated as Mbaya or
Mbai during the early 1950s. The kimonye made up the bulk of Imenti conscripts
during the Second World War who were absent from Meru for most of the 1940s.
Although labour recruiters worked out of market centres like Maua, in the
Nyambenes, the colonial administration was clearly less concentrated than that around
Mount Kenya. District Officers went on safari (official trips) on foot to visit distant
government headmen (kaborio) and compile their reports. In 1948, the government
sought any way to compel local youths to work on government 'development'
projects in the Meru locations. Examples of this included road repair, terracing land,
digging toilets, and attending baraza where the colonial officers and their African
counterparts would introduce new regulations and law, or demonstrate some
agricultural 'improvement.' By the entanglement of indigenous and colonial ideas,
however, the DOs could not force uncircumcised youth to work, although the initiated
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were subject to personal taxation. An unwritten rule was that 'young men who have
just been circumcised must work' (DC/MRU/2/2/1948). A report written in 1948
demonstrates that European colonial officers considered Meru distinctions between
uncircumcised 'children' and circumcised 'youth' problematic, but unavoidable in the
carrying out of their jobs as labour recruiters:
Met three uncircumcised young men who were definately mature and able
to do terracing but aren't dpong so. I would have certainly passed them as
being old enough to pay tasc [sic]. I understand that there are many as old
as 20 who have not been circumcised and yet don't do terracing
[DC/MRU/2/2/1948]
British understandings of age-specific relations would place a twenty-year old as a
'youth', and on this basis, justify the compulsion towards public service. Hundreds
of thousands of similarly aged 'youth' had, after all, been killed in the Second World
War. To the Meru, however, it was far from unusual to find 'over-aged' uncircumcised
boys who, waiting years to join a circumcision grouping, would effectively remain
children until then, despite their age. Frustrated by the reluctance of Nyambene
peoples to accomodate the labour requirements set by colonial officers and headmen,
a DO called Syne-Thompson appropriated a rhetoric derived from the Second World
War, clamouring 'Tigania needs a shaking up and is ripe for a continuing blitz next
year' (ibid.).
Migration, then, has become one of the defining characteristics of Meru age-
class formation since the 1940s. As fieldwork continued, it became clearer that
migration from one's natal or marital location presented particular problems for age-
class formation and, indeed, for the wider generational complex. I began to approach
questions about how migration, in particular, had effected the formation of differing
age-classes. I also wondered how persons, families and communities had transformed
the generational system to cope with it. Because the compulsion to struggle in
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Kenya's economy makes migration periodically necessary, almost every person will,
at some point in their life, have something to say about the inevitability ofmovement
and relocation.
Not only is the contemporary history of migration complex, but its spatial
dimensions are vast. Outside of higher education, where Meru migrate to India,
Europe, and North America for university studies and employment opportunities, the
growth of the miraa industry has also led to global networks of Meru traders whose
economic activities are best described as transnational (cf. Carrier 2003). This raises
significant methodological queries about the nature of ethnographic evidence in the
study of migration. Although spatial movements over long distances defines migration
at its most general level, a more inclusive conception of migration returns to localisable
movements: such as the movement of a new bride to her husband's home; or, the
crises of illegitimacy that many children experience at the interstices of a domestic
group. While keeping scope of the regional, national and global political-economy in
which migration occurs, in contemporary Meru, it is equally sound to explore how
movement is an expectation of all adults' lives and the immediate experience of a large
number of children.
However specific to different persons' narratives, the telling of the individual
biography falls into identifiable patterns. A context begins to emerge when different
cases are compared. Each pattern ofmigration identified tells a significant story about
what it is possibly like to be a particular kind of person at a specific point in their life-
course. The ethnographic treatment of Gikuyu migrants to Laikipia District over
several generations by Yvan Droz (1999) resonates with that encountered in greater
Meru. Frank Bernard's study of Meru agriculture in transition (1972), as well as his
paper on the Kenyan spatial economy (1979), provides perhaps the best introduction
212
to the specificity of Nyambene and Mount Kenya's agrarian transition for the periods
1890 - 1950. The treatment of migration presented here relates to its impact on the
transition ofMeru social structure in the latter half of the twentieth century.
In particular, this chapter examines how the movement of large numbers of
young men at different historical periods created challenges to the successive
formation of age-classes. Labour migration not only made possible the accumulation of
capital, however petty, but it also introduced new forms of inequality and new
mediums for symbolic capital. Critical to these developments were the emergence of
new subjectivities and definitions of personhood. In particular, labour migration
created the context where individuals could be circumcised but not initiated into an
age-class. The increased costs of ceremonies which rose with the commercialisation of
local agriculture, as well as the absence from Meru of large numbers of youth in their
early adulthood, created the circumstances where the expectations of 'tradition'
clashed with the compulsions of the colonial economy.
The introduction of new interstitial categories of person in the 1940s, in central
and northern Tigania, especially those of the buruku - circumcised youth positioned
outside of an age-class - presents the opportunity to discuss how the movement of
large numbers of youth during the years approaching adolescence, for work or for
schooling, had resulted in a significant modification to age-class formation under the
generational polity. Additionally, an ethnographic description of a Nyambene
community, Giithu (eastern Tigania) addresses how long-term patterns of migration
since the 1930s has shaped transitions within the construction of community. Perhaps
representative of many Nyambene valley communities remote from major markets,
Giithu presents an example of an interior community socially transformed by
migration.
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Buruku: interstitial categories of person in Nyambene during the 1940s
Beginning in the late 1930s, how did the increasing number of youth leaving
Meru effect the timing and cohesion of age-class formation? By mid-century, rosters
compiled by the provincial administration ennumerated thousands of young labour
migrants, each of whom required the necessary permits and identification papers
facilitating movement outside the Meru 'tribal reserve.' The bolstered efficacy of the
administration placed a premium upon bureaucratic tools of state, including
registration and enumeration of eligible tax payers. In the absence of accurate
demographic figures prior to the 1948 National Census, colonial administrators
estimated these numbers to be in their thousands, without giving supplementary
percentages of those who remained in the district. Nevertheless, informants who were
old enough to experience labour migration in the changing colonial economy were
almost unanimous in narrating some form of migration or another during the period
concerned (1935-1952). Whether as traders, domestic servants, military personnel, or
farm labourers many of the biographies collected with former labour migrants -
especially elder men of the age-class Micubu and their Imenti counterparts, the Kiruja
or Kaburu - provide significant testimony to the entrenched crises the generational
system endured during the expansion of the agrarian economy in the periods before
and after the Second World War.
Not only was Kenya's colonial economy undergoing the first phases of
internal expansion under capitalism, but there were new levels of commercialisation on
the fringes of the settler economy which provided a steady outflux of men and women
from the poverty striken rural frontiers. In places like Meru, the 1930s had been
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economically crippling. New political institutions, such as the Local Native Council
based in Meru Town, increased the general taxation upon the population which, in
turn, compelled a mostly young and male class of persons to migrate elsewhere in
search of paid work. It was from out of this context of enhanced outward migration
that the buruku emerged.
I had first heard this word, buruku, used to describe categories of boys who
were circumcised without belonging to a specific itaana. While not an age-class,
mention of the so-called buruku was made in reference to a specific category of person
whose circumcision fell outside of a given itaana. During the December 2002
initiations in Mikinduri, several boys were circumcised by force and these individuals
were described to me as buruku. The reasoning behind forced circumcisions are always
obscure, but inquiries were met with responses that the boys had fathered small
children while still ofmwiji status; or that they were of an advanced age and could not
afford to arrange their own sponsorship, letting this responsibilty fall upon the public
and the lamalla. There were additional uses of the term. On occasion, I was also told
that the yet un-named Gicungi, initiated continuously since 1996, were to be
considered buruku because they had not performed kuriria, marking the opening and
closing of specific mataana. At first, I was prepared to compare the Tigania term
buruku with the Imenti kiroge - those boys circumcised in a public health clinic or
under local anaesthetic - but ongoing investigation into the application of the category
placed it historically with events and processes occuring in the 1930s.
Several contradictory explanations of the buruku were offered to me, each of
which reflects differing perspectives on the specificity of crises within the generational
polity. In the first version, the roots of the crisis stem back to the strained relationship
between Kiramunya and Ithalii over the initiation of the new Micubu beginning in
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1933 (see Chapter Four). Other perspectives come together on the changing political-
economy of colonial Kenya during this period and reflect on the impact migration had
upon social structure. In order to discuss the significance of the buruku, a category of
initiate described as falling in between or outside of mataana and nthuki, it is
necessary to present an integrated analysis of both versions.
Several ageing Ithalii in central Tigania, comprising Mikinduri, Ankamia, Giithu
and Kunati, gave roughly overlapping accounts of how and why the category of
buruku emerged from the late 1930s onwards. According to these surviving Ithalii, old
men now in their nineties', there had been an intense rivalry between the opposing
gitiba when Kiramunya prepared their sons for initiation as Micubu. These informants
spoke of ngolo ya Kiramunya; or, the jealousy of Kiramunya towards Ithalii. Within
the structure of age-class formation during the 1930s when Micubu ndinguri were
initiated, inter-class rivalry used to be assuaged ritually through the giving of feast-
bulls (ndegwa cia beethe, lit. 'the bulls of the Fathers'). These bulls were given by the
class of 'fathers' to the class sponsoring the initiations of their 'sons.'42 In this case,
the sponsors of the Micubu ndinguri, those of the Ithalii kobia or kabeeria, did not
receive the bulls, thus the narrative elaboration ofKiramunya's jealousy {ngolo, ngoa)
or envy (ruriitho) towards the opposing gitiba. Referring to this initial incident of
envy, it is often claimed that "ngoa cia Kiramunya gutaana kiri nthuki ingr
('Kiramunya's envy led them to refuse their sons to be initiated by another age-
class'). Of this air of rivalry, elders point to Kiramunya's break with the orthodoxy of
gifting between classes when succession was being organised.
A parallel may be drawn with Kiramunya and Ithalii's Imenti counterparts, the
42 For a suggestive ethnographic parallel see Simonse's (1992) discussion of the 'bulls of
reconciliation' given by a senior age-class to an ascendent class among the Lotuho of southwestern
Sudan, revoking the social rivalry set in motion during the latter's agitation for class formation.
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MurungT and Miriti, during roughly the same historical conjuncture. As reported by a
colonial official:
During the year there was some delay in the initiations, due to the 'ntuiko'
ceremonies and to the fact that the new ruling age-grade had not yet eaten
the 'ntuto' feast. But by the end of the year there were very few nubile
girls in the district who remained uninitiated. The Miriti of Igoki in
Miiriga Mieru initiated their daughters without first eating the 'ntuto'.
This was in accordance with the permissable but uncommon practice of
previous age-grades. It caused some temporary annoyance to the Murungi
who, getting no share in a feast they had been expecting, tried to make an
inter-grade dispute out of it [KNA 1942: DC/MRU/1/1/4]
As with other transformations made to the generational system, Kiramunya's refusal
to give bulls to Micubu's fathers resulted in a structural tension in the organisation of
social life along generational lines. Despite the versions of Kiramunya-Ithalii rivalry,
the social and political significance of the event continued to effect future age-classes
in formation. This was especially true for the 'sons' of Ithalii, the Ratanya, who were
beginning to be initiated by the latter 1940s.
The social complexity of this period's age-class formation cannot be
understood without reference to the demographics (and marriage patterns) of the
groups involved. Kiramunya were remembered for having been a demographically large
group which were devastated by a sustained period of high mortality rates. Following
the famines of Kiaramuu and Kmanduara, as well as outbreaks of disease, the
Kiramunya were a diminutive group by the time they themselves had families. One
Micubu remembers men and women of his parent's age-class having facial pockmarks,
the scars of chicken pox and measles, while adding that they were also few in number.
Chicken-pox (muthanduku) was said to have killed almost all of the Kiramunya
ndinguri. Indeed, information on the timing of Kiramunya's mataana is weak, perhaps
emphasising their loss. Although the Ithalii were also to suffer a significant mortality
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rate as youth, there is a general consensus among surviving informants that a greater
proportion of this class reached the grade of parents.
According to Anne-Marie Peatrik (2000), the social progeny of Kiramunya,
the Micubu, also suffered high mortality rates, owing to the large numbers of MTcubu
ndinguri and kobia recruited into the Kenyan regiments of the King's African Rifles
(KAR) on the outbreak of war in 1939. Sent to combat theatres in Ethiopia, Italian
Somaliland, Libya and Burma many Micubu did not return to their homes after the
war was declared over. While Kiramunya and their sons fought in the first and second
world wars, the age-classes of Ithalii and Ratanya were formed in times of peace and,
despite the terrible droughts and famines experienced by this gitiba (Ntangi), local
elders suggested that their numbers exceeded those formed in the opposite gitiba
(Mbaine). Although evidence on the demographic inbalances between the gitiba
Mbaine and Ntangi (known as Kiruka and Ntiba in Imenti) is circumstantial and
dependent upon the statements of a small number of aged persons, the crises that gave
momentum to a growing number of buruku are suggestive that historically differential
mortality rates between the gitiba was borne out in their uneven numbers.
The buruku are an exceptional element in the generational system which merits
critical attention. Almost all informants in central Tigania asserted that the majority of
buruku were initiated from the Kianjai area in northern Tigania.43 Today, Kianjai is a
busy, roadside market town whose access to the tarmac road running the length of the
Nyambene Range is its most lucrative asset. Even in the 1940s, when the first buruku
started to appear, Kianjai was an exchange hub in the colonial economy, especially
with regards to smallstock markets. A common explanation given was that buruku
431 could not ascertain during fieldwork, if the distinction over the initiation of buruku between
Athwana and Kianjai was based on a larger Tigania moiety which unites together under the generational
system (cf. Bernardi 1959; Mahner 1979; Peatrik 2000).
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were boys who had migrated outside of the district for work or schooling and had
come back too late to be initiated into their appropriate nthuki, thus falling into a
category between age-classes. Many of the 'sons' of Kiramunya - who would have
been initiated as Micubu following the respective timing of their mataana in 1933,
1936, and 1940 - had left Meru for work in the tea and coffee estates of the settler
economy. Some were also school pupils enrolled in African-only schools such as
Alliance Boys. Those who were not initiated as Micubu, or Ratanya should their
fathers have accepted initiating their sons into the opposing gitiba, were circumcised
with disregard to the formation of any particular age-class. Whatever the specific
biographical case, such persons were deprecated against by some, being seen as igii
(despicable) and even polluted, because they were socially out of place. To draw upon
a more structurated theory, they were neither kabeeria of a class A, nor ndinguri of a
class B. Gleaned entirely from the accounts of surviving Ithalii and Micubu elders,
quite a number of over-aged sons of Kiramunya, many of them labour migrants, were
compelled to be circumcised outside of any nthuki or mataana. These young men
formed the new interstitial category of buruku. For their fathers, this meant that they
were not initiated into the opposing gitiba, Ntangi, which opened with the initiation of
the Ratanya ndinguri in 1946-1947.
Several informants in Muthaara, however, challenged the interpretations about
buruku I had been building from peoples' statements in central Tigania. In discussions
which began with the general problems of'over' and 'under' aging, I learned that the
opening of Micubu kabeeria had been postponed because of a food shortage caused
by drought and the failure of the millet harvests. This ecological postponement of
Micubu kabeeria gave rise to the emergence of the buruku in the years to come, since
those who did not recover from the famine, but who were supposed to be initiated as
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Micubu kabeeria, were displaced from the categories of the existing age-class system
by being circumcised after Micubu had closed.
From the perspective of Jiirg Mahner's (1975) description of the Tigania age-
class system as a marriage system, the buruku were subject to severe restrictions.
Positioned at the interstices of social categories of age and generation, these 'sons' of
Kiramunya were disqualified from marrying women who were preferential spouses for
their contemporaries, the Micubu and Ratanya. While the buruku were circumcised,
they were, in the eyes ofmany, not initiated and, hence, gradeless. Being gradeless in
this context meant that a person could remain liminal with respect to many of life's
significant events, such as marriage, entry into a local council, and arranging the
circumcision or marriages of one's children. The significant consequence of the new
category of the buruku lies in their interstitial positionality with respect to the
generational system.
Considered igu, these persons could not marry girls identified as potential
spouses through reference to the generational principle and its alteration between
classes of social 'fathers' and 'daughters.' Even to this day, the buruku are tarnished
by their assumed igu, being reputed to have been sexually licentious and impregnating
uninitiated girls because they fell outside of the generational system. The buruku were
not subject to all of a particular nthukVs rules, thus being displaced figures in the
disintegrative indigenous polity. Originally, the reputed igu attributed to the buruku
may have arisen less from actual sexual behaviour, than from their ambiguous status
with regard to the two overlapping conceptions of incest; that within the domestic
sphere; and that separating parental and filial generations.44 This ambivalence of incest
44 Peatrik's (1999: 89) distinction between familial and generational incest invokes two terms,
wi 'njanga and kioncho respectively, but do not conform to the interpretations given by informants in
central Tigania.
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categories, as they applied to the buruku, helped to create them as deviants. Since
buruku were structurally outside of the age and generational system, finding brides
was difficult, forcing them to the margins of legitimate marriage. They were reputed to
be the only young men marrying their social 'mothers', often older women who had
been previously married, but cast out of their marital home for either abandoning their
children (nthunguthu), or for being labelled igu through improper sexual liaisons. They
were said to marry 'worthless' women, perhaps even finding a bride from among the
ngirani, a clan barred from marrying exogamously.45
On the other hand, however disenfranchised from legitimate marriage and
procreation, their interstitial positionality allowed them a latitude of social action not
tolerated among fully initiated, integrated and representative young men. Being
categorical outsiders within the generational polity, a select few and, in particular,
those who had been schooled, managed to secure positions of authority within the
colonial regime. One prominant buruku, Bernard Mate, is today renowned as a
LEGCO representative involved in the negotiation of Kenya's independence in the late
1950s. While alienated from the indigenous polity, their historicity was marked by a
lack of constraint in operating within the politics of nationalism. What is
ethnographically revealing, however, is that their exeptional status draws attention to
the possible crises engendered by 'over' and 'under' aging within any age-class system
based upon generational criteria of initiation. Furthermore, their social positionality,
unprecedented at the time, was made possible by the heterodox actions of their class
of 'fathers', the Kiramunya, to introduce new responses to social problems as they
presented themselves.
4S For an interesting comparison between the Rendille sapaade girls and the Meru ngirani see Roth
1993.
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Giithu valley: a case study of the effects of labour migration upon the
construction of community
To be specific about migration's effects upon local communities, the case of
Giithu presents itself well because the residence patterns of its people have shifted
remarkably over three generations. The case is particular to rural communities
spatially disengaged from market centres. Dozens of communities in eastern Tigania
and southeastern Igembe may be compared to the valley community of Giithu. Often
sandwiched between the hotter, semi-arid plains below and the higher elevation where
production is concentrated, the smaller fringe communities depend upon a fragile local
market mostly based on food. Although both coffee and miraa have been planted, at
differing periods, the absence of effective transportation and all-weather roads have
stunted the marketing of these crops. Livelihoods in Giithu are largely shaped by this
thwarted commercial development; and the sparse valleys and steep foothills of this
area have been home to generations of migrants. In this small area, as a tactic of
economic survival, migration may even be an optic through which to understand the
historical construction of community.
Giithu is a valley community that has built a church, a school and a small
market on the ridge between the Majiira and Aciampau rivers. Sponsored by the
Consolata's Athwana mission, the large school saves hundreds of children hours of
walking up to alternative schools in Irandiru or Ankamia. It is a remote place,
accessable by only one road which passes through the Nyambene forest and its tea
estates, before a precipitate descent past Irandiru onto the narrow ridge defined by the
waters of the Majiira and Aciampau. Its people acknowledge the disadvantages of
their distance from larger market centres and employment opportunities, but routinely
walk many kilometres to engage in commercial or social interests.
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A community formed through generations of migration, relocation and
displacement is reflected in the individual biographies of its former or present
residents. Within this rural community, migration in one form or another partially
defined the kind of society the community had become. To demonstrate how
migration became a critical part of the life-course process in generations coming of age
after the 1940s, an examination of the linkages between migration, age-class formation
and the construction of community is merited. According to the biographical sketches
of Giithu residents, migration came to have a deep impact upon Giithu late into the
colonial period, but has since then become an institutionalised factor of social life and
economic livelihood.
Prior to the 1940s, Giithu was a territorial community with no remarkable link
to migration. An aged Ithalii, one of a few of this age-class still alive during fieldwork,
mentioned in passing that Kiramunya and Ithalii did not experience being called out to
work as migrant labourers in the settler economy. This, he asserted, fell upon Micubu
("Micubu arutwa ngugi", or 'Micubu were called out to work'). In the biography of
this elder, he had been recruited into a dance troupe consisting of Kiramunya and
Ithalii which was sent to Nyeri where they performed kwoutha for a largely European
audience. Instructed to wear loin-clothes (tutambaa) to cover their genitalia, these
nthaka danced for eight days before returning by foot to Tigania. In recompense for
their entertainment (it was possibly the Royal Visit of Edward), all of the dancers
were exempted from eight years of taxation. There are several possible explanations
why Ithalii had not gone out into the colonial workforce. The high mortality rates
during the first decades of colonial rule had significantly depressed the population of
youth, particularly of Kiramunya who had begun to marry in the early 1920s. In
addition, the organisation of the colonial adminstration had not been consolidated, with
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no district officers posted to Tigania and Igembe, making tax evasion relatively easy.
With the outbreak of the Second World War, the colonial government pledged
the Empire combat troops from all across their rule in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania.
Throughout fieldwork, some fascinating accounts of how such colonial subjects were
conscripted were encountered. The story of how two unwilling recruits of the Micubu
ndinguri grouping were traced back to Giithu and pressed into service speaks of
migration's legacy. Having worked in the tea and coffee estates ofNairobi and Limuru,
these Micubu youth had been ennumerated and their identities formalised through
their kipande issue, allowing them to work as employees on distant estate farms. The
kipande was a work and travel permit worn around the neck in a cannister, the colonial
version of today's kitambalisho or identity card. Upon being called up, they returned
quickly to Giithu, where they tried to escape the attentions of the colonial
administration. Within a short time, they were traced back to Tigania, accosted by the
government chief, before being delivered to the KAR recruitment officers. An earlier
call for laing'o baili (two braves) from each location, soon became a systematised
attempt to conscript from the roll of those issued kipande (work permit and
identification papers). A shift from using local categories of personhood to determine
which individuals would be conscripted to using the state bureacracy as a compelling
force in recruiting soldiers mirrored the advanced desperation of the war by the early
1940s. The challenge of raising an East African colonial army from the sleepy,
demographically robust, rural populations was partially curtailed by playing upon the
martial values upheld by many indigenous communities. A second factor was the
experiences of privation during the 1920s and 1930s, which was linked to the rounds
of labour migration being organised on the outbreak of war. Global war and the
emergent commercialism of Kenya's agrarian economy worked in tandem, turning an
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army ofworkers into an army of soldiers.
With many Micubu enrolled in state sponsored labour recruitment schemes,
members of this age-class were away from Giithu for long periods of time. Those
registered with the government labour recruitment schemes, found themselves either
taking the train or walking to the tea and coffee estates around Nairobi. Others found
themselves working on the commercial farms being established in Timau and Nanyuki.
Thus, gwita ncomba (to go to the coast) frequently referred to any labour migration
outside of Meru. An early period of colonial labour policies worked on a system of
conscription, or forced labour, which was known in Meru as gwita kioro (cf. Lonsdale
1995: 252). In later years, the familiar pattern of labour migration became known
simply as gucwa ngugi (to look for work), implying an absence from home for
undisclosed periods of time.
Giithu's extensive planting of coffee, most terraced into the steep hillsides, is
associated with the Micubu who migrated to Mwimbi in the 1940s as casual farm
labourers. In recent years, as in Imenti, the decline of co-operative marketing societies'
financial power has diminished coffee's status as a worthwhile cash crop, but past
coffee revenue has paid the school fees of, at least, two generations of coffee farmers'
children (cf. Lamont 1999). Having spent years working in Mwimbi, returning
migrants brought coffee to plant in their small parcels of land, inherited upon the
finalisation of marriage arrangements. According to the biographies and narratives
collected with Giithu residents, most clans from Mwimbi had giciaro relations with
their Giithu counterparts and, however diminished today, Micubu labour migrants
expressly evoked them on their sojourns to work in the small farms ofMwimbi in the
1940s. It was in this time, as well, that returning migrants brought back exogamous
trees, like gravellia, to plant on their lands. With respect to the recent migration of
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nthaka as small farm helps, in the early 1990s, there was an exodus of Gwantai to
parts of Igembe requiring labour during the long miraa 'boom' of that decade. Upon
their return in recent years to Giithu, most of these migrants planted miraa trees
chosen from the plantations of miraa farmers in Igembe where they found work and
accomodation. Such migrants, transform the landscape and the scale of commercial
agriculture upon their return from working away from Giithu.
Migration even turned up as an element in the administration of persons
accused of being anti-social, violent, or prone to serial theft. During fieldwork, a newly
appointed sub-Chief, at a divisional level, acted upon an alarming trend of theft
through rounding up the suspects, on the basis of their notoriety, before paying them
the transportation costs to leave Giithu for good. This same sub-Chief, while tackling
an outbreak of inter-personal violence, seized all 'slashers', modified double-edged
machetes, before sending violent offenders either to jail or outside of his community.
While banishment has been an ancient form of punishment, its present manifestation is
woven into the organisation of the state's rural personnel, albeit through local idioms
of jurisprudence.
At the local level, Giithu residency shifted again during the Mau Mau war,
erupting during the youth of the Ratanya and their young wives, the Mukabi. Even in
the construction of the past, elders from Giithu spoke about igiita ya Thama, a time of
migration, from the root kuthamia (to relocate). I latterly learned this was during the
Emergency (majik in Kiimenti46). Several elders' spoke of igiita ya Thama as a
defensive decision of the community to disband their homesteads and rebuild upon the
upper slopes of the valley walls. This was said to have been what all Giithu clans have
46
Many ofmy elder Imenti informants, particularly men and women of Miriti-Mucece and Kiruja-
Nkoroi, declared that majik was the time when Meru social life was in rapid transformation, including
the construction of novel social identities
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done in the past when confronted by potentially hostile enemies: building from a
vantage point, high up in the valley to spot enemies' incursions (maitha). This
expression of Giithu elders' historicity, igiita ya Thama - called majik by those
experiencing it in central Imenti - jogs its witnesses back to times of insecurity and
contingency. Outside of elders' narratives, the point was enlivened by stumbling
across maganjo, or, the ruins of houses on the summits of some of the taller hills.
Sometimes no more than the creozote from a long extinguished hearth or a cluster of
unrecognisable detritus found in an exposed midden (kiara), their physical remains are
testimony to a passed era still tenured in people's memories.
During igiita ya Thama, Giithu elders spoke of constant excursions into the
forest: in building a supply network with Mau Mau in the forests; preparing charcoal
to sell at the kiosks and hotelis of Mikinduri; or else, safely drinking illicitly away
from the path of the local kaborio (Government chief). It was a period of time where
cutting down the wrong tree might mean being served a term in jail, but also a time
when forests were logged in a growing commercialisation of timber. During the famine
known locally as 'the firewood famine', mpara ya kaunanku, when Ratanya ndinguri
were in formation, the forests surrounding the community were felled in a desperate
attempt to make money and buy food. Timber merchants based in Mikinduri started
to make their fortunes through transporting unmilled timber from central Tigania to
bigger buyers based in Meru and Nairobi. Giithu, which means a small forest, is
sparsely wooded today.
Wives remembered their husbands moved away completely from Giithu before
igiita ya Thama, but in the second and third years of the Emergency most local men
experienced relocation. This was also experienced among families living above Giithu,
communities which were collectively known as the Miciimukuru (old families), who
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were removed from their lands and relocated in the marshy and wooded scrub at the
fringe of the Imenti forest at Mbeu. While Giithu residents did not experience mass
relocation, but there was a heightened degree of individual dispersion owing to the
political tensions in the country. The social distress of the local insurgency is noted by
male absence and a suppression of normal ceremonial activities. Young men who did
not migrate during this crisis period, often resorted to guerrilla activities while evading
summary arrest. If igiita ya Thama is remembered for the community relocations in
the early 1950s, it does so through a largely female perspective, those who were
permitted to remain.
In one intimate description of a mother's and co-wife's experience of the
period, she choose to highlight the economic struggle to feed children born prior to the
explosion of animosities that was Mau Mau. Although movement outside of Meru
was prevalent during this historical period among younger men, it is noteworthy that
few women claim to have had children during the Emergency. Circumcisions and other
ceremonies performed during this period appear to have been ill remembered or even
forgotten. With Mau Mau guerrillas campaigning against British colonial troops from
the depths of the Nyambene forest, the pattern ofmovement between different places
separated the sexes, stalled ceremonial life, and engendered coming trends of marital
and residential life.
The movement of young men has historically proven to be a challenge to the
formation of age-classes in Meru. Besides the creation of an outstanding category of
person in the buruku, the migrant labourer in Meru historical narratives is marked by
their ambiguous position within the ageist and generationalist hierachies of the old
polity. In the precolonial past, migration into Meru was frequent among refugees from
other communities scattered by political conflict, drought, disease, or war. The Meru
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age-classes allowed recent immigrants to become Meru within a single generation. In
contrast, the outward direction of Meru migration during the colonial period and into
the present has had the effect of 'Kenyanising' individuals as they encountered a
public space outside of the Meru political imaginary. The colonial state had the
remarkable challenge of balancing its own bureaucratic categories of subject, 'worker',
'migrant', 'Native', and so on, with those which existed in the life worlds of the
people they dominated. It was through an exercise in sorting out entangled cultural
categories that the colonial administration, in Meru, could conflate ideas which
belonged properly to the Meru age-class and generational polity with their own needs
for African labour in the growing agrarian economy. Only circumcised youth could be
legally issued the neccessary travel and work permits which allowed movement
outside of the 'Native Reserve' and conscripted labour within it. Looking for work
became synonymous with social maturity. As such, labour recruitment policies were
shaped as much by indigenous notions of social maturity as such ideas about




'Our gaaru is the School': education and youth
On a bright, dry and dusty day in September, 2002, Timothy Ntongai, a
Lubeeta, told me and Kaunga, my minder, "I do like traditions, but I don't know alot
of them because my circumcision sponsor (mugwati) had told me to forget about them
and put more effort into school." This remark, from a man in his early sixties' who had
been initiated around 1959, upset my earlier assumption that men of his age in Tigania
had undergone initiations which were, as a form of life, not substantially much
different from those which their parents had gone through. This was, in itself, not a
cold display of my own naivety, nor any penchant for 'tradition' in my imaginary,
ethnocentric stance about what had 'really' happened in Meru history. Rather, I was
surprised because I had already sat with dozens of similarly aged men and been
convinced, through their story telling, that it was with the younger men and women
coming of age in the 1970s and 1980s that concern about the 'breakdown of tradition'
and advent of 'modernisation' had become the topic of local conversations.
I had, unintentionally, stumbed onto a meaningful debate which is located in
views about 'white' and 'African' forms of education. Carolyn Hamilton's (1998)
notion of how indigenous and colonial ideas become historically entangled could be
applied to this Meru debate about education. When the lines of alterity between
'white' and 'African', or coloniser and colonised, are drawn around the ideas of
education, the effect is to enter into some kind of polemic about the differences of
material and moral rewards stemming from education. For all boys, the expection of
future employment hinges upon schooling, but this is also shored up by their
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circumcision. For some, this meant that initiation and inclusion into an age-class,
where an individual is taught how to behave as a moral person, was of major
significance as a mode of learning. Others, however, deemed this mode of action
irrelevant, stressing the 'duty' of attending schools in working towards 'developing'
Meru and Kenya. The present chapter aims to contextualise the historical
entanglements of indigenous and colonial ideas through a sociological discussion about
the ways in which education and the formation of age-classes are mutually implicated.
Access to education continues to be a major public issue in Kenya and the
teachers' union, the KNUT (Kenya National Union of Teachers), is the only trade
union able to organise strikes and pressure government into making concessions. The
payment of school fees is a constant worry for many parents. Although there are no
direct fees for primary education, it is frequent for high school pupils to be
periodically sent home for failure to keep up with school fee payments. Successive
governments have attempted to introduce truancy laws to reinforce their
committments to mandatory primary education, but school attendance in the
Nyambenes continues to be dogged by the availability of remunerative jobs for child
labourers. NGOs working in the region have complained about the challenges posed to
'development' and education by what they view as 'traditional factors.' Locally,
however, laws about mandatory educational requirements pose problems for the
organisation of initiatory practices among both boys and girls. One of these problems
is that the community comes to refashion its imaginary through the successive
initiation of youngsters, but that this occurs at a time when their schooling is still
ongoing.
The circumcision of children brings about a situation where the meanings,
values and principles at stake in the formation of age-classes may be negotiated and
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debated. Rites de passage do not only work to integrate individuals into a community
and renew the particularity of social relations, but they also provide a context for the
'historical reappraisal' of circumstances which transcend the social, political, and
economic construction of local society (Rigby 1983: 449). Put another way, as Veena
Das (1995: 5-6) does, such initiations are 'critical events' within Meru, working to
reconstruct the local political imaginary of 'the world', through the institutional
changes experienced by different nthuki. Although Das certainly had in mind
upheavals, especially unprecedented ones, in her discussion of 'critical events' in
contemporary India, such as the Bhopal industrial disaster, I mean to tone down this
concept to include institutionalised events which compel local Meru actors towards
reappraising their ideas and practices about 'tradition' and 'modernity', the two
leading motifs in this community of argument. That is not to exclude a wider definition
of 'critical events' more in line with Das' orginal formulation of the concept. Meru's
recent history has had disasters of its own which have had grave consequences for
social identity and institutional organisation. One such event in 1990, centred around
gender violence at the St.Kizito High School in Tigania, was so shocking to local
morale that Anne-Marie Peatrik suggested that it signalled a crisis in Meru social life
no less severe than those which rocked the Meru in the 1930s, when illness, famine,
and poverty brought about a deepening malaise which is still remembered today
(Peatrik 1999: 34-5). Yet, in Meru, because the initiation of boys and girls normally
involves some measure of political lobbying, even struggle, it is reasonable to see the
forms of argument which emerge in this context as ranging in intensity from Rigby's
interpretation of ritual as an opportunity for historical reappraisal to Das' idea of the
untimely and critical event as an acute reworking of insitutional life. It is important to
note, however, that these reworkings and reappraisals are not limited to ceremonial or
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symbolic life, but have their sociological impact in the institutional nexus of schools,
hospitals, law enforcement, bureaucracy, and organised religion.
This chapter's aim is to trace the political and moral discourses which have
their roots in different generations' experiences of institutional change, and into which
may be inscribed schooling, changes in initiatory practices, as well as transformations
in the categories of personhood based on gender and generation. Many decades ago,
the formation of age-classes was reimagined alongside the growth of school and
educational facilities following efforts to institute new colonial welfare schemes. The
first mention of 'African' welfare as an imperial strategem of rule, covering the 'mind'
and 'body' of the colonised, comes in the shadow ofmetropolitan debates about social
welfare in the economic depressions of the 1930s (Lewis 2001: 1-21). What exactly
was meant by 'African' welfare, however, was hotly disputed not only in the Colonial
Office, but in the heart of the workers' and squatters' quarters, the towns, and the
'reserves' of colonial Kenya. In the institutions of mission or government funded
schools, the space of age-class, initiation, and indigenous forms of knowledge came
under critique from a variety of, mostly European, social actors. The school, as the
primal symbol of this imperial welfarism, represented something other than the
oppressive realities of colonialism. Under the tutelage of white teachers, black pupils
would come to signify some of the deepest challenges to the essentialised idea of the
'conservative' African, as well as begin an incipient process of class formation in the
'reserves' (cf. Berman 1990: 226). Although white domination of school
administration and organisation reified the untenable model of racist hierarchy which
colonial Kenya desparately clung to, African challenges to European control over
schooling began as early as the late 1920s, when the African Independent Schools and
Church movements began to build momentum. Since these earlier decades, education
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has been a controversial site ofpolitical contestations.
In relatively remote districts such as Meru, however, schooling was curtailed
by colonial neglect and local footdragging. The school was also subject to attack in
some of the more vitriolic anti-colonial sentiments. These attacks, however, came less
from the 'conservative' Africans who were constantly and cynically lamblasted in the
colonial officers' reports. Rather, it was the former pupils themselves who rallied
around anti-colonial sentiments and saw the potential for subverting the 'White man's
rule' from within its educational arenas. Involving themselves in teaching, clerical
work, and catechism, a number of young Meru men found themselves working within
the new colonial political-economy in order to work out a new modus vivendi which
could balance local structures of feeling with the modem forms of inequalities and
opportunities. Although this past period is only remembered in fragments,
descendants of early Mem elites suggest that it was the school and the church which
permitted youth in the 1930s and 1940s, to begin with, to adopt styles of thinking,
acting, and dressing which separated them dramatically from their older counterparts.
Attending school was viewed as a political statement in these colonial contexts. Rather
than destroy the Mem, as some of these arguments would claim, schooling became a
context for debate and polemics which rendered formerly embedded anxieties visible to
the public. One of these anxieties was the acknowledgment that initiation and age-class
formation was an object of fascination and alterity for the 'white men', inclusive of
both missionaries and colonial officers, and that their ideas about changing aspects of
these modes of action were often forced upon the young. As Lynn Thomas (2003) has
shown for the medicalisation of Mem bodies, in which the source of men's power
over women's reproduction was linked to changes in female initiation and abortion, the
politics of the institutionalisation of the Mem 'mind' has been equally gendered, as
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will be explored in greater detail below.
As the experiences of cohorts who underwent schooling would demonstrate,
however, the Meru continued to be formed as a community through the central space
inhabited by the nthuki, albeit in an argumentative mode. Debate about the value of
old practices and ideas were not so much geared towards abandoning them, but rather
to force them into new moulds of reckoning and new definatory modes. To give nthuki
its saliency in the entanglements of ideas which education fostered, they had to be
relocated in 'the world', that is, rendered modern. As a young Imenti pointed out to
me, when walking by a secondary school dormitory, 'Our gaaru is the School.'
In order to make further reconstructions of the Meru in transition, thereby
highlighting the significant value of debate and 'historical reappraisal' which
accompanies age-class formation, the changing perceptions of and participation in both
education and Christianity provide further departures on the problem of historical
entanglement and historical perspective. In the discussion of migration above (see
Chapter Five), education was clearly linked to the spatial dispersion of a demographic
cohort and the constraints this imposes upon age-class formation. The focus of this
chapter will continue upon such analysis, but addresses more specific changes that
some of the most recent nthuki have introduced. In particular, after a brief sketch of
the history of missionary-sponsored schooling in Meru, this chapter asks why the
socially demographic phenomenon of 'over-aging' has been less pronounced in age-
class formation since the 1980s. It also addresses the contentious reworking of girls'
initiations within the polemics of the earlier 'female circumcision controversy' of
earlier generations and its more recent representation in the politics and poetics of
campaigns against FGM (Female Genital Mutilation).
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A brief history of schooling in Meru District (c. 1911 -1991)
Education was viewed from afar in the early colonial period. According to
informants over the age of sixty, attitudes towards formal schooling were largely
negative before the mass enrollment of pupils in the early 1950s. These were drawn
from the Lubeeta of Tigania and the Kibaabu of Imenti. Colonial archives demonstrate
a precipitate increase in the number of students attending what were then called 'out-
schools', small classroom blocks built and maintained by missionary societies such as
the Methodists and the Consolata Fathers. Near Mikinduri, an original timber
schoolhouse built in 1939 by the United Methodist Missionary Society still stands on
the grounds of Rware High School. This school had been supported by a government
chief of the Ithalii class, M'ltwariciu, who lobbied amongst the political leadership of
the area to put their backing behind attempts to educate local boys. Itinerant District
Officers, travelling by foot throughout Tigania and Igembe, also reported during this
period that sections of the population were demanding access to schools for their
children. Interestingly, however, these demands were couched in a sectarian struggle
between Methodists and Catholics, each grouping describing the intentions to build a
school too close to their own as a form of 'jealousy.' Regardless, people who
experienced the 1950s strongly supported the building of educational facilities as the
clamour for improved employment increased. Yet, this rather novel appetite for
education had previously been resisted by youth and elders alike.
Elderly Tigania informants, especially those of the Micubu-Mukubu spousal
class, began to send their male children to schools that had been opened in Mikinduri
and Muthaara. Earlier school enrollment had been limited to very few pupils.
Originally built in 1923, the Catholic mission at Athwana housed a main school which
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was attended by boys from a large catchment area. The European priests who taught
there were called batiri, a derivative from the Italian padre, or 'father.' When
pressured by kaborio (Chiefs) to send their children to schools, especially after the
field visitations of DOs, parents relinquished their opposition and allowed boys to
attend the schools, although also instructing them not to divest 'secrets' to the batiri
and to return home as soon as possible. According to biographic statements, there
were internal polemics about the motives of the Catholic fathers, including the lively
creation of rumour that they were cannibals or slave traders. These foreigners were
clearly perceived as a threat by some members of the communities in question. Unlike
other 'outsiders', the batiri made no attempt to marry into local clans, making them
more 'other' than the Pashtun and Baluchi traders who settled in the new market
centres of Mikinduri and Kianjai and who had eventually married local girls. Quite a
number of informants, now mostly aged men of the Ratanya class, remember only
partial school attendance. Others, in the minority, recalled being encouraged to engage
in truancy, especially by older nthaka and their elder kinswomen. While passive
resistance to education in central Tigania appeared to be widespread, there was also
support for it, coming from persons who had been exposed to missionary activities,
labour migration, and the development of commercial markets for agricultural goods.
Certainly, those with linkages to the colonial administration through the offices and
appointments of the kaborio were eager to have local children enrolled in schools.
Although this generally parallels changing perceptions towards school-based education
elsewhere in greater Meru, the general appropriation of education among the Tigania
was less pronounced, and slower, than was the case for the Imenti who appropriated
the school (cukuru) as a political implement to forge an ethniciscd 'modern' identity
(cf. Maupeu 1990).
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In the Imenti section of Miiriga Mieru, where the Methodists built their first
main school at Kaaga, elders can still name the first Christianised pupils. This is
largely because of an act of resistance that spelt tragedy for several of those in
attendance. Latterly, these pupils became known as the athomi (from the verb
kuthoma, to read). In 1911, some years after Kinyanyuri (the Reverend Worthington)
began to proselytise among the Imenti, a trickle of male students, most of them
uninitiated 'over-aged' bwiji, started schooling in a curriculum which was highly
vocational. Carpentry, and not necessarily catechism, was the main goal of this early
education. Some among them, however, were taught to read and write English and
Kiswahili. Their girlfriends, observing from a distance, would come to learn the 'Three
Bs': Babies, Baths and Bibles. According to memory, quite a number of the boys came
from among the poorer, recently migrant families said to be 'orphans' or nkta (clients),
which had congregated in the vicinity of Fort Meru following the 'conquest' of 1908
and the establishment of a military garrison near Kaaga.47 Among them was included
M'lnoti who would become the Methodists' first African minister and a long standing
government Chief and leader of the LNC, until his death in a road accident in the early
1950s, locally rumoured to be an assassination. During the turmoil surrounding the
earlier formation of Miriti (c. 1913-14), an unidentified group of nthaka, probably of
the age-class Kiramana, set fire to the dormitory where these pupils were sleeping,
killing eight and burning several others. For those who escaped, their story became one
of the principal narratives in the formation of an ethnic identity amongst the Imenti
that was specifically Methodist (cf. Maupeu 1990).
An excerpt from an interview with Kirigu, an aged Mucece (wives to the
Miriti) who was an early participant in the Methodist missionaries' activities in
47 The present site of the police station in Meru Town was the early colonial government post of Fort
Meru in 1911, which was latterly changed to Meru District, Kenia Province around 1914.
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Miiriga Mieru, provided a narrative context with which to interpret the local
perceptions of European religiosity and its educational mission:
"Ibuetagite babaingi cukuru mma...Peter-o-M'Marungo abataithiritue
nyomba"




"li...niuntu bwa kuthoma baithirua nyomba Kaaga...M'Ntimbu naite
mma, araringa dirica araumira nao, araya uu kiongo mma"
[Oh yes... because of schooling they were burned in the house at
Kaaga...M'Ntimbu was there and burnt badly on his head, but he struggled
to escape through a window]
uAbakiri ka-a...ni nthaka ciaithithie?"
[Who was responsible? Was it the warriors who did it?]
"77 nthaka ciaithithie niuntu bagwiita kwenjwa migara utiuntu 'Kwenjwa
migara utiuntu ni uthaka bwa miceni! Kwenjwa migara utiuntu ni uthaka
bwa miceni! '...Niuntu tutiendaa kwona until beenji migara...na kangi,
muntu akua ii bakarinda. Nukwigua?"
[It was warriors who did it, because the students went to be shaved with
meaningless haircuts, (we would sing) Meaningless haircuts are nothing but
the warriorhood of the missionaries! Meaningless haircuts are nothing but
the warriorhood of the missionaries!'... because we didn't appreciate to see
shaved scalps... and there was more, when someone died they were buried.
D'you hear?]
European clothing and haircuts were more than superficial contrasts to the aesthetic
ideals of warriorhood espoused by the Kiramana. They were outwardly threatening
signs of contest with the Kiramana, because the missionary pupils had rejected
warriorhood (uthaka) and stood, effectively, on the margins of the indigenous polity.
It is not too difficult to imagine how the warriors would have seen a raid upon the
school as an opportunity to prove themselves. This would have been an expected
course of action. It was this grouping who, among other things, had experienced the
colonial conquest as boys and had been prohibited from engaging in activities
associated with their martial ideals (Fadiman 1993). The arson had been partially
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brought on by Worthington's own interference with the circumcision ceremonies that
his pupils were expected to participate in. His nickname, Kinyanyuri, meaning 'behind
the house' was earned by his reputation for spying on local circumcision events. On
the matter of circumcision among his pupils, Worthington was accused by the DC of
being too 'highly minded' and a proportion of the blame for the arson seems to have
been spirited in his direction. However, instead of terrorising the athomi into
acquiesence, the nthaka inadvertantly created a social opposition to 'tradition' which
would latterly express itself in the formation of an Imenti political elite. New and
disturbing innovations were introduced to the Imenti Meru during this early colonial
period. Kirigu's mention of the the burial of the dead, for instance, signalled not only a
rupture from expected mortuary practices, but also a radical departure from the moral
and spiritual restrictions of contemporary social life. The 'warriorhood of the mission'
would be the social crucible for the construction of literacy, petty capital
accumulation, and access to the resources of the imposed polity: the colonial state.
The uthaka bwa mtceni (warriorhood of the mission), as this elderly informant put it,
was also the emergence of a hybrid form of historical consciousness. As demonstrated
by the first locals to turn to the Methodist Church in the 1930s, known as the Trail
Blazers or the Atemibanjira in Kimeru, evangelical Christianity offered those persons
excluded from the formation age-classes an alternative organisation which also
promoted the use of age categories, specifically church 'youth' and church 'elders.'
Within a single generation's youth, that overlapping the formation of the Miriti-
Mucece and Kiruja-Nkoroi, the churches and their schools became, in some ways, a
refuge of the excluded and disenfranchised. Today, to some degree, the opposite case
prevails where those most active in the formation of age-classes are excluded, to some
degree, from modern forms of sociality and economy.
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Nevertheless, this transitional Christian cohort remained a minority within the
larger social formation until they were to become parents in the 1940s. As such, their
reputed appropriation of 'modernity', most significantly marked by their ambition to
educate their children, would continue to be the subject of internal social debate.
Despite the increasing enrollment of children in schools, whether those of the mission
societies or the Independent Church movements, the effects of education upon social
identity and economic activities were constrained by its on-going association with the
unreasonable extension of childhood.
Even among younger persons, those of Mbaya and Kibaabu whose age-classes
were in formation throughout the 1950s and 1960s, biographies revealed a sense of
embarassment about continuing education after having been circumcised. Mburugu, a
Kibaabu and now a primary school teacher, recalled being teased by nthaka who felt
that his school-leaving certificate was evidence of an extended childhood. Another man
of this age-class said that he left school early, despite the availability of money for
schools fees and uniforms, because he was convinced that sitting indoors amongst
children was inferior to the freedoms he could enjoy "messing about" with his age-
mates. Such freedoms included working as a shamba-boy or having girlfriends. From
the comparison of several biographies created with this age cohort, the Kibaabu,
sacrificing the ideal of freedoms and mobility enjoyed in the company of nthaka was
not a highly esteemed alternative. The idea of being suspended in childhood and
alienated from one's peers provoked anxiety among many youth in the 1950s. Among
a relatively large segment ofMeru's young population in the late 1950s, the ideals of
uthaka had been maintained much as they had been at the time of the Kaaga arson,
despite radical transformations in the political-economy and a gradual elevation in the
value of schooling.
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Even during 2001-2003, however, some educated persons were belittled by
those who have not followed the full course of their schooling. A university graduate
had his degree certificate stolen and thrown into a pit latrine as punishment for a
purported act of 'having airs.' The suspected culprits were his age-mates. As I
followed this particular incident quite closely, I was struck by this individual's sense
of betrayal, confused as he was between having been (in his view) unfairly treated by
his "friends" but also deeply threatened by the loss of a document which he valued
highly and equated with getting a reasonable job. Unemployed and unable to raise
money to replace it, the idea of having wasted years of studying and being ridiculed for
it by his age-mates was painful.
In the past, education was viewed by many as something only suitable for
children and, critically, only boys of Christian families. It is reasonable to ask, based
on the association of schooling with an extended childhood, how and under what
historical circumstances and consciousness schooling became widely available to boys
and, latterly, a large number of girls. While the last section of this chapter deals
specifically with the position of girls with respect to age-class, or in their case,
spousal-class formation, the following arguments further explore how education and
schooling eventually became factors in the transition ofMeru age-class formation over
a period spanning three age-classes, or about a generation.
Age-class formation permits the opening up of opportunities or arenas for
social debate and the construction of historical reappraisals. In the next section, still
following the significance of education to Meru age-class and generational formation,
the theme of 'over-aging' as a problem for social organisation is explored. More
specifically, however, the section exposes the crises within the formation of age-
classes in Tigania for the years 1959-1991. This period is inclusive of a generation
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spread out between Lubeeta (1959-1969), Miriti (1973-1981), and Gwantai (1983-
1991). All of these Tigania age-classes received intensified and expanded exposure to
primary and secondary levels of schooling and, in their transitional mode, significantly
altered the principles through which age-classes are formed and recognised as such. For
this discussion the Imenti case is momentarily suspended, chiefly because the failure
of another age-class to emerge after 1979 is suggestive that 'over-aging' - and its
opposite of 'under-aging' - have become irrelevant in recent decades following a refusal
to form age-classes through strict interpretations of any principles based on timing and
segregating the generations' memberships into adjacent age-classes (cf. Hazel 2001).
As the ethnographic context is revealed, ad hoc amendments to rules, principles and
ideals guiding age-class formation are recognised in the form of 'mixing', a hybrid
category of thought and action which is derived from the historical conditions of the
postcolony.
No more additions!: mitigating the problem of 'over-aging' in the 1970s
Two related problems, those of 'over-' and 'under-' aging, threaten the overall
organisation and continuity of age-class and generational formations. Simply put, one
is 'over-aged' for recruitment into an age-class when exceeding the normative 'proper'
age for initiation. This is reckoned statistically by one's father's structural position
within the system of timing and segregating generations (cf. Hazel 2001). As such, the
'proper' age is bound by a rule which should state that one is x number of age-classes
removed from one's father (Peatrik 1995a). In Meru, this is further bound by the
statement that no ntaam may be initiated into a proximate age-class to his father's, but
into one that is at least preceded by an intermediate class. Likewise, one is 'under-
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aged' when statistically much younger than the average age of others recruited into a
specific age-class. In a system with a generational principle, like that of the Meru,
'over-' and 'under-' aging are articulated through the structural positionality of classes
of 'fathers' and 'sons', such that; one is never in the age-class adjacent to one's own
father's, meaning that one could be very significantly more advanced in years than
one's social age-mates. Again, put schematically, if one's father is compelled to wait
for initiation until he is advanced in years, beyond the age of those he must call his
social peers, even if they are chronologically much younger, in all likelihood, he will
marry and have children when an older man. Consequentially, his sons' positionality
will also drift from the statistical norm of one's 'proper' age. This 'proper' age is in all
cases an ideal consistent with other constructions of the life-course. In Peatrik's
(1999) incisive analysis of what she identified as demographic drift {la derive
demographique) among the generations, the problem is stated:
In effect, the local classification of generations are carriers of a
demographic drift which may rapidly become unworkable. The men of
a class A do not father children at the same time; their sons of a class B,
therefore, will be of heterogenous ags, and their grandchildren of a class
C will be even more so. If nothing in the course of time comes to
contain the widening age span within a set and the straddling of the
generations, it is not possible to see how these classes would be able to
concretely organise their power among themselves {translation mine,
Peatrik 1999: 16).
In this respect, 'proper' age is always something of a constant problem which requires
periodical ad hoc resolutions. Sociologically, people must leam to articulate all the
rules, principles and ideals into bounded temporal limits and strive to avoid situations
of 'demographic drift' which create persons who are, in effect, excluded from inclusion
into an age-class by their structurally late or early initiations. With a frequency left to
be discerned, certain persons' position in the life-course will be disarticulated with
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their chronological age and, in extraordinary situations, their generational position vis¬
a-vis their father. In an earlier chapter, the examples of categories such as mwongela
(Tigania) and nangitia (Imenti) are representative of instances where demographic drift
may be patched up, although the substitution of such categories do not eliminate the
irreconcilable tensions between age and generation as principles of social organisation.
This problematic part of the system only tangentially effects spousal-classes, because
these are in formation long after an age-class and its smaller concomitant circumcision-
classes have closed their recruitment.
Plate 11: An 'under-aged' Igembe youth and his uninitiated
contemporaries (the latter wear school uniforms) (Muringene, 2001)
According to biographic field materials, by the early 1960s, it was becoming
increasingly difficult to negotiate ad hoc solutions to organisational problems. More
and more children were being born, instigating a severe demographic drift in the
organisation and formation of age-classes. The numbers of those needing to be added
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retrospectively to their 'proper' nthuki, the category of mwongela, was rumoured to
expand alongside the enormous growth of the population. In the opinion of some
informants, it became more difficult to know where any particular initiate should be
positioned. This was more acute in cases where the initiate's father had also relied
upon some ad hoc practice to position himself; or if the initiate's mother was the
second wife of a polygynous father. The prior expansion in the numbers of individuals
falling outside the threshold of the generational system, among whom the buruku were
representative, led to a situation where the political authority vested in the elders
became sharply fragmented. Because their power was not distributional, but the
product of lobby and agitation, the fragmentation of nthuki-based solidarity and
reciprocity shrank and divided the political arena.
The Ratanya, for instance, were the first nthuki not to follow through with the
appointment of a mukiama and did not perform the rites of cohesion between the
major sections, or moieties, which transected Tigania and Igembe. This generalised
trend towards a reorientation of the social system towards new circumstances of
change was exacerbated by four primary adaptations of Ratanya. Firstly, they were a
demographically large grouping who had turned to small economic-based trading
associations, like the coffee marketing cooperatives, to maximise the commercialisation
of Meru agriculture. Secondly, they rejected a great deal of the rules and principles
constraining the generational system, extending their procreative period to encroach
upon that of their eldest children. Thirdly, they advocated polygyny among its
members and began to marry outside of the proscriptive marriage categories,
sometimes marrying much younger women who would have, in former times, been
unmarriable and subject to certain incest-based prohibition. Fourthly, they refused to
maintain and encourage their sons' age-class formation because, with time, this would
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signal their enforced 'retirement' as a group of 'owners' (eene) holding on to rights
through property and persons. A likely combination of all these factors produced a
severe problem of over-aging amongst their 'sons' when the future Miriti (preceded by
Lubeeta) were in formation during the early 1970s.
In truth, many of the 'over-aged' Miriti were not sons of the Ratanya alone.
Biographic enquiries demonstrated that many of these were the offspring of Micubu
or buruku. Some could not even identify their father's age-class at all! Clearly, Miriti
appeared to be a heterogeneous grouping, from which extreme examples of
demographic drift could be picked. Yet, from its proponents, Miriti was partially
formed by a committment to reinstating the order of the age-class system which they
perceived had been unworked by their 'fathers', here being represented by the
Ratanya. From the vantage of fieldwork during 2001-2003, it appeared that the actions
of the Miriti, in contrast to their fathers', may have partially conserved the authority
within the generational system. First of all, the Miriti had agitated for their formation,
winning the gradual approval of three senior nthuki. Secondly, the Miriti reorganised
the scheduling, or calendar, through which the timing of circumcision classes and
ceremonies could be commensurate with the priorities of education and formal
schooling. This innovation of using the school calendar to organise the timing of
circumcisions was the key that unlocked some of the contradictions of demographic
drift and, simultaneously, mitigated the effects of 'over-aging' upon future age-class
formation. It achieved this largely through elevating the value of age-based principles
of recruitment more in step with the project of schooling which youth were then
engaged in en masse. Its cost was, perhaps, an abandonment of generational principles
which timed and segregated the period ideally given to couples to have their children,
creating a partial overlap in the fertility of successive spousal-classes. The elevated
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role given to the educational calendar meant shorter, more predictable cycles between
circumcision classes and the innovative elimination of waiting, through postponement
periods, outside of the likelihood of famine or another natural disaster.
In the 1970s, completion of the KJCE (Kenyan Junior Certificate of
Education) became the cue for anticipating circumcision and the ceremonies associated
with it. Yet, how did a set of examinations become an indicator for coming of age?
And, why did this occur in the 1970s? Like most of their forebears, the age-class that
was then in social formation, the Miriti, had agitated for its opening. Miriti ndinguri
were initiated in the dry season of thaano in 1973. This coincided with a famine
known locally in central Tigania as kimwe or kimuua ('the porridge famine') after the
government provision of food relief similar to that which had been effected before.
Because the kabeeria of Lubeeta were struck by a particularly devastating famine in
1969, the infamous kimutu ('the flour famine'), many of these latter had had their
initiations postponed and, compromising their adherence to gitiba, decided to be
initiated as a Miriti ndinguri. Among them could be counted a large number of 'over'
aged fellows.
One of this large group, a school teacher from Giithu, claimed that while he
was 'under' aged at the actual circumcisions, he knew of many contemporary
youngsters who were sporting beards and considered aged beyond their status as bwiji
(uncircumcised lads). These may have been the sons of the Micubu or buruku,
indicating a kind of generational 'slip mechanism' mentioned by ethnographers like
Gulliver (1953) and Lamphear (1989)/'' Another Miriti, from Amatu, explained to me
that there were many aged Miriti, some of them now in their fifties and today
48 As an indication of their possible age, some of the sons of a Micubu or buruku may have been as old
as thirty to thirty-five years old when circumcised in 1973. In Kenya's political-economy of the 1970s,
it is unfathomable that such men would not have already had children by the time they were eventually
circumcised and initiated into an age-class.
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circumcising their elder sons. At the same time, there are relatively fewer of the
opposite cases where young men in their early thirties may be judged to have been
'under' aged. As yet another joked, "There are Miriti who are themselves just having
small babies, while there are others being called Grandpa by a biggish lad." Certainly
among my informants, I had met Miriti who would have been my own father's age, in
their late fifties', while one or two were a little younger than myself, a categorically
fictive Gwantai in his late twenties'. Likewise, I was astounded by the statement:
"There are some Gwantai older than Miriti." These turned out not to be categorically
'over-aged' Gwantai and 'under-aged' Miriti, but rather variations of the theme of
buruku. In a very clear sense, someone like myself could easily have been categorised
as buruku, although I consciously distanced myself from this interpellation. I was
intrigued, during fieldwork, to find that biographical examples of the 'over-' or 'under-
'
aged among the Gwantai were almost nil. It provoked the question as to whether, or
not, something had changed in the ways that age-classes are formed.
The incorporation of educational calendars into age-class formation
One of the main reasons why there are relatively fewer 'over-aged' persons
today is due to the timing of circumcision events during the school holidays. The
history of the early 1990s, when Gwantai kabeeria were initiated, is linked to a
structural transformation in age-class formation. That modification to the existant rules
and regulations of nthuki was the semi-annual circumcision of ntaani during April and
December school closures. Twice each year, school holidays are made to co-incide
with the very personal, but perfunctory circumcision of boys. A primary rule is
outstanding: no boy should pass into secondary school or work-life without being cut.
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Perhaps more fundamental is the construction of uncircumcised 'lads' as children and,
hence, the lifting of sexual prohibition with initiation and the life-passage from old
child to young adult. While many Gwantai exerted pressure to become initiated,
especially ndinguri which opened in 1983, no anterior class of social actors has
agitated for their formation and recognition. The majority of youths circumcised since
1991 are reportedly still unnamed as a class, although they may be referred to and
understood as Gicungi.
With political efforts to make education affordable, such as NGO child
sponsorship programmes, more and more Nyambene children were able to enroll in
primary schools. NGOs such as Save the Children Fund, paid portions of children's
primary school fees for a relatively modest number of families. They eventually
relocated from Nyambene in 2002. For decades, Nyambene primary schools had a
reputation for low enrollment. In the 1990s, this was linked to the incentives for
children to leave school to earn a living. Within the 'cash-only' miraa driven economy
of many parts of Igembe, NGOs persisted in raising enough funds to send a larger
proportion of children to school. In Tigania, with no equivalent commercial boom to
exploit, large numbers of children sought a socially legitimate way of leaving school:
such as to speak of their intention to be initiated. By the act of circumcision, boys
access the individual freedom to participate in the remunerative economy. One pattern
ofmovement for nthaka initiated during the early 1990s was, in Tigania, to migrate to
Igembe and find work in the spin-offs of the miraa boom. Poor school attendance in
Nyambene was blamed on 'harmful cultural practices', a criticism especially prevalent
in the political views of the media, the NGOs, the provincial administration, the
church and the teachers. Slightly earlier, the reputed 'backwardness' of Nyambene
communities was rendered into a nation-wide stereotype, in which interpersonal
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violence was underscored as symptomatic. Admist larger nation-wide rumours of
satanism among students, evidence of a serious crisis in local moralities hit a nadir with
the violent rapes and murders of seventeen girls attending St. Kizito's Secondary in
1990. As a kind of 'critical event', St. Kizito heralded a period of increased
government and NGO activity which put Meru on the national stage as a district
where inter-personal and gender violence, illiteracy, drug and alcohol problems, and
'female genitial mutilation' were rife (cf. Steeves 1997). Part of the response of
Kenya's nascent and assertive civil society was to call for intervention within the
Nyambene Range communities. Following the tragedy at St. Kizito's, a flurry of NGO
activity led to the establishment of PAR (participatory action research) projects,
whose mandate was to highlight the impact civic education and higher enrollment of
primary school age children could have on curbing a perceived wave of violent crimes
and 'backwards' practices. New voices began to be heard calling for further action
against girls' clitoridectomies, interpersonal violence, and the precocity of school
leavers. On a medical front, the dangers of male and female initiations were newly
discussed within a paradigm of risk upon the body which emphasised the threat of
hepatitus and HIV infection through group ceremonies.
Elsewhere, attitudes towards ceremonial practices gave away to political
pressure from within the community leadership. Children in Imenti during this time
were not told they were kiroge ('penknives' or scalpels) if they were circumcised by a
nurse under local anaesthesia. By 1998-9 the njuri nceke based around the
municipality of Meru Town were unanimous in their opposition to initiating young
girls, enforcing a ban which was in effect since 1956. Unprecedented, however, was
that the njuri nceke sidestepped the normal threats to bring parents who initiated their
daughters in front of the courts, following KANU's public announcement of a national
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ban upon the practice. Intead, they announced an 'occult' sanction upon the parents
of girls undergoing the rite. Previous to this alarming decision, the njuri nceke had lent
support to state-led punishments, such as fines or even jail sentences, as well as
backing the churches' committment to excommunication. With the ambivalence of the
provincial adminstration towards such 'customary' affairs noted, the proliferation of
break-away pentecostal churches during the 1990s further eroded the punitive threat
of excommunication for offending church members. One could, after all, easily join a
church on the Christian fringe. New, more acute preventions had to be invented. In
time, the njuri nceke made an astonishing mandate around the original 1956
prohibition. The punishment was to be outrightly cursed (kulaana or kiruume).
In this context of shifting perceptions, debate about the appropriateness of
traditional practices was rekindled. A Catholic priest living in Ruiri, on the dry
borderlands of Imenti and Tigania, publically condemned in a local newspaper the
public hazing and forcible circumcision of aged bwiji. In Tigania, the behaviour of
initiates during their ceremonies, kwoutha, was questioned by some on the basis of
their decency. Christians asked themselves whether the 'burning ceremony', meeting
around the masquerade of ntunkuri, a characterised creature with a tail, was not in
itself a sinister gathering. One of my research assistants, a Gwantai ndinguri himself,
remembered feeling revolted watching a muthaka who - while dancing the circumcision
kwoutha ceremony - hoisted the bloodied underpants of a menstrating woman up into
the air with a spear. Another, he claimed, had elongated his penis with hooks and
weights during dances, provoking an uproar. Soon, the reputation of violence and
vulgarity earned by some Gwantai, led to a lack of enthusiasm and support for their
initiatory celebrations.
The formation of the Gwantai, from around 1983 to 1991, was profoundly
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affected by the new context of debate about 'custom' and 'tradition' in terms of
initiation's relation to other facets of social and institutional life. According to most
Gwantai themselves, they had all gathered into groups ofwould-be initiates during one
or another school break to go outside their location and perform kuriria, the
preparations preceded group circumcisions where initiates would lobby among their
kinsmen and neighbours for material support and moral blessings. The exception was,
however, those initiated from 1991, commonly referred to as the Gwantai kabeeria.
Explanations of kuriria differ significantly according to the age and social positionality
ofmale informants. Most, however, would agree that it entails that the hopeful initiate
publically announce his intentions to be circumcised (kuromba njira gutaanwa). This
public announcement was often made to one's muntuetu (mother's brother), from
whom a young lad could kuromba njira (ask for blessings) and get social approval for
his anticipated circumcision. He always did this in the company of his future wacia -
those one is circumcised with - who accompanied one another to the houses of all of
their mothers' brothers, away from their own clan (mwiriiga) and neighbourhood
(ntuura), and thus into the realm of the intra-clan public. Yet, the last Gwantai
circumcision set to effect this movement was the kobia, initiated in 1988, and
informants suggested to me that kuriria has not been practiced since. Since around
1991, one had to ask for blessings (kuromba njira) through other means.
As suggested above, school calendars seem to have scheduled circumcisions for
a decade, roughly between the years 1991-2003. As I observed among the Imenti
(1998, 2001) and the Tigania (2002), most school going lads anticipate being
circumcised and initiated into young adult life on the completion of their KCPE
(Kenya Primary Certificate of Education) examinations. This is nominally at the end
of eight years of primary level schooling. There is, however, the exception of young
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men who could not arrange to be sponsored, either due to poverty or social alienation.
The case of older boys lacking the necessary sponsorship for circumcision at a
younger age is particularly prevalent amongst the 'shamba boys', the ill paid full-time
employees of prosperous farmers or land-owners. Quite a number of these boys who
work in Imenti households and farms hail from Tigania. It is not unusual to find a
nineteen year old 'shamba boy' remaining uninitiated while working, say, on the farm
of an employer who has recently circumcised his own boy, a primary school leaver, at
the age of thirteen. Poverty and the absence of support, either in food provision or
social instruction, still contribute to 'over' aging, but the majority of prospective
ntaani are legally 'school children', whose entry into a new phase of their life-course is
scheduled by the closing of the school session. Thus, in Meru, passage through the
closing, final exams and the receipt of the school leaving certificate is grafted
symbolically onto the more poignant rite de passage - one's circumcision and
seclusion - leading towards one's social re-absorption as an adult.
What is the social implication of continuous, semi-annual circumcisions upon
the formation of age-classes? As seen with the category of buruku - a circumcised
youth without either itaana or nthuki - the recent abandonment of kunria has
introduced new means through which to organise circumcisions, but no social arena has
been subsequently re-defined for the formation of age-classes. Biographies from Miriti
testify to their ongoing lobbying and exertion of social pressure from 1973 to 1981 in
forming their mataana while their class contained a significant number of 'over' aged
persons. With the abandonment of kunria, the ritual process separating initiation
periods within a single age-class, the establishment ofmataana no longer retained its
logic of linking initiates together, while soliciting additional intra-clan support for the
ceremonies. Although Gwantai informants claimed that both ndinguri and kobia had
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agititated for their initiation and creatively manipulated the public to recognise them,
their particular style of forming their class was widely disregarded as unruly and
perhaps irreverent towards the style of their 'daylight fathers', the beethe ba
muthenya of Miriti, who were seen as Gwantai's social fathers (baithe) and sponsors
(agwati). As had previously occurred between the Kiramunya and Ithalii in the early
1940s, when these nthuki had conflicted over issues of sponsorship and the
reciprocity which went along with this social relation, the Gwantai were widely
perceived as having alienated their 'daylight fathers' and soon earned a reputation for
being vulgar and contrary. Many of the Gwantai's mother's brothers would have been
Miriti and from 1991 onwards there is anecdotal evidence of a growing consciousness
about the disruptive force of large-scale, calendrical circumcisions. Parents, in their
turn, sought alternative ways to circumcise their 'sons', including the partial
acceptance of solitary circumcision, meaning that a boy is cut alone. In such cases, the
focus of the boy's initiation is often no larger a matter than a household or
neighbourhood.
In Imenti, the terms kuriria and itaana are almost unknown, but during school
holidays, especially the December break, thousands of local boys are in seclusion,
closeted away in recently constructed houses. There they will stay for about a month,
recovering from their operations while receiving social instruction from older nthaka
who hail from their own neighbourhood. Sometimes an initiate may move to his
muntuetu should his maternal uncle be supporting his own son's initiation.
Circumcision has become, in some cases, personalised and directed from the
organisation of the family system. A fear of hazing, in particular, has led some parents
to organise a son's circumcision themselves and offer their support of food provision,
the circumcisor's fee and the maintenance of an appointed sponsor (mugwati) for an
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Plate 12: Extension made to a house for an initiate. Imenti (2002)
Plate 13: 'Traditional' circumcisor and elder (mutaani), Kanaeta (2002)
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entire month. For some families, the circumcision of a son or sons proves to be a
stressful, financial burden, however necessary it is for the reproduction of their family
and neighbourhood as social entities. Siblings and cousins of roughly the same ages are
frequently circumcised and initiated together, because the expenses involved in a boy's
initiation are considerable.
The initiation of girls is one of the most politicised elements within Meru as a
community of argument with a lengthy precedence of former controversies. In the next
section, I examine how the female Meru 'body' has been institutionalised along with
the 'mind' through specific attempts on the behalf of NGOs to educate the public
about the 'dangers of FGM.' While obviously written from my perspective and
position as a young man, this section aims to contribute to the already existent
literature on this controversy in Meru (Chege 1993; Thomas 2003, 1998, 1996;
Peatrik 1999). The contribution to earlier arguments, however, lies in an interpretation
of the specific entanglements of ideas about girls' initiations as linked to ideas about
education, development, and the imagined future of age-class and spousal-class
formation.
Cutting words: NGO education against female excision in the 1990s
Little mention has been made about the positionality of girls' and young
women's inclusion, or exclusion, within the age-class and generational 'system.' Does
the hidden, but hardly defunct practice of clitoridectomy (gutaanithua nkenye)
engender a more impassioned social debate and historical reappraisal about modernity?
More specifically, this section seeks to illustrate how the ban on female
clitoridectomy - in effect since 1956 - has periodically been used to portray the
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Nyambene Meru as 'backwards' in the context of social development. Indeed,
country-wide (mis)representations of some Kimeru-speaking communities as atavistic,
strongly vocalised in the daily newspapers, have served the interests of some
proponents of Kenya's 'modernity', which is defined by a wealthy, Christian political
elite who have affinities not only with government, but within civil society and, in
particular, with the non-governmental organisations sector.
During the late 1980s and 1990s, NGOs increased their presence and
programmes in the Nyambenes, many of which made their object the modernisation of
the communities they targeted. Such programmes rested heavily upon a facile
opposition of 'tradition' and 'modernisation', as well as resting upon a series of
assumptions about how poor, rural Kenyan communities remained 'captured' by their
'culture.' Although HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns, family planning clinics, and anti-
child labour activism have been prominant platforms for NGO educational
programmes and interventions, none have been as emotive and provocative as the
FGM ('female genital mutilation') sensitivity campaigns. During fieldwork, none of
my informants actively supported female initiations, at least those through
clitoridectomy, but quite a number also withdrew their support from the outside
bodies which ran campaigns designed to 'eradicate FGM.' Although people casually
wore t-shirts sporting the slogan, Tiga gutaaniro aari (Stop cutting girls), such high
profile campaigns, financed by the Family Planning Association of Kenya (FPAK)
seemed determined to engineer social change. An unintended consequence of such
programmes was to press girls' initiatory clitoridectomies underground. As time went
on, I began to question whether such NGOs had overstepped the boundaries of
'development' activity and whether they had organised a campaign of symbolic
violence against some of the most marginal and 'traditional' factions of the
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community. As I began to appreciate how the continued initiation of girls through
clitoridectomy was implicated in coping with marginalisation and the new inequalities
of the modern economy, I began to ask why the bodies of girls became the most
emotively charged and argued about aspect of Meru political discourse. Did
entrenched, highly funded and politically supported attacks on 'female genital
mutilation' inadvertently recreate the social inequalities which lie behind the initiation
of girls by clitoridectomy? How responsible were NGOs for the emergence of a strong
counter-ethics of silence and secrecy?
A broadly researched historiography of the contraversies centering on
clitoridectomy and its relation to efforts to eradicate abortion in colonial Meru has
been written by Lynn Thomas (1996: 338-63; 1998: 121-45; 2003). The post-colonial
period remains relatively unexplored, although of significance to analyses of the
transcontinuity in Meru social history (cf. Chege 1993). In advocating liberal and
medically informed interpretations of the young and old body, organisations which
sought to educate the public about the dangers of clitoridectomy (and circumcision by
extension) recycled the colonial categories of 'youth' and 'elders' to effectively divide
the intersubjectivity of the generations. In this construct, elders were represented as
conservative and resistant to change, whereas youth were portrayed as the 'righteous'
agents of social and moral transformations. Interventions aimed at stemming
clitoridectomies in Nyambene during the 1990s played upon deeply historical
constructions of the innocent, nubile girl and the profiteering, menopausal crone. The
wicked father and the ignorant brother completed the scene of the 'primitive' family.
These were favourite caricatures of the liberal colonial imagination, itself propped up
by fantasies of 'saving' the African and determining the method of their redemption.
Consider the pamphlet which came upon the scene in 1997, printed by FPAK
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and Plan International, entitled, 'Today's Girl: The Times are Changing' (originally
'Today's Girl: Badilika na Wakati). Published in English, this pamphlet outlines a line
of argument taken by an Igembe girl, Mwendwa, as she argues with her grandmother, a
male cousin, and her older sister why she should have a choice on whether she submits
to clitoridectomy or not. In the introduction, the question of historicity is raised up a
notch in its rhetoric by FPAK's programme officer, Charity Kinya Koronya
Mailutha:
In the old days many societies in Kenya had several traditions and
practices which had a lot of meaning that time. These included Female
Circumcision, Ear piercing, Tattooing, removing or sharpening of teeth,
wearing of ornaments and skin clothes, and elaborate hair styles among
many others. With the advent of modern education, many of these
practices have changed due to changed life styles resulting from
Christianity, formal education, etc. As we move into a new millenium, we
realise that the African women, men, boys and girls are very different
from their fore fathers two generations down the line. We are therefore
faced with the challenges of modernization as we enjoy the new comforts
and personal rights which the new times brings forth. Unfortunately
cultural 'inertia' has not allowed us to move wholly into the modem
times. In some areas, the persistence of old rites and practices such as
female circumcision deny girls and women their basic rights and freedom.
A today's girl has to cut this 'cultural - umbilical cord' to realise her full
potential. In addition, the today's girl has every right to say NO to any
act that will humiliate, dehumanise, injure her health and curtail her future
progress as female circumcision does. Join in the story of Mwendwa, one
such girl, who says NO to female circumcision. WELCOME (FPAK 1997:
ii)
This passage's rhetoric is thick with tropes which are associated with the 'breakdown
of tradition' and 'modernisation' narrative at the centre of Meru as a community of
argument. Far from being the isolated rhetoric of the Family Planning Association of
Kenya, the tropes of 'the old days', 'traditions', and the transfiguration of the body
are neatly opposed to the tropes of 'modem education', 'changed life styles',
'Christianity', 'new millenium', and 'two generations down the line.' In this paradigm,
the 'challenges of modernization' are beset by the weight of 'cultural inertia', an
expression neither framed as resistance to change, nor touted as frustrations with the
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No! No! No! a girl cannot become a mature
woman unless she is circumcised.
i Mwendwa, ifyou are not circumcised you
i will never get a man to marry you
llj because, people say uncircumcised girls
cannotmature, neithercan they make good
■ A
That is not true, for a wife men nowadays
consider qualities such as education,
personality, ability to contribute to family
income, common interests, character, and
perhaps beauty. After all, one cannot
differentiate an uncircumcised girl from a
circumcised one by her looks.
have a point my grand daughter. During
our times, Circumcision was the certificate to
womanhood and social status. An
uncircumcised woman could neither
associate with anybody nor participate in
activities.
certificate to higher social status, today
social status is based on, education, career
and one's involvement In community
activities among many other things.
Men and women no longer
pierce their ears long as a sign of beauty.
Were those not our traditions?. What about




What about our culture and traditions ? Are «
we going to throw them through the window in
order to be considered modern ?
"Juuju" as a christian, haven't you changed
yourways ofworship?. Then, what tradition is
greater than one's believe in God?. Aren't
traditions modified by time.?
05
Figure 5: Today's Girl: FPAK pamphlet on 'Female Genital Mutilation'
(1997)
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expectations ofmodernity (cf. Ferguson 1999). The stress upon historical differences
between the generations, in the late twentieth century, is voiced in a language of human
rights in which Mwendwa's (the fictive Meru girl) 'full potential' and 'future
progress' stands outside of the local moral-economy in which neither gender nor
generational hierarchies are deemed legitimate.
Earlier campaigns which targeted elder women mutaani (circumcisor) in rural
areas have been superceded by more 'culturally sensitive' approaches to the problem.
Following a line of argument that was echoed in the colonial past, NGOs have recently
stressed the social values of initiatory practice, of rites de passage, while still
unflinchingly condemning all forms of excision. A favoured approach stresses
initiation as an essentially educative practice, which is more about changing the 'mind'
than it is about modifying the body. As such, NGO activists working in Meru and
elsewhere in Kenya where excision is practiced undertook a programme which aimed
to 'circumcise through words', a motif which was (rather awkwardly) rendered into
Kimeru as Ntaaniro na migambo (cause to be cut with speech). The organisation
which funded this programme, Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (or
PATH), put out the following press release in 1999:
Young African women facing ritual female circumcision or female genital
mutilation (FGM) now have an alternative, due to pioneering work by
grassroots African organizations and PATH (Program for Appropriate
Technology in Health) a Seattle nonprofit. The new direction is partly a
result of meetings among Kenyan mothers two years ago, seeking
alternative ways to usher their daughters into womanhood. The mothers
hoped to save them from the painful and dangerous mutilating operations
widely performed on the external genitalia of young African women as a
rite of passage. The local group calls itself "Ntanira na Mugambo" which
loosely translates as "circumcision through words." With support from
their local community the women have devised a new approach to
initiation into womanhood that includes song, education, celebration, and
a week of seclusion. The new "circumcision through words" ceremony was
first performed in early 1996 for a small group, followed later that year by
a larger ceremony for 50 young women and their families. On Aug. 15 of
this year, an even larger ceremony was held for 70 young women. This
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transformation was preceded and supported by studies conducted in 1991
and 1992 by PATH and Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organization
(WYWO). The latter is a Kenyan women's organization committed to
improving the health and welfare of Kenyan women. PATH develops
health programs and technologies that fit the economies and cultures of
developing nations around the world. The studies, in the Kenyan districts
of Kisii, Meru, Narok and Samburu, revealed the prevalence of female
genital mutilation in these areas. These practices are most widespread in
Kisii, where more than 95 percent of young women are circumcised by age
12. Female genital mutilation is practiced in more than 50 percent of the
districts in Kenya. The new ceremonies were developed through a series of
workshops conducted by the communities and the women's organizations,
with support from PATH. The groups developed an array of new
materials, including poems, skits, and songs, as well as information sheets.
The new ceremonies were first instituted in the Tharaka Nithi district of
central Kenya. In August, the actual ceremony of initiation was preceded
by a "week of seclusion," which emulated the traditional healing period
after circumcision. The young women were accompanied by female
mentors during this week, who taught them skills they will need for their
own families. Other community trainers instructed the young women on
issues such as sexually transmitted diseases, relationships, and reproductive
anatomy. This period ended with a colorful ceremony attended by
hundreds of community members and leaders. Festivities included singing,
dancing, and dramatic presentations by the young women. The
presentations included messages such as "female circumcision is outdated
in modern life. Young women do not become mature by being cut, but by
education." The young women gave gifts and were showered with presents.
They received new clothes and feasted with the guests on traditional food
commonly served at circumcision ceremonies (PATH 1999)
In another report on the programme funded by PATH, a reporter, Malik Reaves, from
the Africa News Service, wrote earlier that families in Tharaka were taking to the
'Ntaamra na Mugambo' project with enthusiasm. The recognition that initiation
through excision could be replaced by initiation through education is unabashed in its
liberalism:
Yet female circumcision encompasses more than the practice itself. It is
often a deeply entrenched in the culture, wrapped in a complex shroud of
assumptions, taboos, and beliefs that impact a woman's social status and
personal identity. Indeed, it seems the central defining achievement of
Circumcision Through Words is not that it saves young women from the
dangers of FGM but that it captures the cultural significance of female
circumcision while doing away with the dangerous practice itself. "People
think of the traditions as themselves," said Leah Muuya of MYWO.
"They see themselves in their traditions. They see they are being
themselves because they have been able to fulfill some of the initiations,"
said Muuya in "Secret and Sacred," a MYWO-produced videotape,
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distributed by PATH, which explores the personal dangers and harmful
social results of FGM. The tape explains that female circumcision has
traditionally signaled when a young woman is ready for the responsibilities
of adulthood. In answer to that, Circumcision Through Words brings the
young candidates together for a week of seclusion during which they learn
traditional teachings about their coming roles as women, parents, and
adults in the community, as well as more modern messages about personal
health, reproductive issues, hygiene, communications skills, self-esteem,
and dealing with peer pressure. The week is capped by a community
celebration of song, dancing, and feasting which affirms the girls and their
new place in the community. Indeed, after witnessing the community's
response to the first celebration, MYWO Chair Zipporah Kittony said she
was "overjoyed" and believed it was a critical achievement in their efforts
to eradicate FGM (Reaves 1997)
How do self-proclaimed 'modern' girls, like the character in the FPAK
pamphlet, respond to the debates forming around excision? The extent of the
discomfort some young Meru women and girls feel about clitoridectomy is profound.
By 'feel', I draw upon transferences and demonstrable expressions of anxiety
witnessed among young female informants. In a classroom, while reviewing a
'traditional societies' unit in a social ethics course I was teaching at a girls' high school,
a casual mention of the Kimeru words nkenye and ngutu brought about a peal of self-
conscious giggles. Whether their outbursts were projections of embarrassment or
shame, I was not certain, but it proved to be a discomforting topic for the students.
Ironically, it would later make me experience a wave of 'shyness' (nthoni), when
rumour reached the staffroom that I somehow thought 'FGM' was a 'good thing'
(mucunku muthugania gutaanira aari nl into imiega). Nkenye, of course, means an
'uncut' girl, while her counterpart in the figure of the ngutu has been 'cut' and, thus,
sexualised and prepared for marriage. Probing the class for their views on 'FGM' (the
preferred acronym for 'female genital mutilation'), I came across a mixture of concern
and prejudice. Many of these pupils' mothers and grandmothers would have
undergone the rites involved, but it was clear that the sensitivities and, indeed, the
subjectivities of those who had been 'cut' in this way would have no place in the
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educational programmes of NGOs and their representatives. Hegemony had been
established: "FGM is the greatest evil."49
Plate 14: Joy Adamson's representation of women's life-course from
unitiated nkenye to elder nkirote. (Chuka, 1950)
Many younger Imenti informants displayed contradictory views on whether
girl initiates were any different, in behaviour, from their uninitiated counterparts.
Mukuba, herself a young single mother, once questioned me in English, "Where can
you see the difference? And, they are saying their age-mates are going to disco... all of
them... whether they are circumcised or not." Latterly, however, she tried to explain
why gutaanithua nkenye (or ntaano cia aari in Kiimenti), still had appeal amongst
those she called "minorities" in the community. According to this twenty-three year
49 Lest I be misunderstood, this is a quote from an employee of a local educational institute which I
shared with dozens of young women as a means to talk about clitoridectomy. Its association with 'evil'
consistently failed to make sense among subsequent women I interviewed.
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old, the individuals involved in female initiations were a tiny, "backwards minority"
who, she exaggerated, had not "heard of a radio or anything like that." Curious at such
a remark, I asked where these 'backwards' people lived and she pointed vaguely
towards the north-east, in the general direction of eastern Nyambene and Tharaka,
where much of the current 'FGM' controversy is centred. Mukuba described female
initiation as a goal for some people, just as an examination or another scholastic
achievement might present itself as a goal in other households: "In Meru, there are
some other people [laughter] with different traditions... now if you discover you are
circumcised when you are in Class Eight, you have a process to go from Form I, II,
and III... your parents push you up there, hmm? [emphasis mine]" With this attempt
to understand the motives of those people supporting clitoridectomy, Mukuba felt
strongly that an initiated women was the object of ridicule and prejudice by a
community which should be more sensitive:
"You know there are these programmes... it has become an open thing
that this circumcision of girls is wrong... female genital [sic] is not good.
You are even scared of being married, scared your husband discovers how
you look [laughing]... and these people are forced to give birth at home,
you don't want to go to the hospital to give birth because you will be
mishandled by the nurses, they don't want to see circumcised women. It's
not even your fault! So, you discover it is better that you stayed without
that circumcision, because it puts so much negative on you... actually, on
your self, inside you, not even on the outside... your views about life"
Mukuba spoke as an unmarried young mother of two. Her awareness of self as an
internal and embodied condition of security, rather than an intersubjective and
socialised measure of acceptance is peculiar, challenging some assumptions about an
essentialised 'African' sense of selfhood. And another young woman, Kathambi,
participating in the same conversation, was to suggest that the relational security and
subjectivity of female initiates, those who have been 'cut', has been deeply eroded:
"OK... one thing... zamani, before it was a celebration. People knew
someone has been circumcised, people are called to greet and see the
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ntaani [a boy initiate]... you see? But a girl! It is done secretly nowadays,
those who want it to happen. But for a boy, he's our brother, because you
are going to make new clothes, buy him a suit... that day he's coming
out... but if it's you! Ha! [mockingly] No one is going to see you! Ha!
You'll be hiding now like whispers... people are just gossiping, 'You see
her? She's what-what!' They go laughing... how do you feel? Instead of
feeling proud that now you are from a different stage to another one...
unataka kufichia tu [you just feel like hiding]"
Such feelings of embarassment are far reaching in their consequences for evaluations
about 'African culture' among today's young people. The rhetoric of "zamani" (Swa.
'the past') or "karaja-rf (Meru, 'a long time ago') in narratives about female
initiations achieves a distanciation between young people and their parental or
alternative generations. But, even among young people themselves, there is
disagreement about the nature of the FGM controversy as it was expressed in the
1990s. A small number of nthaka I spoke with, for example, stated that circumcised
girls "make better lovers", but an equal number of these young men, when asked
whether they would prefer wives who were initiated in the 'traditional' way, said that
they wished their future wives to be 'uncut', but 'trained' as wives were in the past.
Such contradictory statements demonstrate the cultural entanglements which
characterise debates and arguments taking place in contemporary Kenya 'about'
tradition from 'within' modernity (cf. Englund 1996).
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CHAPTER SEVEN
You Don't Know Without Being Told:
religion, moral crises and the local press
Identity and morality in Meru ideals of personhood
In Kimeru thought, the impact of initiation upon an individual's subsequent
life-course is explored through the metaphor of birth. Besides the use of kinship
terminologies within initiatory practices, such as the 'daylight fathers' {beethe ba
muthenya), the metaphor of birth is implicated in the formation of age-classes, such as
when someone says, "Ratanya aciarire MiritF ('Ratanya begot Miriti'). Through
relying on metaphors derived from the language of procreation and parenting, Meru
creatively invest the formation of age-classes with moral evaluations which identify
different ideals for different persons and stages of life.
Prior to their re-birth through initiation, Meru children are considered to be
passive and amoral. But in this state, children are also said to be 'pure', as in the
proverb, "guti mwaana uri mugiro" ('A child has no pollution'). In many public
events, such as funerals or weddings, children participate when called upon, but are
then allowed to wander off and mingle amongst themselves. In burials, children
generally do not pitch handfuls of soil down into the grave as do all others. Adults told
me at a funeral, "aana batina kieba nkorone", 'children feel no grief.' Attitudes
reflecting the blamelessness of children also extend to other public events. During my
own wedding, for example, a well dressed boy of about four years old urinated
casually without attracting an adult rebuke. I used to marvel at what I considered to
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Plate 15: The composure of children, Muringene. Igembe (1998)
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be a great latitude allowed to children by their parents and other adults, witnessing in
children a kind of freedom which would later be curtailed at the appearance of the
circumcisor's blade.
I noticed, however, that in matters involving cohorts of children, such as
schooling, there is a strict insistence on their essential dependency upon, and need for,
the moralising presence of adults. Adults commenting on this dependency would tell
me "Guti mbiji ituri", 'You don't know without being told.' In many ways, this saying
mirrored my own incomplete moral education among the Imenti and Tigania Meru.
My position as an outsider, whose connection to community was partly contrived by
idioms of fictive kinship and age-class membership, often placed me in a kind of social
liminality which was comparable to that constructed around childhood, when
individuals are not held accountable for their actions.
In 1998, when I first carried out fieldwork in the Imenti part of Meru and
when I was then concerned with theories about the moral-economy of the household, I
asked an aged grandfather whether the half-dozen or so young children who happened
to be milling about in front of his son's house did any work (I had asked, "twaana bao
bathithia ngugi muciine?"). From inside his son's dank house, where we were
hunkered down in conversation, he pointed out one small boy leaning on his sister. As
ifmeditating on the significance of the question, he answered languidly, "Work around
the house? Yes, they do work...their work is to play." Where I had seen it everywhere
and celebrated it in everyone, this elder man jolted my understandings of agency, by
pointing out something he clearly perceived to be obvious. As is often said, "You
don't know without being told."
In this sense, most Meru would argue that children are not social agents. But it
should be stressed that the Kimeru sense of being social implies being moral.
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Existentially, however, children are compelled by the imperative to take some mastery
over their own lives, demonstrated by their absorption with play (cf. Jackson 1998:
29). In Meru, adults' ideas about the passivity of children and the negation of their
agency seemed to be contradicted by the presence of neighbourhood children who
embarked on adventures together as a group and seemed conscious of the fact. In the
marketplace of Mikinduri, I watched school children and listened in on their
conversations about vehicles, which exposed intimate details about the owners and
crews of well-known buses. Often, when negotiating bush areas, off the well-worn
trails which lattice residential space, I was compelled to ask groups of small boys for
directions. They frequently appeared on the margins of the bush, armed with knives
and bows for hunting, and would draw up to me out of mixed curiosity and
trepidation. Noting this association of small boys with bush space, in conversations I
learned that such groupings of bwiji are formed among prepubescent boys who intend
to be circumcised together, at some anticipated time in the future. These groupings, I
learned, were called nciibi, but little more than this was revealed in conversation.
Speaking with young, recently initiated adults about the activities of nciibi seemed to
provoke mild embarassment. Some others could not even pronounce the term without
displaying a wry grin. Later, on a return home, I reflected upon this by remembering
my own bashful response on seeing a trunk full of toys I had played with as a young
child, my older ego uncomfortable with the immaturity of my former self. The
reluctance ofmy young informants to speak about things they considered themselves
far removed from had resonance with my own experiences of shifting personhood.
Eventually, convinced that a straight answer about nciibi was not forthcoming,
I resolved to myself that - like the adult councils of lamalla and njuri nceke which are
steeped in a consciously maintained esoterica - whatever went on between nciibi was
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not to be divulged except through initiatory experience. One probably enters into such
a grouping conscious of the unprecedented step one is taking, only later to
acknowledge that this particular step paled in comparison with others which follow.
Knowledge about such organisations could only come through participation. It was, in
a word, a secret. The secretive nature of peer groups stems from the locally specific
hierarchies rooted in age as a primary form of social differentiation. Yet, in this secrecy
and in the subaltern status of uninitiated boys to everyone older, lay a significant
social tension. In forming into groups, such uninitiated boys were demonstrating
agency, an act of will, a lobbying, which are properly the characteristics of the
initiated.
Forming themselves into clandestine neighbourhood groups, the nciibi, these
small boys imagine and act out what they think they would be doing upon attaining
the age of initiation.50 The inventiveness in this 'make believe' hides its seriousness,
for in their playful appropriation of grown-ups' life passages, right down to pretend
circumcisions, belonging to nciibi inverts the passivity they are constrained to display
towards everyone older than them. The clandestine codes which nciibi maintain are a
reflection of the secrecy of the other, adult world. And, in learning to keep their
secrets and identity from adults, children learn to act upon their identity as a group,
outside of being passively identified as so-and-so's child.
In the past, parents recognised the latent, but limited moral development of
children and encouraged cohorts of boys and girls to interact and define, for
themselves, arenas where they could exercise some freedom and control. As such,
adolescent children were permitted their own spaces through which they could
construct their separate identities. Persons initiated into nthuki historically precedent
50 These groups of uncircumcised boys are also called kathingiriti or luungi in Igembe according to
Peatrik (1999:72-5).
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to the Ratanya-Nculubi (c. 1947-1956) gave descriptions of neighbourhood dances,
where uninitiated boys and girls were permitted to act together as a group in a public
place (kienene, a field), although supervised by the ever-watchful nthaka. Although
uncircumcised boys continue to form themselves into nciibi, the public field and
venues for dancing amongst peers of children have been subsumed by the primary
school's playing fields. If any changes have been striking over the past sixty years, it
is the further separation of boys and girls based on their gender, reinforced by school
policies which mandate single-sex schooling after the end of primary education.
Nevertheless, children's activities taking form around a football made of polyethyline
and string, a game of three on three, conceal a gradual struggle against passivity at a
group level.
Plate 16: Children dancing at Independent Church gathering, Iqembe
(1998)
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It is through initiation and the re-birth of the individual, however, that the
Kimeru concept of agency (inya, strength or power) is objectified. An individual's inya
is 'cooled' by healing after circumcision or clitoridectomy. Socially, however, an
initiate learns to hone and control their 'strength' or 'power' through the relationships
they form, firstly, with their age-mates, then, with their girlfriends or boyfriends, but
also secondarily by their relations with older people and persons. There is an ongoing
relationship between their own itaana and those of other, older, established nthuki.
Thus, the passage through the early life course transforms an individual from being a
passive dependent and encourages a notion of agency which is realised through the
creation of adult inter-dependencies and reciprocities. Action, therefore, is grounded in
the possibilities opened up by initiation and the intersubjectivity that it, for the first
time in the public life of an individual, thrusts upon them as an obligation. Upon entry
into an age-class, a new form of intersubjectivity is encouraged and expected which is
predicated on actions which discern between 'right' and 'wrong.'
Such a moral imperative assumes that inya is the power or strength not only of
action, but also of intentionality. One Kimeru proverb, "uume bukurukite inya",
comes to mean something like 'wisdom [intention] overcomes might [strength /
power].' A parallel proverb links the integration of intentionality and moral agency to
maturity: "uume buria bunene nigukura", or 'the greatest self-knowledge comes from
growing old.' This suggests that the Meru concept of agency, which springs from
one's initiation, is a moral construct which is subject to some kinds of ethical
ambiguity: one may possess the power to do something, but one should also be
prepared to face up to the consequences of acting in one way or another. For example,
former Meru understandings of pollution and sickness, in the form of a substance
known as migiro, was frequently linked to sexual misconduct. Illness was often
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thought of as stemming from a person's sexual impropriety. From initiation comes the
imperative to accept responsibility for one's actions. Parents, siblings and neighbours
present at an initiate's coming-out ceremony do not expect to see the child who went
into seclusion, but rather expect to witness the outing of a transformed individual who
is adult in behaviour if still adolescent in physiology. In striving to attain control over
the course of one's life, and being a social equal to one's age-mates, the concept of inya
becomes a moral limit in defining and identifying adult life.
Inya is not, however, a property of an age-class. It may only rarely be applied
to a group of persons. In everyday life, inya is an individual capacity which expresses
the presence or absence of maturity within an initiated person. This is not to say,
however, that an individual matures alone by merit of their possession of strength or
power and intentionality. They can, in principle, misuse such power and strength and
it is here that Meru explained the disciplinary 'nature' of the age-class. By
identification with an historical cohort, the nthuki, an individual's inya is subjunctive;
that is to say, one's outward display of strength or power is limited by one's age-
mates who are, by inclusion into an nthuki or itaana, subjugated by the rules and laws
imposed by the age-class. While the initiated adult is expected to act morally, the
nthuki in which the individual is positioned defines morality.
In regulating the behaviour of its adherents, the nthuki ideally forms its own
codes for judging, faulting and punishing persons who eschew a negotiated standard of
moral practice. And, as Meru men and women frequently stressed, each nthuki
legitimises its activities in contrasting ways. Besides the historical transformation in
ethics, punishments meted out for transgressive behaviour, such as age-based incest,
also depend upon one's position as a muthaka (youth / warrior), mwari (young
unmarried woman), mukuru (married elder), or mwekuru (married woman). In Miiriga
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Mieru, I once witnessed a case where a small uninitiated boy had abused a young man,
raising quite a scandal in the neighbourhood where the slight was committed. His age-
mates rallied around the 'crime' of the insult and the young man's peers 'inducted' the
child into their age-class, thus presenting the boy's parents with a fine of a 'feast bull',
but which was, in 2002, a levy of several thousand shillings. The father of the
misbehaving boy challenged the younger men's appropriation of the feast bull as a
'traditional' form of compensation, claiming that they had no authority to do so.
Unfortunately for him, the father's lack of authority and status within his own nthuki
left him with little option than to pay the fine. Some observers found this action
extortive, while others claimed it had been justified. The different behaviour and ideals
espoused by separate nthuki presents moral ambivalences, which, if left unchecked,
leads into gainsaying other age-classes or generations' claim to moral high ground. As a
kind of social tension, however, this dynamic rarely leads to overtly hostile relations
between age-classes or generations. The ideal of civility, upheld through story telling
about 'notorious' individuals or groups, holds sway in the relationships between
persons of different ages and generational positions.
Three points are of significance to our discussion of age-classes and the
historical changes in their moral disposition. The idea that morality is taught,
especially through close association with peers, but importantly through engagement
with people of different ages, is a persistant theme of discussions about 'wrong' and
'right' among adult Meru. In Kimeru, this is summed up by the conceptual distinction
of nature and nurture, on the one hand, and raw and ripe on the other. Another related
idea is that peers may influence one another in 'good' or 'bad' manners, often earning
nicknames which reflect this, such as that of the Imenti age-class, Mbaya, who were
called lMbaV (the 'bad' ones). Secondly, the emphasis on self-regulation and discipline
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amongst members of a single age-class provides the context for debate about how to
connect 'good' and 'bad' to a wider social public. Here, there is seldom much
agreement on what constitutes appropriate behaviour, although clearly such
transgressive behaviour, such as familial or generationally based incest, murder, and
theft are viewed as threats to the public at large and punishable accordingly. A third
point may also be extracted from the construction of particular ideas about morality
within differentiated age-classes, and this has to do with the power of story telling,
songs, and historical narratives which blame particular generations for accepting
immoral practices and hastening the end of community as prophesised in quite a
number ofKimeru and Christian allegories.
Before interpreting the enigmatic figure of the 'bad' generation in allegorical
Meru narratives, it is important to discuss other texts which address popular concerns
about the vicissitudes of cultural history, social crises, and immorality. In the
following section, several books published in Kimeru by missionary societies serve as
examples for how different genres of narrative have responded to social crises and the
threat of cultural disruption and change. Key debates within these texts allow for an
ethnographic reflection on the necessity of building tropes and figures about the 'bad'
generation within an age and generational 'system.' What is significant in these texts is
the degree to which nthuki are placed at the centre of debate about the Meru as a
community. Similar to the lyrics of gospel music discussed in a later chapter, these
texts take the Christian scriptures and the idea of a pure, mythic, 'tribal' past as their
generic starting point to construct complex and often contradictory allegorical
interpretations of the cultural crises of the present.
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'You Don't Know Without Being Told'
1973 saw the appearance of a short book, written in Kimeru, called GutiMbiji
Itiiri: Yuku Ria Aciari, Nthaka na Aari (Nyaga 1973). In translation, this book is
accurately rendered as 'You Don't Know Without Being Told: A Book for Parents,
Lads and Lassies.' It was published by the Consolata Catholic Diocese and written by
Daniel Nyaga, a priest working in Tigania during the 1960s. Although originally from
Embu, Nyaga wrote in Kimeru and was part of a small group of Catholic intellectuals
in the early 1970s who advocated the use of 'vernacular' languages and the
establishment of a local press to engage local populations in wider debates and
arguments about the social, political and spiritual tensions left in the aftermath of
colonialism. A recurrent theme of such literary production is the question of the
Africanisation of Christianity (cf. Ndegwa Ng'unyura 1977; Kinoti 1984). In one
sense, these intellectuals set for themselves the task of interpreting the differences
between 'tradition' and 'modernity' within their indeterminate positions as African
Christian clerics. In their literature, they were acutely aware of the ambiguities which
deeply affected local communities' abilities to negotiate the changes brought about by
political independence and the end of formal colonial rule. For these authors,
'tradition' and 'modernity' were aporia to which their literary production was an
ethical response.
Contrary to their aims, such authors reified the polarity between 'tradition'
and 'modernity' in the process of writing about them. In prefacing the first editions,
the Bishop of Meru, Lawrence Bessone, encouraged people to read the book
"irrespective of religion" because in it they would find "sound Christian principles
corroborated by the ancient tribal customs" (guti gwikira mantu ja Dini... mooritani
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jameega ja Gikristu, na mooritani jekiri inya na jarikua ni miitire imiega ya karaaja)
(Nyaga 1973: ii). In striving to bind together ecumenical religion and the moral codes of
some local traditions, these authors were not acting upon the 'scriptures' and oral
traditions in an orthodox fashion. Talk about the 'Africanisation of Christianity', like
all secular anti-colonial political projects, was a form of dissent which rattled the
metropoles of Rome and Canterbury alike. Ndegwa Ng'unyura's (1977) theology
dissertation, for example, contributed to his ex-communication from the Catholic
Church because, in his own words, "To the Meru, the left hand of the mugwe is
sacred, and I refused to swear on the Bible with the polluted, right hand." In Guti Mbiji
Itiiri, Nyaga's vitriol against the perceived immorality of modern child-raising and
parenting casts him as an author suspicious of anything which falls outside the scope
of Christian exegesis, but he also has recourse to re-writing what he calls the 'mitCurire
imiega bajuuju bwetu', 'the good traditions of our ancestors.' This makes Nyaga, and
writers like him, difficult to categorise, but it also raises difficulties about typological
thinking. Are such figures modemisers or neo-traditionalists? Are the new religious
movements that they represent syncretic? Such questions can only end in
dissapointment because they rely upon certain forms of ethnocentrism. This is
especially the case with a concept such as syncreticism because, as Jeff Haynes notes,
the term disguises an 'ethnocentric certainty' that there is only one orthodox
interpretation of a faith, centered in the historical metropoles (Haynes 1996: 169). The
project of these religious Meru authors represent a kind of aporia which was
represented in the cultural politics of the Meru in the 1970s.
When I first stayed in Meru Central, in 1991, one of my lasting impressions
left with me was the idea of a community in turmoil. The gendered violence which
erupted, on July 14th, 1991, at St.Kizito Girls' School in Tigania, was still a fresh
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wound in peoples' memories (cf. Steeves 1997). Since then, my ethnographic
fieldwork, carried out in 1998 and then again in 2001-2003, has perhaps engaged with
a succession of largely ethical inquiries about the idea of the Meru as a community of
debate. I certainly have not intended to create yet another ethnographic allegory about
the African 'other' (cf. Goldschmidt 1990: 6-9), but I am intrigued by the constraints
imposed upon me in what themes I may choose to write about. In other words,
reflecting on the circumstances in which I encountered the Meru requires that I take
the historicity of this fieldwork situation seriously. As I have come to reflect on my
experiences in Meru Central and Meru North, I find that I cannot write about the
'Meru' as a community of argument without engaging with local authors. My
empirical materials alone do not adequately reflect on the historical backgrounding of
the fieldwork situation. I find in the allegorical interpretations and narratives ofwriters
such as Nyaga a voice of dissent, or railment against the uncertainties of postcolonial
Kenya, which is less pronounced in the otherwise significant works of foreign
scholars. In particular, I am still unsure whether my fieldwork was intellectually
influenced more by the ethnographic and historical writings of Anne-Marie Peatrik or
Lynn Thomas, than by the local press and locally published works of authors such as
Daniel Nyaga, Alfred M'lmanyara, and Matthew Adams Karauri. I know 'Baikiao'
Ndegwa Ng'unyura on a personal basis and intend to write something about his church
with his permission. Partly because Peatrik and Thomas' works are more or less
inaccessable to most Meru, not only in language, but also in price and availability, the
local press has a greater, albeit still limited, influence upon the flavour and tone of local
debate. Not all people find the work of local intellectuals agreeable. I have witnessed
long and intense debates about Nyaga's representation of the 'traditional' Meru. From
an ethnographic, or anthropological, perspective, the terms of these arguments are
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critical to an ongoing local debate about the aporia of 'tradition' and 'modernity.'
Despite the subversive intent of this work, Nyaga is better known for a
controversial ethnological description of Meru 'traditional' society, also written in
Kimeru, which he published in 1986 using an improved orthography.51 Some ofmy
informants condemned this second book by Nyaga on the grounds that it was
misinformed, but I suspect their hostility had something to do with the author's status
as an outsider from the neighbouring Embu District. With Guti Mbiji Itiiri, however,
this book became part of a small collection ofwritten documents which allowed me, as
an ethnographer working in Tigania during the 2000s, to reconstruct the historicity of
generation during the 1970s. Interpretations of Guti Mbiji Itiiri permitted me to
formulate and ask questions which were originally formulated in a past, but not remote
time, before my first sojourn to Kenya in 1991. Although never translated into English
or Swahili (Kenya's official languages) the book is a treatise on Christian social ethics
intended for an audience of youth and their parents. What is key about this book is the
way in which it draws its conclusions about the vicissitudes of the present through an
analogy of the 'moral' and 'traditional' and the 'immoral' and 'modern.' This analogy
frequently appears in religious exegetical texts published in Kimeru, In another
chapbook published by the Catholic Diocese, the Meru of the present are compared
with the statement 'Before the 1940s, the Meru were a good people': a view which is
generally reflected in the invention of a moralising past by contemporary Church-going
elders.
The title Guti Mbiji Itiiri, 'You Don't Know Without Being Told: A Book for
Parents, Lads and Lassies', barely hints at its contents. In several chapters,
interwoven with Nyaga's anecdotes and forays into scriptural interpretation, a
51 Daniel Nyaga (1986) Mikarire na Mituurireya Amiiru, Nairobi, Heinemann Kenya.
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decisively modern concern for 'good parenting' is contrasted with a vision of the
'tribal' past which, although moral, was 'improved' by the inclusion of Christian
ethics. In other words, the 'tribal' past and the Bible become the foundations for
Nyaga's allegorical interpretation for what is wrong with the present. Yet, the work
makes a decisive departure from any attempt to historicise the idea of 'tradition' and
produces some contradictions which are explained by allegorical exegesis of the Bible.
On the 'modern' allegory, in which Christian social ethics become a necessary part of
the education of boys, girls, and their parents, Nyaga's book highlights the
redemptory ideologies consistent with ideas of development. His readings of
redemption focus on the bodies of adolescents (a category which has no equivalent in
Meru concepts of personhood and the life-course). In this vein, chapters cover 'sex
education' (uritani bwa 'sex') through to advise for parents about the social,
epidemiological and moral dangers of cigarettes (ndagitari munyuui wa thigara),
drinking and alcoholism (ncoobi na wogiti), and the threats posed by disco halls
(ndanci teka ithuuki). This document is a fascinating glimpse at the intimate political
dramas unfolding in schools, at church congregations, and within families during the
early 1970s.
But what of this period and its historicity? How have the people who were
schooled and initiated in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s constructed themselves and
others in the contingencies of this period? How have the inter-subjectivities of a
generation comprising two age-classes been represented and narrated for a person
(myself) who was publically known to be a social interloper, perhaps impossibly
demanding to understand the old and young alike? These questions are posed because
they emphasise the problems of historical perspective that ethnographers must
inevitably face.
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According to informants' biographies, this period was known as a time when
people began to abandon the patterns of avoidance between the generations. It was
around the time of the first Gwantai being initiated in 1983,1 was told frequently, that
ntaani dared 'for the first time' to speak face-to-face with their mothers after their
operations and re-birth as muthaka. Indeed, being accustomed to the Euroamerican
practice of maintaining eye contact - as a putative sign of attentiveness - more than
once I failed to realise that I was being addressed by a social 'mother' because her gaze
was fixated somewhere in the beyond and I thought she was speaking to an unseen
figure behind me. After a curt rebuke, I was all ears. An elder of the Micubu age-class
demonstrated for me what bodily comportment he would have displayed to his father
in conversation by turning his back to me! This left me unnerved. The embodied
nature of avoidance between the generations, while becoming gradually less
accentuated, is still maintained in spatial movements. I was once stunned into
accepting this level of estrangement between parental and filial generations when an
informant, the father of a boy I was walking with, refused to acknowledge our
presence or my greeting despite his usual conviviality. I also noticed, when reading
over fieldnotes, that the greatest gaps in my biographic profiles of nthuki were for
those categories of persons deemed to be the age of my parents. While this was a
source of anxiety - of not having enough biogaphy on the key cohorts implicated in
Meru's demographic expansion - it was also a doorway to knowledge about the
relative isolation of the generations. Through some kind of transference, possibly on
my part as well as that of informants, the lived dimensions of generational
estrangement had been internalised methodologically. Similarly, Anne-Marie Peatrik
encountered such avoidances during her fieldwork among the Tigania and Igembe
(Peatrik 1999: 31). Because today's young people do not adhere to this pattern of
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avoidance, older informants insisted that they have become 'mannerless', pointing out
that youth no longer appreciate personal discretion and act imprudently in front of
their elders.
Sensitive issues, such as sex, are also deemed to be inappropriate subjects of
discussion between filial and parental generations. This is despite the existence of
sexual joking between grandparents and their adult grandchildren. Such joking between
the alternate generations stems from the Meru pattern of naming ntagu (namesake),
where a girl grandchild may be referred to as 'my wife' (mwekurokwa) or 'my lover'
(munyanya) by her grandfather. The 1970s, however, are now known to have been
something of a 'sexual revolution.' Many formerly preserved sexual prohibitions, such
as having relations with a categorical 'daughter', 'mother', or clan 'sister', were
considered irrelevant to newly emergent categories of relationships based on English-
language ideas of 'love' or 'playing sex.' To give an idea of how public ideas about
courtship changed in a brief period of time, people no longer referred to the girl and
boy relationship as kugambia, literally 'on speaking terms', which reflected longer-
term expectations of bridewealth negotiations and marriage, but began to speak of
'sneaking' which chiefly referred to the newer practice of keeping relationships secret
at great cost. Kimeru terms for such relationships gradually became replaced with
English ones in which the meanings were much more ambivalent to Kimeru speakers.
In addition, sociological changes contributed to this 'sexual revolution' in Meru during
the 1970s. Parents complained during this time that their sons and daughters could not
define who was a relative and who was not, nor determine who was considered subject
to rules of social avoidance. Older theories about the relation between pollution
(,mugiro) and illness were swept aside by stronger convictions in etiologies derived,
partially, from biomedical frameworks. Once, an informant confided with me that,
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when he was a small child, his grandmother had forced him to carry a small charm
(mutheega) under his armpit to ward off pollution and to dispel witchcraft. Twenty
years later, as a university educated health worker, he found this difficult to
understand, but also mildly convinced that it had protected him from some childhood
illnesses. Sexually transmitted diseases, such as gatego (gonorrhea) and maria
(syphilis) was once thought to have come from having sexual intercourse with a
woman who had miscarried or aborted, giving theories of contagion a precisely
gendered form. Although ideas about mugiro have largely faded, many local people
remain convinced that HIV/AIDS, called mutheera in Kimeru, is an ancient disease
which killed many people of the Miriti bantene (1870s) which has returned to infect
and kill the current Miriti, who are said to be similarly tainted with contagion.
The confusion in how to behave was not necessarily the outcome of the lack of
a set of moral codes, but the diversity of choices left open to follow and adhere to.
Caught in between the imagination of 'modern love' and the resonance of previous
sexual prohibitions, quite a number of local youth expressed their frustrations with
the lack of clarity on choosing spouses and engaging in sexual relations, as testified by
the following conversation with a young Imenti:
"Ciwi comment umba kugiue una antu baguragurana nandi?"
"Give a comment on how people marry nowadays?"
"Ntuku cia nandi, nguranu cia nandi ti ja cia ntene... muntu nagwita
tannine nau bwacemania na muntu nau... nyuma ya ntuku ijiri ithatu
bakaana nja kwao. Kwa ba muthaka. Kana inya gutiutenue kwi na mantu
ja jau... nukwona antu ni kwendana ouu... baagi inya kugurana niuntu
family yenu... ya ba muthaka ina mbeca... nandi ugwe nukwenda
gukuinua ni mbeca iria ii ti inya ucoore bungwa na ntuku cia nandi kwe
na mwanya jwa nguranu cia nandi na cia ntene."
"These days, the marriages of today aren't
like those of the past. A person can go to
town, meet a person, after two or three
days they go home. The home of the
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young man. [This is done] even without
the consultations as was in the past... the
inviting of the in-laws and union of the
two families... now there are no such
things. People are loving in any old way.
Some are marrying because the man's
family has money, so the girl is enticed by
money, so it is not true love [ti inya
ucoore, not strong friendship]. So there is
a difference in today's marriages and those
of the past."
"fTgf-compare-aga time cia nandi na cia mbere ni difference iriku
ukwona uria antu babairia family ciao?"
"Comparing now and the past, what
differences do you see in the way people
start their families?"
"Difference cia uria antu babairagia... mbere muntu aguranaga ni untu
bwa nthuki... ugikira gutigwa ni nthuki yenu... ii nthuki yaku... ukona
ng'ania naraguranue na ugwe utigaarune wakira gutewa mono... indi
nandi nthuki iti-matter niuntu ugwe nandi womba kwithirwa two na
nthuki imwe wa wathiririe cukuru Form Four... wakara miaka iri
ukagurana... nani gitaita mbere geeta inya university... gacoka geeta gu-
further mbere nandi ntiona kanya ga kugurana... kiija kugurana ndina
miaka imikuru... buugi nabu ntene ti lazima withirwe wina na mbeca
kenda ugurana... indi nandi ugwe nuukire kugukina iitinacio niuntu
utiumba gw-support family."
"In the past, one married because of
nthuki. You would fear being left behind by
your age-mates. You would see somebody
has married and you have not, so you
would fear to be left so far behind. But
these days nthuki does not matter because
we could be of the same age and I leave
school at Form Four, stay two years and
then marry, but you go to the university or
even for further studies abroad, such that
you don't get time to marry, so you would
come to marry at an older age. The other
thing is in the past it was not obligatory
that you have money for you to marry, but
now you might fail to marry without
money because you can't support the
family."
Other Imenti informants, particularly young men and women, spoke to me about
keeping their relationships secretive, such that their parents would not know who
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they were courting. A dominant theme of conversations about courtship revealed a
strong fear that one would 'play sex' or 'love' with a clan 'sister' or 'brother.'
Mutethia, one ofmy closest friends in Meru, put the situation this way:
"You see, at times, with the clans, they still have a strong impact towards
these things... and you can never rule it out, 'cause although they are not
as strict as they used to be, it is also very embarassing once they know all
these things. I don't think a time will come when one can marry his or her
kinsmen, because these things will start first at home, the parents will try
to wreck everything, then if now it goes to the clan as a whole... you will
not wait for these things to be told not to marry... it is so embarrasing that
you will have to break the relationship. To some extent, the clan itself is
also a factor that contributes to not exposing these things, 'cause they can
say, 'We don't marry them'... let's take for an example an inter-clan
marriage... like the Kiriamburf is not supposed to marry the Omo, that's
an example, then let's say you are interested in that particular lady from a
particular family. How would you then expect to expose these things,
when you know these things are very bad? That's why you see there are
people married somewhere there in Nairobi, and some other places, so that
even if they come now, they won't be asking so many questions, but they
will always live as social outcasts. It's because they did exactly what was
not expected, because as far as grandmothers are concerned... we take
these people as sisters and brothers, fathers and mothers. So...now [we are]
so far out of control as these social matters are concerned... they feel that
[all this] is something that is not so good"
Within several weeks of recording this conversation with Mutethia he experienced a
difficult period in his relationship to his young wife because of the "interference of her
people" in matters relating to her family's bridewealth. But Mutethia's experiences of
difficulty were by no means unique.
An elder woman from Kunati, eastern Tigania, described to me how her Miriti
son married a woman in Nairobi with whom their clan was affiliated with as giciaro, a
clan relation which was subject to a marriage prohibition. The man spent several years
working in Nairobi, but following the loss of his job as a construction worker, he
returned to Kunati with his wife and two children. Upon realising that the two were in
breach of the giciaro pledge not to intermarry, the clansmen and clanswomen of the
man compelled the couple to undergoe an expensive and humiliating cleansing rite
(kuthinjanua). The couple did so under considerable duress, but brushed off the
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controversy between the giciaro clans by exposing their relatives as 'superstitious'
and 'ignorant' of the way they had lived in Nairobi.
In another case, from Miiriga Mieru, Imenti, a young man proposed marriage
to his girl friend. Not long afterwards, an elder was sent to speak with the young man
to dissuade him from seeing this particular girl because she was from one of the
ngirani clans. In translation, the ngiraniwere said to be 'abominable' clans, who were
subjected to a curse which is said to affect its women.52 The ngirani clans are said to
have "very beautiful girls", but are prohibited from marrying anyone but a man from
another ngirani family or polygamous elders. The only endogamous clan in Meru, it is
said that if a man takes a mwari wa ngirani as a wife, he is fated to die prematurely.
This particular young man resisted the elders advise and continued to be harassed by
his clansmen until, one day, he gave into their pressures. He was enraged and
embarrassed, not to mentioned saddened, by the interference of his clansmen in what
he felt was his "private life." Versions of the following tale were told to me by several
people about the origins of the ngirani curse:
"Once upon a time there lived a beautiful young girl who came
from a poor family. Many of the young men visited her father's
house, hoping to open up a courtship. But, then, her father
betrothed her to an old man, to be married as a second wife. She
went to her old husband's house with a terrible heart and swore
publically that she would rather die than be an old man's wife. In
revenge she proclaimed a curse: 'May my life be taken so that no
other female descendant of mine be taken as a handsome young
man's wife. Let them be beautiful, but the lowly wives of old men.
If they marry a young man, let their husbands perish while still
young!' This girl then threw herself into a river and drowned
herself. Her curse is still there. The only way a young man could
protect himself from the curse when visiting a ngirani late at
night is to collect a torch (kinyanga) to throw outside the gate to
avoid being eaten by a norocu, a kind of fantastic beast."
A second incident related to the elopement of a young man with a ngirani girl from
52 For an ethnographic parallel on the ngirani, see Eric Roth's (1993) discussion about the Rendille
sapaade girls.
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their rural homes to the relatively anonymous urban life of Meru Town. This couple,
who 'loved' each other and who had maintained a lasting relation from the age ofbeing
schoolchildren, eventually planned a large wedding and set about making the necessary
social arrangements. They were, however, shocked by the behaviour of the groom's
parents who, learning the true clan identity of the girl's people, refuse to convey their
blessings upon their son's matrimony. The refusal of a parent's blessings in marriage
are akin to a curse and, subsequently, the couple could find no appropriate course of
action to take beyond a civic union in the offices of the provincial administration.
Beginning in the 1970s, however, the category of 'youth issues' included the
'western' idea that sex could be, and should be, discussed within an educational forum.
Previously, the whole field of knowledge about sexual matters was integral to initiation
for both ntaam (boy initiates) and ngutu (girl initiates). Sex was, as a rule, never
discussed between a parent and a child, for whom such a conversation would be
improper and even incestuous. A more evasive practice was to speak of sexual
activities euphemistically. Thus, as a lukewarm example, reference to 'doing work'
(kuthithia ngugi) was a code for sexual intercourse. Between lovers there are different
registers, which may be vulgar when used in cross-generational contexts. For examples,
when sex is solicited one asks for tobacco (kumathira mbaki); and 'getting some' can
be described as 'having a bite' in the commensual sense (nkuruma itnwe). The use of
metaphorically embedding sexual meanings in everyday things or objects is creative
and constantly being renovated. In Kimeru, it is socially easier to describe female and
male genitalia through the metonym of the mortar and pestle (ntiri na muthii), or
describe a girl's first menstruation as 'spitting' than turn to the seldomly iterated
words for these body parts and functions. Mastering euphemistic speech in Kimeru is
well within keeping close to the ideal of 'shyness' (nthoni). These kinds of social
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speech acts were maintained where the context included persons of adjacent
generations, as happens between parents and children. In the 1970s, however, explicit
English and Swahili terms came to supplant implicit references to sex in Kimeru.
Miriti (Tigania) and older Mung'atia jwa kilo (Imenti) respondents told me that
English terms, especially vulgar ones, could be spoken of in front of their elders
innocuously because they would not be understood as shocking or abusive. There is
nothing especially remarkable about peers cultivating their own use of language, which
may be unintelligible to those positioned outside of their cohort. What was
significantly changed though, was that the brash use of English and Swahili
terminologies for generally sensitive or inappropriate topics of conversations
subverted the prior insistence on generational separation or estrangement. The
difference, in the 1970s at least, was not that filial and parental generations spoke with
different idioms, but that they even spoke at all!
It was perhaps this innovative change in the relations of children and parents
which prompted Nyaga to write his book, 'You Don't Know Without Being Told.' It
is instructive, at this point, to mention that while local intellectuals and educators were
relying on Kimeru as the language through which perceived crises in morality were to
be discussed, it was simultenuously being overshadowed by Swahili. With greater
numbers of children passing their KPCE than in previous generations, the children
schooled and initiated in the 1970s found written Kimeru rather poorly matched with
the popularity of Swahili and English literacy. The problem with books like GutiMbiji
Itiiri was that its moral argument was written in a language considered by many
Kenyans as parochial and ineffective in promoting the ideology of development. Later
publications tended to be in English, with the result that basic literacy in Kimeru was
gradually abandoned as a goal of the religious community.
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GutiMbiji Itiiri contains many stories and references which reflect on meanings
about 'the good life' derived from both Christian scriptures and Kimeru narratives. It
is in this sense that Nyaga's work is largely allegorical. Nyaga's turn to allegorical
interpretation of the Bible and Kimeru rugono (stories) allowed him a critical textual
way of engaging with the social and cultural crises he perceived in Meru during the
1970s. Allegorical intepretations and narratives are flexible in that their genre changes
over time, yet the source of these allegories makes great use of symbolism from a
number of archaic traditions. As such, works like Guti Mbiji Itiiri, in its exegetical and
poetic moods, place text within a historical dimension where they have both a past
and a future (Whitman 1987: 11). By speaking directly to the social conflicts,
tensions, and crises of the 1970s in postcolonial Meru, Nyaga's focal perception of
the immorality of the present is countered by the indeterminancy of the 'traditional'
past and the 'modern' future. His arguments are legitimated by denying the present its
own historicity and looking for authentic meaning in what once might have been and
what possibly could come to pass. In other words, Nyaga's critique of Meru social
life in the 1970s was founded upon an indeterminate idea that the Meru were a people
which had, allegorically, fallen from grace. Biblical parables and a variety of Meru
forms of narrative, such as stories and fables {rugono) and proverbs {njuno), were also
placed with a temporal history in which this fall from grace was hastened by the
influence of the immoral White colonialists, especially Kang'ang'i, the first District
Commissioner. In response to the uncertainties of differing ways of behaving and new
models of choice and constraint, texts like Guti Mbiji Itiiri were produced in partial
response to Nyaga's observation that previous generations of Meru could not speak
directly to one another. In casting his role as a mediator between the generations, the
priest plays figuratively with his own ethically ambigous relation to being a 'spiritual'
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father (batiri, from Padre). Allegory, at least, allowed for extrinsic sources of
interpretation about the nature of historical, spiritual, social, and cultural crises. In
addressing a story told to him by an elder Imenti woman, where she had come close to
being cmcified for a sexual offence, but 'saved' by a 'white man', Nyaga turns to
allegorical readings of Meru punishments of immoral acts by linking these to other
extrinsic traditions issuing from the Jews, Hindu, and Romans (Nyaga 1973: 95-6;
Nyaga 1997: 74-5). The following is the analogy drawn between Mosaic law and that
imagined for the Meru before the Pax Britannica:
Ugakuamiira uria amaramari batwire kuritithua nthinje ni migongo
mwanya mwanya, woona ati nthinje imwe ya iria inene itwire kunenkerwa
amaramari ni kuuragwa. Kira twone aniini uria migongo mwanya
yathithagiria amaramari.
It should be noted that it is not only the Meru who had such abhorrence
against sexual immorality. Other people's stand on this matter, in a way,
testifies that a human being, despite his weakness, naturally craves for
purity of heart and moral protection in the family as well as in the
society. The following are just a few examples of such peoples:
Ayahudi
The Jews
Gatigatine ka Ayahudi, mwari, athiritie kwingwa ni mukuru wawe nyuma
ya gwika niuntu bwa kwithirwa ataari 'bikira' agiika, neka oraagwa na
maiga, tontu nathithitie uthuuku bubunene gatigatine ka Aisraeli. Ningi
mukuru agwati na ithuukia ria kwithirwa amaamite na mwekuru waitha
neka oraagwa amwe na mwekuru uu. Nawe mwari uumuujuru, kana
'bikira', aringithithia umaramari akigambagua ni muntu ungi, neka
oraagwa amwe na muntu uu bamaramarite nawe. Indi mwari uguri
aringigwatirwa kithakene na inya, atoraagwa kethira neka aagitie muntu
wa kumutunyukia, ni ntomurume woraagwa wenka. Nawe ntomurume
aringimaramara na mwari utiguri aaritithagua nthinje, na nyumene
agakinyiirua kujukia mwari uu ae mwekuru wawe utuurone bunthe
These people desired to see their daughters married as virgins. In this
regard, if a girl was expelled by her spouse on the grounds that she was not
a virgin at the time of marriage, she was stoned to death because she had
committed a heinous crime in Israel. If a man and woman were caught
guilty of adultery, they were both stoned to death. Similarly, if a girl who
had been betrothed to someone was caught on the way or in the town and
lost her virginity, she was stoned to death because she had not cried for
help. But a virgin girl whose screaming had availed nothing was spared of
death. It was the man alone who was stoned to death.
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This highly extrinsic link to the Israeli may appear distant and spurious to the
outsider, but effective allegorical interpretation and narrative depends upon such
distanciation and indeterminancies. It is not the point of allegory to create one-to-one
correspondencies between text and its meaning (Whitman 1987: 17-9). Many Kenyan
peoples have allegories of an exodus, not unlike the stories told of the flight of the
Jews and their escape from the tyrrany of the Pharoahs. Answering the question,
where did we come from?, many Meru answer either Misri (Egypt) or Mboa
(Shungawaya). Although John Lonsdale (1995) has qualified the Misri link in the
context of labour migration and an emergent ideology based on readings of the Old
Testament, these stories are so widespread as to open further questions about exodus
in Kenyan allegory (cf. Ochieng 1972) In Meru, this narrative of exodus from Mboa
orMbwa and the arrival of the proto-Meru clans in the Nyambenes and Mount Kenya
region is the most commonly heard Kimeru allegory, which has been insightfully
analysed by Anne-Marie Peatrik (1999: 381-423). All the narrative elements of the
Meru exodus from Mboa, or Shungawaya - the parting of waters by the striking of a
sacred rod, enslavement, flight and persecution, wanderings in the wilderness, and
eventual spiritual redemption in the founding of a promised land - are recognisable in
allegorical form among the Abrahamic myths of Judaeism. Christianised Meru are fond
of calling the Nyambene Ranges, the New Canaan. Even the Meru insistence on
circumcision is claimed as an originary Jewish 'survival' from their wanderings in the
desert. One local author, Alfred M'lmanyara (1992), wrote a highly allegorical history,
The Restatement ofBantu Origin andMeru History, in which he attempted to link the
proto-Meru clans arrival into their present homeland as the end of a lengthy exodus
from the Sudanic Meroe kingdom, where the proto-Meru were assumed to be a branch
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of Falasha Jews. When European missionaries encountered such narratives, they made
expressive use of the allegories intrinsic to their scriptures in order to translate the
Biblic concepts into Kimeru. The depth to which such allegories respond to crises of
identity and social change should not be underestimated. On a visit to the Nyambene
Forest, the guide who led me along the ridges and valleys stopped to show me where
Abraham had rested and stayed in his wanderings in search of a home. In the guise of
the parish priest's allegorical tales and literacy in the vernacular, a novel way of
inventing public morality was encountered which steered a course through the
polarities of'tradition' and 'modernity.' In the 1970s, not knowing how to respond to
change and uncertainty - the aporia of 'tradition' and 'modernity' - young people
went on to shape their community's encounter with modernisation through further
elaborations of the allegorical genre, in which intrinsic and extrinsic narratives could be
melded together into something new.
In the next section, the subjectivities of Imenti youth coming of age since the
late 1970s is explored in the context of postcolonial uncertainties. By highlighting the
ways in which belonging to an nthuki may restrict novel understandings of
development and personhood, and the constraints and choices which follow from
these understanding, I examine the historicity of the Mung'atia jwa kilo, an age-class
which began its initiations in 1976. It is the last Imenti age-class to be formed and was
still unfinished at the time of fieldwork. With some similarity to James Ferguson's
(1999) discussion of contemporary Zambian subjectivities, in which expectations of
development and becoming subjectively modem have been unachievable because of
political and economic crises, young rural Kenyans find it increasingly frustrating to
hold onto the myths of development and personal success which they grew up with.
The significant crises in Kenya's political-economy have affected young people in
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profoundly distressing ways, despite their capacity to refashion themselves through
engaging with story telling and other forms of self-expression. The new forms of
historical contingency and uncertainties lived by young Imenti highlight the ethical
ambiguity which underlies age-class formation and the historicity of generation.
Imenti modernity and life in the subjunctive
Young Imenti informants occasionally took to mocking my interest in their
nthuki. "We have none", some would suggest, while others feigned an elaborate
knowledge of the system's intricacies, probably to appease my curiosity and position
as a foreign interloper. With older informants, both men and women, the subject
assumed an importance, a bridge across which I could enter into an intersubjective
stance. Yet, among my peers, no amount of methodological delicacy could dissolve
their conviction that, somehow, I was only interested in illusions, the anachronistic,
and the irrelevant. "These things are of long ago" ('mantu jaja jariku kuraja rimono'),
Kilemi told me during a meander through his miraa plantation, "This generation,
Mung'atia jwa kilo is the last, there [will be] no other after it" ('nthuki ijiMung'atia
jwa kilo ni mwisho, itina ingi yakinyete'). The sense of finality and fragmentation
attributed to the age-class and generational system is pervasive among Imenti youth.
Despite the resignation that it has gone, and been surpassed by different means of
organising life course ideals, the figurative 'collapse' of the generational system is
openly put forward as a discursive pivot for explaining local perceptions of modernity
and its morality. Anytime the pitfalls of the present are to be discussed, the essential
goodness of the past is evoked.
While each nthuki is given a pseudonym, appropriate to its historicity, that of
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Mung'atia jwa kilo is unique in that it was named by a prominant and powerful
individual in Meru parliamentary politics. Jackson Harvester Angaine is reputed to
have been asked, by the ubiquitous, but anonynmous 'elders', to name a rapidly
growing number of young initiates in 1976. This group, if they could be called that,
appeared to be a group of unprecedented size and distribution, spanning communities
which could have no ceremonial link but through the then weakening agency of the
Imenti-based njuri nceke. The office of the lamalla was by then no longer recognised
among the Imenti. In the end, a politician proved the most likely connection between
disparate Imenti communities, albeit a very tactful one whose family was also eminent
in the political history of the ethnic Meru. Mung'atia's adjacent and more senior
nthuki, Gichunge, were declared 'closed' after having been recruiting in excess of a
decade, but no ntwiko was organised to orchestrate a shift in the life-course of all social
positions. Local opinion asserted that the coffee boom of 1977 gave the new nthuki its
syncretically modem nickname, jwa kilo53, while the choice ofmung'atia ('something
surprising') emphasised the optimism of the period, its modernity and its comparative
prosperity (cf. Lamont 1999). Taken together throughout Imenti locations, this nthuki
comprise an enormous demographic span of individuals from fifteen to forty years of
age, setting it apart from all other precedent age-classes.54
The identification of Mung'atia with the political, economic and moral
turbulence of the past decade is reflected in an additional nickname: 8-4-4. The
nickname refers to the education system introduced to Kenya by Daniel arap Moi's
"Kenya converted to the metric system in 1971 (Weights and Measurements Act)
54 Mung'atia was, however, the name of an age-class which was in formation when the first European
caravan traders passed through North Imenti during the 1890s on their way to Nyambene and the
northern ivory trade routes. Their aggressive repute in fighting several of these traders, Arkell-Hardwick
in particular, earned them the pseudonym, Memeu, by which they are generally known by elders who
would have met them as children. The reputation of the current Mung'atia is cast as the antithesis of
their heroic predecessors.
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administration in 1986: eight years of primary; four years of secondary; and four years
for a higher education degree. The 8-4-4s - if they may be called this without
introducing confusion - demonstrate a standing contradiction in being a highly educated
but massively unemployed cohort. In dozens of interviews with young men and
women of this age-class, their experiences of primary and secondary education were
prominant biographical features which exposed their collective sense of betrayed hope
in their country's leadership. One memorable anecdote was told to me about free milk
distribution within schools. According to a twenty-seven year old, she claimed that
the milk had been laced with a chemical which would restrict boys' and girls' fertility
when they were older. In the context of Kenya's spectacular population growth in the
postcolonial period, such suspicions were grounded in both the unregulated
authoritarianism of the state and the emergence of altered values about ideal family
sizes and new discourses on family planning. The 8-4-4s, unlike their parent's
generation, could not share in the early optimism of the 'uhuru generation' which were
born in the years immediately following Kenya's independence in 1963. Outside of
these formative years spent in schooling, many youth commented on exposure to
technological innovation, transformations in sexuality, and the widening arena of inter-
generational misunderstanding.
Dampened hopes in the value of a school-leaving certificate were, by the early
1990s, echoed by the real decline of incomes. Most ofmy Imenti informants under the
age of thirty were involved in a diversity of economic activities outside of agriculture.
Coming of age when SAPs and policies of economic liberalisation systematically
eroded the structure of coffee production and marketing, most youth looked upon
agricultural jobs and labour, in the words of a high school graduate, as "part of the
problem and not part of the solution" (cf. Lamont 1999).
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A recently married, thirty-year old man from Chugu location spoke to me at
length about the tainted reputation of the Mung'atia:
"They are very misbehaved people, so they always call us nthuki ncabuka,
as we are known to be...[but] not misbehaving in that sense, the way you
[might] take it [truthfully], because we must also defend ourselves! The
world has become so modem that it cannot match with the old people, so
with the introduction of things like these televisions, we tend to watch so
many things. Small children are getting to know such things that we used
to say they were 'mannerless.' You can see young people
practicing...early marriage, early sex...and so many other things. You see,
they cannot keep to those traditions, almost all the Mung'atia now, so
they tend now to remain much with the changing world. We tend to create
a gap. And this is why we are told [that] we lack discipline"
In contrast to their Nyambene counterparts, where Mung'atia would subsume
members of three nthuki, Miriti, Gwantai, Gichunge55, this Imenti class has been left
open indefinitely since 1976. Situated within the ethnographic record, such an
extended period would characterise the Imenti age-classes as defunct. Several examples
of systems which were abandoned in the earlier decades of colonial rule in Kenya, such
as those of the Iteso, have been cited as evidence for their insignificance within the
history of colonialism and the postcolony (Nagashima 1998).
Perspectives emerging from my fieldwork on the Meru, however, suggest that
the current disorganisation of age-class formation is the outcome of many generations'
experimentation with choice within constraints about when and who they marry.
Spanning almost thirty years in duration, those identified as Mung'atia jwa kilo in the
late 1970s may live to see the incorporation of their own sons into the same age-class,
should an alternative, successive nthuki not be formed. There is no clear way to know
how informants perceived this situation. Although some elder persons found this as
evidence of a kind of social apocalypse, likening the Mung'atia as a kind of 'last
generation', others stated that it was too early to know whether an antecedent nthuki
would be formed. The prospect of fathers and sons being mutually identified through
55 In some parts of Tigania, Gwantai is pronounced Wantai or Bwantai and Gichunge may be Ichungi
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belonging to a single nthuki, however, presents somewhat graver consequences within
thought about the proper course of marriage, generational separation, and catgeories of
incest. However liberal informants remain about other ancilliary rules and principles of
the generational system, most are uncomfortable about the demographic drift currently
distorting the relevance of age-class formation to contemporary marriage, initiation and
the ideal regulation of the life-course. One of the elder Mung'atia, now in his early
forties', explained this crisis as the outcome of not maintaining succession rituals:
"You see, traditionally, people used to have a kind of timetable, where
maybe a certain [group of] people were supposed to marry at this age and
so and so forth...There was a kind of [way] how things were getting
followed up. In the end, you would realise that maybe the elders would
decide that a certain age-class [is to begin] marrying...they are all going to
marry...especially when there [were] these ntwiko and other sorts of
things. But, these days there are no such things, so you can see there are
so many people who are not married and they are very old. Young people
are marrying before others are married. So, in this case, we have been
mixed up. So, the age-class cannot have a good way of [starting] a new
nthuki, so it takes longer. First, there was this in the past, where one could
not become of a certain age before getting married, but these days there
are so many things happening [such] that some are late, others are doing
things when it is too early, which was against the tradition at the time. So,
you end up having a group of so many people falling into the same age-
class, because their children will also all come of age at one time, whether
you are old or young. Maybe this is the problem: there is no procedure.
There are not those things like ntwiko that could have told people that
they've come of age. So, you end up mixing everything and having such a
big age-class of very young and very old people mixing. You end up with a
long period between [classes]"
The metaphor of 'mixing', used here, refers not only to local peoples' analysis of their
own social life. It lends itself to further anxieties about how to determine morality in a
period of uncertainty. The English term, 'mixing', was used by both Tigania and
Imenti informants to describe how boys from fathers who belong to different
generational fractions, or gitiba, are circumcised and initiated into singular and
undifferentiated age-classes.
Although the circumcision of boys (bwiji or ntaani) is positively and
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assertively retained, the initiates in many Imenti locations no longer perform group
circumcisions. Instead, they opt for individualised operations, often carried out by a
public health nurse, under local anaesthetic either at their parent's home or in a clinic.
The temporal and spatial re-organisation of circumcision - at an opportune moment
and in a clinic - has produced heightened consciousness among initiates about the
ambiguity of this rite and other ceremonial performances. Boys circumcised in this
manner are refered to as kiroge, a derogation derived from the term for a pen-knife. At
one time, the term kiroge was an abusive and provocative slander, akin to calling
someone ncabu (lit. 'foreskin', but meaning uncircumcised). Like the naming of the
Mung'atia jwa kilo, encouraged by MP Angaine in 1976, the decision to persuade
Imenti parents and young boys to visit clinics or solicit the aid of nurses to perform
circumcisions was sanctioned by the njuri nceke of Imenti. Under the advise of
organisations such as FPAK (Family Planning Association of Kenya) who have been
running anti-clitoridectomy campaigns for decades, the spectre of HIV and hepatitus
infections from boys' group circumcisions led the local njuri to consider a campaign
focused on behavioural changes in the way boys become young men (ntaani /
muthaka).
The outcome of these transformations in the ways in which age-classes are
formed and organised is the production of a generalised anxiety that local people are no
longer 'true' Meru. In response to such anxieties and uncertainties over the future of
their community, certain personalities have resorted to a creative re-imagining of
Kimeru narratives about the end of community. Similar to the allegorical project of
Christian intellectuals, the theme of the 'bad' generation - as a kind of critique about
the malaise ofmodernity - is elaborated through the re-fashioning ofKimeru narratives
which speak about the place of certain nthuki in telling new versions of an end of time
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allegory. The following chapter draws upon some of these narratives, which were
never rendered in a complete or lengthy fashion during fieldwork, but which point to
the power of expression in local allegories during times of trouble, stress, and crisis.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
With Bells on Their Ears: allegories of a last generation
Central Kenyan prophesies of the 'last' generation
This chapter specifically deals with storytelling in an allegorical genre. Other
historians and ethnographers of central Kenyan communities have written about
indigenous world views and theories of history that were articulated around
prophesies recounted by nineteenth century mantics and which foretold of immanent
crises in their time (cf. Anderson and Johnson 1995). As an emergent genre of history
and prediction, such prophesies were retrospectively woven back into these
communities' experiences of colonial subordination generations after they were first
proclaimed (cf. Ambler 1995; Lonsdale 1995). A number of colonial-era allegories were
derived from prophesies said to have been originally told in the late nineteenth century
or even before. This was a period when most central Kenyan communities had heard
of, or had been in contact with, the 'red strangers' (nguu ntuune, lit. red clothes) or the
bacomba (from the coast), names for the Arab, Swahili and European traders who
initiated the caravan trade along the Mombasa-Ukambani corridor (cf. Ambler 1995:
221-239). Among the most famous of these central Kenyan prophets were Syokimau
(Kamba), Mugo wa Kibiro (Gikuyu), and Ireri wa Irugi (Embu). Although there were
Meru seers (arorT) shortly before the conquest of 1908, they foretold of the coming of
the Europeans ('red strangers') in formula which are recognisable in other
communities, evidence that 'prophesy' often overlapped within regionally based
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genres, or, that news of the interlopers was passed by word of mouth and story
telling.
Whereas both Charles Ambler's and John Lonsdale's (1995) projects are
limited to interpretations of prophesy in relation to colonialism, my intention here is
to extend their discussion into the postcolonial era, especially in relation to the
hybridisation of popular Christian gospel music and allegories said to pre-date the
imperial conquest ofMeru. My argument is that both pre-colonial allegory, based on
prophesy, and evangelical gospel music, based on scripture, respond to perceptions of
social crisis in particularly formulaic manners. Based on my interpretation of selected
Kimeru narratives (story telling) and lyrics (gospel music), I aim to demonstrate that
no model of history stands outside its own poetics and politics, a point echoing
Hayden White's (1973) idea that all 'historical explanations are rhetorical and poetic'
in their construction. Central Kenyan prophesies of the mid- to late- nineteenth
century, therefore, lend a particularly powerful means of expressing the formula and
rhetoric embedded and entangled in contemporary allegories about the relatedness of
the past, present, and future. Because former prophesies and contemporary gospel
music politicise morality and get people to think about and debate the nature of the
crises affecting their communities, their creators or raconteurs are active in shaping the
way people think about themselves and their identity.
As such, social identity is seen to be in an unfinished dialectic with political
morality. In the case of younger cohorts, emergent social identities have been
associated with the transmutation of moral codes within everyday life. Although, in
Tigania, public questions about 'proper' moral conduct of youth have been asked
since the 1950s, especially since the changes introduced by the Ratanya, it is to recent
decades that most informants attribute a sharpening crisis within the moral
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community. The view of many elderly people is that the younger people have become
greedy, selfish, and insensitive to the needs of others. This local view has a parallel
with Kenyan political rhetoric, in which the country is said to have gone from an
ideology of Harambee ('Pulling Together') to Jitegemee ('Fend-for-Yourself). In a
slightly different vein, self-ascribed 'African' values of communal support are said to
have been eroded by individualism imported from the West. This stress on the external
origins of the 'bad' conceals the extent to which there has occured significant historical
entanglements of Kimeru and colonial ideas, resulting in a situation where local crises
are discussed in idioms and registers marked by their hybridity. Meru stories about
'bad' nthuki are usually narrated to criticise the behaviour and manners of extant
cohorts. While among the Imenti and Tigania in the early 2000s, I was struck by the
variety of stories told about the immorality of 'notorious' age-classes (nthuki da
naitoya). The curious Kimeruisation of the English word 'notoriety', naitoya, marks
the entanglements of ideas used in this community wide debate. Most of these
narratives were told in the past tense, but were allegories which highlighted the debates
and uncertainties of the present.
As in the previous chapter, where I argued that allegory is effective because of
its indeterminancy, the genre has the advantage of being quite indirect. The quality of
'shyness', or nthoni, is an intrinsic ideal of Kimeru notions of (inter)personal moral
conduct. Allegorical approaches to the charge that contemporary Meru are behaving
immorally allow the narrator a certain flexibility. Because of their rich stock of
metaphors and analogies, allegories remain poignant in criticising today's codes of
behaviour, but also permit the story teller a cautious, unthreatening way to mask the
fact that the people being criticised are living persons one should treat with civility. In
other words, the indirect and indeterminate character of local allegories encourage
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narrators to enter the community of argument and its political imagination without the
constraint of the consequences of directly insulting their parents or children.
On several occasions, I was struck by the metaphor of the coming of a
generation with 'eight ears' (Iktija nthuki ya matu yanaana''). Again, in a slightly
different register, another prominent motif in this genre was to mention the "coming of
a last generation with bells on their ears" ('gukuja i-ii ruciara rwa muthia rwma
ntuara matu'). The figurative motif of the 'ear' is intriguing, but I have not found it
useful to speculate on its specific meaning. Instead, the very indeterminancy of these
metaphors perhaps explains their power of expression. Not surprisingly, when I first
heard these stories, I found them vague and needed help in understanding their
application to everyday life situations. A young man of the nthuki Gwantai, my age-
mate, offered a short explanation of these quips:
"When the elders say that there will come a generation with bells on its
ears, or one with eight ears, what they mean is that the last generation of
Meru will be a 'don't care.' Thus, the elders say that this 'don't care'
generation has come because we, the Miriti and the Gwantai, make so
much noise. They say we are noisemakers. There was an old story which
spoke of people wearing strange clothing, with very bad behaviour, which
has happened if you look at the fashions we young people are now
wearing. This 'don't care' is what we call in Kimeru, nyaga na mpua, that
is to say, 'nyaga' is to let one's livestock graze anywhere and with
anyone, while 'mpua' means that one does not fear anything or anyone.
So, when they say that we come with bells on our ears, they mean that we
listen to the elders, but that we take their words for fun."
When asking other people in Mikinduri about the significance of these metaphors, I
was told that seers had foreseen the coming of a generation which listened to nobody
and was known for their imprudence. They were described as noisy and irreverent.
Even as some informants stopped at the end of discussing such stories with the
sentiment, "and these things have come to pass", there is a kind of emplotment at
work, reminiscent of White's (1973) 'tragic' and 'satirical' modes of historical
representation in which the 'ongoing structure of relationships' being spoken about
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appear as Marx put it, 'the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce' (White
1973: 11). In its brief form above, this narrative holds meanings which are somewhat
satirical, because the metaphors used are oblique enough to contain alternative
interpretations, each according to the story teller's motives.
These metaphors derive their meanings from stories about coming events
which were prophesised in the past (cf. Anderson and Johnson 1995). Charles
Ambler's (1995) essay 'What is the World Going to Come To?' quotes his central
Kenyan informants of Embu in lamenting the predictions of the Embu seer Ireri wa
Irugi, said to have lived in the eighteenth century. One informant told Ambler, '[TJhere
would come a generation that would dance with their backs to one another... A great
example of this is the current youth' (Ambler 1995: 221). Another narrated that the
defeat of the Embu at the hands of the 'red strangers' would 'usher in a generation of
men who would wear rings in their ears, and an era in which children would disobey
their parents and youth would dance shamelessly with their elders' (ibid.). The Embu
historian Kabeca Mwaniki (1973) takes the foretellings of Ireri wa Irugi a step further
in their moral implications for the present when he writes about the prediction that the
Embu would 'lose' their age-class organisation. The seer was reputed to have said:
'Between the nthuke of Muranja and Ndiiriri there is an nthuke that will be
lost. The nthuke after that will bear children who will be having ear-bells
and who will not obey their elders. When one is told something he will
throw his hands about and go away in disobedience... when these will be
born, they will be dancing muturamuko (That is, dances where people of
all ages will participate shamelessly). That time, the land will belong to
woman and moles' (in Mwaniki 1973: 155-6)
Mwaniki commented on this prophesy in the context of his own historicity of the
early 1970s:
People interpret this as the present period where the nthuke have lost
their ancient strength and authority. That modern youth do not seem to
be paying satisfactory respect to their elders as was the rule in those days
and the elders do nothing but accept the situation reluctantly. The
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muturamuko dances are the Western dances where anyone is allowed to
participate be he a junior, an in-law or a relation of any kind. 'Women
and moles' who own the land mean the men who, now dressed in Western
clothes, look like women of Ireri period (ibid.)
The familiarity between Embu and Meru prophesies perhaps demonstrates the
interculturality of these central Kenyan peoples during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. The three strands of worry in this prophesy, the coming of a 'last'
generation, the 'mixing' of people of different ages and generations, as well as the
inversion of gender roles and the irreverent relation between affines, does much to
depict the upheaval occurring in the colonial period. Although these prophesies were
said to have preceded the European conquest of the region, from 1906-1908, by at
least a century, their narration and probable transformation during the early twentieth
century does not exclude them from being applied to any engagements and debates
with contemporary 'visions' of social and spiritual crises. In other words, the
indigenous world view and theories of history revealed by earlier prophets and
prophesies offer a powerful metahistory for expressing the crises perceived in the
present day. To return to White's (1973) notion of emplotment, in which the tragic
and satirical dominate as tropes, early central Kenyan prophesies can be vicariously
drawn upon today because they treat crisis as an 'eternal return of the Same in the
Different' (White 1973: 11).
Take, for instance, the idea of a 'don't care' generation which, in Kimeru, is
rendered as nyaga na mpua. Without understanding the former role of livestock in the
Meru economy, the metaphor retains little meaning to the outsider. Over time, I came
to appreciate how people formed intersubjective relations through domesticated
animals and, in some cases, also insects, particularly bees. When one is said to be
nyaga na mpua, such as that which happened to the Ratanya in the 1950s when they
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began to live with their wives in a single, conjugal home, the metaphor plays upon
secondary meanings associated with cattle droving and grazing. A household which
was visited by some kind of illness, or else reputed to be under some kind of sanction
because of pollution (mugiro), was prohibited from having their livestock mingle with
those of others. The theory was that the contagion, the mugiro, brought on through
immoral acts, could equally spread to others through their livestock. Thus, someone
who ignored this sanction and grazed their cattle and smallstock without regard to
those of other people was said to be both nyaga na mpua. A similar extension of
human relations into the animal world also affects bees. Some Imenti claim that a
man's moral disposition may be inferred from the behaviour of his domesticated bees.
"The bees of a man are sometimes volatile, sometimes docile, but these bees reflect the
character of the keeper himself', an informant told me after a swarm had reputedly
attacked another man's bull. If a man's beehive was unruly or threatening (iugu ya
muntu mwene mai), this was generally read as a visible metaphor for the man's inner
will or volition towards others. As with the world of men and women,
intersubjectivity also extends into that of animals.
But what about the generation with bells on their ears? Without speculating
too much, some sense may be made from the 'ear' metaphor. A grandmother, in mildly
chastising her small grandchildren, may pull an imagined substance, called mbithi,
'unripe', from the children's ears. This is a gentler version of the British 'giving the
tyke a cuff on the ear' treatment. The 'ear' certainly crops up as one of the
components in discussions of moral agency and personhood. In Kimeru, hearing and
listening are associated with understanding. When one wants to know if what they
have said was understood, a common question to ask is, "nukwiguaor 'have you
heard?' The idea of having bells on one's ears, however, cannot be reduced to simple
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'noise making', it implies a further refinement in Kimeru theories of mind and body
and, by extension, of personhood.56 The bells, as metaphor, likely refer to ideas about
personal integrity and moral disposition. As discussed in greater detail below, the
idiom of a 'cow bell', ntuara, refers to how discreet a person keeps their personal
affairs. If one keeps their ntuara quiet, the addage goes, they protect themselves from
any gossip which may sully a person's or group's reputation. The first time I heard of








one in the town
the other in the farm
bankiro ugakira nguutii




Lovers, if you fear gossip
going at night time don't fear noise
my cow-bells
do not ring aloud
[they call me] Kironyi-o-Munyanu
This song exhorts the value of secrecy in one's private affairs, as well as remaining
stoic when confronted by malicious rumour. Although this song is about an individual,
the stories about the coming of a last generation with bells on theirs ears, identify the
'cow bell' concept with a group of persons, in this case an nthuki. In both senses,
56 In comparision with Meru concepts of the mind and body, as in 'ears' and 'bells', Onians (1954)
noted that Empedocles, a Hellenic physiognomist, 'taught that hearing is produced by the impact of
the moving air against a piece of cartilage suspended in the ear, which rings and oscillates, when
struck, like a gong' (Onians 1954: 71-2).
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however, the 'bells' signify the relational strains of 'self through 'other' and the
centrality of intersubjectivity in social life.
The ways in which different Meru express their malcontent with other
generations are often voiced in the subtlety of euphemistic or idiomatic speech. In each
of the contexts where I heard these stories being told, the point was to use the
rhetorical power of allegory to speak about difficulties in social life. In other words,
'ears' and 'bells' were woven into critiques about history, personhood, and morality
in such an indirect way that listeners were permitted to draw their own conclusions
about the debates which centred on questions of immorality, or more existentially put,
of Meru losing their way in the world. Yet, the stories about the coming of a 'last
generation' were open ended and resisted closure. Because the framework for telling
these stories were allegorical, it allowed people to avoid placing their own subjectivity
at the heart of the arguments being made. To put this a bit differently, people from all
the adult generations in Meru could draw upon these stories because they spoke to the
collective fear about the end of their community.
The use of allegory allows social critique without transgressing the ideal of
civility. Transgression of this sort is about the loss of respect between adjacent nthuki.
These adjacent generations, once subject to avoidance rules, do come into conflict
because their actions are frequently transgressive to the moral code of the other. But as
will be demonstrated through interpretations of specific gospel songs, this respect is
never irrevokably lost until parents and children break with locally developed ideas
about long term reciprocity. While the theme of reciprocity between the generations is
significant to my arguments in this chapter and will be addressed below, storytelling in
the allegorical genre pertains to wider constructions of community, especially of a
deep historical nature. At the heart of Meru allegories about the 'bad' generation and
310
the 'end of community' is the parallel theme of redemption. With the idea of
redemption, the concept of an overarching morality is contested, but also restored and
regained by the melding together of Biblical and Kimeru ideas of providential history.
The rhetorics employed in Meru history telling, expressed by the concept of
gitiba, lends narrators a fluid way of linking the deep past to contemporary social
concerns. Because of the cyclical logic of a history fated to return with each gitiba,
very old stories retain their symbolic focus by emphasising the notoriety of specific
extinct and extant age-classes. For example, stories about the Miriti bantene (Miriti of
old) are told in parallel with the contemporary Miriti who were in formation during
the 1970s. On first mention, it seems as if there is an ontological relation between the
two in Kimeru thought: "Miriti bantene ni amwe na Miriti bantuku iji-rf ('Miriti of
old are one with Miriti these days'). When taken into consideration alongside local
modes of emplotment, however, their relationship is more accurately described as
metonymic. Consider the following narratives, composed by several informants, which
attempt to explain why the current Miriti are the same as those from the 1870s.
"Long ago, the old Miriti had been forewarned by their father's fathers
that they had seen a terrible famine that would force the Miriti to hunt
wild animals, since their herds would be decimated. The diviner of their
father's fathers had seen which kind of animal would be hunted, but it was
an ominous kind. They passed on this divination to their son's sons. The
Miriti of old were warned that when the time comes, they should expect
large herds of buffalo, but they should not hunt them lest it be disastrous.
These Miriti of old experienced a famine. There was no water anywhere.
Even the springs ran dry. Their cattle began to die. Miriti consulted their
diviner, who saw that they would hunt in the bush, but that the
consequences would be dire. There were large herds of buffalo roving about
in the bush. Then, all of the Miriti warriors went out into the bush to hunt
for the buffalo. They sent word back to their fathers that they were
preparing a feast for the elders and instructed them to meet at a particular
elder's homestead. Seeing there were so many buffalo, the Miriti began
beating chums and corralling the beasts, eventually driving them in a
stampede in the direction of where the elders were waiting. The buffalo,
mad with fear, stampeded through the homestead where the old men were
seated. They were crushed to death. To this day, the Miriti are said to be a
generation with eight ears because they refuse to listen to their elders'
forewamings. You can see, also, that these Miriti of today are killing their
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parents as well."
Another version of this narrative is more explicitly linked with contemporary tensions
over reciprocity between the Lubeeta and Miriti and their parent's generations:
"These age-classes of Lubeeta and Miriti are the ones who killed the elders
with buffaloes in the past. They lied that they wanted to slaughter the
animals and host a feast for their fathers. These two agreed that the old
people should not eat, so they drove the wild animals through the bush and
crushed that homestead where the elders had gathered. These same age-
classes of today, but with Gwantai as well, are doing the same thing by
taking their elders' property. They have agreed among themselves not to
kill the elders with their own hands, but to deny them food and kill them
with hunger."
Each of the story tellers ended their stories with the phrase, "mantu ja mbere
jwacokcT, 'the things of the past return.' The problems of interpreting these two
narratives are considerable, but the theme of transgression is marked. The breaking of
inter-generational reciprocities is an old theme of conflicts between the ages (cf. Foner
1984; Lamb 2000: 46-57). Told in the relative safety of the distant past, of the Miriti
bantene who would have been young men sometime in the 1870s, these tales speak of
the refusal to share food in a time of extreme hunger and link it to parricide, whether
intention or accidental. Although there are no written documents about the late
nineteenth century crises, oral history stands as evidence that East Africa was
undergoing significant crises of disease, famine, and warfare which saw the dissolution
of Maasai dominance over other communities, which would have included those of
central Kenya (cf. Spear and Waller 1993). In this nineteenth century context, the
power relations between patrons and clients were undergoing rapid changes, perhaps
finding an apt metaphor in the status and tensions of the relations between junior and
senior generations. In the context of my fieldwork, the historical analogy between the
Miriti 'of the past' and the Miriti 'of today' is of an allegorical kind, which invites
further interpretation of how Meru rhetorics of history have been re-fashioned to
explain the nature of current crises between the generations and within the historicity
of the postcolony.
The two principal themes of parricide and the withdrawal of generationally-
based reciprocities are related to other transgressions which contemporary Meru treat
as problematic. In most cases, anxieties about the failure to reciprocate, parricide, and
sexual transgressions would not necessarily be separated in the view of many
contemporary Meru. As elderly men and women stressed, the Miriti who were
initiated from 1973 to 1981 were not the first nthuki to be seen as morally
transgressive. In Meru thinking on the subject, all age-classes are, by definition,
despoilers and rebels. Their dissent is integral to their historical formation. But, these
same informants would intone, the Miriti did not show signs of limiting the scope or
scale of their dissent, such that they became synonymous with transgressions of a
serious nature. One of these is generationally defined incest between social 'fathers'
and 'daughters', on the one hand, and 'mothers' and 'sons' on the other. According to
elder informants' statements, the Miriti abandoned or chose not to acknowledge many
of the marriage or sexual prohibitions which were articulated around the formation of
age-classes and the separation of the generations. This they did with considerable risk,
knowing that their relations with their parents could be damaged to the degree that
both succession and inheritance proceedings could be prevented by their elders. In
terms of sexually transgressive behaviour, the Miriti were said to carry out adultery
(kubungira), incest between allied clans (mwonkaranua), and generationally based
incest (kiringa ndebe, or, 'to beat the drum').
Because the Miriti 'of old' earned their notoriety through the killing of their
fathers, many people today say that "the Miriti of today are killing their parents and
stealing their property." In terms of real inter-personal violence between fathers and
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sons, I did not record a single case, although I did not have access to police records
during my Tigania fieldwork. Occasionally, in the national or local newspapers such an
incident would be reported, usually in relation to an ongoing dispute over access to
land. Nonetheless, it was a very common quip made by elders to denounce these
younger men as immoral "because sons should not be equals", a difficult position to
hold which is based on the naturalisation of 'father' and 'son' cooperation, despite
evidence of their actual rivalry.
It was a common complaint among elder informants in Tigania to blame
younger men and women for their lack of reciprocity, especially with reference to
refusals to share food. A woman in Mikinduri told me and a Gwantai companion this
simple story:
"When I was a big girl, we used to go up there to Kilimantua [a hillock
which hides a massive crater at its center] to meet with one another and
collect those wild bananas. In those past days, the bananas were so many
and so thick that some people disappeared and got lost inside them. But,
when anyone was hungry, they could go to Kilimantua to take bananas.
Nobody minded and nobody could go without food. All of Mikinduri was a
field of bananas. During drought and hunger, these bananas fed many
people. But, today, if there were a drought, many people would go hungry,
because these mannerless younger people have said, 'No! You can't come
up here to Kilimantua to pick bananas, they are mine! Am I not the one
who holds this paper [title deed]?' And so, they finished the bananas
completely. This is what is wrong with this generation today. Private land
has finished all the bananas.'
The details of the story were biographical, but the perception of greed undermining
cooperation, and individualism eroding the communal, speaks to the contemporary
malaise with a world where 'fend-for-yourself has become something of a cliche. Talk
of conflict over food often foreshadows direct grievances between the generations. The
churlish behaviour of young people was often criticised, but more frequently, elders
lamented that they had fed their 'children' when they were small, but that once they
had grown, they starved their 'parents' to death. An old woman was expressly
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concerned that her own sons and daughters were denying her food. I noted that she
had many pumpkins growing under her granary and wondered whether such claims
were statements of fact or whether they were utterances which spoke to other issues.
Another elderly woman, complained about her son's lack of material assistance:
"Ai! itwarimite aba..."
"Eh! We really farmed in those days, father..."
"Mwarimite na inya ukoona ukiumba kuthoomithia aana na
kurima rV"
"You farmed with great effort to be able to see your children
educated through farming!"
"it... Ndatonga abagu, ambira ndi muriku, ndimuriku, uni ri...
ndimuriku, 'atamba kinya kaara bin!', 'atamba kinya kaara biu,
uni, atamba kinya kaara biu'. Itu ukoona, 'No, No, No!', nikio
gitiimi ukwona kiigua...mmm....mukuru rimwe kaigua..."
"Yeah... I went to your own father for assistance, he would tell
me, 'I'm bankrupt, No, No, No, me, I am bankrupt!', he never
gave me a cent... that's why I feel so bad about him sometimes,
husband, I feel bad"
Put into context, these women were expressing their unhappiness with their sons' lack
of reciprocity. Elder widows frequently lived at odds with their sons' families, some
even complaining that they were being treated as additional mouths to feed. The denial
of food is a common complaint within households by persons who feel disadvantaged,
regardless of age or position. I witnessed one incident where an ostracised young man
eventually hung himself in his mother's kitchen after finding no food to eat.
NthukT ncabuka, or, the 'bad' generation
The most frequently heard idiom among Imenti and Tigania identifies these
youth under the derogative term nthuki ncabuka. Although I attempt to gloss nthuki
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ncabuka as the 'mannerless' or 'bad' generation, this term does not easily translate
into English. Taken from the verbal root gucabuka, meaning the action of persisting
with a bad habit, the term plays semantically with verbs which may be used to
actively describe something 'leaking' (gukuthuka or guturiika). These cluster of verbs
connote a sense of intentionally doing something wrong. The connotation of a Teak'
implies a social gaffe or persistent blunders which are cheapening in terms of public
esteem. In everyday speech, one often hears reference to 'leaking' behaviours. For
example, the enigmatic figure of the wastrel is called nturiika, implying a hardcore
deviant on the one extreme and a bumbling ne'er-do-well on the other. Despite the
discursive backdrop of the term, nthuki ncabuka, the construction of youth
subjectivities as 'despoilers', as one informant put it in English, has a long historical
presence in Meru.
The outsider cannot help but underscore the contingency of such social
identities upon historical conditions (cf. Spencer 1988: 236-9). In most cases,
however, bad manners are essentialised. In my conversations, I listened to elders argue
that all nthuki were 'leaking', asking "which age-class doesn't leak?" ('bwi butinthuki
icabuka?'), since they were 'by nature' rebellious. Others were more conscious of the
historicity of bad manners and rebellion, arguing that immoral behaviour is learned and
encouraged. Nor are today's nthuki ncabuka without historical precedent. A cadre of
Imenti women formed into a spousal-class during the 1940s, following that of the
Kiruja-Nkoroi, earned the nickname nthuki ntibuka because they had refused the name
chosen for them by representatives of the 'retiring' elders. Like their women-only
counterparts during the 1940s who were deemed nthuki ntibuka for their resistance to
the tacit power base of the elders, the formation of the so-called nthuki ncabuka
points to the historical contingencies through which all subjectivites are articulated. It
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also permits the possibility of dissolving the language of structure and system in our
discussions of age-class formation and thereby, as Michael Jackson does, test out the
waters of'verisimilitude and contigency' (Jackson 1998: 36).
The association of nthuki ncabuka with today's youth echoes the more
positive formation of reputation among the Atemibanjira in the early 1940s. The
Atemibanjira or 'Trail Blazers' were the first Imenti cohort to aggressively organise
themselves through the Methodist Missionary Society. It is astonishing that, even
today as their members are declining because of mortality, the Atemibanjira retain a
positive, almost heroic identity, while the nthuki ncabuka attract derogatory comment
and moral condemnation. To many of my Imenti informants, this comparison reflects
a greater sense of urgency for finding new models and ideas for defining what it means
to be a 'youth.' Whereas the Atemibanjira, for an example, refashioned local material
and moral values into specifically Christian categories of 'youth', the same process
undertaken from the 1970s to the present has not produced a lasting positive
impression about young people despite their greater access to social programmes
geared towards 'youth' issues. During fieldwork, I questioned why this was the case. I
asked why 'youth' categories tend to be maligned or championed within their specific
historical context. Why is it, for example, that the colonial categories of 'youth' and
'elder' persist into the present, albeit within a locally constructed moral crisis?
In partial answer to these questions, it is possible to argue that the category of
'youth' effaces previous categories of personhood which young people could aspire
towards and achieve their moral place in the world. Social categories which were once
congruent with moral definitions of the life course have now fragmented. The category
of 'youth' is applied to all young people, with little matter whether they are now
parents or not. Formerly specific categories of person, like muciere (young mother) or
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murume (married man), highlighted the elevated moral position of anyone of a parental
generation. Today, the status of parents have noticeably changed and along with the
shifting of their moral definition, the relations of parents and children have also been
transformed. Despite the notion of the life-course as a moral and social maturation,
few young parents, today, are able to attain and appropriate any status from such
social categories. Individuals are subjugated to the possibility of never becoming a
'young mother' or 'married man' in the moral dimensions of these categories.
The fragmentation of previous categories of personhood has a material
dimension. As partly discussed in previous chapters, the economic instabilities of
specific historical conjunctures has made it difficult to organise and sustain the
ceremonies and events which mark transitions in an individual or group's life. The
costs of provisioning food and providing gifts are often prohibitive to families whose
main income derives from agriculture, petty trade, and rock-bottom wages. Although
the past decade has been experienced as tumultuous for many Meru, a wider historical
perspective might include economic crises, 'booms' and 'busts', since the early
colonial period. Prior to the intense commercialisation of Meru agriculture in the late
1950s, drought and famine were perceived to be the main contributors to the delay or
postponement of major life transition ceremonies. According to many informants,
however, the relation between material and moral crises in Meru is not explicitly made.
Changes in residency patterns, new modes of consumption, dress, sexuality, and even
ways of speaking are talked about more often than encroaching, widely experiences
declines of income as to explanations of the longevity of the crisis in the local moral
economy.
Kagwiria, one of my mugwati (research assistant), kept her own notebook,
writing down a parallel account of our research, which she shared with me at the end
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ofmy stay in Tigania. A single page from this book condensed many of the narratives
about the nthuM ncabuka we had collected from individual respondents:
January 18th, 2003
She told me that her age-group lost their own
traditions due to white/western culture. Girl
education was discouraged as they believed that
girls would become prostitutes and run away with
the white man and those who worked for him.
Those who went to school were only from saved
families, e.g. Methodist Families, e.g. M'lkunyua
and headmens. The deviation from the set norms
to gucabuka came when people started residing in
the same houses. Gucabuka refers to lack of
manners and becoming ndemi itikwathwa. This is
also attributed to the drinking of beer for both men
and women. This came as a result of the Mau Mau
oathing where beer was involved. After
Independence, people started celebrating day and
night. These led to immoral acts being done in
secrecy. These dances gave rise to night dances or
discos which were done in schools at night. Young
men and women danced until dawn and also old
people went to watch. Long ago, men's cases were
handled in secrecy or far away from women and
youngsters. Also the socialising where people
shared beer and tobacco was done only to age-
mates never to you elders or youngsters as it is
today. Confusion set in during Ratanya. Though
some of Micubu men had tasted a bit of learning
they did not hold so much onto the western
culture. Ratanya started gucabuka by not showing
any regard for the old generations. They started
having loose talk (rwaria ruti kiriki) and obscenity.
Beer became the order of the day for them. The
noticeable social changes from Ratanya to us
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Gwantai regards as in dressing, i.e. many women
have started wearing trousers and also clothes that
are above their knees and also clothes that do not
conceal their whole bodies. Men and women walk
together shamelessly holding each other and also
hugging to kissing in public like the westerners do.
More so, grown up children continue sharing the
same houses with their parents which promote
their immoral behaviours. Also there is increased
use of alcohol for both men and women which go
to the latest hours of night and once the night
falls, anything gonna happen.
The idiom of 'modernisation' in local explanations of social change is marked. As with
local authors who turn to allegory to render the experiences of crisis palpable, it is
very common to attribute many aspects of 'immorality' to outside forces. Here, the
'West' is often mentioned as a force of rupture and disjuncture, although less people
are overtly critical of economic policies enacted in the recent past, such as structural
adjustment or economic liberalisation, as contributing to the current social malaise and
malcontent. The 'West' represents an abstract entity with which to think about and
discuss crises in identity, well being, and morality. When it comes to blaming extrinsic
forces for the economic decline of postcolonial Kenya, many of the criticisms come
closer to home, with politicians and bureaucrats receiving their share of condemnation.
Yet, ultimately, unsettled opinion about the 'breakdown of tradition', as Lynn
Thomas (2003) calls the modernisation paradigm, frequently points to the changed
behaviour of local actors to argue why the Meru have Tost their way', to borrow a
phrase I frequently heard from informants.
The emphasis in talk about moral crises is the perceived loss of respect.
"There is no respect" ('gutina uthoni nandi-rV), as the very aged reiterate. Yet, this is
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not seen to be stemming from 'youth' alone, but effecting people of all ages, save
perhaps children. Instead, each age cohort is viewed to be infected by the social
malaise evoked by the term nthuki ncabuka. In everyday life, however, civility still
persists in a world perceived to have been degraded from some purer, ancestral form.
As such, in living contingently through a series of historical uncertainties, coming to
terms with the moral contexts constructed around age and generation has been a major
historical theme of the postcolony for Meru. In this sense, it is as if people of all ages
are currently 'living in the subjunctive', to borrow a concept from Susan Reynolds
Whyte (2002). The difficulties of interpretation notwithstanding, the aim of this final
chapter is to contextualise the moral-economy into which at least two age-classes have
been formed, while examining the political consequences of the past three decades'
experiences upon the construction of community.
Figure 6: The Bad Generation: nthukf ncabuka represented in Nyaaa's
Customs and Traditions of the Meru (1997)
"I am old, but I fear for you young generation."
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Lip-synch gospel: recording artists as social critics
Gerevasio Gakula Akwalu has produced four volumes of gospel music, sung in
Kimeru, which have enjoyed wide appeal among Christians in Meru North. This
evangelist is one of a dozen popular recording artists who write lyrics and perform in
Kimeru, echoing their Gikuyu counterparts who reach a wider target audience due to
their larger population. Kimeru music has had a limited history of recording artists,
despite the classic popularity of folksingers such as George King'ua and Gitonga
Kathuma who sang in Kiimenti during the relatively prosperous 1970s. Going well
beyond the riffs played out on the wandindi, a one-string violin tautly bowed against
the glass ribs of a coca-cola bottle, acoustic guitars and keyboards gave Kimeru
folksongs new media for expressing unprecedented moral dilemmas. Cheaper
production costs in the 1990s permitted a recording boom, where local artists paid
studios in Nairobi to record their performances, while the artists themselves marketed
their tapes at home. Due to the popularity of the genre, this 'cottage-industry' is
incapable of keeping up with the demand for gospel music sung in the vernacular.
Against a flood of imported sounds and lyrics - of which pirated copies of Afro-
America hip hop are mass marketed at a fraction of their copyright price - local gospel
singers presently occupy a niche market. They offer local consumers of their musics a
sharply contrasting call to self-fashioning which integrates 'traditional' or regional
idioms with the 'modernity' of the global evangelical movement.
Although available in music shops, greater exposure is achieved through live
events. These were usually performed at the edge of marketplaces or at busy cross¬
roads, where casual passerbys could be enticed to stop and listen to the singers'
message. Not a single performer in this genre sings live, although one performer has
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adapted his events upon a kind of 'stand-up' comedy which pokes fun at the
perceived ignorance of local peoples' interpretations of the Bible. Otherwise, the
preference is always with the 'lip-synch' performance which, karaoke-style, retains
the clarity of the audiocassettes while eliminating the need to lug around cumbersome
instruments. Nevertheless, such performances necessitate the setting up of large PA
systems, whose speakers belt out deafening, crackling Christian anthems. In 2002, I
witnessed such events in Maua, Meru Town, and Mikinduri.
Gerevasio Gakula Akwalu, from Kigucwa, a small market in the tea producing
zones of Nyambene, was in Mikinduri for one such performance, selling his most
recent tape entitled Nthuki Iria Ncabuka (This Mannerless Generation). Planned for a
market day, a large crowd of perhaps a hundred persons assembled in a light drizzle
around Akwalu who, amplified by the PA system, was leading his ad hoc congregation
in the Lord's Prayer. Dressed in the de rigeur uniform of evangelicists, a tailored suit
and tie, Akwalu's height and intensity cast him as impressive and dominating. Engaged
in Tip-synch', the lyrics of his songs strike at the heart of moral controversy,
publically speaking against faithlessness, sexual promiscuity, HIV/AIDS (mukingo or
mutheera), social indiscipline and greed. Upon the initial chords of the title song,
Nthuki Ma Ncabuka, Akwalu posed in enormous sun-glasses, adopted a
contemptuous sneer, expressing his distaste for the excesses of the 'mannerless
generation' he was actively mocking as he sang:
I-i ti kwina nkwina
i jaja ti mariri, ningi ti nguri, kana kirarire
muntu uri gutu akinde mwithurire mantu!
Yeah, I'm not just singing songs
Yeah, this ain't dancing, bonding, or celebrating
Lend me your ears, I'll tell you some things!
Ikwerirwe gukiija i-ii ruciara rwa muthia
irwa nthuki iria ncabuka rwina ntuara matu
rutikoroigua aciari ningi rwendi mbeca!
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It was said there will come a last generation
A careless group with bells on their ears
Who never listen to their parents and love money!
Ii shetani atonyete akagwatithia meeyia
akagwatithia ukimwi akauga ni bahati mbaya
aari beeta kithuunu bakerwa ni fashioni!
Yeah, the Devil's come and grabs you with sins
He infects people with AIDS and says 'what bad luck'
Girls are going naked, saying it is fashion!
Ii womba kwona mwari akirite nguu
yaturi mbere, nyuma na rungi
etite nukuthooma mwiri nyama cionthe!
Yeah, you can meet with a girl wearing clothes
Slit down the front, back and side to side
Walking along you can study her entire anatomy!
Ii ningi womba kwona muthaka ekirite
mina matu na nyiuru, mutwe naju piece-i
muromo ni ta muntu unywite ndamu ya muntu!
Yeah, you can also meet a young man
Rings through his ears and nose, with a hair-piece on his head
His lips are red like he's drunk human blood
Ii arina kimuguto ii kia nthuki ya bajuuju
na kiratu kiarite kanyua ja samaki
etite ariuga 'oh highly' yeye ndiye mwisho!
Yeah, his trousers are sixty years old
And his shoe has an open mouth like a fish
As he walks, he says 'oh highly' he's the latest thing!
Ii shetani atonyete akuru bakenda
beetawa mambo yote na ringi mdosi
onia mwaana aitha mbeca agatiga cukuru!
The Devil's come in and the elders have given up
They are called 'boundless' and the other is a tycoon
he flashes money at a lassie, she quits school!
Ii nthuki igucabuka ii akuru barenda
tucungwa na mwekuru ituma ni kauzi
muthaka akiaria na ng'ina, mwari akaaria na ithe!
This generation is careless, and the elders enjoy them
being happy seeing their women quarrelling shamelessly
As the lads talk with their mothers, the lassies speak with their fathers!
Ii ningi kwina na bungi, ii womba kwona juuju
ekirite muguto mutwe curl-set
na goggles iri meetho cia gutisha memba!
And another thing, you'll meet a grandma
Wearing trousers and a curl-set placed on her head
Wearing sunglasses to show off she's with it
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li ukiija kumwita juuju kana umwita maami
no umwe na ugerete iga kwa bolisi
arienda umwite beste kana ndogo-ndogo!
If you call her grandma or mum
She'll throw up a tantrum, casting stones
She prefers being called 'matey' or 'on the side'
li womba kwithira aka ii malaya utuku
corridor cia lodging batumite laini
ja ng'ombe iri munandene kana thokone!
You also meet prostitutes at night
in the corridors of lodgings, queing in line
like cows at the cattle dip or marketplace!
Ituturiene maru ii mbere ya Mwathani
itwire Murungu baaba agarure nthuki iji
bamenyane na Jesu barekerwe meeyia..!
Yes, let us kneel before the Saviour
Pray that the Lord, our Father, transform this generation
Pray for them to love Jesus and to be redeemed of their sins!
As a study in meaning, Nthuki Iria Ncabuka, plays upon the anxiety people
experience in crafting a moral response to prolonged crises of political authority. The
common fear that indigenous codes ofmorality have collapsed is subverted by a call to
evangelicise the community into moral action. Whether that of youth, or even that of
the aged, the song constructs the uncertainties of contemporary social life as irreverent
and immoral.
In this gospel song, the nthuki ncabuka are identified with the formation of a
public ethos where social roles have been subverted by 'love of money' and
irreverance for established moral codes. All of the positions and points in the life-
course are inverted and distorted. The crises of political authority and the power of
elders to control the identity of others are represented as a moral failure: elders sleep
with girls young enough to be their daughters; and grandmums, trying to be girls,
appear ridiculous in sunglasses and hair-curlers. Accusations of age-based incest and
other inter-personal transgressions, such as not acting one's age or flaunting one's
personality, are flung as direct attacks on the people of today. Young people, like their
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boundless elders, are represented as beyond subjection by others and, hence, morally
adrift in the influence of the Devil.
What is striking in Akwalu's lyrics is his capacity to meld indigenous
narratives with biblical scripture about the 'coming of a last generation.' Indeed,
interpretively, there are no grounds to separate them. Entanglements of ideas drawn
from local allegories about the coming of a last generation and the prophesies in the
Biblical scriptures about the End of Days lend the artist a powerful public workshop
in which to underscore his social criticism with a vision of redemption. In terms of
what I may call a Meru epistemology, the body of Kimeru narrative and allegory are
not perceived to contradict popular understandings of the Bible, particularly those
which profess (uroria) a second coming. The central place of returns in both Christian
and Kimeru eschatologies is taken locally as the prophetic truth of both. Allegories of
a 'last generation' (nthuki cia muthia, literally tailing generation) were an integral part
of indigenous eschatology in the dialectic of gitiba (see Chapter Two). A brief mention
of the 'age-class with bells on their ears' (irwa nthuki iria ncabuka rwitna ntuara
matu) is an idiomatic reference to narratives which foretold {kurorua, to divine) of a
generation being born with eight ears (ikirwe nthuki na matu yanaana). A common
narrative, the end of the world is brought on by a generation which has eight ears,
dresses in bizarre fashions, commits age-based incest and kills its parents. In
fieldwork, several versions of this story about 'the generation with eight ears' were
heard, as presented earlier. In brief, this is an allegorical tale about the end of
community. The 'generation with eight ears' (nthuki na matu yanaana) are the
youthful harbingers of so much cultural loss and social chaos. In one version, because
these young people listen to so many voices, they become so distracted that they hear
nothing of what others - in this case their elders - tell them. As a Miriti informant told
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me, "Look at us now with all these radios and televisions! And the elders are saying
that we don't listen, like a generation with eight ears." New tastes in clothing and
concerns for personal 'style', or fashion, also weave their way into the description of
the generation with 'eight ears', who dress bizzarely, but it is not clear whether this
imagination comes from the old stories, or whether this has been a recent modification
upon the old theme.
In the narratives, not only do the nthuki na matu yanaana refuse to listen to
their elders, but they also begin to break the rules defining incest. The imperative to
keep the social rules and principles surrounding reproduction in order is one of the
allegorical strands of this story. Unlistening and oblivious to rebuke, the community
commits heinously immoral acts such as sleeping with their mothers and daughters or
fathers and sons. In another version, the bells on their ears make so much noise that
intelligible discourse becomes futile. Noise making is always considered vulgar and
impolite against the internalised ideal of nthoni. Where one's ntuara (cow bells) are
obtrusively loud, the meaning is that one is deemed arrogant, a loud-mouth and
immune to the suggestions of others. In public meetings, such as baraza or co¬
operative society meetings, persons speaking out of turn, or in an offensive way, are
frequently rebuked by calls of "karaga nthoni!" (stay quiet, but colloquially 'have
you no shame?'). Speaking of someone's bells is a reference to how discrete they
manage to remain in a context of eager gossipers. That the 'bells' of the 'last
generation' may be heard, indicates the existence of a well-heeled perception that there
is less decency or self-respect in the present than there was in the past. As grasped in
the English concept of 'shame', itself a painful emotion which strips away one's social
esteem, the problem with the 'generation with bells on their ears' is that they have
have no shame (nthuki ncabuka iji batina uthoni), that is to say that they take no heed
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of the importance of 'shyness' or civility.
Circumcision songs are frequently disconnected from any sense of nostalgia
and used in contexts where social actors fall into conflicting roles. During the political
campaigns leading up to the 2003 general elections, parties of lobbyists called upon
such songs to discredit their political opponents. Similarly, Akwalu evokes Kimeru
dances (kwina, to sing and dance) to emphasise their power to express age and
generationally based antagonism. Although, today, mariri, nguri, and kirarire are
considered by some people to be anachronisms, at ceremonial events they are a part
of the ludic and celebratory process through which successive age-classes are formed.
In his denunciation of the moral conduct of contemporary social actors, Akwalu
juxtaposes the propriety of dances like mariri, nguri, and kirarire to a 'modernity'
which is both sinful and without ceremony. It is the banality of the present which
renders it impotent against immorality. The agitation and outrage of popular gospel
music, evangelically active in exposing the 'sin' (meeyia) of 'modernity' is likened to
mariri, nguri, and kirarire because these dance forms provided a social context where
the intersubjectivity of age cohorts could be used as a critique of the relationship
between parental, adjacent, and filial generations. Kirarire, for example, was sung by
young and emerging warriors to shame older warriors into acquiesing to their demands
that they 'retire' from warriorhood. Through singing kirarire, these younger men
agitated their slightly older counterparts with song and dance, humiliating the warriors
still living as bachelor-warriors. The moral content of circumcision songs was stressed
as one way of showing others that one's age-class were mature enough to advance
themselves to the status ofwarriorhood. An older warrior's illegitimate children could
be publically exposed, bringing the individual great personal loss of esteem. This was a
threat for him to finally leave the gaaru and make room for the formation of a younger
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age-class. This dance form was a poignant form of symbolic lobbying, because it
publically named individuals for having impregnating uninitiated girls and announced
acts of individual cowardice which would negatively portray the whole older grouping.
Of course, however, Akwalu would not have experienced this dance-song in his
lifetime as described above and as expressed in his own lyrics, but its evocation clearly
demonstrates the meaning which continues to linger in Akwalu's choice of iconic or
anachronistic words.
Another popular song by Akwalu, 'A Parent's Blessing' (Kirathimo kia
Muciari), expresses further misgivings and disquiet about the attitude of youth
towards their parents. The concept of kirathimo, blessings from a person, is grounded
in age differences because an older person may either bless or curse those younger than
he or she:
Mucoore menyagira riria akwaaria ii
My friend, beware when you speak
Utikiije kurumwa ni muciari ii
To avoid a parent's curse
Nikaaba waage utonga na waage nkuma ii
It's better you've no wealth and no fame
Nujukie kitharimo kia muciari ii
And you've got a parent's blessings
Throughout Kenya, a parent's curse is considered to be the strongest and virulent of
sanctions upon the actions of offspring. In some contexts, it may be seen as a sort of
psychic violence brought on by the child's insolence towards their parents.
Earlier, in the 1970s, reknowned folksinger Kathuma Gitonga sang of Kibaabu
and Gichunge's moral experiences of modernity. In one song, Cabacu, Kathuma sings
about his age-mates' itinerant sense of direction, getting 'mixed up' (gucabacu) with
drinking alcohol and sexual activities. Playing on the saying, "there is disarray in the
clan gathering" ('kwiiina mucabacano mucemanione'), Kathuma laments the moral




ja matu jakirega guturwa
By-gone things have become
mixed up, things are bad
like they refuse to have ears pierced
The body is a focus ofmany of Kathuma's folksongs. The reference to pierced ears is
an unmistakable idiom for the elders of his day. By the late 1990s fewer and fewer
elders had the pierced and elongated ear lobes (,gutura matu). Such ears are an
embodied symbol of how people's subjectivities have changed. To some, these bodily
features of the elders are the brunt of insensitive jokes and several elders I encountered
expressed a mild embarrasment that people did not understand why they shaped their
ears in this way. M'Muramba, a Micubu ndiguri from Giithu, Tigania, flashed with
anger, once, when he told me, "These youngsters are saying things will be better when
all the old people with pierced ears pass on... old men like me!" An Imenti women I
knew, had her ears sown back up sometime in the 1950s, so that she would look like
what she thought a Christian should look like. In Tigania, large numbers of the Micubu
and their Mukuba wives acquired the nickname Nkunja utu (fold the ears) because
they wanted to appear 'modern.' Yet, Kathuma's praise of the past (he himself was
born after people stopped piercing the ears of children) may be taken with a larger
anxiety about the social, moral, and economic transformations of the Meru
countryside experienced in the 1960s.
The figures at the heart of Kathuma's lyrical anxiety are young women and
especially their bodies. Like Akwalu's description of today's fashion, the slitted and
short skirts cited above, Kathuma condemns girls' expression of their sexuality
through their choice of clothing in the late 1960s. In numerous photo albums presented
to me when visiting the houses ofnow middle-aged women, I came across faded black-
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and-white prints of them wearing mini-skirts, open shoes, and long hair as young girls.
I would joke with my informants that my mother, a Glaswegian teenager in the 1960s,
had dressed in almost the same fashion. To the political imaginary of the 'tribal' past,
however, women's sexuality and their bodies represented a threat to the moral order
that had been established under late colonialism. This singer's nostalgia for an
imaginary, moral past, in another song, berates the wearing of sandals and mini-skirts
by the 'sisters' of his generation, explified in the songMwari wa Ciokairuthi.
Mwarocia Kairuthi, mwarocia Kairuthi... gwe mwari...
Niatia bukugiita?, niatia bukugiita?.. gwe mwari...
Bwenyangia Merit, bwenyangia Meru... gwe mwari...
Bwekira 'tight', bwekira 'tight'... gwe mwari...
Nairatu bia 'sandal', nairatu bia 'sandal'... gwe mwari...
Mwarocia Kairuthi, mwarocia Kairuthi... gwe mwari...
My sister Kairuthi, my sister Kairuthi... you girl
What are you up to?, what are you up to?., you girl
You've destroyed Meru, you've destroyed Meru... you girl
You've worn tights, you've worn tights... you girl
And sandal shoes, and sandal shoes... you girl
My sister Kairuthi, my sister Kairuthi... you girl
It is tempting to interpret this popular music as a new form of oral artistry, within
which a critique of modernity is embedded. But, it is not clear whether the personhood
of the recording artist as social critic is formed through a clear division between
'tradition' and 'modernity.' Kathuma sings about educating one's parents to count to
three in English, the language of development, just as he sings about how his age-class
has become lost in its exuberance for things new and naughty. Is it even necessary to
beg the separation of these seemingly polar kinds of histories?
Indeed, these songs represent the creation of a vernacular modernity,
particularly through the localised transformation of Biblical images and metaphors.
The Igembe singer Kibara, from Ntonyiri, incensed by the crises of morality witnessed
in the Nyambenes, contests the idea that 'development' and 'modernisation' have led
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people towards a better life (cf. Karp 2002: 82-104). In his song, Kidawa, Kibara
points out people's hypocrisies in their understandings of 'development', 'modernity'
and 'religion' through metaphors drawn from the Bible:
Uthungiri twauga jau ni maendeleo
Inya urebi nabuo ni maendeleo najo!
Kathi ni maendeleo jau ni ja Jehoram
Kidawa itu wirire na wonoke buru!
They're calling adultery development
Even drunkeness, this is called development too!
These are developments for Jehoram's eternal fire
Kidawa please repent and be fully saved!
This particular song demonstrates an interesting lack of constraint in Kibara's
interpretation of the Old Testament, especially Kings (Anene), where Jehoram is
briefly mentioned in a power struggle with the kingdoms of the Moab. Problems of
translation are hardly moot, here, but the links made between maendeleo
(development) and the vices of sex and drinking, have a rather thinly stretched relation
with the story of Jehoram's downfall in the Bible. Writing about Ewe interpretations
of the Bible, Birgit Meyer (1999) argues that 'the Book' often figures as a pretext for
the imagination, a source of authority, from which scattered images and metaphors
may be used to provide 'a clarity and certainty that the biblical text itself lacks'
(Meyer 1999: 36). In their hermeneutic readings of the Bible, Ewe reconstruct the
biblical meanings through their own allegorical interpretations (ibid). In Kimeru
popular music, song lyrics drawn from the 'gospel' exhibit a similar play on form and
meaning.
Exegesis and allegorical interpretation in Meru
Deborah Madsen's (1996) discussion of allegory in the construction of
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America as a 'redeemer nation', from the time of the Puritan colonists to postmodern
literary criticism, strikes a resonant chord with allegory as a method of interpretation
and a narrative genre among the Meru in the twentieth century. Highlighting allegory
as both a 'rhetoric of dissent' as well as the 'voice of orthodoxy' in America's political
and spiritual imagination, Madsen traces how allegorical narratives are often produced
in particular conjunctures of social and cultural crisis:
[AJllegory has been the priviledged form to which successive generations
of American writers have turned in times of particular uncertainty and
tension because allegory is, fundamentally, an indeterminate literary form.
The essential indeterminancy of reference that characterises allegorical
interpretation and allegorical narratives lends to allegory the kind of
flexibility needed to respond to the vicissitudes of cultural history.
Allegory comes into its own during periods of uncertainty regarding the
nature of communication, the reliability of language and the authenticity
of culturally important texts because allegory is, above all, focused upon
the complexities and difficulties inherent in the activity of interpretation
(Madsen 1996: 4).
The commercial possibilities notwithstanding, contemporary Meru recording artists
are working within an allegorical genre, drawing upon the orthodoxy of 'traditional'
narrative to creatively subvert, or dissent from, the dominant ideas of a teleologically
'modem' future. These are creative stories in which both Christian faith in salvation
and secular expectations of development are in tension with an unachievable vision of
the community's redemption. Allegorical modes of telling these stories are effective
because, as Jon Whitman (1987) phrases it, 'allegory turns its head in one direction,
but turns its eyes in another... it says one thing, and means another' (Whitman 1987:
2). In Kimeru, allegories of the 'bad' generation contribute to a vision ofMem cultural
history as recursive and resilient, but not without its dissent and malcontent. The
allegory of the coming of the last generation, with bells on its ears, is an anxious and
indeterminate metaphor for the end of community. The rhetorical position of the
nthuki ncabuka is not about the immorality of specific and contemporary young
generations, but about the ineluctable difficulties of social and cultural crises and
transitions per se. And, critically, the allegorical interpretation of a mythic, pure past
amply contributes to an ideology of history which glosses over 'bad' histories and
makes the most of 'good' histories, forgetting the former and celebrating the latter.
Because they cannot efface the pervasive sense of crisis into which local people find
themselves entangled, gospel music makes use of 'tradition' and 'modernity' to steer a
meaningful path through the community's aporia. Meru gospel and folk musicians'
written lyrics provide the Meru public the possibility to create a counter-history
which does not relinquish the idea of a 'golden age' before the white man came (indira
gukuja bantune), nor give up faith in the Biblical second-coming of Christ and personal
salvation. Perhaps more importantly, however, such rhetorical uses of history suggest
that crisis, suffering, struggle, and uncertainty all have some redemptive value among
the Meru, thereby supporting a hope and expectation that development will
eventually occur in this part of the world.
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Epilogue:
'When the Dust Settles': Historicity and uncertainty
Some weeks before completing this thesis, I received an email from a friend in
Mikinduri. This was John Lemi, a primary school teacher and aspiring novelist who
had sent me a draft chapter of his new book for review. One statement, in particular,
startled me. He wrote in the free manner of email:
"Before I met you I dint know how
important the age group foctor was/ was- to
African Natives. But slowly by slowly itz
materializing in me."
It was an important moment of clarification. I had never really consulted Lemi as I did
with other Meru about their age-classes and the historicity of generation. Did I
'invent' this ethnography I had just written? Were all those who criticised me for
being narrowly interested in 'tradition' correct? Were those authors using the
metaphors of collapse and erosion describing real and actual conditions on the ground?
Did my ethnography distort the way things were played out to me during fieldwork in
Meru? Or, had my attention been drawn to something which was there, but hidden
from the view of those not participating directly in its social drama?
Reconciling myself, I thought about John Lemi's life and his aspirations.
Educated at university and comfortable in the city as well as the country, Lemi spends
his spare time writing novels which are set in a magico-realist past. In short, Lemi
writes about the absurdities and ironies of life on the margins of 'tradition' and
'modernity.' A recent example of his work told a story about struggling to make a
living in Mikinduri from the point of view of a donkey. In his fiction, Lemi uses
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history selectively and to make a point which is emplotted into his arrangement of
characters, the fields of their drama, and the moral overlay he inscribes in his words.
His latest works defy realist historiography, but that's not his concern. When he
mentioned how age-classes were 'materialising' in him, while using the now
internalised colonial category of 'African Natives', I thought about 'invention',
inventiveness, renewal, and the implications of historical entanglements upon the
thinking and actions of future generations. I thought about point of view and position
in assessing different kinds of social, cultural, and historical entanglements. But
through Lemi's comment, I also had moment to pause and reflect on some of the
defects with arguments which share family resemblances with the 'invention of
tradition' thesis.
One such element might be rephrased as the 'concealment of tradition.' Lemi's
comment forced me to think about the ways in which knowledge about age-class
formation is concealed from some actors, before it 'materialises' in them because it
gains salience it formerly and subjectively did not have before. I think this notion of
knowledge materialising within someone, as a novel subjective experience, is a
fascinating proposition. It is like Gadamer's notion of a horizon. It links into much of
social anthropology's insights into the ritual process and its effects upon personhood,
identity, and relatedness. Although Lemi underwent the necessary life passages
through circumcision, in the Kimeru style, the idea that 'traditional' knowledge could
have been hidden from him strengthens the argument made by Paul Spencer (1990)
that the power of ritual knowledge specialists lies in their control over esoterica and
secrets. But there was also something else going on which suggests that in times of
crisis and historical transition there are choices to be made about either keeping secrets
or exposing them. In Meru, as it was in the late 1990s and early 2000s, many elements
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of the age-grading and formation of age-classes which might have been shrouded in
secrecy in former periods of time were made into tokens of public debate. The status
of the community was at stake with the ageing of its eldest persons and the transition
of ideals and expectations about the life-course among the young. Formerly guarded
knowledges were suddenly revealed because the succession between the generations
was viewed, not only as an inevitability, but as a moral necessity made all the more
poignant in the present than in the past, because it had been stripped of the specific
ritual contexts it formerly demanded.
Old women, convinced that their silence would be harmful, spoke of issues
that would have been deemed inappropriate years earlier. Dozens of such older
women told me about the crises of their youth, about their lost infants, of marriage to
migrant men who were rarely at home, and of broken relations with their sons. In their
ageing, they found voice to expose what they had previously repressed and kept
silent. They spoke of broken chains of reciprocity and of injustice between the
generations, not necessarily to affirm any vestige of control they had over their sons
and daughters-in-law, but out of recognition that their ageing demanded they let go of
it. In provoking debates about the extreme tensions of filial and parental relations and
giving voice to what they had previously suffered in silence, these old women openly
defined a space where issues and dramas which had previously been concealed could
be made public. The vocabulary through which they exposed local dramas which
effected them directly were the centrally organising idioms and tropes of age and
generational difference.
Meanwhile, their husbands worried about their own ageing and the demands of
their maturing sons. Succession became the issue of the day, but this time round, such
men were in the position of relinquishing control over material and symbolic assets
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and passing it on to younger men, rather than working together and lobbying as an age-
class to acquire such things themselves. Having never been placed in such a social
situation, there was much disagreement on how it should be done. Njuri elders could
not agree on the specific rites to perform, but found consensus in the idea that they
had to do something to make public their intentions to succeed decision-making power
to their sons, however postponed by reasonable argument or deliberate footdragging.
As such men aged, succession had already taken place on hundreds of individual farms
and households but not writ large upon the political 'community.' I was perhaps only
to get a glimpse of this drama, as it must have unfolded over many years, but this
struggle amongst older men to redefine succession, through playing with ritual form,
said much about the pliant and resilient features of the age and generational 'system' in
channeling conflict towards predictable outcomes. Whatever ad hoc covenants and
deliberations the elders made in secrecy, the very inventiveness of their debates about
'tradition' stemmed from the ways in which these unspecified ritual practices had
been formerly concealed from them.
Among young people, elements of Meru's age-class and generational 'system'
were materialising in other ways. Young women found voice in arguing for some kind
of reinstatement of ritual process, however token, through a language of universal
human rights. This was much more than a case of getting new clothing. It went much
further into the liminal nature of many contemporary girls' experiences, their lack of
either 'traditional' or 'modern' standing, itself an outcome of many decades of debate
about the dangers of female initiations. For quite a number of young women, the
connections between the NGOs and the residues ofwomen's initiatory lore presented
an arena for reassessing their value as social beings. Their male counterparts, deeply
divided through innovations made to their initiatory performances and the body, were
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also unsure of what constituted the residual practices of male ritual. Some among them
substituted the act of initiation and the creation of moral personhood with self¬
consciously regressive acts such as 'forced circumcisions', explicit denunciations of
the language of universal human rights. What seemed to be happening in Meru during
my fieldwork was that much of the importance of the age-class and generational
'system' was materialising in different persons not as a reification of tradition, but as a
creative and pragmatic stance to their changing circumstances.
Although with caution, it has helped to think of Meru attitudes towards their
age-class and generational 'system' through the metaphor of the underground stream
which I evoked earlier. This metaphor ties in with the idea that 'tradition' can be
concealed and the notion that 'tradition' can be called upon when historical conditions
change. These ways of thinking about the formation of age-classes in Meru resonate
with Victor Turner's conceptualisation of 'communitas', not especially when looked
at within the observable ritual process, such as a 'cleansing' rite implicated in a
particular generational succession, but within social dramas which carry on through
historical time (cf. Turner 1974: 98-155). Turner's idea of communitas provokes
thought about the making and unmaking of persons, often within very unequal or
alienated relations to one another, but it can also be applied to larger social formations,
including 'communities' which lie in unequal relations with others at a wider level of
abstraction. The whole metaphor of modernisation as a kind of 'growth' from one
stage of life to another is deeply embedded in contemporary Kimeru thought about the
transformations of their own society. It is also represented in Euroamerican ideas
about 'progress' and 'development', such that its place in Kimeru thought is probably
an example of historical entanglement. It is worth taking a risk to suggest that in
Kimeru thought about historical change, the 'traditional' represents a phase of growth
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where everything was structured and where everyone knew their place; but that the
'modern' represents an unfolding in liminal time and space where everything is
disarticulate and nobody really knows their place. As simple an idea as this is, what
prevailed during the specific period when I lived in Meru and undertook my
ethnographic research were a series of historicised debates which sought to make use
of such liminalities to reconstruct the notion of the Meru as a community.
Unlike other theoretical uses of the notion of communitas, however, it is not
clear that I can rely upon the return to a re-structurated condition in the case of
contemporary age-class formation in Meru, as Turner's studies of the ritual process
suggested. True enough, new social positions are being created in Meru all the time,
and many of the ethnographic situations I have chosen to write about emphasise this,
perhaps above other interpretive possibilities. But this 'communitas' among the
contemporary Meru has the effect of providing some kind of interpretive arena around
the irrevocable shifting of social positions occurring over generational time. As such,
new vocabularies and metaphors are created to name this reordering and reassesment
of Meru models of the life-course, such that 'mixing', buruku, and 'Swahili' become
meaningful new concepts within the familarity of old forms.
By drawing attention to how social knowledge 'materialises' in the context of
new situations, Lemi provided me with an insight into the ageing process as
experienced in a 'society' which makes young men, then women, into moral persons
through their inclusion in an age-class. Rather than being captured by an 'age
organisation' or 'generational system', those who experience the formation of an age-
class in Meru do so as very active participants. Of course, like in any arena of social
life, some people are more active than others. If today's young people, for example,
did nothing about organising the rituals through which they recreate themselves, then
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we would have the ethnographic context to agree with other ethnographers of East
African societies that such forms of life have indeed become defunct. Instead,
however, the formation of age-classes among the Meru continues to materialise
because such ritual contexts provide an arena for interpreting the contemporary
challenges of local social life.
It is relatively easy to understand why generations of ethnographers studying
'age-organisation' in East Africa have thought that these forms of life would
'disappear', 'erode', and 'collapse.' The crises they encountered in their ethnographic
present and the debates about community such crises provoked were dutifully noted
as empirical evidence of the instability of such 'systems' under the influences of
modernisation (theory).57 What such ethnographers perhaps did not note, however,
was the specificity of the events and the processes they sought to describe, then
theorise, as conditions preempting the disarray of age-class formation. They did not
consider historicity as part of the 'field' in which they 'worked.' And, by historicity,
I do not mean that ethnographers of these generations did not consider history, this
charge being an inaccurate summary of the situation then (cf. Lewis 1999; Goody
1995). Rather, they perhaps did not think it appropriate to reflect, at length, on the
interplay between the theoretical vogues occuring in the academic seminar, the
historical circumstances underlying their fieldwork experience, and the effects the
debates of the people they 'studied' had upon the kinds of ethnography they
eventually wrote. Often the disadvantages of the ethnographic present, its historical
myopia, prohibit greater and wider appreciations of historicity upon the creation of
57 It should be noted that the expansion of structural-functionalist studies about kinship, especially
segmentary lineages in Africa, such as those which contributed to African Political Systems, perhaps
ingrained the idea of age-organisation as being less stable than the lineage model of social organisation.
Although theoretically moot today, I still think the eclipse of thinking specifically about the
interrelations of age and gender in this earlier period of social anthropology has had an impact on how
'age systems' have been conceptualised and written about since.
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anthropological theories. One sees little evidence of continuity because of the
historical uncertainties into which one is cast. Theoretical concerns which are the
preoccupation of a particular year or decade may outweigh ethnographic concerns
which pertain to a specific social drama of much longer duration and of greater
historical consequence. Faced with the historical uncertainties, the ethnographer
reconstructs the past from the 'evidence' gleaned in the 'here and now' of fieldwork.
In order to grasp the significance of precedent happenings which 'shed light' on the
social drama occurring during fieldwork, the past is reconstructed through knowledge
of the changing 'social structure' of the people or peoples in question. The structural
metaphors notwithstanding, without a historical method and perspective on age-class
formation it becomes impossible to understand why social structure (that bugbear of a
word) remains necessary to anthropological theory on the subject. Because the study
of age-class formation has to do with time and the making and unmaking of persons
over the life-course it has much to do with understanding, as Victor Turner put it, a
structure of positions or the passing of an 'interstructural situation' (Turner 1967:
93). But I have not necessarily written about structure as if it were analytically
primary to an understanding of Meru age-class formation and the historicity of
generation.
What I have attempted to do here is argue for the idea of social and cultural
transcontinuities, while still engaging with the deconstructionist arguments in vogue
over the past two decades. Anthropologists now question the axiomatic status of
concepts of 'culture' and 'society.' As Nigel Rapport frames the question, 'Is it not
the always the case that cultural communities are arenas of interpretation - even if
presented rhetorically, by leaders and representatives, to insiders and outsiders alike,
as matters of traditional doctrine and practice?' (Rapport 2003: 381). But cultural
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communities, by this definition, are also formed out of debates about 'society', such
that we are able to identify the binding forms of community in terms of contest and
argument. In this sense, neither 'culture' and 'society' are constructs worth examining
outside of their historical specificity. Important to my argument is an insistence that
our analyses of age-classes, or even the life-course, are dependent upon the historicity
of the situation in which they are studied, its confluences, ideas, and politics. A
recognition of this strengthens the kind of anthropology we write.
As loan Lewis suggests for the anthropology of local political histories, 'Much
debate in anthropology about the 'nature' of a particular cultural system often seems
an artefact of studies of the same 'system' at different points of time' (Lewis 1999:
22). Writing about the subject of historical change and East African 'age-systems'
more specifically, Paul Spencer (1999) notes that the changes which these forms of life
have undergone continually pose a methodological problem to the advancement of
theory production in anthropology. Disentangling historical shifts from recurrent
phases of age-class formation, as Spencer correctly states, is thwarted by the trompe
d'oeil when 'direct observation by the visiting anthropologist amounts to little more
than a passing glimpse' (Spencer 1997: 127). While the views of Paul Spencer are not
endorsed without question, his recognition of changing points of view on 'traditional'
knowledge among his elder Maasai informants, once moran when Spencer carried out
his first fieldwork in Kenya in the late 1950s, is an important new contribution to
theoretical reflections on age organisation in East Africa. That these elders 'assumed a
licence to reinterpret the rules in response to new circumstances as they saw
necessary' resolves some of the structural-functionalist trappings of ethnography
written about these situations (Spencer 1997: 128). What Spencer does not stress with
equal enthusiasm, however, is that these elders' changing points of view and power to
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'reinterpret the rules' within novel historical situations come to them, 'materialise' one
might say, from quite specific situations related to their own ageing process which,
historically, has been a drama in progress since their age-class was formed as such. To
some degree, much of the 'traditional' knowledge which they conceal from others,
would be of highly idiosyncratic significance. This is especially the case where
different generations lead lives characterised by filial and parental avoidance. For a
contrasting example, the dramas of young women over key debates about their own
initiations may ultimately have, in their own peculiar historical circumstances, more
impact on shaping the Maasai as a community of argument than the elders' power to
transform 'tradition' as they feel necessary. In communities highly stratified and
differentiated by age and gender, such as Spencer's Maasai, the historically salient
reasons why one group of people are attributed with having changed something often
do not necessarily prove the validity of anthropological theories which equate the
'licence' to change the rules with a vague notion of power held in the hands of the
most mature. This sense of licence captures the very 'nature' of age-class formation
which, as Lewis points out clearly, is more often reflective of how the 'system' was
interpreted by outsiders at any given period of time than demonstrative of its inherent,
structural qualities.
In conclusion, it needs to be stressed that I cannot write myself out of this
debate which took place in Meru in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Like Peristiany in
1933, during his Kipsigis fieldwork, the ethnographer is compelled to enter these kinds
of debates on some level, even instigate them on occasion. My discussions with
hundreds ofMeru contributed to revisioning social dramas which were many decades
in formation. Sometimes, I drew the rebuke of people who felt that I was talking about
something which was either embarassing to them or which was felt to grossly
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misrepresent the 'modern' forms of personhood they upheld. Others found my
research an ideal venue to discuss matters which were clearly important to them,
outlining in which ways they felt alienated from either 'traditional' or 'modern' forms
of life. In the end, of course, I am aware that the worlds of the 'traditional' and
'modern' are fused, any separation of the two merely an artifice and a tool to speak
about social life in a rhetorically meaningful way. In my future research, of which I am
uncertain of, perhaps I will sort through the maze of differing perspectives about
Meru age-class formations to offer new possibilities for looking at these forms of life
and structures of feeling as part of a larger theoretical project on the politics of
maturation. Perhaps I will return without this theoretical project and listen to how the
local debates have transformed, as all of its protagonists get older, fill new shoes, or
pass away into the underground stream. History will be important then, as it has been
in this thesis, but I am aware that the point of view presented here will be a moment in
time and understanding quite apart from that which may, or may not, occur in any
future sojourn to Meru, Kenya. One always hopes that the dust can settle so that
one's understandings can attain greater clarity. This metaphor has arisen before in
anthropological thinking about history. Evans-Pritchard viewed the place of historical
data in social anthropology as a 'dust settling' effect (quoted in Lewis 1999), where
the significance of events and situations happening in the ethnographic present are
only grasped once this moment has passed and we have been allowed to take stock of
the deeper past of the events or situations in question. I certainly stirred up a lot of
dust with people in Meru through my research on the historicity of generation. I
think, without introducing too much more distortion, this is what John Lemi meant
when he said that knowledge of age-classes was materialising in him.
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Appendix A
KTmeru and Kiswahili Glossary
KTmeru
aba 'my father', used in respect for all older males
akuru elders, older married men (sing, mukuru)
antubantene ancestors, people of the past, ancients
arori the prophets, seers (sing, murori)
athomi the first mission school students, literally 'readers' (sing.
muthomi)
baite kin term for sister's son, by mother's brother (see muntuetu)
baithe kin term for 'my father's people' (see bantti)
bamu reference between age-mates (see bamungo)
bankiru love relation reserved for elders whose children have all been
initiated
bate kin term for any very young child in one's clan
batiri Catholic priest, derived from Italian padre
beethe ba muthenya the 'daylight fathers', sponsors to a junior age-class
beethe ba nthn the 'father of the country', ruling elders (see eene ba nthn)
bibii 'chewing gum', nickname of Lubeeta
buruku term for a person without an age-class or circumcision group
chankanabiri largest and most senior Imenti circumcision class (arch.)
eekanga dry and hot season from January to February
eene ba nthn the 'owners of the country', ruling elders (see beethe ba nthii)
gaaru (a) warrior's barracks; (b) man's house
gatego gonorreah
giciaro cross-clan affiliation, 'blood brotherhood', adoption
gitiba (a) a generation alteration; (b) a 'century' or period of historical
time
gitonga a wealthy man, a rich person
gucabacu to become 'mixed up', as in confused or in disarray
gucabuka to 'leak', to deviate or be immoral (see nthuki ncabuka)
gucwa ngugi to look for work, labour migration
gukumbukia ng'ondu cleansing rite involving slaughter of sheep
gutaana to be cut, circumcised (boys)
gutaanithua to be cut, excised (girls)
gutura matu ear piercing
guturanyumba 'coming out' ceremony for new intiates








































compulsory labour in early colonial period (see gwita Ncomba)
'to go to the coast', labour migration (see gucwa ngugi, gwita
kioro)
men considered to be sexually polluted and immoral
an unspecified period of time
strength, power, volition
white soda pigment used for bodily decoration
a shade, a spirit
grandparent, usually 'grandmother' (see ujuwe)
elder women's council, eclipsed during colonialism
Government Chiefs, literally 'the ropes'
scapegoat, usually a child who takes punishment for another
kinsman
a council ofuncircumcised lads (see nciibi and luungi)
the first nine initiates chosen from specified clans during
circumcision
a council, usually presiding over a territorial or clan section
beginning stage of entering njuri nceke, Mama ka otha
a midden, usually within homestead compound
Famine of 1918-1919, literally 'Scorching Sun'
a circumcision field
a distinct agricultural season, e.g. kiingo gia uthima (short rains)
maize meal flour, name of famine in 1969
songs of praise and critique sung by warriors at succession
period
blessings bestowed by an older person to a younger
famine of 1922, literally 'Eating Leather Skins'
to 'beat the drum', or commit generationally based incest
(a) a scapel; (b) derogatory term for boys circumcised in a clinic
'Cook', nickname ofKiruja labour migrants in 1930s
a curse, proclaimed publically
juridical council of elders
the second rung circumcision set (see ndinguri, kabeeria)
clan or family based incest (see mwonkaranua)
period when no circumcisions take place, literally 'closed
period'
to curse
declaration of a generational succession period
public cleansing of a curse (see kiruume)
public cleansing through the slaughter of a goat
to graze or pasture livestock
parade of would-be initiates visiting the houses of their kin
to ask permission to do something
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kurorua to 'foresee', divine or even prophesise
kuthamia to move house
kuthinjanua ritual performed to remove taint from clan-alliance incest
kwoutha a circumcision dance
kwora nkoro clear throat, to announce approach as a warrior
laing 'o a warrior of great reknown, also member of lamalla
lamalla the warriors' council (arch. + Kiimenti, ramare)
libwi a dance of neighbouring children held at evenings
luungi a council ofuncircumcised lads, meaning 'lungs' (see
kathingiriti)
macembe forked hoe,jembe in Swahili (sing, ncembe)
maganjo ruins of a homestead
maitha enemies, raiders, outsiders (sing, munthu)
makethija mutaani the circumcision fee, literally the 'circumcisor's gain/harvest'
maria syphilis
mariri a dance performed by warriors or young men (see nguri)
marwa fermented millet beer
mataana the circumcision classes (sing, itaana)
mbithi raw, unripe, or immature
meeyia Christian concept of sin
mucian a parent (pi. aciarT)
mucii (a) lineage; (b) a house or home
muciere a parturient young woman, a wife
mugaa a herbalist, ritual cleanser, 'witchdoctor' (pi. agaa)
mugiro pollution, state of impurity often causing illnesses (pi. migiro)
mugwati an initiate's sponsor, a minder (pi. agwati)
mugwe ritual leadership (see mukiama)
mukiama the representative, rain maker, ritual leadership (see mugwe)
mukingo HIV/AIDS, derived from Kikuyu (see mutheera)
muntu a person (pi. antu)
muntuetu mother's brother, literally 'our man'
munyaya a friend, a lover
muramu men circumcised together and who form a bond partnership
murume a married man
muthanduku small-pox
mutheega a charm or medicine for protection from pollution, sorcery,
illness
mutheera (a) ancient sexually transmitted disease; (b) HIV/AIDS (see
mukingo)
mutongeeri a spokesperson charged with 'protecting' the public interest
mutuurire 'nurture' or living together
mpaara drought, famine or hunger
mwariiki eldest ritual experts (see ntindiri)
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mwekuru an older woman, a wife
mwene a household head, an 'owner' or elder man
mwiji an uncircumcised boy (pi. bwiji)
mwijukia a midwife, the 'receiver' of a baby (pi. eejukia)
mwingo 'binding' laws or covenant
mwiriiga (a) clan and territory; (b) gate to homestead
mwongela 'additions' of initiates to an age-class (see nangitia)
mwonkaranua incest between people of clans affiliated by giciaro (see
kubungira)
mwuthi board and counter game, often called mbao
naincu (a) honey; (b) hydromel or mead drink (see uki)
nangitia 'laggards' or over- and under- aged in age-class for Imenti (see
mwongela)
ncamba a hero, usually in terms ofmartial quality or reputation
nceege a 'porcupine', or an outcast
nciibi a council of uncircumcised lads (see kathingiriti and luungi)
ndegwa a bull
ndegwaya nthuki the gift bull, 'bull of reconciliation' given between rival age-
classes
ndinguri the most senior circumcision class in any itaana (see kobia,
kabeeria)
ngirani endogamous, 'unmarriable' clan of'abominable' women
ngoa the jealousy or rivalry of groups of people (see ruriitho)
ng 'ondu sheep, often in ritual context
ngugi work or labour
nguri wrestling matches performed by uncircumcised boys
ngutu an excised girl, a 'maiden'
nguu ntuune the 'red clothes', non-Africans in precolonial prophesies
nkia an 'orphan' or a client
nkuru elder, older than
njira (a) a road or passage way; (b) intentions within one's life time
njuno a pithy saying or proverb
njuri imbere the most elite level of njuri proceedings
njuri imbingere an elite juridicial council in political hierarchy
njuri nceke select council of elders
nkenye an initiated girl, maidenhood (sing, mukenye)
nkoma a spirit being (from the Swahili) (see irundu)
nkurumbu degrogatory term for elder not a member of a council (see
ntiriika)
nkuulo abdominal scarification for initiated girls
ntaani a circumcised lad during initiation (see gutaana, gutaanithua)
ntaliba term of respect for a girl's elders in mother's age-class (see aba)




































the one 'who waits', the eldest of the elders
a wastrel, ne'er-do-well, elder of ill repute
warriors (sing, muthaka)
(a) an in-law or affine; (b) quality of being 'shy' or respectful
age-class, generation
a mannerless, immoral, or 'leaky' generation
a cow-bell, euphemism for personal discretion
the mascarade in the 'burning' ceremony
a he-sheep, used in bridewealth
residential space, a village or cluster of homesteads
generational succession (see guturuka gaaru and kunenkanira
thiiru)
an age-class, age grouping (see nthuki)
a genealogical generation
(a) to initiate courtship; (b) to enter into marriage negotiations
a story, narrative or allegory
personal envy or jealousy, literally the 'evil eye'
dry season from from August to September
grandfather, as in 'my grandfather'
(a) honey; (b) hydromel or mead drink (see naincu)
bond partnership between age-mates, often betrothing their
offspring
teaching of something specific
the prophesies or dreams of soothsayer (see arori)
agricultural season from September to March
an age-mate for boys circumcised together, literally 'my
brother'
a violin
a public meeting organised by Government
distilled alcoholic drink, 'Nubian Gin'
ideology of self-help, literally 'pulling together'
the Carrier Corps, a colonial military unit of porters in the
1914- 1918 war
the identification card carried by migrant workers, work and
travel permit
to fend for oneself, to be an individual and survive
the 'fruits of freedom', the opportunities of politicial
independence

















































































































Administrative Map of Meru, post-1990
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Until 1991, when the larger historical Meru District was divided into smaller
administrative districts, the north-south limits of the district were Mutuati in Meru
North to the Thuci river on the border with Runyejes District (then Embu). Today,
Kimeru-speaking peoples live in Meru South, Tharaka-Nithi, Meru Central and Meru
North, as well as in today's Laikipia District to the north-west. The principal
fieldsites in this thesis may be found between Meru Town (Meru Central) and Maua
(Meru North). See Map 2 in Appendix C for topographical details.
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Appendix D
Satellite Imagery of Mount Kenya and the Nyambene Range
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Map 2: Satellite image of Mount Kenya and the Nyambene Range to the North
East (Adapted from GeoCover. Earth Satellite corporation. 2003)
Lighter arable vegation appear green, with forests noticeably darker. The Nyambene
Range, seen as a spike of green to the northeast, acts as a watershed for the drier
savannah below. Note the precipitate drop towards the lowlands on Nyambene's
western flank. The mountain rising to the direct north is Shaba National Reserve.
Meru National Park and Bisanadi National Reserve are divided by the Tana River,
which can be seen clearly in the lower eastern quadrant of the image. See Map 1 for
corresponding administrative mapping of the region.
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